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The Netherlands played a remarkable
role during the October War and the oil
crisis of 1973. In secret, even before 
the Nixon government began an airlift to
Israel, the Dutch government had already
sent a substantial amount of weaponry
like ammunition and spare parts to Israel. Within the EC the Dutch government vetoed 
a more pro-Arab policy.
The Arab oil producing countries punished The Netherlands by imposing an oil embargo.
The embargo seemed to threaten the Dutch position in the international oil sector.
However, within two months it turned out that oil continued to flow to Rotterdam. The
Dutch, therefore, rejected French plans for a more interventionist EC energy policy.
Atlanticism and liberalism were the key words of the Dutch policy. It was business 
as usual.
This book is the result of intensive research in all relevant Dutch archives. The authors
had free access to many still classified governmental and private files. The result is 
a surprising analysis of the oil crisis of 1973, and of the Dutch role in particular. 
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Foreword
October 2003 marked the 30th anniversary of the Arab oil embargo levied
against The Netherlands as a ‘punishment’ for its pro-Israeli stance in the
October War. On October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian troops attacked
Israel in an attempt to regain the land occupied by Israel since 1967, and
for several days the Israeli army had its back against the wall. In The
Netherlands, the first reports of the war aroused great concern: Israel
must be helped as in 1956 and in 1967.
The Dutch government led by Prime Minister Joop den Uyl had been in
power in The Netherlands since May 1973, a coalition consisting of, on
the one hand, three progressive parties, the Dutch Labour Party (Partij
van de Arbeid, PvdA) and two smaller parties: the progressive-liberal
d’66 and the Radical Party (ppr), and on the other hand, the Catholic
People’s Party (the Katholieke Volkspartij, kvp) and the protestant Anti-
Revolutionary Party (arp). After the outbreak of the October War, the
Den Uyl Cabinet left no doubt as to its pro-Israeli sympathies, making it
clear in a governmental statement that it held Egypt and Syria responsible
for initiating hostilities and for unilaterally violating the truce. In the Eu-
ropean Community, too, The Netherlands took a more emphatically pro-
Israeli stand than did other member states, so much so that for a while
The Hague found itself isolated.
Nor was this merely a matter of words. Under conditions of strict se-
crecy, a considerable quantity of ammunitions and spare parts was sent
to Israel, an extensive military operation in Dutch terms, which it has
long been maintained was undertaken without the knowledge of the Cab-
inet. This political and military support for Israel would subsequently be
given as the reason for an oil embargo levied against The Netherlands.
Yamani, the Saudi Minister responsible for oil matters, himself declared
that this was the main motive for the embargo.
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Yet the affair of the oil embargo was by no means merely a response 
to the help lent to Israel. The oil crisis was also part of, or rather an ex-
pression of, an intense power struggle in the international oil sector. The
radical Arab oil producers were intent on breaking down the traditional
relations in this sector in which The Netherlands occupied an important
position. It was the homeport of Shell, one of the largest of the oil multi-
nationals. Furthermore, Rotterdam was a crucial switch-point in the
whole circuit of the processing and distribution of oil in Western Europe.
An embargo against The Netherlands seemed to affect half of North-West
Europe.
In various respects, the oil crisis was a first test case for the Den Uyl
Cabinet, for it presented enormous problems, not only of foreign policy
but also with regard to domestic and socio-economic affairs. In the arena
of international politics, the oil crisis demanded that fundamental choic-
es be made concerning relations between North and South, the Ameri-
can-European relationship and relations within the European Communi-
ty.
The oil crisis had a huge influence on Dutch domestic politics. The
Central Planning Bureau predicted a marked rise in unemployment,
slackening economic growth, increased inflation and possibly great dam-
age to the port of Rotterdam and Dutch business life. For on paper, as one
newspaper wrote a few days after the announcement of the embargo,
turning off the oil tap was nothing short of a national disaster. The Dutch
public was confronted with the prospect of Sundays without cars, of
petrol rationing and restrictions on the use of electricity.
What above all prompted us to write this book was the fascinating and
at the same time complex totality of the oil crisis. In addition to which,
this crisis suddenly placed The Netherlands centre stage in the theatre of
international politics. The oil embargo focused all eyes on The Hague. So
far, relatively little has been written on the role of The Netherlands during
the oil crisis. Several studies have appeared, but an extensive study cover-
ing the whole range of different aspects has been lacking. More curious is
the fact that no one has hitherto undertaken a thorough investigation of
the archives of those ministries most involved in the oil crisis.
Thanks to the Dutch Freedom of Information Act, we were allowed
ample access to the most restricted records that had a bearing on the cri-
sis; which is to say that those ministries closely involved in the crisis – For-
eign Affairs and Economic Affairs – made their records freely available.
Abroad too, specifically in the United States, we were granted access to
relevant archival documents, often for the first time.
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Naturally, a number of questions remain unanswered. On certain
points the archives contain no information, such as, in the matter of
secret weapons deliveries to Israel. Nor were interviews always capable of
filling these lacunae. Furthermore, the oil companies involved declined to
allow us access to their company archives, because of which, in part, we
have had to set ourselves several limits and have deliberately left (indeed,
have had to leave) some aspects unconsidered.
In addition, we pay scant attention to the financial-monetary aspects
of the Dutch position or to the long-term consequences for the Dutch
economy. Nevertheless, this study does, in our view, embrace several new
points of view on Dutch foreign policy and, not least, on the policy of the
Den Uyl Cabinet.
In the end, we decided to write a case study focusing mainly on the po-
litical actions of the government, concentrating mainly on those minis-
ters and ministries most significantly involved. The construction of the
book is such that we try in each chapter to deal with a particular aspect of
the oil crisis: Dutch Middle East politics, Dutch European politics, do-
mestic measures, and so on.
We are most grateful to the following (archive) assistants and civil ser-
vants who provided help: Francien van Anrooy and Sierk Plantinga of
The National Archives; Fred van den Kieboom and Radjen Gangaper-
sadsing at the Cabinet Office; Hans den Hollander, Henja Korsten, Peter
van Velzen, Marco Verhaar and Ton van Zeeland at the Foreign Ministry;
Sam Martijn of the Central Archives Depot at the Ministry of Defence;
Th.J.N. Knops, Henrietta Kruse and J. Zuurmond at the Ministry for
Economic Affairs; Ella Molenaar, Monique van der Pal, Cees Smit,
Willeke Tijssen and Mieke IJzermans of the International Institute for
Social History and Jaap van Doorn and Maarten van Rijn at the Ministry
of Justice.
We would also like to thank those individuals involved at different
stages who have been prepared to read (parts of) the manuscript and offer
constructive criticism. These were: F.E. Kruimink (then Co-ordinator of
the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services), J.P. Pronk (Minister of
Development Cooperation), A. Stemerdink (Under-Secretary of De-
fence), M. van der Stoel (Minister of Foreign Affairs), H. Vredeling (Min-
ister of Defence), W.Q.J. Willemsen (Secretary of the Co-ordination
Group for Oil Crisis Management and of the Ministerial Commission on
the Oil Crisis) and G.A. Wagner (Chief executive of the Royal/Shell
Group). We also wish to thank Paul Aarts (University of Amsterdam) for
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his advice; and to extend thanks to all those who were ready to give us
their time in interviews or to provide written answers to our questions. Of
course, we as authors take full responsibility for the final text of this
book.
Amsterdam, September 2004
Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes and Toby Witte
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1War in the Middle East
On 6 Ocober 1973, large numbers of Egyptian and Syrian military units
crossed the frontiers with Israel that had held since 1970. Around 240
Egyptian warplanes crossed radar installations. At the same time, some
1800 artillery and mortar positions opened up along the whole front and
700 Syrian tanks attacked the Golan Heights where the Israeli land forces
had only been able to deploy some 150 tanks. Although reports had al-
ready been circulating throughout the summer of an Egyptian-Syrian at-
tack, the Israeli army command appeared to be caught by surprise. It
seems that they were only convinced that the threat was serious a few days
before the actual outbreak of the war. The possibility of a pre-emptive
strike was briefly considered, but there was insufficient time for the neces-
sary preparations. And furthermore, Israel would then be branded in in-
ternational opinion as the aggressor. The decision therefore, as the Dutch
Ambassador G.J. Jongejans reported to The Hague, was to wait whilst at
the same time ‘seeking the full moral and political advantage’ of that re-
straint.1
The question is whether the aggressors really had set themselves the
aim of ‘wiping Israel from the map’. Possibly their intention was merely
to realise limited military objectives and to cause an international crisis
which would make the Great Powers realise that continued political im-
passe was unsustainable. Whatever the case, the Arab advance was an
impressive success, and the Israeli military situation rapidly became seri-
ous. Within a very short time, the Egyptian forces had crossed the Suez
Canal and broken through the Israeli line of defence. The Egyptian Army
was able to re-take most of the Suez East Bank, occupied by Israel ever
since the 1967 war, while at the same time the Syrian army succeeded in
occupying a large part of the strategically important Golan Heights. It
seemed that a real disaster for Israel was taking shape.
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After about four days, however, events began to turn. Israel managed
to halt the offensive and began its own counter-attack. Israeli forces man-
aged to regroup on the Golan, and on October 10, tank units broke
through the Syrian defences, bringing Damascus within range of Israel’s
artillery. Tel Aviv decided, however, not to pursue this course, since the
Soviet Union had made it clear that any attack on Damascus would not be
tolerated. In addition, further advance would be likely to incur unaccept-
able losses and would also run the risk that Jordan might become more ac-
tively involved. In the Sinai, the Egyptian army was managing for the time
being to stand its ground, but during the night of October 15, Israeli tank
units crossed the Suez Canal with the aim of isolating the Egyptian 3rd
army. The plan worked, and on October 21 this army corps was almost
completely cut off from the outside world.2
On October 16, when it became apparent that Egypt and Syria were in
deep trouble, Soviet premier Alexei N. Kosygin flew to Cairo to urge the
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to call a cease-fire. He showed Sadat
satellite photos of the Israeli advance, and on October 18, when the Israeli
army had established a bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal,
Sadat agreed. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, informed Kissinger and
Nixon (who were at the time totally preoccupied by the Watergate affair)
of Sadat’s willingness, and because Washington did not immediately re-
spond, Brezhnev invited Kissinger to Moscow for further talks. This de-
lay allowed Israel time to advance further against Egypt.3
On October 22, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a
cease-fire. Although the two sides accepted this resolution, the fighting in
fact continued. In the night of October 24– 25, the Security Council again
called for a cease-fire and further demanded that the belligerent parties
withdraw to the positions held on 22 October. International tension in-
creased. The Soviet Union threatened direct military intervention if the
Israeli advance were not halted. Washington reacted on October 25 by
putting into operation Defense Condition 3 (DEFCON III) which meant
that the American armed forces were put on a higher alert, including the
announcement of a nuclear alert. 4 To the annoyance of West European
countries, this also involved the American troops in Europe, even though
there had been no discussion of this within nato. Emotions were quickly
calmed, however, when Washington withdrew DEFCON III on October
26. One day later, the first meeting took place between Israeli and Egypt-
ian officers. Three days later an agreement was reached on the exchange
of prisoners of war.5
The October war was not the first confrontation between Israel and its
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neighbouring Arab states. There had been wars in 1948, 1956 and again
in 1967, all of them decided in Israel’s favour. In the Six-Day War, in par-
ticular, Israel had succeeded in considerably expanding its territory, tak-
ing in the Sinai desert (which led to the closure of the Suez Canal), the
Gaza strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank of the Jordan. The end
of the war initiated a period of protracted and fruitless diplomatic ma-
noeuvrings in search of a peace accord, the starting point for which
would necessarily have to be an end to this Israeli territorial expansion.
To this end, on 22 November 1967, the Security Council adopted resolu-
tion 242, a resolution which in subsequent years was to give rise regularly
to diplomatic differences of interpretation, even within the ec. While the
English version called for ‘withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict’ the French version demanded that
Israel withdraw from the territories occupied (‘retrait des forces armées
israeliennes des terrritoires occupés’).
The failure to find a political solution to the Middle East conflict en-
sured continuous tension in the area from 1967 to 1973, with the differ-
ences between the Soviet Union and the United States playing an increas-
ingly important role. Time and again, hostilities flared between Israel and
an Egypt enjoying large-scale military and economic support from
Moscow. In the summer of 1970, after long and delicate negotiations, a
cease-fire was agreed, but it proved impossible to reach agreement over a
peace accord. In the Arab world, this impasse served to increase frustra-
tion. In January 1973, Sadat warned that a new war was beginning to
look inevitable unless a political solution could be found soon. On Octo-
ber 6, he was vindicated.
The outbreak of the October War brought the two Great Powers, the
Soviet Union and the United States, unexpectedly and sharply into con-
flict. From the early 1970s on, relations had improved between the Soviet
Union and the usa. In May 1972, Brezhnev and Nixon had met in
Moscow and jointly signed the salt-i treaty. In the meantime, the Con-
ference over Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) had been set up.
It seemed that a new period of détente had begun.
Egyptian and Syrian dissatisfaction with the situation in the Middle
East was well-known. Rumours had circulated earlier of a possible
Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, and in January the joint armed forces of
Egypt, Syria and Jordan were put under the command of the Egyptian
Minister for War. Nonetheless, most informed opinion held that the three
nations possessed insufficient military resources to see such a venture
through successfully.6
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Early in 1973, Moscow decided to supply Egypt with extra military
material whilst at the same time, in Cairo, continuing to press for a diplo-
matic solution. Moscow’s strategy failed, for on October 4 the Soviet
leaders were informed of Egypt’s intention to attack Israel within a few
days. Immediately, the Kremlin sent transport planes to both Cairo and
Damascus to collect the families of advisors and diplomats. Washington,
however, remained convinced that Sadat would not start a war.7 Once
war had broken out, both Washington and Moscow immediately set up
an airlift. The Soviet airlift came into operation the third day of the war,
in spite of the fact that the Soviet military leadership expected Arab suc-
cesses to be of only a temporary nature. On October 9, the airlift was con-
centrated solely on Syria, since the Syrian military situation was rapidly
deteriorating. Supplies were still modest: no tanks or aircraft, only fuel
and ammunition; but on October 10, Antonov-12 and the gigantic
Antonov-22 transport planes began flights to Egypt.8
On October 14, several days after the Soviets began provisioning and
after a week of hesitancy and differences of opinion, the usa announced
that it was beginning delivery of weapons to Israel. The American airlift
ran via the Azores. In all probability, however, the Americans began sup-
plying Israel earlier, albeit on a limited scale. For example, as soon as the
war broke out, American supplies were redirected from West Germany.
The major West European countries were reticent in their response to
the Middle Eastern war. Both French and British governments called for
an arms embargo and refused to provide the belligerent parties with ma-
terials, an attitude which rapidly assumed an anti-Israeli complexion, at
least partly as a result of statements from both countries over who was to
blame. In addition to which, France continued to supply other Arabic
countries, for example Libya, without specifying that such supplies
should not find their way to Egypt or Syria.9 West Germany adopted a
much less outspoken approach. Bonn declared that it was not wholly in
sympathy with Israel, but turned a blind eye to the movement of Ameri-
can supplies to Israel from West German soil. Within the European Com-
munity, not only did a majority seem disinclined to come out openly or
actively in support of Israel, there was also unease over the role played by
the Americans in the war and over the lack of consultation, particularly
when Nixon put American troops on a high alert. In this regard, however,
The Netherlands was the exception.
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The Netherlands and the Middle East
As during the 1967 war, the first reports of the war in the Middle East
caused great concern in The Netherlands. In its assessment of develop-
ments in the Middle East, The Netherlands had firmly allied itself with Is-
rael over two decades. Originally, the Dutch had vacillated for some time
before recognising the Jewish state, careful lest Islamic Arab countries
should be antagonised in view of the problems with Indonesia.10 But dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, a ‘special alliance’ developed between the two
countries. During the wars of 1956 and 1967, the Netherlands supplied
Israel with military materials, though it should be added that policy in
1956 was heavily influenced by the desire to see Nasser’s Egypt brought
to heel. 11 The government also tried to offer Israel diplomatic support on
various other occasions, in particular in the 1960s over the question of
the Israeli-occupied territories.
In the diplomatic battles over the question of whether Israel should re-
turn all of the occupied territories to the surrounding Arab nations, The
Netherlands always interpreted resolution 242 in such a way that the pos-
sibility of strategic ‘border corrections’ would remain open. It was fre-
quently emphasised in The Hague that Israel had the right to secure bor-
ders. On the Palestinian question, too, The Hague came out in support of
Israel: the position and status of the Palestinians were a humanitarian and
not a political issue. In the General Assembly of the un, The Netherlands
voted against resolutions calling for the Palestinian people’s right to self-
determination.
The period in office of the Foreign Minister, W.K.N. Schmelzer (1971-
1973), saw a cautious change of political direction. In the General As-
sembly in December 1972, The Netherlands backed the famous resolu-
tion 2949 which recognised the rights of the Palestinians as an insepara-
ble part of the peace process, in spite of both Israeli and American dissent.
In the same year, Schmelzer declared that border corrections were only
possible if all parties accepted them. Inevitably, such views introduced an
element of estrangement into Dutch-Israeli relations.12 These develop-
ments were accompanied by a closer rapprochement with the Arab coun-
tries, a process already begun in the late 1960s.
During this period, although it became increasingly more difficult for
the Foreign Ministry to consent to arms deliveries to Israel,13 Dutch-Is-
raeli military contacts were never completely broken. Israeli soldiers, for
example, trained in The Netherlands in 1971 and 1972. Military instruc-
tors familiarised their Israeli colleagues with the lightly armoured person-
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nel carriers, the m-113’s; Israelis learned to shoot, drive, manoeuvre and
navigate the m-113’s, and for this purpose they received secret training at
the Royal Engineers Training School for Navigation and Diving. An exer-
cise involving crossing the Maas with an m-113 was held near Zaltbom-
mel.14 The m-113’s were to be used in crossing the Suez Canal in October
1973. According to the Military Intelligence Service (mid) documents,
the Israelis conducted their exercises in The Netherlands because ‘in the
circumstances instruction from the American side would have been too
sensitive’.15
Shortly before the October War, The Netherlands and Israel were still
cooperating in the modernisation of the cannons of Israel’s Centurion
tanks. A number of Israeli military personnel were given training at the
Army tank workshops in Amersfoort. Parts for Centurions were also
flown to Israel from the Soesterberg military airfield,16 a rather remark-
able transaction since the new (PvdA) Minister, M. van der Stoel, had de-
cided on August 30 that all military deliveries to states immediately in-
volved in the Israeli-Arab conflict must cease.17
Support for Israel
On October 6, at the request of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Dutch
Ambassador in Jerusalem sent a communication to The Hague that there
were ‘massive concentrations of Egyptian and Syrian armed forces in at-
tack positions’ gathered on Israel’s borders. From New York it was also
reported that un observers were seeing ‘strong indications’ that Syria and
Egypt wanted to embark on acts of war. It was assumed in New York that
the intention was probably to achieve limited military objectives in order
to be able subsequently to exploit the political situation. The Ambas-
sador in Jerusalem was of the same view, maintaining this assumption
even after the outbreak of the war. It was further assumed that Israel
would rapidly push back the invaders through its supremacy in the air, an
assessment that soon proved overly optimistic.18
In spite of the political shifts of the preceding years, The Netherlands
came out 100% behind the Israeli cause. At first, The Hague – including
the Dutch Foreign Ministry – was uncertain of the situation in the Middle
East. On Sunday, October 7, Van der Stoel in fact was not prepared to
comment. In the meantime, it was clear that Egypt wanted to petition the
General Assembly and did not want the Security Council to intervene.
Van der Stoel’s preference, on the contrary, was for the Security Council
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to be brought in. The Permanent Representative in New York, R. Fack,
was nevertheless instructed not to oppose a debate on the Middle East in
the General Assembly.19
On October 8, a high-level discussion of the conflict took place at the
Foreign Ministry between J.M. den Uyl, Justice Minister A.A.M. van
Agt, Minister of Economic Affairs R.F.M. Lubbers, Van der Stoel and
Defence Minister H. Vredeling. At that moment, Israel was in serious
trouble. As reports of this meeting reveal, it was decided to call for a
cease-fire as soon as possible on conditions acceptable to both sides,
preferably on the basis of a restoration of the status quo ante.20 The co-
operation of the ec countries must be enlisted to prevent any Arab reso-
lution which labelled Israel as the ‘aggressor’ being passed in the General
Assembly. In any case, The Netherlands would vote against any such
resolution, and would press for a quick meeting of the Security Council.
In brief, it was decided during this consultation to lend all possible diplo-
matic support to Israel.21
In accordance with the conclusions of this consultation, the Permanent
Representative at the un, R. Fack, was thoroughly briefed the same day.
Above all, he was to oppose any resolution which condemned Israel as the
aggressor. He was also instructed to vote against any resolution that de-
manded the implementation of resolution 242, since the situation was
now very different following the breaching of existing borders. The Secu-
rity Council was the appropriate organ for ending the conflict, to which
end the first priority was suspension of the armed struggle, preferably on
the basis of a restoration of the status quo ante. 22
On Monday, October 8, the Dutch Foreign Ministry issued its first
press statement on the war. According to this statement, it could be de-
duced from the reports of un observers that Egypt and Syria had initiated
the open violence. The government hoped that the Security Council
could find a formula acceptable to both parties that would lead to a
cease-fire. 23 On the afternoon of October 8, the Permanent Committee
for Foreign Affairs met in emergency session. At the end of this consulta-
tion, it was given out to the press that all political parties, with the excep-
tion of the communist cpn and the pacifist psp, could endorse the gov-
ernment’s position that restoration of the existing pre-war borders was
essential.24
Meanwhile, under the instigation of the Second Chamber, a govern-
ment statement was being prepared. This statement was worked out at
the Foreign Ministry by the Department for International Organizations
(dio), a branch of the Directorate-General for International Coopera-
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tion (dgis). This arose from the fact that, in the Netherlands at least,
Middle Eastern policy had until that point always been a un affair. The
Director-General for Political Affairs (dgpa), D.W. van Lynden, dis-
agreed with what he considered an excessively pro-Israeli statement.25
This criticism of the policy pursued by the government, expressed by the
dgpa, was to remain a significant factor throughout the entire period of
crisis. Van Lynden, like a number of diplomats involved, continued to
urge that this standpoint be modified to go some way to meet the Arab
countries.
On October 9, the government statement was made public. The Cabi-
net, it said, had noted with consternation the resumption of the acts of
war initiated by Syria and Egypt, as was evident from the reports of un
observers, among other sources. Egypt and Syria had thus unilaterally
broken the truce that had held since 1970. The two assailants should
therefore withdraw behind the armistice lines observed prior to October
6. The government called on the Security Council to try to achieve a polit-
ical solution based on Security Council Resolution 242.
Through its choice of words, the Den Uyl Cabinet made it clear that it
still stood firmly behind the interpretation of resolution 242 that the Arab
countries considered pro-Israeli: Israel must withdraw from occupied ar-
eas (without the definite article). At the same time it was proposed that a
political solution to the conflict had to be inseparably linked with a just
and fair solution to the refugee question, meaning the question of the
Palestinians.26 What the declaration meant – as had been agreed in the
ministerial discussions mentioned earlier – was support for Israel. In the
event, the Dutch government statement was fairly generally supported in
the Second Chamber, notwithstanding observations on the Palestinian
question made by the PvdA and ppr. The PvdA leader, E. van Thijn, em-
phasised the need to strive for a solution to the Middle East conflict that
would do justice to the political aspirations of the Palestinians.27
In New York, this government statement caused consternation among
the Dutch Permanent Representation at the United Nations. Once Fack
had scrutinised the statement he decided in consultation with his second
man, subsequently Minister C. van der Klaauw, to give it as little publici-
ty as possible. According to Fack, those in The Hague had been ‘unwise’
since The Netherlands could not, after all, ‘maintain that a country try-
ing to regain its own territory from a foreign occupier was committing
aggression’. The position of conscientious balance and probity in the
question of the Middle East, a position carefully constructed over past
years, now threatened to collapse, Fack believed, like a house of cards.28
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This was a first indication that his diplomats did not always subscribe to
Van der Stoel’s viewpoint.
But the government’s position could obviously be bent more towards
the Arabs. On October 10, Van der Stoel had an interview with the Am-
bassadors of Saudi Arabia and Tunisia and with the Egyptian temporary
chargé d’affairs concerning the Dutch position. It appears that at this
meeting the Foreign Minister emphasised the fact that the government
had called for a cease-fire based on a situation acceptable to both parties.
It was not for The Netherlands, argued Van der Stoel, to say what the con-
ditions should be before a cease-fire could be reached, although he stated
his preference for a restoration of the truce boundaries of August 1970.
The three Arab diplomats were evidently satisfied with this clarifica-
tion.29 At that moment, it seemed that the two principles, ‘restoration of
the status quo ante’ and ‘a cease-fire acceptable to both parties’, were
evenly balanced. Two days later, however, during a European Political
Cooperation consultation, the Dutch emphasis had shifted pre-eminently
to the side of restoring the status quo ante.
This did not prevent The Netherlands finding itself rapidly isolated
within the ec. It was announced in the government statement that The
Hague would make its attitude better understood within the consultative
process with the nine member states. It was soon evident, however, that
this was no easy matter, since most ec countries were not inclined to offer
Israel their support. France and Italy, in particular, and to a lesser extent
the uk, seemed rather to choose the Arab side. In the case of France, this
became apparent during a sitting of the Security Council, when the
French delegate pointed out that the current fighting was taking place in
areas that had been occupied by Israel since 1967. France sought a peace-
ful solution to the conflict on the basis of resolution 242 (i.e. no restora-
tion of the status quo ante) and expressed the desire that the entire Middle
East problem should be involved in such a settlement.30 It was evident in
The Hague that French sympathies inclined to the side of the Arab coun-
tries. The Security Council appeared paralysed for the time being because
the usa would not desert the Israelis, and furthermore neither Israel nor
the Arab countries put much stock in any pronouncement from the Coun-
cil. The conflict was to be decided on the battlefield.
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Military Support
As we said earlier, the first reports arriving in The Hague, both from
Jerusalem and New York, were still fairly optimistic over Israel’s military
position. It was assumed that it was a limited military conflict in which Is-
rael’s military superiority would ensure a swift Israeli victory. On Mon-
day the 8th, Ambassador G.J. Jongejans reported from Jerusalem that the
Israeli Cabinet had the previous day authorised crossing the existing truce
boundaries. ‘As far as Israel was concerned, the war was actually already
won.’31 But it turned out to be far from as easy as that.
On October 7, the second day of the war, in a dramatic conversation
the Israeli Ambassador to The Netherlands, C. Bar On, asked Minister
Van der Stoel for military and material assistance. Undoubtedly, the Am-
bassador was fully aware that The Netherlands had assisted Israel with
military material in the wars of 1956 and 1967. Bar On let it be known
that Israel stood on the edge of the abyss and was desperately in need of
ammunition and spare parts. The British and French governments had is-
sued a ban on the export of arms to the warring parties as soon as the war
broke out. American material support, to all appearances, was also very
slow to get going during the first days of the war. Unlike Great Britain and
France, the Dutch government did not ban the export of arms to the bel-
ligerents. According to the Ambassador, The Netherlands appeared to be
the only remaining candidate for supplying Israel with the much-needed
ammunition and spare parts.32
As Bar On recalls, Van der Stoel reacted rather coolly. Perhaps his cau-
tion was dictated by the initially optimistic reports from Jerusalem, but in
any case he wanted to wait and see exactly how serious the Israeli situa-
tion was. Bar On remained in contact with Van der Stoel and with Pre-
mier Den Uyl and Vredeling, the Minister of Defence, throughout the fol-
lowing days.33 The contacts with Vredeling were arranged by the PvdA
Member of Parliament H. van den Bergh. Vredeling meanwhile had al-
ready intimated to him that he wished to send arms to Israel.34
As Minister of Defence, Vredeling played a central role in supplying
arms to Israel. He has always stressed that his position was based on emo-
tional, personal considerations. The events of the Second World War, the
ex-resistance fighter later explained, must never be allowed to happen
again. But despite all Vredeling’s noble-minded aims, the fact was that
The Netherlands was being discretely pressured by the Americans.
The background to this was that Foreign Minister Secretary Kissinger
and Defence Minister James R. Schlesinger had clashed over extra arms
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deliveries to Israel. The initial American reaction was one of reservation,
but apparently this caused considerable unrest in some quarters in Wash-
ington, given Israel’s initially threatened military situation. On Sunday
morning, the cia operator at the American embassy in The Hague in
charge of communications with headquarters in Langley, Virginia, re-
ceived a critic from cia headquarters. Such a coded telegram requires a
response within a few hours. He therefore contacted the cia Chief of Sta-
tion in The Netherlands, Carlton B. Swift Jr., who had arrived in The
Hague in the summer of 1973.35
Swift was instructed to approach the Dutch Cabinet to supply Israel
with as many weapons and spares as possible. The critic emphasised that
the political heads of the American Embassy had not been informed of
these instructions. The critic that Swift received contained this brief re-
quest to the Cabinet to satisfy the Israeli requirements to whatever extent
possible.36 Swift carried out his brief in discrete fashion. On Sunday
morning he contacted the Head of the Dutch Internal Security Service
(the bvd), D. Kuipers, and the Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator of
the Ministry of General Affairs, (the Prime Minister’s Office) F.E.
Kruimink, who later confirmed that he and Kuipers were unexpectedly
called at home by Swift on Sunday, October 7, to discuss a matter of great
urgency.37 Swift’s request found a receptive audience. Kruimink was to
play an active role in the deliveries of arms.38
As we said earlier, a meeting on Monday, October 8, of the five Cabi-
net members most involved led to the conclusion that The Netherlands
should support Israel. Both Van der Stoel and Vredeling deny that mili-
tary support was discussed at this meeting.39 Nonetheless, a remarkable
incident occurred that same day. As the newspaper De Telegraaf report-
ed, ‘two days after the outbreak of the war’, two Israeli transport planes
arrived at Gilze Rijen airport. A note in the Den Uyl archive, written by
Den Uyl himself, reads: ‘Two days after the outbreak of the war in the
Middle East, the Cabinet allowed several Israeli transport planes that had
come to The Netherlands to fetch armaments to return empty-handed’.40
The journalist F. Peeters, who has written a book on the Dutch-Israeli
military alliance, believes that the two aircraft actually left loaded.41 Un-
der-secretary for Defence Stemerdink confirmed that the two aircraft had
indeed been loaded with American communication and detection equip-
ment sent from West Germany. In all probability there were no Dutch
materials sent; there had been at that stage inadequate preparation on the
part of the Dutch.42 In Vredeling’s view, there had been no political per-
mission for this procedure, and in any case he himself was not fully in-
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formed.43 Stemerdink, however, was of the opinion that no Dutch per-
mission was necessary, since it was a matter of American transport of ma-
terials, as had often occurred before. The Dutch government had nothing
to do with it.44 Stemerdink takes a rather laconic line here, since the air-
craft that collected the American materials were from Israel, a country at
war. In this connection, it is even more remarkable that Den Uyl noted
that the government had allowed these Israeli transport planes to return
empty. This note from the Den Uyl archive may well indicate that the pre-
mier clearly knew what was going on.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Bar On had convinced Vredeling, Van der
Stoel as well as Den Uyl of Israel’s great need of ammunition. This request
set a series of activities in motion. Vredeling asked the Secretary-General
of Defence, G.H.J. Peijnenburg, to obtain information from the Israeli
military mission in Paris regarding Israeli wishes. It was in the meantime
known that there was a special need for 105 and 155 mm artillery. It was
not only Vredeling who was trying to clarify the situation. Van der Stoel
instructed his Ambassador in Washington, R.B. van Lynden, to find out
what the us Government thought The Netherlands’ contribution should
be. And Den Uyl requested Kruimink to draw up a memorandum over
arms deliveries.45
The information requested by the Ministers was presented the follow-
ing day. Vredeling received a memorandum from Peijnenburg, whose in-
formation had been obtained by the Quartermaster General, J.L. An-
tonissen, who in turn had been instructed by the Israeli military attaché in
Paris. The Israeli reply was clear: Israel needed as much as possible 105
and 155 mm ammunition of any type, both for cannons and howitzers.
Antonissen informed Peijnenburg that The Netherlands had no surplus
stocks of this ammunition, i.e. stocks beyond those needed for exercises
and in case of war. Stocks of 105 mm in particular were still being built
up.46
According to Peijnenburg, The Netherlands could nevertheless relin-
quish munitions and reorder replacements from Eurometaal (the former
Artillery Establishment). Delivery of 155 mm shells was easier than the
105 mm ammunition, because the English would be able to cite licence
restrictions as an objection to their being re-exported to Israel. Antonis-
sen thought this unlikely, however. Peijnenburg, concluding his advice,
stressed that the Cabinet, or a few Ministers, must now decide whether
deliveries to Israel should be permitted to go ahead. He pointed out that in
1967 deliveries had been made out of Dutch stocks and that this had been
successfully carried out without publicity. Peijnenburg had meanwhile let
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Bar On know by telephone that the Israeli military attaché in Paris had
been contacted to establish exactly what Israel’s needs were, and that
once this was known, the decision lay with the Cabinet. Bar On was told
no more than this by him.47
More information arrived at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Oc-
tober 9. From Washington came the news that The Netherlands must see
what they themselves could do,48 which meant that in any case there
would be no American repudiation. Van der Stoel was kept informed of
activities at the Defence Ministry. A Foreign Ministry memo of October
9 reported the Israeli request for ‘any type and any quantity’ of 105 and
155 mm ammunition. Defence had let it be known that smaller quanti-
ties of the above calibre were available from surplus stock and could in
addition be supplied from stocks intended for the Dutch army’s own
use.49
The following morning, October 10, Den Uyl received a note from
Kruimink titled: ‘Several factors of relevance in evaluating the question:
what is the value of 11,000 tank shells for Centurion tanks.’ The note
made reference to the possible delivery of 11,000 tank shells, field tele-
phone cable, tank parts and also mines. The artillery ammunition that
had been so centrally significant in the Defence papers was not even men-
tioned in Kruimink’s note. According to him, what was important at that
time was above all spare parts and tank shells for the Israeli Centu-
rions.50 This shift was probably linked with developments in the war, for
after the first few difficult days, the Israeli army had now gone on the of-
fensive.
The Israeli interest in ammunition and spares for Centurion tanks was
understandable. These tanks constituted about half the Israeli tank force,
in a situation in which they were confronted on both fronts with superior
numbers of Syrian and Egyptian tanks.51 The British Centurion tank was
also the standard tank in both Dutch and British armies. The British gov-
ernment, however, as already mentioned, had banned the export of
weapons to both belligerent parties.52 For the Dutch army, the 11,000
tank shells constituted ‘ammunition for the first phase’, predestined for
five days of Dutch fighting in the event of war (mainly in Germany, it was
hoped), whereas this was probably sufficient to see the Israelis through
three days of battle.
Given the content of his note, Kruimink was assuming a secret opera-
tion. He indicates briefly how transport to Israel could be worked out
practically and also made suggestions for camouflaging the necessary re-
plenishment of stocks in The Netherlands, which would have to occur in
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consultation with Britain. It was therefore inevitable, thought Kruimink,
that Britain would have to be approached over this matter of re-stocking.
Contact would also have to be made with the Americans.53
The problems were resolved on Wednesday morning, October 10, in a
conference at the Dutch Foreign Ministry involving Den Uyl, Van der
Stoel, Vredeling and the Director-General of Political Affairs, Van Lyn-
den.54 The position of the Foreign Affairs chiefs was immediately clear,
both the Head of the Department for Africa and the Middle East (dam)
and Van Lynden opposed it. The head of dam argued: ‘Unless M (the
Minister) definitively decides that under the present battle circumstances
Israel is to be supplied with military materials, I would ask you to consid-
er whether in this conflict situation any material should be supplied to any
warring party that might contribute to the continuation of war.’ Van Lyn-
den also advised against supplying Israel unless Israel’s own territory was
under threat. In the course of these deliberations, Van Lynden referred the
three Ministers to existing policy: ‘not to supply the belligerent parties’
and ‘not to supply Israel or the Arab states since the forming of the new
Cabinet’. Further, Van Lynden stressed the danger of reprisals by the
Arab countries when it came to oil.55
Finally, the three Ministers involved decided to withhold supplies ‘pro-
visionally’. At least, that is what was noted on the Foreign Ministry mem-
orandum.56 It was certainly not a definitive refusal; quite the contrary, it
was a decision which, in view of the attitude and choice of words of those
involved, still left everything open. Vredeling, according to what he him-
self said, found the decision taken wholly unsatisfactory.57 But Van der
Stoel’s subsequent account also leaves considerable room for interpreta-
tion. At the time, Dutch supplies seemed to Van der Stoel ‘personally’ un-
necessary because American assistance with weaponry was already un-
der consideration. Furthermore, as he explained some 25 years later, the
ex-minister ‘made a possible exception for American armed materials
that had been given us on loan’.58 This is a remarkable addition, since the
urgent Israeli interest in Centurion spare parts did in fact concern materi-
al that The Netherlands had been ‘loaned’ by the usa in the mid-1950s, at
the time of American military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assis-
tance Program (MDAP). Supplying Israel with Centurion parts and am-
munition therefore, at least in part, did involve material given by the usa
‘on loan’.
Van der Stoel also remembered that there had been talk of a swap, i.e.
deliveries in exchange for later compensation.59 In all probability this
mooted exchange concerned the Centurion shells to be supplied. The fact
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is that stocks lay ready in Great Britain, destined for Israel, already paid
for, but which because of the British arms embargo could not be deliv-
ered. The solution was simple: The Netherlands would supply Israel and
would later get back these materials from the stocks lying ready in Great
Britain. In this way, the problem raised by Kruimink could be solved,
namely, how to restore stocks to the same level without drawing attention
to oneself. Through such a swap, the relevant British military authorities
need never be informed of the Dutch deliveries. There is another reason
for assuming that the decision-making of October 10 went further than a
simple ‘provisionally not’. Den Uyl later remembered, without actually
giving the date as October 10, that it was agreed it would be ‘a good idea
to transport reserve ammunition from Volkel’. As he added to the Dutch
historian Grünfeld, ‘in fact it never came to that’.60 But this added remark
is not correct: it most certainly did come to that.
In view of the content of Kruimink’s note and the debates about an ex-
change, the indicators all suggest a secret operation. The decision ‘provi-
sionally not to supply’ can also be interpreted as a decision for the time
being to not officially supply, i.e. not according to all the stipulations in
force. Subsequently, the Foreign Ministry would always deny that they
had been involved in the surrender of arms export permits. However, an
official procedure authorised by different departments was out of the
question given the wording of Kruimink’s note and the decision-making
of 10 October.
Finally, a last point. There was a second important decision taken at
that meeting. Both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl remembered that it was de-
cided to offer the freedom of Dutch airfields for any possible American-Is-
raeli airlift. Den Uyl later said that ‘from our side we then offered them
the use of our airfields’. The airfield primarily in question was that of
Soesterberg. In the end, the offer was not taken up because us transports
were routed via the Azores. 61 However, there were Arab accusations that
The Netherlands and Portugal were the only nato partners prepared to
collaborate in setting up an American-Israeli airlift.
Arms Deliveries
Later on the same October 10, Vredeling informed Under-Secretary of
Defence Bram Stemerdink that he had shared in the decision to supply Is-
rael with weapons. He told Stemerdink that he had that morning thor-
oughly discussed the question with Van der Stoel and Den Uyl.62 Vredel-
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ing and Stemerdink subsequently always maintained that they personally
took this decision; that otherwise the whole process would have taken far
too long, not least because of the anticipated opposition of Van der Stoel.
But in the light of what we have already seen above, it is very much to the
point to ask whether this picture is an entirely accurate one. Stemerdink
has further since declared that ‘there was political consent to supply
whatever was necessary’.63
Vredeling and Stemerdink came to the agreement that, if the whole
matter were leaked, the latter would take responsibility and if worst came
to worst he would resign to avoid bringing down the Den Uyl Cabinet in
its infancy. They decided naturally to deny any knowledge of the opera-
tion. Next, Stemerdink contacted the Quartermaster General, Antonis-
sen, who was to lead the whole operation. The Under-Secretary of De-
fence did not know that Antonissen had already been busy since Monday
– or even Sunday – drawing up an inventory of what could be delivered to
Israel.64
The question of arms deliveries preoccupied Van der Stoel, and in par-
ticular the ‘swap’ discussed on Wednesday morning. This is also rather
remarkable in view of the fact that the Minister should not have been fully
informed. Stemerdink recalled subsequently that he had a conversation
with his fellow party member about this whole affair on Thursday, Octo-
ber 11. Van der Stoel then returned to the question of whether The
Netherlands would in fact be able to replenish stocks discretely after the
war, Stemerdink setting out the reasons why this was not an insuperable
problem. The stocks intended for Israel and now lying ready in Great
Britain would after all be shipped to Rotterdam and with a little sleight of
hand they could be unloaded. The ‘swap’ need never come to light.65
Dutch stocks would thus by the spring of 1974 be completely replenished.
This happened with the assent of Stemerdink’s counterpart, the British
Secretary for Defence; for by March 1974 the Labour Party had been re-
turned to power in Britain, whereas a Conservative Defence Secretary
would have undoubtedly declined to cooperate.66
Matters were efficiently expedited. According to Vredeling, the whole
operation of 1973 was conducted on a need-to-know basis. At the min-
istry, Quartermaster General Antonissen, of course, knew about the
whole operation, as did Brigadier General T. Meines, the logistics deputy
working for the Quartermaster General.67 Besides Antonissen, the
Deputy Quartermaster General, General Major T.A. van Zanten, also
knew about the operation.68
Meines confirmed that it was mainly tank parts and ammunition that
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were delivered to Israel, chiefly major components such as tank engines
and various small spare parts for Centurions. Tank shells needed for the
Israeli tanks were also sent. This material was fetched from the depots in
Soesterberg and Utrecht and taken to Gilze Rijen. Material from Ger-
many was also sent on. The ex-Israeli Ambassador Bar On has also said
that it was mainly a matter of artillery ammunition, tank shells and spare
parts.69 Those directly involved later reported to Peeters that the tank
shells were taken from the arsenals of the First Army Corps, and that the
Centurion spare parts mainly consisted of shock-absorbers, gun turrets,
caterpillar tracks, gearboxes and engines. But according to Peeters, that
was not all. Machine guns and later parts for light amx-tanks were also
flown to Israel, together with 0.40-canons, 22 mm ammunition for air-
craft artillery and thousand-pound bombs. If it suited Israel better, these
‘1,000 lbs’ were flown by the Dutch airforce, sometimes in f-27’s, to the
American base Ramstein in Germany and there loaded into Israeli air-
craft.70
Meines points out that the Army was busy changing over to the West
German Leopard tank. The Centurion material was thus becoming su-
perfluous, and parts could readily be disposed of. The Centurions did not
belong to the Dutch, they were on loan. This was also the case with the
spare parts, although over time the Dutch army had also bought reserve
parts themselves.71 As far as the American-loaned material was con-
cerned, Vredeling later emphasised that The Netherlands was not in a po-
sition to dispose freely of the relevant parts. Kruimink also accepts in ret-
rospect that Antonissen maintained contact throughout the whole opera-
tion with a military attaché at the American embassy. 72 This was proba-
bly the mdap attaché or a functionary of the Military Assistance Adviso-
ry Group. We have already seen that there was no need to anticipate any
problems from the Americans. Besides, Vredeling points out that the in-
volvement of American Centurion material served a kind of ‘camouflage’
function, for in case of discovery, it could always be maintained that the
Centurions were being given back to the Americans.
The material was transported to Israel in unmarked Israeli Boeing
707’s from the Gilze Rijen military airfield, and according to Stemerdink
also from Soesterberg, Ypenburg and Valkenburg.73 These Boeings,
which belonged to the Israeli airforce and the Israeli airline El Al, were
sprayed grey to make identification more difficult. It is also possible that
other 707’s were hired from European airline companies. Indeed, klm
was very soon accused by the Arab side of being involved. The Israeli air-
force itself commanded only seven Boeing 707’s.
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Each of the 707’s would have made an intermediate stop at the Belgian
airfield Melsbroek. The transports took place at night, most probably
commencing the night of October 12, and lasted several nights, possibly
from October 12 to October 14, the day the American airlift openly went
into operation. The military historian J. Schulten believes that the Israeli
aircraft flew within nato airspace via civil flight corridors, giving
Schiphol as their destination. The military personnel involved in the
transport were mainly cadets of the Royal Military Academy in Breda,
who were told that these were unexpected night-time exercises.74
It is not easy to establish just how important the Dutch deliveries were
for Israel. Twenty years after the event, Vredeling gave his own view in a
rather emotional fashion, piling on the agony and insisting on the signifi-
cance of the supplies as though to justify his own actions. They were
weapons, he said, that had been ‘begged and pleaded for’. It was a matter
of sink or swim, and therefore, acting entirely in a personal capacity, he
had decided to lend Israel a helping hand.75 In Kruimink’s note, however,
it had already been decided on October 10 that the weapons would arrive
– and according to him did arrive – too late at the front to affect any ‘sink
or swim’ situation. The Co-ordinator of the Intelligence and Security Ser-
vices furthermore opined that Israel’s survival was no longer in question
after the fourth day of the war. In view of this, he called the Dutch contri-
bution ‘valuable’, ‘more than a token gesture’, ‘but not decisive’. 76 Nev-
ertheless, at the time, Kruimink found these comments no reason to speak
out against the plans in his note. He pointed out that ‘if the Egyptians suc-
ceed in keeping parts of the Sinai’ the consequences would be seriously
detrimental to Israel.77 The Dutch transports thus may not have played so
much an important role in defending the state of Israel against a threat to
its survival, as Vredeling subsequently claimed, but they surely did help
Israel in regaining the offensive. The Dutch government, or at least the
ministers concerned, had already adopted the standpoint that a return to
the status quo ante would be highly desirable for Israel, since it would al-
low Israel to enter peace negotiations from a position of strength. Albeit
on a modest scale, through its supplies of military material The Nether-
lands contributed to the realisation of this goal while the war was still in
progress.
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Foreign Ministry Denial
In October 1973, Kruimink thought it would be impossible to keep the
arms supplies a secret. The transport and loading would involve hundreds
of military personnel. Peijnenburg was less pessimistic since previously,
in 1967, the public had successfully been kept in the dark. And Peijnen-
burg was for a long time right. The arms deliveries of the October War did
indeed escape public attention. When this became no longer feasible, first
Stemerdink and subsequently Vredeling took personal responsibility.
Den Uyl and Van der Stoel, let alone other members of the government,
had known nothing.
However, different individuals involved in the affair are of the opinion
that it is highly unlikely that Den Uyl and Van der Stoel did not know.
That, too, is the verdict of ex-Ambassador Bar On. He recalls that Van der
Stoel was indeed initially unresponsive in his assessment. That was short-
ly after the outbreak of the war, but when the situation became more seri-
ous for Israel, the government – i.e. Den Uyl, Van der Stoel and Vredeling
– decided to look at the Dutch position again. An actual airlift, they deci-
ded, was not possible. ‘But the Dutch government did agree to the pos-
sibility of Israel purchasing ammunition, particularly artillery ammuni-
tion and shells’. On his own admission, Bar On had constant contact over
the affair with both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl as well as Vredeling.78
The Foreign Ministry and Van der Stoel furthermore played a remark-
able role when psp member of the Second Chamber F. Van der Spek be-
gan to make trouble. On October 26, Van der Spek tabled written ques-
tions on the matter of arms deliveries. According to him, on October 12,
13 and 14, unmarked b-747’s had landed at Schiphol to refuel and to
transport weapons to the Middle East. Van der Spek wanted to know
whether great risks had been taken. Was it likewise the case that on Octo-
ber 19 military aircraft had landed on their way to the Middle East?
This was close to the truth, and the answer to these parliamentary
questions caused a number of problems. In a memo of November 2, Van
der Stoel was informed that the draft reply should already by the begin-
ning of the week, and with the utmost haste, be submitted to the Dutch
Minister of Economic Affairs, Lubbers, and the Minister of Defence. But
co-ordination led to considerable delay. Vredeling was meanwhile in
agreement. In Economic Affairs and in Defence it was felt that, because
of the political nature of the questions, Van de Stoel should be the first to
sign it. The Minister was also informed that the Ministry of Economic
Affairs wanted it borne in mind when framing the answer that ‘no li-
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cences for the export of arms had been issued’. Beside this, Defence had
let it be known that the Gilze Rijen airfield had not been used as an inter-
mediate stop for military aircraft on their way to the Middle East.79
In his reply to Van der Spek’s questions, Van der Stoel did not simply
declare that no arms had been supplied to Israel. That would have been a
lie. He answered, also on behalf of Lubbers and Vredeling, that since the
outbreak of the war ‘no licences for arms exports to the Middle East had
been issued’. That applied also to arms in transit. This was obviously a
hypocritical answer: of course, no official export licence had been grant-
ed, since the entire operation was conducted in secrecy. The specific ques-
tions over Schiphol were answered with explicit denials.80 The flights had
in fact been from Gilze Rijen and possibly other airfields.
Van der Stoel thought the formulation of the answers to Van der Spek’s
questions, ‘no export licences’, was probably chosen ‘with reference to
the loaned material made available by America’.81 This is a remarkable
comment, since the Dutch government had no authority to dispose of ma-
terial given by the us on loan.82 In retrospect, Van der Stoel also insisted
on the formulation ‘to have been able to say in all conscience that no li-
cence was given for the export of weapons during the Yom Kippur War’.
Neither he nor Den Uyl had been informed of arms deliveries.83 This is, in
the strictest sense, true. Bar On stressed in this connection that there had
been no question of delivering weapons, but the supply of ammunition
and spare parts.84 Others involved, both at the time and later, may well
have relied on this tactical but dubious distinction, but if aircraft machine
guns and mines were also supplied, the distinction is invalid.
It is also not very plausible that Den Uyl was not immediately, or at least
within a few days, fully informed. Den Uyl was certainly present at the dis-
cussions of October 10. Furthermore, he would in all probability have
been informed of the transports soon enough by one of the intelligence
services. After all, it was an operation in which, quite apart from the un-
recognisable foreign aircraft, several hundred Dutch military personnel
had been involved. Former member of parliament H. van den Bergh later
brought to the world’s attention the story that in December 1973 Israeli
Premier Golda Meir had effusively thanked Den Uyl at the Socialist Inter-
national for his support, and that Den Uyl was highly surprised at this ex-
pression of gratitude.85 But was Den Uyl surprised because he knew noth-
ing about it (as Van den Bergh suggested) or because Meir thanked him so
openly in the proximity of other witnesses? Brandt was also warmly
thanked by Meir, but the reason for that show of gratitude was evident, for
it was well-known that the American war materials had also been flown
from West Germany.
32
And indeed, Den Uyl need not have been so surprised. A week after the
war broke out, the premier had received a cordial letter, dated October
10, from the Israeli government warmly thanking him for the Dutch sup-
port that had been highly important to Israel.86 Furthermore, it would be
highly unlike Den Uyl to be left uncertain. Rumours were already circu-
lating in October over Dutch arms deliveries. According to Vredeling,
Den Uyl never once asked him what was going on, which in the light of
Den Uyl’s curiosity, remarked on by Vredeling and others, could mean
nothing other than that he was already fully informed. Bar On also claims
that Den Uyl had been informed.87 Ex-Minister of Economic Affairs Lub-
bers is of the opinion that Den Uyl had ‘some knowledge’ of the affair and
that he suspected that Lubbers also knew.88 Kruimink similarly thinks it
highly improbable that Den Uyl knew nothing.89
These rumours were not only circulating in The Netherlands, but more
significantly abroad. This was quickly evident from an undated memo-
randum to Van der Stoel, most probably written during the first days of
the war. A report in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, most probably from a
friendly intelligence service, reads: ‘The Israelis are anticipating some
ammunition shortage for their artillery and have requested 105 and 155
mm ammunition from The Netherlands, according to some Western Am-
bassador.’90 In Washington, various people were told both of the Dutch
willingness to make an airfield available and of the arms deliveries. When
Ambassador Van Lynden held a conversation with the Deputy Secretary
of State, Kenneth Rush, on October 30, the latter expressed his apprecia-
tion of the Dutch role during the war. Rush stressed how disappointing
the attitude of the other European partners and Spain had been. He ad-
mitted that the member states of Europe had not always been adequately
consulted, but it was intolerable that they had denied Americans the right
to use their airspace or the facilities to refuel on European airfields or to
move their own American materials. Some member states on which
Washington most counted had let the usa down badly – meaning, of
course, the uk. The Netherlands, Rush emphasised, absolutely did not
belong to this category.91 Four days earlier, on October 26, the American
Ambassador had communicated to Van der Stoel the appreciation of his
government for the Dutch attitude during the October war.92
An American official would later write in the New York Times that
‘the Europeans, with the exception of Portugal and The Netherlands, had
refused to have anything to do with us effort to resupply Israel with
weapons, in some cases denying them overflight and refueling by Ameri-
can planes’. But this open reference did not go down well with the Dutch
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Foreign Ministry; for the whole aim was that the Dutch attitude should
remain secret. On November 6, in a request that he should inquire into
various matters of world affairs, the Ambassador in Washington was
asked to advise the Minister how ‘to dispel the wholly incorrect impres-
sion that we allowed overflights and refuelling’.93
Vredeling recalls that James Schlesinger, American Defense Secretary,
also knew of the Dutch arms deliveries. This was evident in December
1973, when Vredeling spoke with him in The Hague. Schlesinger was ful-
some in his praise of The Netherlands. The American had learned the first
line of the Dutch national anthem Wilhelmus by heart.94 Van der Stoel
also remembers that Schlesinger had thanked him for Dutch support
‘with tears in his eyes’.95 If Van der Stoel really did think that no weapons
had been supplied, he must have wondered what on earth Schlesinger was
thanking him for.96
In October, it turned out that the French government had suspected
something. Why, they wondered aloud in Paris, had The Netherlands not
announced an arms embargo? The Dutch Ambassador in Paris was asked
by The Hague to explain that The Netherlands had indeed announced no
arms embargo but that the delivery of war materials was subject to ap-
proval. The Ambassador was to declare the following:
In accordance with the principle always adopted that no supplies will be
delivered to the belligerent parties, no supplies have been delivered to
the countries concerned since the outbreak of hostilities.97
In early November, it appeared that London was also giving credence to
the rumours of Dutch arms deliveries. After Ambassador W.J.G. Gevers
had reported this, Van der Stoel instructed him on November 8 to take
steps, employing the cryptic denials he himself had used in his answer to
the questions put by Van der Spek.98 This Gevers did, and the Foreign
Ministry appeared to regret that the impression had arisen that the British
government gave any credence to suggestions of Dutch arms deliveries.99
But the British apparently did not entirely trust this, for on November 10
a British diplomat asked whether The Netherlands had imposed an em-
bargo on the export of arms and ammunition to the warring countries.100
As Van Lynden, the Director-General for Political Affairs, had
stressed during the deliberations of October 10, risks had indeed been
taken, particularly if Arab countries got wind of the secret arms supplies
to Israel. The Saudi Oil Minister Yamani later said that he knew what had
gone on and that the arms supplies were the direct reason for the oil em-
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bargo being imposed against The Netherlands.101 It is possible that Ya-
mani was bluffing, but it is certainly true that some Arab countries ac-
cused The Netherlands at the time of giving military support to Israel. On
October 16, the Dutch Ambassador in Damascus, J. van Hoeve, reported
that the Syrian authorities were accusing the Royal Dutch Airlines, klm,
of being involved in the transport of weapons to Israel. He was summoned
for a hearing with Vice-Minister A. Rafai, who ‘wanted to draw atten-
tion to the fact that, according to Syrian intelligence, fifteen aircraft
loaded with weapons and ammunition had departed from Schiphol’.102 A
day later, Van Hoeve stated specifically that it was supposed to have been
Galaxy aircraft involved. This could only refer to the American airforce.
The Dutch Foreign Ministry informed their Ambassador that the Minis-
ter had learned with displeasure ‘of continuing Syrian accusations against
The Netherlands on the basis of completely unfounded rumours concern-
ing arms supplies to Israel’. Van der Stoel was also to make his displeasure
clear to the Syrian Ambassador.103
There were more indications that Arab states suspected something.
During a conversation on October 17 with four Arab Ambassadors, ac-
cording to the report of that meeting, Van der Stoel had to defend himself
against accusations of arms transports.104 In fact, it is rather remarkable
that the Arab countries have never publicly accused The Netherlands of
arms deliveries. There were, however, sufficient other grounds for accus-
ing The Netherlands of adopting a pro-Israeli attitude.
European Political Cooperation
On October 12, the war issue was for the first time raised in the Dutch
Council of Ministers. Meanwhile, the Dutch position was becoming
more difficult. klm was already openly suspected of having transported
persons and materials. During this Cabinet session the question of possi-
ble Arab oil sanctions was aired for speculation. Van der Stoel still had no
indication that the oil supply was to be restricted, but assumed that the
risk of this happening was very real if the war were to escalate.
On the same day, in Copenhagen consultations were being held within
the Comité Politique of the Director-Generals for Political Affairs
(dgpa) of the nine ec countries. The dgpa’s considered the question of
whether a declaration by the Foreign Ministers over the war was called
for. This meeting took place within the framework of the European Politi-
cal Cooperation (EPC) gathering of European Foreign Ministers.105 A
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draft declaration was drawn up that was clearly based on the British and
French positions. The declaration called for a cease-fire and for a political
solution on the basis of the French interpretation of Security Council res-
olution 242, which demanded that Israel withdraw from the occupied ter-
ritories. In addition, in the last sentence of the declaration the uk and
France were given the mandate to represent the whole ec in the Security
Council.
Van Lynden’s initial instructions were to block any joint statement over
the Middle East war in the Comité Politique. The instruction held that the
war in the Middle East did not lend itself to decision-making, but only to
consultation. The mandate granted to the uk and France to represent the
Nine in the Security Council would simply mean that these two countries
would put their own views into effect. The Dutch standpoint with regard
to the cease-fire was also out of harmony with the draft text. The Hague
wanted withdrawal behind the existing truce lines as a condition for a
cease-fire to enable a formula acceptable to both sides to be reached. This
was a further reason to withhold assent from a communal declaration.106
Van Lynden was absolutely opposed to this and further considered
these instructions as having originated under the influence of his oppo-
nent, J. Meijer, Director-General for International Cooperation. Van
Lynden feared, together with many officials in the Department, that The
Netherlands was heading for isolation within the ec. Furthermore,
blocking a communal ec standpoint would only succeed in weakening
the West European position with regard to the Arab countries. Van Lyn-
den later claimed that decision-making within the Foreign Ministry was
influenced by a powerful pro-Israeli lobby, to wit from the Directorate
General for International Cooperation.107
The Dutch standpoint indeed encountered serious objections in the
Comité Politique, leading Van Lynden to seek contact with his Minister
who, at the time, was in ministerial council. Following Van Lynden’s ad-
vice, Van der Stoel agreed to a communal epc standpoint. Van der Stoel
even instructed him to go along with an appeal for an immediate cease-
fire, without further reference to any restoration of the status quo ante. It
should be noted at this point that Israel’s military situation had in the
meantime improved considerably. Van der Stoel nevertheless continued to
have great difficulty with the final passage of the proposed statement in
which the nine member states empowered the uk and France to represent
the ec in the Security Council.
During this Cabinet session, Van der Stoel informed his colleagues that
he had, meanwhile, given instructions to strike out the final passage con-
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cerning the British-French mandate. He saw no way in which the Dutch
and the French visions could be brought into harmony with each other
with French representation in the Security Council. In general, any initia-
tives in New York should preferably be taken on the basis of the old truce
lines. And, it should be said, Van der Stoel was certainly not alone. Trans-
port Minister Westerterp pointed out that Paris had meanwhile put out a
statement in which the Syrian and Egyptian attack had been more or less
approved. He reminded his colleagues that France had also abused such a
mandate in the past: one could well guess what would happen with a new
mandate. Van der Stoel agreed wholeheartedly with this point of view.108
In the Comité Politique, in accordance with the instruction from his
Minister, Van Lynden stated that The Netherlands found itself unable un-
der any condition to agree to the last sentence of the draft declaration. As
a result, the Dutch Director-General for Political Affairs found himself
heavily attacked, particularly by the Italians. Italy and France refused to
remove the last sentence, leading to an impasse which was only broken
the following day when the French and Italian governments gave their
consent to dropping the mandate. When the statement was published on
October 13, most Arab countries reacted with disappointment or even
anger. The demand was heard almost immediately that the ec should de-
clare itself in favour of complete implementation of resolution 242, and
specifically for complete withdrawal from the occupied territories.
A veto was thus declared, under the responsibility of Van der Stoel and
with the support of the Cabinet, on the mandate requested by Paris and
London. Without doubt, this had to do with the differences of opinion
concerning the Middle East conflict. However, it should be noted that Eu-
ropean Political Cooperation (epc) in the field of foreign policy was still
at a very early stage. This was one of the first times that the epc had been
considered as the appropriate, co-ordinating body to act in such an impor-
tant matter. The Netherlands had long stood out against such political co-
operation between the six, and subsequently the nine member states. The
veto in part possibly stemmed from the usual aversion to the politicizing
of European integration, although it should be added that there were few-
er misgivings on this score within the Directorate-General for Political
Affairs than entertained by the Minister and within the Cabinet.109
Like a true Atlanticist, Van der Stoel took for granted American lead-
ership in the question of the Middle East conflict and advocated first of all
Atlantic unity rather than political co-ordination within epc.110 This did
not prevent considerable dissatisfaction in The Hague with the American
government’s policy, particularly over the lack of consultation with the
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West European allies. When the new American Ambassador in The
Hague came to pay his respects to the Secretary-General of the Dutch
Foreign Ministry, E.L.C. Schiff, the latter made it very clear that The
Netherlands also needed to be kept in touch with the thinking and actions
of the American government. Understanding and cooperation could
hardly be expected of the West European allies if they were not adequately
informed of American objectives and tactics.111
On October 16, the American government declared the war in the
Middle East a ‘major test’ for nato. Unity was necessary in the face of
the Soviet threat. Responding to this appeal for Atlantic solidarity, Van
der Stoel expressed himself cautiously positive. In an instruction to Fack,
the Dutch Minister stressed that, given the Soviet backing for the Arab
countries, American military support for Israel was understandable. He
had sympathy for the American resumption of arms deliveries and sub-
scribed to the belief that the nato allies must do everything possible to
maintain their unity. He advocated considering measures against the So-
viet Union, for example within the framework of csce consultations. Un-
less Moscow exercised the necessary restraint in time, thought Van der
Stoel, the climate in Geneva would be badly affected.112
Nevertheless, within a few days, West European resentment was again
aroused by American action when Nixon, as mentioned earlier, put his
troops on a state of high alert. On October 26, the nato Permanent Rep-
resentatives met in Brussels. The West German government, meanwhile,
had taken the decision to end its collaboration in the transport of Ameri-
can arms stocks to Israel. Although Israel had the winning hand, Bonn
appeared to side with France and Great Britain on this point also. Both
the French and Belgian Permanent Representatives sharply criticized the
American conduct, specifically the lack of information given – particular-
ly when the Americans had so shortly beforehand appealed for solidarity
and cooperation. The Dutch Permanent Representative let it be known
that, in spite of everything, The Netherlands could understand the Ameri-
can actions.113
Conclusion
The Dutch government’s policy, as we said, did not go unnoticed in the
Arab world. There were definite rumours of Dutch military assistance to
Israel. Further, the Dutch veto of the epc mandate requested by Paris and
London did not long remain a secret. On the basis of information from
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‘highly qualified sources’, The Guardian reported that ‘France and Italy
privately informed Arab governments about Dutch reluctance to support
a joint neutralist European stand on the Middle East’.114
That was not all. On October 13 a large demonstration had been held
in Amsterdam in support of Israel, which Defence Minister Vredeling
attended. On October 17 there appeared a page-sized declaration of soli-
darity with Israel in several newspapers, signed by many prominent pub-
lic figures from Dutch society, including ex-ministers and ex-premiers.
The presence of Vredeling at the October 13th demonstration seemed to
demonstrate clearly that, in this issue, the Cabinet stood squarely behind
pro-Israeli public opinion. In the coming weeks, the Arab countries would
return time and again to this remarkable gesture on the part of Vredeling.
Why did the Den Uyl Cabinet adopt such an emphatic position? The
normal alliance with Israel is a possible explanation but certainly open to
doubt, for in the preceding years there had been a certain degree of es-
trangement. The party political composition of the Den Uyl Cabinet
played a part. Those members of the government most involved were the
Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) members who (more than, for example, the
Catholic People’s Party, the kvp, according to ex-minister Van der
Klauw) felt solidarity with Israel and certainly also with the governing
Israeli Labour Party at that time.115
The Dutch government rejected the understanding of the Arab coun-
tries advocated by the French, and resisted any joint epc role, particularly
in the Security Council. Indeed, Van der Stoel’s preferred orientation was
pro-us rather than pro-epc, which conformed to the usual line of judge-
ment where European Political Cooperation was concerned. Neverthe-
less, Van der Stoel’s policy is remarkable, given the criticism voiced by the
dgpa and by diplomats. In the weeks that followed, Van der Stoel’s
judgement was not always shared by his political and diplomatic advi-
sors.
Furthermore, arms were delivered, even though the Cabinet had never
taken any decision on this. Vredeling always insisted that he had acted on
his own initiative, together with Stemerdink; but in light of the above,
that hardly appears likely. It would seem more probable that the various
individuals involved were fully informed or at the least had their suspi-
cions. Vredeling subsequently confirmed that none of his colleagues ever
asked him explicitly about the arms deliveries, even though various ru-
mours, questions and accusations were flying around. When Stemerdink
years later told Den Uyl what had happened, Den Uyl said that he always
suspected something of the kind. It is quite extraordinary that Den Uyl
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had never asked his Defence Minister for clarification. The inescapable
conclusion is that the premier knew very well what was going on.
The attitude taken by the Dutch Cabinet carried necessary risks, in the
first place the risk of Arab sanctions. In the coming weeks, Van der Stoel
would be confronted with Arab accusations on various occasions. How-
ever, it is remarkable that when Algeria pronounced an oil embargo
against The Netherlands (the first country to do so), although a series of
accusations were thrown at The Hague, these did not include any accusa-
tion of arms deliveries.
The Cabinet position also carried with it problems within the ec;
though at the same time the support of Washington could be relied on. In-
deed, the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Van Lynden, was told on
October 30 just how highly the Americans appreciated the Dutch role.
Besides, in the event of conflict in the oil sector, The Netherlands was in
itself in no weak position:116 the home base of Shell, it included Rotter-
dam and the huge refinery capacity in the Rijnmond area. Furthermore, it
commanded considerable reserves of natural gas which it exported to Bel-
gium, West Germany, Italy and France. This fact may well have played a
role in determining policy with regard to the October war and the subse-
quent oil crisis.
All in all, risks were taken, without a doubt, and yet at the same time
the Dutch government was sailing a course in the wake of the usa with a
certain accuracy. This is not to deny that there was sometimes irritation
in The Hague at the lack of information provided from the American side.
Van der Stoel complained of this in a conversation with the American Am-
bassador.117 Yet perhaps there was at the back of the minds of all the
members of the Dutch government the conviction that if it came to the
crunch, the Americans would not abandon their small but steadfast ally.
There were times, as Van der Stoel put it, when solidarity between nato
allies was essential.
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2Difficulties
In the years leading up to the 1973 war, the international oil sector had
undergone structural shifts against the background of a world-wide in-
crease in the demand for oil.1 Oil production had also increased hugely,
not least in the Arab countries. Between 1950 and 1973, oil extraction in
the Middle East increased fourteen-fold.2 Western Europe and Japan in
particular had become increasingly dependent on Arab oil.
The West European countries had become to a significant degree de-
pendent on oil imports for both their energy production and their petro-
chemical industries. In 1955, coal was still the most important energy
source in Western Europe (75%), whereas in 1972 this share had fallen to
23%. In contrast, oil had risen from 22% to 60% of the total energy sup-
ply. In 1955, 78% of all West European energy needs were met from with-
in Western Europe, whereas in 1972 this figure had been drastically re-
duced to 35%. Energy imports had correspondingly risen from 22% to
65%.3
The dependence on Arab oil imports, as a percentage of total energy
requirements, rose in Western Europe from 13.4% in 1956 to 36% in
1967 and 45% in 1973. This in turn had considerable consequences for
the status of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, particularly
Saudi Arabia, whose share in the world’s oil production rose from 13% in
1970 to 21% in 1973. This development made Saudi Arabia one of the
most important political players in the Middle East.4
Even in the usa, long self-sufficient in oil, scarcity began to make itself
felt on the oil market. The oil-producing areas in the usa could no longer
satisfy the ever-increasing demand, with the result that oil imports grew
throughout the 1960s at an average rate of 6% – rising to some 20% after
1970. The squandering of reserves and increasing consumption meant
that the usa had become a net importer of oil. Although American de-
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pendence on imports was far less than in most other industrial countries,
the term energy crisis became securely established in the vocabulary of
American politics.5
Because the countries of the industrial West were more dependent,
they became more vulnerable. Furthermore, the powerful position of the
traditional, international oil companies, the majors or Seven Sisters, sym-
bols of Western domination of the world economy, appeared to be under
pressure by the early 1970s. In 1972, although the Sisters, consisting of
five American, one British (bp) and one Anglo-Dutch concern (Shell), still
controlled 71% of oil production (excluding the usa and the communist
countries), 49% of refining capacity and 54% of product-marketing, the
power of these companies was on the wane. The ambitions of the oil pro-
ducing countries were clearly spelled out by nationalisation in Algeria
and Libya, in 1970 and 1971; ambitions which were expressed in the ac-
tivities of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec)
which had been set up in 1960. The status of the majors was further seri-
ously affected over the years by the so-called independent American oil
companies (Occidental, Phillips, Getty, Standard Oil of Indiana), as well
as by the rise of national and semi-national concerns such as the French
cfp and Ef-Erap and the Italian eni and Agip. The emergence of these
new competitors appeared to offer the oil-producing countries new per-
spectives. The new rivals needed to strengthen their position and were
therefore likely to show a greater willingness to meet their demands than
the majors.6
The growth of independent oil concerns and of West European and
Arab national oil companies was not, however, to the advantage of the oil
producers in every respect. It also meant that ever more oil was coming on
the market, with inevitable effects on oil prices which, initially as a result
of the enormous supply in the late 1960s, gradually declined. From that
moment, the opec countries, with considerable verve, tried to push
through a new policy. The number of opec member countries had mean-
while sharply increased from five founder members in 1960 to thirteen
countries in 1973. In particular, the entry of Algeria (1969) and the radi-
calisation of Libya led to an ever greater pressure on traditionally conser-
vative oil producers like Saudi Arabia.7 opec began to force up oil prices.
This was understandable, since for decades oil prices had hardly in-
creased at all, while the prices of Western oil products had often increased
by dozens of percentages if not a hundred percent. opec also began to in-
sist on a greater say – or ‘participation’ – in national oil extraction. Fur-
ther, the opec countries wanted to manage their mineral resources intel-
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ligently and, if necessary, to limit oil production. After all, a reduced sup-
ply should raise the price of oil.8
In December 1970, by which point oil prices had fallen to an all-time
low, the opec countries demanded steep rises both in the price of oil and
in taxes on oil production. At first, the majors declined to cooperate with
this demand; while for the first time ever, the so-called ‘parent countries’
of the main oil companies – among them The Netherlands, albeit rather
reluctantly – met to discuss this development in Washington. On Febru-
ary 14, 1971, agreement was reached on the opec demands when the
main companies and six Arabian Gulf states concluded an agreement that
included increases in oil prices and taxes. There subsequently followed
similar agreements with other oil-producing countries. A few Arab opec
countries, such as Libya, were not happy with this February outcome, and
negotiations were reopened. On April 2, 1971, the Tripoli agreement was
signed, setting a further increase in the price of oil.
Western countries’ fears that these concessions would not be the end of
the matter were very quickly realized. Within months the opec countries
were demanding a greater participation in national oil extraction (mainly
controlled by the majors) as well as compensation for the devaluation of
the dollar, the currency of payments for oil.9 In January 1972 these aspi-
rations led to a new agreement between the Gulf States and the companies
on oil revenues and to the setting up of discussions on expanding national
participation which, if opec had its way, allowed member states a 51%
national share.
The apparently insuperable clash of interests between opec and the
oil companies began to look as though it were not, after all, entirely irrec-
oncilable, even if certain aspects could not be resolved. The majors were
thus not dissatisfied with the moderate price increases agreed in 1971 and
1972. In reaching these settlements, the majors were helped by Saudi Ara-
bia, which feared that too steep a rise in prices could perhaps lead to an
uncontrollable inflation in the industrialized world, in which case Saudi
investments abroad would be severely devalued. There was the further
fear that the search for alternative energy sources would be stepped up in
earnest.
Gradual price rises suited the long-term strategy of the majors. Moder-
ate increases coupled with a guaranteed supply could well deliver greater
profits which, at the time, the majors certainly needed. Meanwhile, they
were on the lookout for new oil areas in politically safe regions beyond
opec’s demesne. They were also considering bringing into production
such new oilfields as Alaska and the North Sea, more expensive locations
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that would call for extra capital if they were to be developed. Traditional-
ly, the oil industry had always been able to finance its own development,
but profits were no longer high enough for such large-scale operations.
Deep-sea drilling in particular entailed colossal initial outlay, costs that
could only be recouped by raising the price of oil.10
Nor was it only the majors who had an interest in higher oil prices. The
American government, unlike the majors, had from the outset expressed
no objection to higher oil prices, and in 1972/73 had informed opec ac-
cordingly.11 Such increases would ensure that the profit margins of do-
mestic oil companies in the us would rise, making it a more attractive
proposition to utilize otherwise uneconomic oil wells in Texas and else-
where. It should not be forgotten in this connection that in the early
1970s the us was dependent on foreign oil for a mere 15% of its total en-
ergy consumption. In Western Europe the situation was quite different.
France depended on oil imports for 67% of its energy consumption, Italy
for 74%, West Germany for 55%.12
Another effect of the hike in oil prices was that Western client states
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia would acquire greater financial scope for
large-scale technological and military purchases. The American presi-
dential advisory body, the Council on International Economic Policy, an-
ticipated that Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues would increase from 5 billion to
20 billion dollars. In the mid-1970s the arms sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia
and Israel amounted to more than 50% of all foreign American arms
sales. Besides which, the State Department’s view of the oil price increases
could only benefit American business life, since such a blow was mainly
felt by America’s European and Japanese competitors, whose products
would become more expensive. Washington’s stance, therefore, was ini-
tially not unsympathetic toward opec’s demands.13
However, the scenario did not unfold entirely as anticipated. The
opec countries turned out to be unwilling to go along with gradual price
increases, while mutual tensions between the consumer countries gener-
ated ever more problems, as became all too apparent at the time of the oil
crisis. The oil market was becoming increasingly politicised. One of the
first reasons for this was that the governments of the consumer countries,
the parent countries, found themselves more and more embroiled in ques-
tions of oil. Against this background, and to an increasing extent, differ-
ences of viewpoint emerged between the consumer countries – and not
least between the Europeans and the usa. The position of the European
countries vis-à-vis the usa was even more problematic as they could not
succeed in speaking with a single voice. In the years leading up to 1973
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there had been attempts within the ec to arrive at a common energy poli-
cy, but the clash of interests between member states had always stood in
the way of such agreement.
Oil was not the only problem aggravating relations between the usa
and the European countries in this period. In fact, the oil problem cannot
be seen in isolation from other politico-economic conflicts. In 1971, not
only had America’s balance of payments been in deficit, but also the
American balance of trade. Particularly in sectors like the motor industry,
steel and electronics, European and Japanese producers had undermined
the American position. Nixon’s reaction was to cancel the dollar’s con-
vertibility to gold and to devalue the dollar, especially with a view to
making exports more attractive.14 This suggested that Washington was
prepared to set off a trade war with Western Europe and Japan. Raising
oil prices was a part of that trade war.
The politicising of the oil market was also a consequence of the in-
creasing self-awareness evident in the actions of the oil-producing coun-
tries who were determined to get a firmer grip on their national oil pro-
duction. In the Western consumer countries, such greater participation
evoked only alarm. This fear, however, was not enough to prevent an ac-
cord being signed between the major oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, who wanted a step by step increase in the national share in
the oil production up to a maximum of 51%. For the majors, in retro-
spect, the consequences of such nationalization subsequently turned out
to exceed expectations at the time, for this did not affect their position in
the processing and distribution sectors at all.
In early 1972 the American State Department produced a secret report
of some seventy pages on The Impending Oil Crisis, setting out the typi-
cal position in which the Western countries now found themselves, the
usa in particular. The report assumed that around 1975, possibly earlier,
the era of a permanent sellers’ market would have arrived, with any of the
several major producers being able to create a supply crisis by cutting off
oil supplies. It was also assumed in this report that America’s energy posi-
tion would have weakened by around 1980 to the point where the usa
would be forced to import more than 50% of its oil requirements.15
The consumer countries had survived the price increases carried
through by opec in 1971, the report declared, as a result of mutual soli-
darity, but this success had been underestimated. In the view of the State
Department, opec members must be convinced that long-term stability
would avail them far more than complete chaos and short-term gains. It
was recognized that the devaluation of the dollar had caused problems,
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but these need not be insuperable. The problem of participation was
much more difficult, however, because the differences on this point did
seem to be irreconcilable. The danger of nationalization could only be
prevented in the long term if a serious dialogue were initiated to discuss a
new relationship between the majors and the governments of the oil-pro-
ducing countries. In addition to which, according to the State Depart-
ment report, the American government had to consider a possible reduc-
tion in the growth of oil consumption, an increase in domestic production
and importing from safer sources.16
The question of price increases meanwhile dragged on. In June 1973, a
new increase of 12% was agreed, but this was still not enough. Just be-
fore the war broke out, new negotiations were announced between opec
and the major oil companies, negotiations which should have opened on
October 8 in Vienna. The opec countries wanted a 100% increase in the
price of oil. This was no longer a matter of gradual price increases. Shell
and Exxon, wanting first to consult with Western governments over such
drastic steps, insisted on postponing negotiations, since the kind of in-
creases opec wanted would have far-reaching consequences for the
economies of the West. The negotiators, George Piercy (Exxon) and An-
dre Bernard (Shell), therefore decided to insist to the Saudi Oil Minister
Yamani that the negotiations be postponed for two weeks.17
On the eve of the October War, there were thus a number of unresolved
differences within the international oil industry brewing, and concomi-
tantly, the developing fear in the Western consumer countries that the ‘oil
weapon’ would be used politically. This fear was mainly focused on the
Arab opec countries who since 1968 had amalgamated in oapec. In the
early 1970s, under the influence of the more radical members, oapec an-
nounced on several occasions that oil wealth would be used as a weapon
against Western countries that supported Israel, warnings which were to
be repeated before the outbreak of the October War. On May 15 1973,
the day Israel celebrated its 25 years of existence, Iraq, Kuwait and Alge-
ria turned off the oil tap for an hour, Libya for the entire day. Nor did the
radical oil producers speak for themselves alone. In the summer, the top
executives of Aramco (the daughter company of Chevron, Exxon, Texaco
and Mobil) held a meeting in Geneva with King Feisal of Saudi Arabia at
which the latter threatened that, if America did not change its pro-Israeli
attitude, Aramco’s access to the Arabian oilfields would be withdrawn.18
A resolution passed in the Kuwaiti parliament in June 1973 in the clearest
terms called for a freeze on oil production in the event that war should
break out in the Middle East.
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Enough warnings had thus been sounded, and if that were not enough,
the Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi, declared on July 10 on French tv
that in future the Arabs would be able to use their oil as a political
weapon against the usa and Western Europe. On September 4, too, at a
meeting in Kuwait of the Foreign Ministers of the opec countries, the
question of using the oil weapon was openly discussed. The claim made
by Yergin, in his book The Prize, that the embargo came almost as a total
surprise cannot therefore be taken seriously.19 The use of the oil weapon
most certainly did not come out of the blue.20
Turf War in The Hague
During the years leading up to 1973, the possibility of restrictions on the
oil supply had also preoccupied The Hague. The Dutch Ministries of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Foreign Affairs in particular had been at work on this
question: indeed, there had been a certain vying for recognition between
these departments as to whose area of competence it was. Economic Af-
fairs was responsible for foreign economic relations, which was taken to
include the question of oil supplies. Yet to the extent that this question of
oil supply was being raised increasingly often in such international or-
ganizations as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (oecd), and the more the political nature of the whole oil question
was foregrounded, the more the Foreign Ministry became involved. Dur-
ing the period of the Biesheuvel Cabinet (1971-1973), this led to friction
between the ministers concerned, H. Langman, Minister of Economic
Affairs, and W.K.N. Schmelzer, the Foreign Minister.
At the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the oil problem was especially the con-
cern of the Department for Economic Cooperation (des). The central
role of des stemmed from the increasing importance of the oecd and the
ec in matters of oil. In January 1971 it was decided to appoint the des as
co-ordinating organ within the Foreign Ministry where matters of oil
supply were concerned. Plans for emergency allocation had been debated
within oecd for some years. At the beginning of 1970, prompted by the
Americans, the oecd again began to pay more attention to the security
aspect of the oil supply. Washington’s basic position was that within a
few years the West European countries could no longer expect to be able
to call on American oil reserves. In addition, the demand for crude oil on
the world market was now in excess of supply. The us therefore wanted
the oecd to discuss measures for reducing dependence on Arab oil and, if
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necessary, together to prepare steps in the event of a reduction in the sup-
ply of oil.21
The oecd could not agree on the issue of an allocation system in crisis
situations. There was no problem in reaching accord on the need for lay-
ing in emergency supplies, but the oecd was not in a position to force
member states to act on this. The ec or the European Commission were
however, and although it had not been possible within the ec to agree on
a common energy policy, the European Commission issued a directive
that all member states were required to lay in emergency supplies: for 65
days with effect from January 1, 1971, and for 90 days with effect from
January 1, 1974.
The change of government in 1971 brought no change in the sharing of
responsibilities between the Ministries for Economic Affairs and Foreign
Affairs, although Minister Langman suspected his colleague Schmelzer
of wanting to take over the primary responsibility for the oil issue: not
without justification, it seemed. There was indeed a level of unrest within
the Foreign Ministry over the dominant role played by Economic Affairs
in the matter of oil supplies. On January 4, 1972, Schmelzer informed
Langman that he considered himself responsible for oil politics in the in-
ternational context; but this proposal led to no revision of the division of
competencies between the two ministries. Schmelzer then proposed let-
ting the question rest. des subsequently tried to come to some arrange-
ment with Economic Affairs separately over a ruling at the executive, but
this offer was also declined by Economic Affairs.22
True to its traditions, The Netherlands had adopted a liberal attitude
toward the international oil market and had spoken out against market
regulations and state intervention. In 1971, the government had taken a
reserved position in the consultations in Washington between the parent
companies and the major oil companies. A report drafted in 1971 on the
vulnerability of Western crude oil supplies reiterated this assessment. In-
tervention by the state would involve untold risks, not least because the
opec countries would then be inclined to raise political issues. The ma-
jors would be in a better position to deal with opec than national govern-
ments, who were not only far more divided among themselves but also
susceptible to the influence of domestic political interests.23
Yet the tenability of even this rather conservative standpoint was
doubted. In 1972 the Head of des concluded that it was inevitable that
governments would be drawn into the problems of international oil, and
that the government therefore had to develop a clear international energy
policy. Whether within or outside the frame of the ec, the question that
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had to be investigated was whether improved relations with the oil coun-
tries would promote the secure future provision of oil.24
In the spring of 1973, the policy unit (plan) of the Foreign Ministry
was asked to draw up a memorandum on this question. Subsequently and
after extensive preliminary discussions, a couple of papers were submit-
ted by H.Ch. Posthumus Meyes, advisor to the plan Policy Unit, to For-
eign Minister Van der Stoel in May 1973: The oil crisis and Dutch foreign
policy and The use of the oil weapon for political purposes.25 In these pa-
pers, Posthumus Meyes reached the conclusion that, where oil supplies
were concerned, the ‘careless period’ of the past was over. Oil would be-
come an increasingly important subject of government interference.
Complete abstention by the state was no longer tenable, though govern-
ments should not assume the role of the oil companies at the negotiation
table. More active involvement on the part of the consumer countries
would also involve risks, such as rivalries in the ‘scramble for oil’ and the
use of oil as a tool for applying political pressure. Care should also be tak-
en to avoid a buyers’ cartel being set up that might lead to a dangerous
confrontation with the producer countries. Consultation between con-
sumer countries should, among other things, look at controlling competi-
tion, promoting the diversification of supply and energy, emergency pro-
visions and activities to channel the enormous financial resources of the
producer countries advantageously. Although The Netherlands, accord-
ing to Posthumus Meyes, was well situated, given its North Sea natural
gas fields, its major oil industry and the position of Rotterdam, it was
nevertheless too weak to pursue an independent course in matters of oil.
In The use of the oil weapon for political purposes, Posthumus Meyes
particularly pointed out the possibility of oil being deployed as a weapon
in any Middle Eastern conflict. During such a conflict, the threat to the oil
supply could be exerted to force the West to take a different attitude to-
ward Israel. There was also the possibility that dependence on Arab oil
might be exploited to incite Western countries into military support
against the Arab countries. In any such situation, the memorandum pro-
posed, ‘the Netherlands would also be involved’. The role of the usa in
the Middle East was still dominant. The question that arose was whether
Western Europe should not take its own, independent line, such as up to
that point had not been possible. It was a better idea to lend support to
‘any American turn toward a rather more balanced treatment of the Mid-
dle East question.’26
plan’s memoranda were sent to various Ambassadors with the re-
quest for feedback, provoking a reassuring response from several quar-
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ters. W.J.G. Gevers, the Ambasssador in London, opined that in the short
term there seemed to be no major problem likely to arise, and that in any
case the Western countries, including The Netherlands, held stocks suffi-
cient for ninety days. H.N. Boon in Rome likewise thought an embargo
unlikely, although restrictions on production should not be ruled out.27
From Washington, D.W. van Lynden reported that the State Department,
albeit in the view of Under-Secretary Kenneth Rush, considered the polit-
ical use of Arab oil unlikely, particularly in view of the divisions extant in
the Arab world.28
However, The Netherlands’ Permanent Representative (pr) at the
oecd, J. Kaufmann, found that the plan memorandum was too reserved
in its appraisal of international cooperation, and its proposals for future
possible influence by The Hague too modest and self-effacing. Because of
the oil companies established in The Netherlands and other sectors of
business life contributing significantly to the know-how and the provision
of materials for oilexploitation, he thought The Hague should have an
important voice in consultations among consumer countries.29 Ambas-
sadors in some of the Arab countries were also asking for a more active
role. Cultivating extra goodwill in these countries was a real possibility.
Saudi Arabia, for example, was attempting to broaden its economic base,
and Saudis therefore were highly interested in joint ventures with foreign
contractors.30
Nor was it only in the Dutch Foreign Ministry that serious thought
was being given to the possibility of restrictions on the oil supply. After
an extensive exchange of ideas, a crisis scenario was drafted in the Min-
istry for Economic Affairs. Distribution plans were laid, although these
were to play no further role in the weeks ahead.31 In various places, thus,
the possibility of a restriction on oil imports was being given serious at-
tention. And yet, in the spring of 1973, The Hague appears to have been
totally unaware of one acute danger, let alone the fact that Arab measures
directed specifically against The Netherlands were at that very moment
being considered.
The First Signs
Shortly before the outbreak of the October War, as we have already indi-
cated, disturbing signals were received. Rumours concerning Arab oil
measures were already circulating by early September. In addition, Libya
had decided to press ahead with its nationalization of 51% of all foreign
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oil interests. One of the places where this was discussed was the ec, in the
epc Middle Eastern working group as early as September 3. This discus-
sion revealed differences of judgement and a remarkable divergence of
viewpoints. On the one hand, Italy and France, countries with large state
oil companies, thought that oil would play a political role within a very
short time and that the ec would have to adjust to this. The traditionally
liberal parent countries of Shell and bp, Great Britain and The Nether-
lands, however, did not share this point of view.
During the first week of the war, it appeared that the threat of an em-
bargo would not materialize despite an appeal for such a measure from
the plo leadership. Lubbers and Van der Stoel confirmed in the Dutch
Council of Ministers of October 12 that so far no political oil measures
had been implemented, though the possibility remained. Even the radical
Libyans were delivering normally. According to Lubbers, the central
question determining the way the opec countries behaved was still the
question of prices. After all, far-reaching demands from the Arab coun-
tries remained on the table at the Vienna negotiations which, in the mean-
time, had been interrupted by the war.32
As the war entered its second week, accusations began to be heard
from the Arab capitals concerning Dutch political and military support
for Israel. Syria in particular accused The Hague of military activities on
Israel’s behalf. Further, on October 16, the Arab opec countries met in
Kuwait where they were to take a series of drastic measures whose conse-
quences, it was announced, would cost countries that supported Israel
dearly. It was this announcement that triggered a much-needed sense of
urgency in The Hague. This appeared to be for real.
Van der Stoel himself was also now confronted with the Arab accusa-
tions. On October 17, at their request, the Minister received the Ambas-
sadors of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia together with the Egyptian tem-
porary chargé d’affaires, who claimed to speak for the other Arab coun-
tries recognized by The Netherlands. At this meeting, the four diplomats
appealed to the ec countries for some contribution to the resolution of the
Middle Eastern conflict. In response to their plea, Van der Stoel put the
case that the Nine could do little more than call on the warring parties to
cease hostilities in accordance with the ec declaration of October 13.
Concluding this conversation, according to the Dutch Foreign Ministry
record, he informed them that
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he was not favourably impressed by exaggerated official reactions from
Arab capitals to various rumours of volunteers being recruited and
transported together with armaments from The Netherlands.
He requested that the four Ambassadors should again advise their gov-
ernments of the baselessness of these reports.33
In retrospect, with the insight provided by the Foreign Intelligence Ser-
vice (idb), it would appear that, after their conversation with Van der
Stoel, the Ambassadors suggested to their governments that The Nether-
lands should be warned against proceeding with political and military
support for Israel; and that if the reaction to such a warning were nega-
tive, The Netherlands, like the usa, should receive no more oil. All Arab
countries should be urged to condemn the clearly hostile attitude of The
Hague. The Arab countries should furthermore blacklist all Dutch firms
and threaten klm – as well as other airlines – with reprisals if they contin-
ued to ferry mercenaries and arms to Israel.34 These reports were to reach
The Hague only later. For the time being, it was not clear what concrete
sanctions the Arab side could impose. If it should come to that, according
to Lubbers speaking in the Second Chamber on October 18, then the con-
sequences of such sanctions would have to be taken care of through joint
action in common with the ec.35 A few weeks, however, would be suffi-
cient to make this judgement appear naively optimistic.
The Oil Weapon Brought to Bear
The situation was gradually beginning to bite deeper. A number of im-
portant decisions were taken at the conference of the oapec held in
Kuwait from October 16 until October 21. To begin with, in the first
place by the six Gulf States, it was decided on 16 October to raise the
price of crude oil unilaterally by 70%, thus by-passing the Vienna negoti-
ations suspended on October 9. The oil companies would have to pay
henceforth not $1.80 but $3.06 a barrel in taxes and royalties. In the sec-
ond place, it was agreed to use the Western dependence on oil as a politi-
cal weapon in the war with Israel. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani informed
the oil companies on October 16 that his country would be cutting oil
production by 10% if the us continued to replenish Israeli military loss-
es. The following day, the eleven oapec countries decided to reduce oil
production by 5% each month until Israel had withdrawn from all the oc-
cupied territories and had recognized the rights of the Palestinians. At the
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same time it was announced that those consumer countries that support-
ed Israel would have to bear the consequences of these measures while
those consumer countries that supported the Arab cause would be ex-
empted from production restrictions.36 As Yamani later commented, the
Arabs thus finally showed themselves ‘to be the masters of their own
oil’.37
The American response to the Saudi threat was crystal clear. On Octo-
ber 19 Nixon requested congressional approval for 2.2 billion dollars in
emergency aid for Israel. The Arab world reacted immediately: on the
very same day Libya announced an oil embargo against the usa in re-
sponse to arms deliveries to Israel. The following day Saudi Arabia fol-
lowed suit, and on October 21 Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein and Dubai joined
them.38 Panic ensued in the usa, for the embargo meant that some 3.5
million barrels a day would be lost. A Federal Energy Office (feo) was set
up with broad powers to compel reductions in the use of oil.39
In the Dutch Council of Ministers of October 19, the situation in the
Middle East was again raised for comprehensive discussion. Meanwhile,
the military situation in the region had drastically altered. According to
Van der Stoel, the Israeli position had radically improved, particularly on
the Egyptian front. The Syrian army had not yet been defeated, but there
was now little chance of any new offensive against Israel. All in all, Israel
appeared no longer to be in acute danger. Indeed, the territory now under
Israeli control had expanded considerably compared with the old lines of
demarcation.
Meanwhile, it had become clear that The Netherlands was likely to
suffer the Arab sanctions. Van der Stoel recognized that relations with the
Arab countries had been ‘somewhat strained’ following the Syrian accu-
sation that The Netherlands had sent volunteer fighters to Israel. On vari-
ous occasions he had protested about this, as in his meeting with the four
Arab Ambassadors, but had evidently made no impression.40
Two days later, on October 21, the Arab League’s Bureau for the boy-
cott of Israel called on its members to implement punitive measures, to
boycott Dutch firms and to cut off the oil lines to Rotterdam. This re-
quest, an official of the Bureau informed the world, was in response to the
wholly pro-Israeli line taken by The Hague.41 October 21 was a black day
for The Netherlands. Iraq nationalized the Shell share of an Iraqi oil com-
pany, and Syria called for a general boycott of The Netherlands and
specifically of klm. The same day, Jordan declared itself ready to boycott
klm.
But that was not all. Algeria implemented the boycott of the Arab
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League’s Boycott Bureau the very same day. In a conversation with the
head of the Western Europe and North American Bureau, Ambassador
G.W. Bentinck in Algiers was given eight reasons why it been decided to
impose a boycott. The first reason was the government’s pro-Israeli decla-
ration immediately after the outbreak of the war. The second was the pro-
Israeli stance taken by Van der Stoel in his meeting with the four Arab
Ambassadors. Thirdly, The Netherlands had adopted a pro-Israeli pos-
ture in the un and in other international bodies. Fourthly, the govern-
ment had supported Israel within the ec; and furthermore, the govern-
ment had approved the recruiting of volunteers and had offered the trans-
port facilities of klm.
It also struck Bentinck that his opposite partner in this conversation
was remarkably well-informed of the deliberations of the Comité Poli-
tique that preceded the epc meeting in Copenhagen. One of the ec’s
member states, probably France or Italy, had evidently allowed the con-
tent of these discussions to leak. The last three Algerian arguments were
not directly connected to the war, but served rather to demonstrate that
The Hague had generally adopted a pro-Israeli or pro-Jewish stance. For
example, the Dutch Foreign Ministry had summoned the Austrian Am-
bassador to protest against the announced closure of a refugee camp for
Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. And finally, Den Uyl had openly
declared that he suffered sleepless nights thinking about the Jewish vic-
tims of the Second World War. The embargo, Bentinck was told, would
be swiftly followed by other Arab countries, but otherwise it was hoped
that Dutch exports to Algeria would not suffer as a consequence. A few
days later these arguments were reiterated in a letter from the Algerian
President Boumedienne to Den Uyl.42
The Algerian move was a serious threat because it could possibly be
followed by similar measures from other Arab opec countries. On Octo-
ber 21 Kruimink, the Co-ordinator of Intelligence and Security Services,
informed Den Uyl and Van der Stoel that following their audience with
Van der Stoel, the Arab Ambassadors in The Hague, as we have already
seen, had advised their governments to impose an embargo if the Dutch
Cabinet continued its anti-Arab policy and its military support for Israel.
It would seem that the Arab diplomatic codes had been cracked.43 A day
later, Kruimink further warned Van der Stoel that it was learned ‘from a
reliable source’ that the Algerians were actively prevailing on other Arab
countries to follow their example. It appeared that Kuwait had already
decided to follow suit, thought Kruimink, and the next day confirmed his
impression.44
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A day after the Algerian decision, the Dutch Ambassador reported
from Damascus that Syria had also decided to follow Algeria. A junior
minister had informed him that there had been a meeting of Arab Ambas-
sadors in Brussels at which it had been decided to advise their respective
governments to declare a total boycott of Dutch interests. The embargo
should be put into operation, since it was apparent that The Hague had
not modified its attitude, deemed so prejudicial to the Arab world.45
Nationalization in Iraq
In spite of this development, the Arab opec countries proved incapable of
any unity of resolve. For different reasons, Iraq and Iran did not join the
embargo.46 At the oapec conference in Kuwait, Iraq had adopted a hard
line: complete liquidation of American assets in the Arab world, with-
drawal of all Arab deposits from the usa and a general hardening of the
political attitude toward Washington.47 Subsequently, Saddam Hussein
would explain that although the embargo against the usa and The
Netherlands was just, it was far too weak a measure. Restricting produc-
tion only succeeded in damaging Arab business. The oil weapon had to be
aimed effectively against Washington and crucial American interests.
Iraq announced on October 21 that the Dutch share – i.e. the Shell
share – in the Iraqi Basrah Petroleum Company was to be confiscated and
nationalized, or rather the Dutch part (60%) of Shell’s participation. Two
weeks earlier, on October 7, immediately after the outbreak of the war,
Iraq had nationalized the interests of the American companies Exxon and
Mobil Oil in Basrah Petroleum Company as a first step in an ‘oil battle
against Israel and its supporters’.48
Explaining the decision taken against Shell, reference was made to the
‘aggressive attitude toward the Arab nation’ and ‘support for our enemy’.
A statement from the Iraqi press agency laid a whole series of accusations
at The Hague’s door, the grievances already known. In particular, Dutch
territory was being used as a bridgehead for assistance to Israel.49 Al-
though the Iraqi grievances were essentially political, Shell initially set 
no great store by any Dutch governmental move, preferring to take inde-
pendent action against the nationalization decision themselves. Never-
theless, it became clear to one of Shell’s top men several days later that it
would be exceptionally difficult to get the nationalization revoked. His
Iraqi counterparts at negotiations were extremely negative over the hos-
tile Dutch position, leaving the Shell representative to conclude that per-
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haps diplomatic steps might procure compensation for the nationaliza-
tion.50
Nonetheless, for several days there was uncertainty in The Hague over
the Iraqi moves. On October 22 a spokesman let it be known that news of
the nationalization had only reached The Hague via the news media. In
spite of the lack of information, the Dutch government regretted the
measure: ‘The Netherlands observes friendly relations with Iraq and
moreover values their continuation.’ The Cabinet hoped that all misun-
derstandings could be cleared up, a vain hope as soon became apparent:
the situation in Iraq remained alarming. It was reported from Baghdad
that a boycott of klm was in the wind.51
When a Shell delegation held new discussions in Baghdad the follow-
ing week, it was once more concluded that the nationalization had been a
political decision. This was evident not least from the fact that the Oil
Minister Saadun Hamadi was not fully informed of what was happening.
During these discussions, a hard line was taken by the Iraqi side, who
again referred to the hostile attitude of The Hague. As one Shell director
confided, it appeared highly improbable that the decision would be re-
voked in the foreseeable future. On the question of compensation, too,
the Iraqi attitude was far from compliant.
Van der Stoel, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the political
justification for the nationalization ‘should be taken with a pinch of
salt’.52 This was an understandable view, since the nationalization in Iraq
was part and parcel of a whole series of comparable measures, both in
Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world. Van der Stoel thought the Dutch at-
titude to the October War was more likely a convenient stick to beat them
with, and that this was also the case with the embargo. Shell, however,
maintained the view that in Iraq it was a matter of political action, a reac-
tion to The Hague’s Middle East policy. A member of the Shell delegation
that had negotiated to no avail in Baghdad was pessimistic on his return
to London, telling Ambassador Gevers that the embargo looked like be-
ing a long business. It was important to keep talking to the Arabs, but he
saw the situation worsening rather than taking a turn for the better.53
A New Government Statement
It was now a matter of priority to try to prevent the embargo spreading
further and to head off other anti-Dutch measures. The Saudi position
was most important because around one-third of Dutch oil imports came
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from Saudi Arabia. On October 22 , Director-General of Political Affairs
of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Van Lynden, had a meeting with the Saudi
Ambassador, Rashad Nowilaty, at which hope was expressed on the
Dutch side that King Feisal would not join an embargo. Van Lynden
sought to clear up the many ‘misunderstandings’ between the two parties
and in fact was partly successful. Nowilaty promised that his country
would continue to supply would-be customers as long as this incurred no
principles that might damage Saudi Arabia. He promised to inform King
Feisal of the various currents at play in The Netherlands and also to relay
expressions of sympathy for the Arab cause. Van Lynden afterwards con-
cluded that it had been a good meeting. He had the impression that the
Saudis were in no hurry to join the embargo, though the pressure exerted
on them to do so should not be underestimated.54
With regard to the Algerian embargo, it was decided by Van der Stoel
to make no formal protest but to react, as it was termed, ‘with dignity and
moderation’. Ambassador Bentinck was instructed to respond with a de-
marche, to the effect that The Hague regretted the Algerian decision, all
the more that it was based on incorrect information. The Jewish people
and Israel perhaps enjoyed much sympathy in our country, but the gov-
ernment’s policy with regard to the Middle East was ‘balanced’ as was
evident from its stated view that a cease-fire must be acceptable ‘to both
parties’.55 These instructions were also sent to various diplomatic posts
in the other Arab countries that they might approach the governments on
the spot in the appropriate way. The Algerian temporary chargé d’affaires
was summoned to Foreign Affairs to draw his attention once again to The
Hague’s point of view.
For all these efforts, however, The Netherlands was about to find itself
in serious difficulties. The situation called for close contact with the ma-
jor oil companies. On October 22, Van der Spoel spoke with the chief ex-
ecutive of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, G.A. Wagner, who had requested
the meeting mainly as a result of the nationalization of the Shell interests
in Iraq.56 Although F. Grünfeld, a Dutch expert on the Middle East,
claims that Shell did not try to exert any influence on foreign policy57, ac-
cording to the Dutch Foreign Ministry report of that meeting, Wagner did
make substantial allusions to government policy. Wagner emphasized
that Shell kept itself out of Middle Eastern politics, even though the sym-
pathies of the board lay with Israel. It seemed undesirable to Shell’s presi-
dent that his country should be too much identified with the usa by the
Arab countries. Because Shell particularly feared that the nationalization
in Iraq would be emulated by other Gulf States such as Abu Dhabi, Qatar
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and Oman, Wagner said he would be grateful to the Cabinet if, wherever
possible, the emphasis could be laid on the ‘even-handedness’ of its Mid-
dle Eastern policy.
Van der Stoel, according to his own testimony, was doing everything
he could to refute the rumours of support given to Israel, but so far this ef-
fort had met with little success. He promised to summon the Iraqi Ambas-
sador. Wagner appeared not entirely reassured and suggested making a
statement expressing commiseration with the fate of the Palestinian
refugees in order to strike a more suitable chord with the Arab world. Van
der Stoel, however, did not comply with this suggestion. Finally, Wagner
expressed his concerns over the consequences of the price rises, particu-
larly for the developing countries, arguing that consultations must be ini-
tiated as a matter of some urgency. According to the Minister, this should
be handled within the framework of the oecd.58
Meanwhile, a new governmental statement was being prepared, duly
released on October 23, which spoke of the ‘misunderstandings’ that had
arisen concerning the Dutch position with regard to the Middle East con-
flict. A solution would have to include all elements of resolution 242. The
statement cited the recently presented explanatory memorandum on the
Dutch Foreign Ministry budget, in which it was asserted that Israel
would have to withdraw behind ‘secure boundaries to be agreed, to a ter-
ritory approximately of the same area as her territory before the Six Day
War.’ In addition to which a peace settlement would have to be based on
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region. Further-
more, a solution would have to be found for the refugees.59 This con-
tained little that was new. Nonetheless, the Shell board expressed their
thanks for the new government statement, while Shell’s Arabists began
preparing a translation.60 This statement, which was sent out on October
26 by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to Ambassadors in the Arab countries,
was an example of effective collaboration between the Ministry and
Shell.
The Embargo Spreads
Despite all diplomatic activities, the embargo spread, with Kuwait fol-
lowing the Algerian example on October 23. In explanation, the Dutch
temporary chargé d’affaires in Kuwait, D.M. Schorer, was referred to his
government’s pro-Israeli attitude, and in particular to the presence of
Vredeling at a pro-Israeli demonstration. Schorer reported that Oil Min-
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ister Abdel Rahman al-Atiki had said that the damage could only be re-
paired if The Hague broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. This, ac-
cording to Schorer, was also representative of Kuwaiti public opinion.61
Following Kuwait there came embargo announcements from Abu Dhabi
and Qatar, and finally from Oman, while from another quarter came ru-
mours that Libya was also about to join the embargo; and indeed, on Oc-
tober 30 this happened.
At this stage, the Dutch Foreign Ministry was under the impression
that Algeria was playing a major role in spreading the embargo. Attempts
to mollify Algiers came to nothing. On October 24 Bentinck offered the
new government statement to the Algerian Director-General for Political
Affairs, who promptly blamed The Netherlands for their
evidently constant support for Israel …. without ever compensating for
this attitude with the least appearance of understanding or support for
the Arab or Palestinian cause.
The Director-General later declared that relations could only be repaired
if The Hague adopted the same point of view as its ec partners.62 The Al-
gerian Ambassador, Messaoud Aít Chalaal, later explained that The
Hague’s attitude in nato had aroused the Algerians’ ire. Of all the nato
countries, only The Netherlands had unreservedly agreed to allow over-
flights of American transport planes to Israel.63
On October 31 a letter signed by Den Uyl was delivered to the Algerian
President Boumedienne – his reaction to the missive which had an-
nounced the embargo. Den Uyl wrote that he shared the Algerians’ con-
cern over the conflict in the Middle East. On the outbreak of the war, the
Dutch Premier emphasized, The Hague had urged an immediate end to
hostilities. He went on to underline the fact that The Netherlands had al-
ways pressed for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the Middle East
on the basis of resolution 242.64 But this letter too was for the time being
of no help.
Although the embargo was spreading, there had been from the outset
no united Arab front. This was evident, for instance, from the fact that
various Arab countries had only joined after several days. There were
other Arab countries which did not join at all, such as Iraq. Iran also re-
mained aloof, though from a much more moderate standpoint than Iraq.
The Dutch Ambassador in Tehran reported that the Shah was trying to
take a softer line, declaring that it was unfair of Saudi Arabia to punish
Europe for the American position.65
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In Cairo, Dutch Ambassador F. Von Oven reported that the Egyptian
government was also unwilling to take part in the embargo, certainly as
long as there was discord between the Arab nations. Egypt was a modest
oil exporter, which might account for the Egyptians’ reluctance. In any
case, Cairo considered the embargo an overly hasty action.66 Later,
Egypt’s temporary chargé d’affaires in The Hague, Mohammed Said El
Sayed, explained that Van der Stoel’s meeting with the four Arab Ambas-
sadors had not been the cause or the main reason for imposing the embar-
go. He had found the exchange reasonable and constructive.67 This
judgement would have confirmed Van der Stoel in his conviction that the
embargo was not essentially a reaction to his policy, but had in all proba-
bility been in preparation for some time.
As the biggest oil producer, Saudi Arabia was of course more impor-
tant than Egypt. At this stage, Saudi Arabia also declined to join the em-
bargo, though very soon reports came of steps in this direction. On Octo-
ber 24 the Dutch First Secretary at the Embassy in Jeddah reported that
an embargo decision had ‘already been prepared’. It was still possible, he
learned, to turn the tide in Saudi Arabia through some positive deed – for
instance if The Hague were to declare that it believed ‘that resolution 242
should now be implemented without further delay’.68
Two days later the possibility for such a ‘positive deed’ seemed to pres-
ent itself when Saudi Arabia gave The Hague an ultimatum, delivered by
Ambassador Nowilaty on October 26 to the Dutch Director-General for
Political Affairs, Van Lynden. The ultimatum contained three demands
that must be satisfied if implementation of the embargo were to be avert-
ed. Firstly, the Dutch Cabinet must condemn the Israeli aggression. Sec-
ondly, it must demand Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories69
and thirdly, the Palestinians’ right to self-determination must be recog-
nized.70
The Dutch Council of Ministers met the same day to discuss the ulti-
matum. Meanwhile, it was learned that Saudi Arabia was classifying con-
sumer countries according to three categories: friendly, neutral and hos-
tile states, with The Netherlands in danger of finding itself ranked as a
hostile state. Van der Stoel concluded that there was no point in yielding
to the ultimatum. In his view, The Hague was being used as a scapegoat,
mainly, he suspected, to strike at The Netherlands’ transit and refining ca-
pacity and, as result, to put pressure on the whole of Europe, although of
course this was not to deny that there was considerable sympathy for Is-
rael among the Dutch population.
During this ministerial council, though in a circumspect manner, a dif-
60
ference of opinion became public between Lubbers and Van der Stoel.
Lubbers expressed his great concern over the situation that had arisen.
There was now a danger that the oil stream might shift from Rotterdam
to other countries. He believed that some Arab countries saw Washington
and The Hague as too much on the same wavelength. He thought it was
probably France that had depicted the Dutch position in the ec as bluntly
pro-Israeli, but he was also of the view that the Cabinet itself was partly
responsible for this image. He advocated that the main determining prin-
ciple in the current situation should ‘not be the aggression of the Arab
states’ but rather ‘the resolution of the conflict on the basis of resolution
242’.
Van der Stoel replied that his policy was aimed at removing misunder-
standings. During the General Debate in the Second Chamber, support
for Israel may have been adopted as a clear principle, but that had been
with an eye to public opinion. Dutch policy continued to be based, as be-
fore, on the implementation of resolution 242 as the condition for any
Middle East solution. According to Van der Stoel the government must
demonstrate publicly that there was no panic. He was not pessimistic. An
attempt to provide a counterweight to the growing criticism of the radical
Arab countries had to be essayed, particularly through Saudi Arabia and
Egypt.
Lubbers replied that, given the way the Saudi position had been formu-
lated, there was apparently room for talking, and he warned against re-
acting too negatively to the ultimatum. Van der Stoel agreed, but at the
same time felt that it had to be made clear that the Dutch Cabinet could
not be blackmailed. In any case, in conversation Ambassador Nowilaty
could be referred to the declaration of October 23, which stated that Is-
rael must withdraw to roughly the same territory as before the 1967
war.71 In the end the Cabinet decided not to comply with the ultimatum.
Van der Stoel would ask Nowilaty to call on him, declare his failure to un-
derstand the content of the ultimatum, and would point out that the gov-
ernment also failed to understand why The Netherlands was being treat-
ed differently from other ec countries. On October 27 Nowilaty was
summoned to an audience with Van der Stoel at which he was handed a
brief statement referring once again to the government statement of Oc-
tober 23. In the Dutch view, there were a number of misunderstandings,
and therefore the Cabinet sought further diplomatic consultations.72
There followed several confused days during which it quickly became
apparent that this response was inadequate. According to some reports,
the Dutch reaction immediately provoked Saudi Arabia to join the embar-
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go, though other reports seemed to point the other way. The Dutch Am-
bassador in Jeddah, in a telephone conversation with a journalist from the
Algemeen Dagblad on October 31, stated that in his view Saudi Arabia
had not called an embargo, a judgement which the paper published the
same day.73 The Dutch Foreign Ministry was not at all happy with this
statement and promptly instructed the Ambassador to make no further
public pronouncements over the embargo, since these could very well
prompt the Saudi government to actually join the embargo demanded by
the Arab League.74
In The Hague, meanwhile, efforts were made to maintain friendly rela-
tions with the so far apparently moderate countries, Tunisia and Iran. To
this end, Van Lynden met with the Ambassadors concerned, trying yet
again to remove the ‘misunderstandings’ that had arisen. He further put it
to the Iranian Ambassador that the embargo was in conflict with the con-
ditions of gatt, and observed that his government in its reaction had for
the present taken a dignified and moderate attitude. Given the position of
Rotterdam, imposing the embargo meant striking at the whole ec. Van
Lynden emphasized his appreciation of the position taken by Iran, which
was continuing to supply oil and was not using it as a political weapon.
Van Lynden expressed himself similarly on October 30 to the Tunisian
Ambassador, who let it be known that his country indeed took a moder-
ate position, but out of solidarity had to conform with the other Arab
states. At that moment, Tunisia was not able to oppose the voice of the Al-
gerians. In his view, the Arabs had been most incensed by the Dutch gov-
ernment’s statement of October 9, which spoke of withdrawing behind
the truce lines existing before the October War. These were, after all, not
recognized state boundaries but demarcation lines resulting from the ille-
gal, six-year Israeli occupation of Arab territory.75
On November 2, the move that had been feared was finally taken: Sau-
di Arabia definitively joined the embargo. There had been uncertainty
over Saudi intentions for several days. Kissinger later maintained that
Saudi Arabia had not really themselves taken a decision over the embargo
but ‘may have felt their hand tipped by published reports that the sag (the
Saudi Arabian government) had or was about to take such a decision’.76
This view corresponds with Van der Stoel’s own understanding that it
was public speculation over the institution of a Saudi embargo that had
contributed to its actual implementation.
In reaction to these developments, Van der Stoel instructed diplomatic
representatives to refrain from asking for further clarification in future,
either over the oil embargo or any other measures taken against their
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country. The attitude of The Hague was to be one of ‘dignity with moder-
ation’. The impression must at all costs be avoided that there was any con-
fusion or panic. Low key, low profile were to be the watchwords for the
way The Hague would conduct itself, while all would be done to ensure
business as usual. The developments in Saudi Arabia demonstrated, ac-
cording to Van der Stoel, that public pronouncements over the embargo
of Dutch and American business had done no one any good.77 The Dutch
government and Foreign Ministry did not adopt a completely passive po-
sition. Nowilaty in particular was at the same time requested, in secret, to
see whether a special legation would be received by King Feisal. This Van
Roijen mission would in any case have to wait a while.78
The De Lavalette Mission
On October 26, in order to save what could be saved, the Council of Min-
isters agreed with the proposal of the Ambassador in Tehran, P. Renardel
de Lavalette, to arrange a tour of the Gulf States, i.e. Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates. The preparations for such a tour had al-
ready been underway for several days in close consultation with Shell,
who provided the Dutch Foreign Ministry with extensive information
concerning Shell’s interests in the relevant countries. It was also Shell
which suggested the sequence order of visits, although this was not en-
tirely adhered to. During his tour, De Lavalette always had close contact
with the Shell representatives on the spot.79
Although the Dutch Cabinet was later to complain of a lack of solidar-
ity between the ec countries, this initiative was set up without the knowl-
edge of other ec partners. Only London was informed in advance, for the
reason that the English oil interests were closely bound up with the
Dutch. Within the ec, however, no other member state was told by Van
der Stoel what was planned. A modest press conference would be held on
the day of De Lavalette’s arrival. Accordingly, the plan had to be commu-
nicated in strictest confidence to the British government.80
De Lavalette would have to travel to the Gulf States to cultivate good-
will. His most important task was to remove misunderstandings and
false impressions. In connection with the anger allegedly caused by Vre-
deling’s presence at the pro-Israel demonstration in the Amsterdam
Bourse, Van der Stoel instructed him to emphasize that although Vrede-
ling may have been there, it was purely in a private capacity. De Lavalette
should anyway ‘not return to this point of his own accord’.81
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It was soon clear, however, that De Lavalette’s mission was not a sim-
ple one. In preparing his trip, he spoke in Jeddah with the Ambassadors of
the countries he intended to visit, who informed him that their govern-
ments were particularly furious over Vredeling’s attendance at a ‘Zionist
demonstration’. They did not accept the argument that this had occurred
‘in a purely private capacity’.82 Preparing for De Lavalette’s mission in
Kuwait, Ambassador Schorer was told the same: The Hague’s view-
points, Vredeling’s presence in the Bourse and clandestine support for Is-
rael did not contribute to good relations. Besides, it was said, the Arab
world was not asking for an anti-Israeli position, but it did demand an
objective approach.83
The journey began badly. When De Lavalette arrived in Kuwait on Oc-
tober 27, he did not manage to arrange an interview with a single relevant
authority. In desperation, the Ambassador journeyed on to Abu Dhabi
where he had a meeting with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
This went rather better. The Under-Secretary informed him that the Emi-
rates had hesitated several days over the implementation of the oil embar-
go, but had in the event been unable to escape joining the Arab line. After
Abu Dhabi came Qatar. The meeting there with the Foreign Minister, M.
Suheim, began in unpleasantness, but this was later checked, with the
Minister going so far as to express regret over the embargo and promising
that he would inform the Emir of his conversation with De Lavalette.84
Back in Kuwait, De Lavalette was granted a meeting with the Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Rashid al-Rashid. Following several emo-
tional accusations, which De Lavalette suspected were intended for their
effect in the subsequent report, Rashid admitted that the embargo had
been introduced on the basis of the ‘atmospherics’ rather than any solid
evidence that The Hague had actually breached the principle of neutrality.
In Kuwait too, the sore point was raised of Vredeling’s action. As an illus-
tration of Kuwait’s attitude, Rashid pointed to the great number of Pales-
tinians working in Kuwait. He then took up Van der Stoel’s point that the
embargo was actually aimed not so much at The Netherlands as the whole
of Europe. Rashid found this argument unconvincing. The nine ec mem-
ber states, after all, wanted oil as normal and therefore desired no part in
the Dutch-Arab conflict. The Hague therefore stood alone.85
Subsequently, De Lavalette held conversations with the Foreign Minis-
ters of Oman and Bahrein on November 2 and 3. Both Arab Ministers
gave the impression that their countries had been more or less forced to
join the embargo. In Oman, moreover, De Lavalette was reassured that in
all probability The Netherlands would manage to survive through the
‘rescheduling’ of oil.86
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The last country on De Lavalette’s round was Iraq, where he was re-
ceived in an ‘unexpectedly courteous’ fashion, yet at the same time was
given to understand that the nationalization of oil assets was a legal fact
and could no longer be reversed. De Lavalette was given the impression
that Iraq was not immediately about to implement an embargo.87
In his final report, De Lavelette judged that the embargo had not been
implemented with full conviction by several Arab countries, but that
these had been more or less corralled out of solidarity. The basic cause, he
had learned from his conversations, lay in the inadequate attention given
by The Hague to the Arab side of the Middle Eastern conflict. This one-
sided approach was coupled with extreme pro-Israeli pronouncements –
highly distressing to the Arab countries – of certain Dutch authorities. De
Lavelette had the impression, therefore, that friendly words addressed to
the Arab countries could do much good.
The question, thought De Lavalette, was how effective the embargo
was. Kuwait was apparently the sole country that had detailed plans for
its effective implementation. De Lavalette was in general not pessimistic.
He considered it unlikely that there would be further punitive measures
taken against The Netherlands. His general impression was that matters
were sure to simmer down, although the initial Egyptian military success
had created a huge stir in the Arab world, and the oil weapon was now
seen as a powerful resource. De Lavalette concluded that the countries he
had visited would follow the Arab line, but indicated ‘that although the
embargo might be formally adhered to, what further happened to the oil
was otherwise a matter of no concern’.
This was an important and reassuring conclusion. ‘The Netherlands
would manage to survive’, was the assumption in the Arab countries,
specifically through ‘rescheduling’ the oil stream to Rotterdam. If this
were indeed the case, De Lavalette stated, it would be best for various rea-
sons ‘if it were revealed as little as possible to the outside world’. If it were
known, ‘the shadow play would lose its value for the Arabs, and that
could only serve to provoke new actions’.88
It was also assumed in the usa that the embargo was far from effec-
tive. The American Ambassador in Tripoli was already able to report on
October 25, 1973, that the Libyan authorities had let it be known that
they had no objection to exporting oil ‘not documented as destined di-
rectly for us ports’. It turned out that the Libyan National Oil Company
was simply continuing to fill American tankers or oil tankers bound for
the usa without showing the least concern for the question of the oil’s
destination. The National Oil Company turned away not a single Ameri-
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can buyer, so long as they were prepared to pay high prices.89
It became apparent from other sources that even Algeria, the main in-
stigator of the embargo, was not taking it too literally. On October 30,
the American Ambassador in Algiers was able to report that the Algerian
government evinced no serious interest in the ultimate destination of their
oil exports. A captain of a tanker originally bound for the usa, but who
had in the meantime altered his destination on the freight documents,
was informed by the Algerian official that his government had absolutely
no interest in what tankers did once they were on the open seas. In addi-
tion, there still remained the question of whether Algeria would reduce its
oil production by 10% as agreed within the oapec.90
None of this, however, could disguise the fact that, however merely for-
mal, an embargo had been declared against The Netherlands. It was abun-
dantly clear that there was great irritation in various Arab countries with
the attitude taken by The Hague. Ex-minister Luns, at that time Secre-
tary-General of nato, had also noted this whilst in Turkey between Octo-
ber 24 and November 1. According to Luns, this resentment was not so
much a consequence of what The Netherlands had in fact done to favour
Israel, but the public remarks of some Cabinet members. Luns pointed out
to his interlocutors that The Hague had accommodated the Arab coun-
tries, in spite of the pressure brought to bear from ‘certain quarters’, by
declining to supply Israel with any war materials. The present government
had difficulties, according to Luns, because of the role of left-wing ‘agita-
tors’. He assured them that Van der Stoel was certainly not anti-Arab.91
The Second Chamber
Meanwhile, the seriousness of the embargo began to penetrate through to
public opinion and the Second Chamber, leading in turn to a remarkable
change of stance. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Second
Chamber stood foursquare behind Israel. This now began to change, and
a major role in this change was played by the party-political composition
of the Den Uyl Cabinet, so recently put together. It was suggested by the
conservative-liberal vvd that the government and Van der Stoel with
their politics of ‘bearing witness’ had put Dutch interests in the Arab
world at risk. Criticism of government policy was also expressed in the
press, particularly NRC Handelsblad and De Telegraaf. NRC Handels-
blad even spoke in somewhat overwrought terms of the ‘collapse of our
step by step, almost completely democratized, foreign policy’.92 Reject-
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ing this criticism at a press conference held on October 30, Van der Stoel
insisted that he had never taken an anti-Arab standpoint.
The standpoints taken on the October War and the Arab grievances
were set out once again in an internal Foreign Ministry memorandum on
the eve of a debate in the Second Chamber. The Dutch government’s posi-
tion was in general balanced; Israel had to withdraw from the occupied
areas, subject to minor border corrections; Israel’s security had to be
guaranteed; a just solution had to be found for the position of the Pales-
tinians. Beside this, after the outbreak of the October War, The Nether-
lands had never spoken of aggression against Israel. The ec declaration of
October 13 was unanimously accepted and embraced all the elements of
resolution 242. The only objection the Cabinet had was to a mandate
granted to Great Britain and France to speak on behalf of the Nine in the
Security Council.
The Dutch Foreign Ministry memorandum denied most emphatically
that The Hague had given Israel military support. There had been no re-
cruitment of volunteers, and The Netherlands had not served as a bridge-
head for arms transports to Israel. Since the outbreak of the war, no per-
mits had been granted for the export of arms to the war area. klm had
transported neither soldiers nor material to Israel. Only on October 9 had
there been a further flight to Tel Aviv. No oil had been supplied to Israel,
and Vredeling had participated in a pro-Israeli demonstration ‘in an en-
tirely personal capacity’. It was true that the Dutch people, for historical
reasons, had much sympathy for the Jewish people and for Israel, but dur-
ing the war there had also appeared expressions of understanding for the
Arab cause in the national press.93
On October 31, the Dutch government’s policy with regard to the Oc-
tober War was once more raised in the Second Chamber for further ex-
tensive discussion. The vvd spokesman, F. Portheine, opened this discus-
sion by putting several critical questions. He thought perhaps the report-
ing had been rather haphazard and asked whether the De Lavalette mis-
sion that was underway could not be used to lay the ground for a visit by
Van der Stoel to the Arab countries. M.W.J.M. Peijnenburg (kvp) also
thought that Dutch diplomacy had not always been effective given the
number of misunderstandings that had apparently arisen between The
Netherlands and the Arab countries. More fundamental was the criticism
of M.J.J.A. Imkamp (of the d’66 party) who asked whether the govern-
ment was finally ready to underwrite the French interpretation of resolu-
tion 242. The Cabinet was mainly supported by A. van der Hek (of the
Labour Party, the PvdA). In general, the Chamber seemed to have a better
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understanding of the Arab side and the position of the Palestinians than
they had three weeks earlier.
In their replies, Den Uyl and Van der Stoel emphasized that govern-
ment policy had not altered since the statement of October 9, on which
occasion the Chamber had scarcely uttered a word of criticism. Van der
Stoel went into the background of the embargo. The Arab countries felt
that The Netherlands had manifestly not understood them for a long
time, thought the Minister. On the Dutch side, despite sympathy for Is-
rael, regular initiatives had been essayed to try to remove this feeling. In
order to improve relations with the Arab countries, Van der Stoel had in-
vited the Egyptian Foreign Minister to visit The Hague at the end of Au-
gust. Dutch diplomats had used every possible opportunity to overturn
the many misunderstandings current in the Arab capitals. Van der Stoel
emphatically declared his conviction that the meeting with the four Arab
Ambassadors had not been the cause of the embargo. The decision had in
all probability been taken earlier, and it was directed against the whole of
Europe. He endorsed the standpoint that the Palestinian question also de-
served attention.94
The Cabinet was thus subjected to considerable criticism during this
debate. During the uncertain days immediately preceding the Saudi deci-
sion to join the embargo, this disapproval was also voiced outside the
Chamber. The PvdA member of the Dutch parliament, R. ter Beek, pub-
licly stated on November 2 that, in view of the often divergent and con-
flicting reports concerning the attitudes and aims of various Arab coun-
tries, particularly Saudi Arabia, he had serious doubts over the quality of
the diplomatic service. At a press conference on the same day, Den Uyl re-
jected this criticism: Dutch diplomatic representatives in Arab countries,
he said, had nothing to reproach themselves with.
KLM
The measures taken against The Netherlands were not restricted to oil.
From the moment the October war broke out, rumours began to circulate
to the effect that the usa and Israel had arranged supplies of arms by
means of hired European aircraft. As we saw, klm in particular was sup-
posed to have transported military experts and volunteers to Israel. These
and similar accusations were put out by – among other sources – the Arab
League’s Bureau for the Boycott of Israel. It quickly became clear that
various Arab countries were considering denying klm landing rights.
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klm denied all involvement from the outset. In a press statement it was
firmly stated that since the outbreak of the October War, there had been
no more flights to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Damascus or Amman. There had been
one more flight to Tel Aviv on October 9 to pick up stranded passengers,
but that was all. The Dutch Foreign Ministry sought to back up klm.
Ambassadors in Beirut, Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem received instruc-
tions to communicate the contents of the klm press conference to the re-
spective authorities without making any public statement.95 In spite of
this, klm’s position became more difficult when accusations began to
emerge over involvement in arms transport to Israel via Schiphol (Ams-
terdam Airport).
It has also not been excluded that klm might have hired aircraft to the
Israeli airforce or to El Al. An ex-member of the Mossad, the Israeli intel-
ligence service, believes that klm flew mainly from Tehran to Tel Aviv. At
the time, like Israel, Iran used weapons systems almost exclusively of
American manufacture. The Shah would have sent war materials to Israel
through Turkish air space, for which purpose klm transport planes
would also have been used. Former officers of the Dutch secret security
service claim that the Dutch Schreiner Airways and other charter compa-
nies were involved in the secret arms deliveries via Schiphol to Israel.96
On October 16 the Dutch Ambassador in Damascus, J.B.E.Ph. van
Hoeve, reported that the Syrian government appeared to be endorsing one
of the accusations against The Netherlands. According to Under-Secre-
tary for Foreign Affairs Rafai, ‘fifteen aircraft loaded with weapons and
ammunition left Schiphol’.97 On October 21 the Syrian government
called for a total boycott of The Netherlands, including klm. Van der
Stoel maintained his policy of not reacting publicly to the accusations lev-
elled at klm, but trying rather to resolve the matter as far as possible
through diplomatic contacts. Diplomatic efforts to support klm, howev-
er, made difficult headway. In Cairo, Ambassador Von Oven was sum-
moned by the acting Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmi, whose communica-
tion that Dutch volunteers taken prisoner by Egypt would not be consid-
ered as prisoners of war seemed to indicate that he gave little credence to
Van der Stoel’s disclaimers. And yet Von Oven came away with the im-
pression that Fahmi wanted to give the Dutch standpoint on the Middle
East the benefit of the doubt. The Boycott Bureau and the Middle East
were not totally convinced by the klm statement, thought Fahmi. He of-
fered to get both statements broadcast again on radio, tv and in the press,
an offer that was gratefully accepted by Von Oven.98
It became clear on October 21 that Jordan was willing to join the klm
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boycott demanded by Syria. The Jordanian Director-General for Political
Affairs informed the Dutch Ambassador, A.C. Vroon, and a klm repre-
sentative that in view of the communal struggle against Israel his country,
to his regret, was compelled to follow Syria. Action in Amman was point-
less: The Netherlands would have to present evidence to the contrary to
the Boycott Bureau.99 But apart from this, Van der Stoel had forbidden
any contact with this Bureau, since it was not recognized by the Dutch
government. Two days later, news came that Iran was also about to join
the boycott of klm.
klm did not let matters rest there. On October 23 a letter was com-
posed in Arabic on behalf of the President-Director in which issue was
taken with ‘untruths’. klm succeeded in making direct contact with the
Boycott Bureau and in seeing that no new steps against klm would be
urged. A request to withdraw all punitive measures, however, would have
to come from Damascus where, meanwhile, klm had already ap-
proached the Syrian Foreign Minister. 100 On October 25 the Dutch Am-
bassadors to the Arab countries once more received instructions to stand
behind klm as far as possible.
On October 26, however, the Arab League’s Boycott Bureau in Dam-
ascus let it be known that klm, together with Sabena, Lufthansa and Air
France, had been informed they could only resume flights to Tel Aviv after
Israel had vacated the occupied territories. This seemed a good occasion
for cooperation, but klm was not in favour of joint action, as it informed
Van der Stoel. klm’s position in the Middle East was stronger than that
of Sabena, Air France or Lufthansa,101 in spite of all the problems, and for
this reason the Minister refrained from any initiatives involving joint ac-
tion.
In fact, aside from the Syrian appeal, it turned out that only the Jordan-
ian government had announced a boycott against klm. In Amman, Am-
bassador Vroon tried to get this action undone at the end of October, with
the Jordanians promising that klm would be allowed to resume flights to
Amman once it became clear that Damascus gave permission to fly over
Syrian territory. The Ambassador in Syria, in accord with the ‘low key
policy’, made no direct approach but merely assumed that klm would be
able to land again as soon as the Damascus airport was opened to civil
traffic.102
The situation was thus a confusing one, but apart from Jordan there
was no question of actual boycott. This did not altogether prevent the sit-
uation starting to become more difficult for klm at the end of October,
when boycotts were called by unions and other organizations for which
70
the governments of the countries concerned could not really be held re-
sponsible. In Iraq, such actions were staged by the Association of Iraqi
Travel Agencies. In Libya, a workers’ boycott of American and Dutch
ships and air traffic was announced by the Federation of Arab Trade
Unions. On November 2 the International Federation of Arab Trade
Unions adopted a severe resolution which, among its articles, recom-
mended a total boycott of American and Dutch ships, aircraft and goods;
and in fact in Libya there were boycott actions against klm. In Egypt,
where the political situation was tense following the collapse of the Sinai
front, similar actions were threatened.103
Conclusion
Low profile or not, the situation looked particularly unpropitious for The
Netherlands, although the Dutch were not entirely alone. Denmark was
also subjected to an embargo. But that was of small comfort. Those states
that had proclaimed an embargo against The Netherlands provided more
than two-thirds of total Dutch oil imports. If these were really going to be
blocked, this would undoubtedly entail complex economic consequences.
Diplomatic measures taken so far had had relatively little effect. Van der
Stoel was still assuming on October 6 that it would be possible to put up
some resistance to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but a week later the biggest
oil producer of all had joined the embargo. In the meantime, the Minister
had made it clear to his representatives that the policy must be low key,
hoping to conduct business as usual as much as possible.
It is not easy to establish what was the actual purpose of the Arab
countries in choosing The Netherlands as their target. The reason that
was served up by all the Arab states involved for imposing the oil embargo
was the alleged support for Israel during the October War, but the ques-
tion remains whether the embargo was really – or solely – about Dutch
Middle Eastern policy. By striking at Rotterdam – and Van der Stoel was
right in this – the whole of Northwest Europe was affected because of the
port’s transit importance in Europe’s oil flow. The embargo therefore
looked like an attempt to put pressure on the whole ec. On the other
hand, the Arab measures against The Netherlands rapidly led to serious
conflict within the ec, which only seemed to make any ec political in-
volvement in the Middle East all the more unlikely.
But there was certainly more at stake during the oil crisis than the Is-
raeli question. The measures taken by the Arab opec countries were not
71
a purely political sanction against those countries that had allied them-
selves with Israel during the war. The oil crisis was also part of a struggle
in the international oil sector. The Arab countries, albeit from different
perspectives and interests, had set themselves to break the mould of tradi-
tional relations within the oil sector, in which Rotterdam occupied an im-
portant position. It was the home port of one of the Seven Sisters and fur-
thermore a crucial link in the chain of processing and distributing oil and
oil derivatives in Northwest Europe. So at a quite early stage of the crisis,
Van der Stoel was convinced that the embargo had already been prepared
months before the outbreak of the October War.
In conversation with Golda Meir on November 13, Den Uyl also em-
phasized that the oil weapon had been planned well in advance. PvdA
leader in parliament Ed van Thijn, learned of this on November 15 in the
Permanent Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence and Security Ser-
vices. The parliamentary leaders of the four main political parties were
told that as early as July there had been indications that an embargo had
been decided on. According to Van Thijn the Dutch attitude had little to
do with it. The same statement was repeated the following day in the gov-
ernmental consultation between the PvdA Ministers and parliamentary
party leaders.104 These judgements do not square at all with the asser-
tions of the ex-honorary consul for Kuwait, Mahmoud Rabbani, to the
effect that the decision to boycott The Netherlands was of Van der Stoel’s
fault.105
However, when it came to the boycott and other measures, such as na-
tionalizations in Iraq, there were differences of outlook, objectives and
expectation within the Arab world. 106 For some, the Palestinians for ex-
ample, the primary objective was political, part of the fight against Israel.
For others, the struggle was to break out of existing power and property
relations in the international oil sector, for example Iraq and possibly also
Algeria, even though the former did not participate while the latter did.
Some countries joined in simply because they did not want to desert the
Arab cause. For Saudi Arabia it was perhaps an attempt to avoid more
radical measures whilst at the same time ensuring that the price hikes
agreed in Kuwait would in this way be more easily accepted. As a result,
the embargo assumed a more politico-symbolic aspect, based on the idea
that the major oil companies would in any case supply Rotterdam with
enough oil. These various points of view and different objectives made it
very difficult for the Den Uyl government, and for Van der Stoel in partic-
ular, to take any effective action against the embargo.
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3European Divisions
By the end of October, the situation in the Middle East had still not stabi-
lized. During the night of October 24/25, the Security Council had called
on the belligerents to comply with a cease-fire demand and to withdraw
to the positions of October 22. A day later Kurt Waldheim, the un Secre-
tary-General, submitted a plan to station a peace force of 7000 men in the
conflict zone for a six-month period. The principal task of this United Na-
tions Emergency Force would be to ensure the cease-fire along the Suez
Canal, and the withdrawal of all troops behind the lines occupied on Oc-
tober 22 (when the truce should originally have come into operation). The
first Egyptian-Israeli talks were held under un auspices on the 27th.
Despite these developments, a peace accord was still remote. On No-
vember 5, 1973, Kissinger left for the Middle East to help work out an Is-
raeli-Egyptian armistice. This effort was rewarded with some success,
even if only the agreement of a truce formula for the Israeli-Egyptian
front. On November 11 an agreement was signed by the Israeli Major-
General Aharon Yariv and his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Ghani
Gamasi, under which Israel undertook to withdraw to the positions of
October 22. But it quickly became apparent that further details of the
truce would be more difficult to work out; and not only were the Israeli-
Egyptian negotiations threatened with an impasse, agreement on the Is-
raeli-Syrian front had not even begun.1
The war had ended but at the beginning of November, despite all diplo-
matic efforts, the embargo aimed at The Netherlands went ahead, al-
though not all Arab oil-exporting countries participated. On November
4, the Arab opec countries succeeded in closing ranks again with the an-
nouncement that November’s oil production would be reduced by 25%
(compared with September levels). Although this was again a powerful
measure, the reductions implemented earlier were discounted, including
73
the embargo in place against The Netherlands, the usa and Denmark (on
account of its pro-Israeli stance), so that the Arab resolutions of Novem-
ber 4 appeared worse than they in fact were, as the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs observed.2
Nonetheless, serious problems were becoming apparent to the con-
sumer countries. As stated by the Dutch Cabinet on several occasions, in-
ternational cooperation was needed to deal with these developments.
Such cooperation should chiefly take shape within the context of the
oecd or the ec. In the event, however, it would prove difficult to achieve
a common response among the consumer countries, for these countries,
even in Western Europe, seemed to be more keenly competitive than co-
operative.
Initially, the Dutch government hoped that steps could be taken within
the oecd to come to the assistance of countries affected by the embargo:
in fact, the oecd had tried in the 1950s and 1960s to develop an emer-
gency allocation system. The Dutch Cabinet also tried to move the Euro-
pean Commission to introduce a proportional sharing of oil within the
ec, but it was quickly evident that both these attempts were fruitless.
Meanwhile it was learned that the Foreign Ministers of the ec were to
meet within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (epc)
to discuss the situation that had arisen. This appeared to be an important
conference, for it was hoped that the other ec partners would show soli-
darity with The Netherlands. The Hague had two objectives: proportion-
al sharing of oil supplies for ec member states, and the maintenance of
free traffic within the common market. However, it was a very open ques-
tion whether the other European partners were prepared to agree on a
common policy with regard to the oil crisis: interests within the ec were
widely divergent, and in addition, the Arabs were threatening sanctions
against countries that lent The Netherlands a helping hand. And the past,
too, stood in the way of effective cooperation.
The Netherlands and European Integration
The process of European integration at the time of the oil crisis was in a
dynamic phase. The entry of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973
had expanded the ec to nine countries. General de Gaulle had for years
resisted Britain’s entry, but after the General’s departure in 1969, agree-
ment had been reached over the Community’s expansion. After all the
conflicts of the 1960s, this expansion seemed to provide European inte-
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gration with a new boost, and consequently plans were worked out
around 1970 to develop the ec, in good time, into an economic union. In
1971, the six government leaders and heads of state adopted a plan to in-
troduce monetary union in 1980.3
This European revival went hand in hand with, and perhaps con-
tributed to, a growing estrangement between America and Europe. At the
time there were various conflicts and differences of opinion in play be-
tween the West European countries and the usa, not least in the monetary
area and over trade. The Nixon government was reproached with its pur-
suit of an economic and monetary politics all too closely aimed at further-
ing America’s own interests, while at the same time there was increasing
criticism in Western Europe and also in Japan of America’s prosecution of
the war in Vietnam. This irritation in European capitals and in Tokyo
was only further augmented by the lack of consultation over such matters
as the détente with the Soviet Union, the salt-1 treaty (1972), the ap-
proach to China, and the Middle East. Mutual relations seemed to deteri-
orate so far that in 1973, Kissinger called for the Year of Europe, in an at-
tempt to breathe new life into the Atlantic Alliance, albeit on a new foun-
dation.4 The French historian Alfred Grosser believes, nonetheless, that
1973 was the nadir of postwar American-European relations.5
The ec itself had for years been the ground of serious differences of
opinion and collisions of interest. The Netherlands had played an active
role in these conflicts, not least as the opponent of Gaullist France. The
two countries had also opposed each other in the years 1960-63 following
France’s proposal to reform the ec as a political union. Luns had stood by
the principle that the Community must remain an economic community,
whose aim was the free economic movement between the Six, in which
the institutions created by the Treaty of Rome, and particularly the Euro-
pean Commission, should play a leading role. Furthermore, the Dutch ar-
gued, the politicisation of European integration threatened to undermine
the unity of nato.6 Following the breakthrough of 1969, i.e. the decision
to expand the ec to nine members, various plans were mooted in the early
1970s to try to get the political development of the Community moving
again. One of these plans, the Davignon report in 1969, advocated more
consultation and perhaps even a level of harmonization of foreign policies
within the epc framework. In the second Davignon report, from July
1973, it was proposed that the nine member states, after mutual consulta-
tions, should adopt a common standpoint on questions ‘in those fields
where a common position would be necessary or desirable’.7 In this same
period, the need arose to give more authority to consultations between ec
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heads of state and government leaders to meet on a more regular basis and
even to form an institutionalized European Council, a proposal which
would be definitively decided in 1974. 8
Although de Gaulle had in the meantime disappeared from the stage,
the Dutch in the early 1970s remained apprehensive about political coop-
eration within the ec. The Netherlands opposed the intensification of epc
consultations, nor did The Hague look kindly on the institutionalization
of the European Council – though on this point it has to be said that there
was a difference of opinion within the Den Uyl Cabinet, between the Pre-
mier and his Foreign Minister, Van der Stoel. This difference of opinion
was also to play a part during the oil crisis. It should be borne in mind that
the institutional changes in the ec were still fresh, such as the introduc-
tion of official epc-preliminary consultations in the form of the Comité
Politique of the Directors-General for Political Affairs (dgpa’s).
In the years leading up to the oil crisis, there had also been clear differ-
ences of opinion between France and The Netherlands in the field of ener-
gy policy. The Hague objected to the more controlling, dirigiste, role of
the ec in the provision of energy, and its greater independence from the
usa, as proposed by Paris. The Netherlands stood for a free oil market in
the ec and for maintaining the existing power structure in the interna-
tional, and especially in the West European oil sector in which, after all,
The Netherlands occupied an important position.
The Dutch government had also resisted plans put forward in 1968 by
the European Commission for developing a common policy on the trade
in oil and oil products. These were considered at the time as being exces-
sively dirigiste, threatening to involve the ec in all kinds of political com-
plications. As we have said, The Netherlands – even after the formation of
opec – was against direct consultations between the West European
countries and the oil producers. As set out in the Explanatory Memoran-
dum for 1972: ‘The government commits itself not to get involved in the
negotiations between the producer countries and the oil companies.’ Un-
like those countries with state-owned oil companies like Italy and France,
the feeling in The Hague was against any direct state intervention in the
negotiations between the oil companies and opec, which were seen as ‘a
purely commercial matter’.9
These basic premises were set out again in a note of October 1972, on
the occasion of a conference on the ec’s energy policy. According to this
note, the little progress made in the preceding years toward establishing a
common energy policy was mainly due to the very real differences in the
energy situation of the different countries of Europe; and above all, the
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very different perceptions of The Hague and Paris. Paris wanted to pro-
mote the assurance of oil provision by obtaining direct influence over im-
ports. In addition, it has to be said, Paris was also working to raise the
status of the smaller French oil companies to the same level as Shell and
bp.10
Such objectives were of course in conflict with Dutch interests. The
Dutch Cabinet naturally therefore took an extremely cool stand on the
French ideas over market regulation. The Hague was in general opposed
to ec intervention in the oil sector. 11 The British entry into the ec was re-
garded in The Hague as a welcome counterweight to those member states
very much in favour of market regulation and state intervention, such as
France and Italy; and indeed, British membership was soon making itself
felt. Shortly before the oil crisis, proposals were put before the European
Commission that were far more in line with the Dutch views, based as
they were on the principle of a free, communal energy market.12 Subse-
quently, however, as we shall see, the role of the British government dur-
ing the oil crisis was to disappoint The Hague.
France
In fact, from the very outset, it turned out to be exceptionally difficult
during the oil crisis to achieve a common ec approach. There was no
question of a common ec policy to the oil crisis itself; on the contrary, the
ec proved to be the theatre of conflict and a clash of interests.
Paris had already been busy before the oil crisis enhancing its competi-
tive strength in the oil trade by improving the ports of Marseille, Dunkirk
and above all Le Havre. The main objective was to try and strengthen the
position of the French state oil companies. These attempts, based on
large-scale government support, were at the same time aimed at under-
mining the position of Rotterdam as the most important centre of the oil
trade and the main transit port in Europe. This of course did not go unob-
served in The Hague and elsewhere.13 The Dutch Ambassador in Paris,
J.A. de Ranitz, reported that ‘quite a number of the French’ would not
look askance if ‘the position of Rotterdam as the first world port [were]
put in danger’, from which, it was hoped, ports like Dunkirk, Le Havre
and Marseille might gain advantage. For this reason, some of the French
thought their pro-Arab political stance, certainly in comparison with
that of The Netherlands, was beginning to bear fruit. For the time being,
thought De Ranitz, ‘the French government itself was of the view that a
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certain degree of solidarity was called for’, but despite this, it was quickly
apparent in The Hague that French politicians and diplomats in different
situations were adopting an attitude that was ‘incredibly lacking in soli-
darity’.14 In particular, the conduct of the French Foreign Minister,
Michel Jobert, was followed in The Hague with rapidly growing dismay
and distrust.15
During the crisis, characteristic and fundamental differences of out-
look between France and The Netherlands were revealed, both over the
direction of development of the ec and over the ec’s energy policy. In ad-
dition to these problems, there appeared to exist similarly antithetical po-
sitions on European political and economic cooperation, as well as the
American-European relationship. Furthermore, very different concep-
tions of the conflict in the Middle East also played a role. In fact, all these
aspects, both from the French and the Dutch viewpoints, were closely
connected. The French president, Georges Pompidou, pursued a policy
that might be described as ‘Gaullism without de Gaulle’, with the qualifi-
cation that he had exchanged de Gaulle’s globalism for a European orien-
tation and the ec.16 And the Dutch-French clashes under de Gaulle were
still fresh in the French memory. According to Grosser, Pompidou com-
plained to a close confidant:
Les Hollandais detestent la France: c’est la seule constante de leur his-
toire. Ils nous donnent les leçons sur l’Europe, mais ils ne souhaitent
rien d’autre que de l’amarrer à l’Amérique.17
And in a similar vein the president told the West German Chancellor,
Willy Brandt, that The Hague had never striven for European solidarity.
The Netherlands was merely a place of transit: ‘un lieu de passage’.18
On October 31, De Ranitz reported that Paris did still see something in
solidarity. A day later in a meeting with dgpa Van Lynden, the French
Ambassador in The Hague, J. Senard, left no possibility of misunder-
standing over the French attitude regarding the oil crisis and the embargo
against The Netherlands. Senard stated that France was only inclined to
work together for a Community solution to the oil crisis if The Nether-
lands was prepared to accept a Middle East statement in the epc. And in
addition to this, said Senard, The Hague should endorse the principle of a
common ec energy policy. According to Senard, it was clear that in times
of scarcity the oil companies no longer had an adequate grip on the mar-
ket mechanism. It was therefore necessary for The Netherlands to adapt
to circumstances and to accept that a system of European market regula-
tion had to be established.19
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In several ways, Italy found itself in a position essentially in agreement
with France. Italy also had major state oil companies, although there
were differences of opinion on the politics of energy and oil which had be-
come evident shortly before the oil crisis, when reports began to circulate
suggesting that Shell wanted to pull out of Italy. Some European-oriented
politicians opposed this, since otherwise there would have been only
American and state oil companies remaining.20 Nevertheless, it was
quickly apparent that the Italian attitude toward the oil crisis was close to
that of the French.
Great Britain
At this stage, the impression began to grow in the Hague that not only
Paris but also London was prepared to go to great lengths to secure its
own oil supply. This was a blow, given the expectations aroused in The
Hague by Britain’s entry into the Common Market. London was having
to deal with the extraordinary circumstances of a massive miners’ strike
at the same time as the oil crisis, added to which Prime Minister Edward
Heath had to contend with serious misgivings within his Conservative
Party as to the wisdom of joining the ec at all. Here then was the opportu-
nity for the Heath government to refute once and for all the assumption
that the ec could only be expected to bring misery and misfortune.
Although the differences between the Dutch and the British were less
fundamental than with the French, the prospects for ‘solidarity’ from
Britain now appeared equally slight. That, at least, was the message from
the Dutch Ambassador in London. On November 1 he reported that the
oil companies were being put under pressure ‘at the highest level’, i.e. by
Heath himself,
to move them to make an exception for the United Kingdom in fixing
quotas for Middle Eastern oil, and to maintain unimpaired supplies to
the uk; in other words to pass on the reductions applied by the produc-
ers to other countries.21
This actually happened when Heath summoned Frank McFadzean of
Shell and Eric Drake of bp to a meeting as early as October 21. The Shell
and bp representatives let it be known on this occasion that because of
their role as international players they were unable to comply with this re-
quest. But the British government would be able to force them if it came
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to it, Heath had threatened, by issuing an Order in Council.
McFadzean and Drake, however, declined to guarantee a full 100%
delivery. When McFadzean remarked delicately that 60% of Royal Dutch
Shell was in Dutch hands, an irritated Heath turned to Drake: the British
government owned 51% of shares in bp. Drake asked Heath to put his re-
quest in writing, to which the enraged Prime Minister replied: ‘You know
perfectly well that I can’t put it in writing’. Drake’s response was: ‘Then I
won’t do it’.22
The Dutch Foreign Minister, Van der Stoel, wanted to discuss the
whole question with his British counterpart, Douglas Home, preferably
before the ec meeting of November 5 and 6, but Home had no time, he
said. He did write Van der Stoel a personal letter in which he observed
that it would be best for everyone if as much oil as possible continued to
enter Europe. Communal action co-ordinated by the ec would not con-
tribute to this.23 This did not sound particularly cooperative, and Van der
Stoel instructed Ambassador Gevers to issue a démarche expressing the
hope that London would not take ‘unilateral definitive steps’ before the
ec talks ‘which could prejudice cooperation within the ec or oecd’. On
November 2 Gevers held discussions with the Permanent Under-Secre-
tary at the British Foreign Ministry, D. Greenhill. The Dutch Ambas-
sador indeed expressed the hope that London would take no steps before
November 5, which Greenhill was able to promise.24
The following morning, Gevers had a further meeting with the Assis-
tant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, G. Parsons, who said that
Arab suspicion was the consequence of the position the Dutch had taken
during the political discussions of the Nine, of which ‘the Arabs (and Is-
raelis) were always extremely well-informed’. The Arab countries had
been given the impression that The Netherlands was the major stumbling
block to formulating European support for the Arab cause. Parsons won-
dered whether The Hague could not stress continued Dutch support for
the un resolution 2949 of December 1972, one of the most pro-Arab res-
olutions passed by the General Assembly which The Netherlands had
supported at the time. According to Parsons, this would give the leaders
of the Gulf States in particular room to extricate themselves from the em-
bargo, or at least not to apply it too rigorously.25
The Dutch were thus put under pressure from the British side as well as
the French to take more account of the Arab standpoints. On November
5, the first day of the ec meeting in Brussels, there occurred an incident in
the House of Commons in London which was highly inconvenient to the
Dutch: the Labour MP, Christopher Mayhew, said that the British gov-
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ernment should be very careful of making any agreement to ‘pool oil re-
sources’ with countries which, by supplying arms, had de facto chosen
sides in the October War. The Minister of Trade, Peter Walker, did not re-
act to this accusation, giving the impression that his government attached
some credence to such rumours. Gevers asked The Hague whether it was
necessary to approach the Foreign Ministry – at least, ‘assuming both as-
sertions could be categorically denied’. The Dutch Foreign Ministry ap-
parently had no trouble with this, for the Ambassador was instructed the
following day to do just this.26
The Neighbouring EC Countries
For various different reasons the conflicts with neighbouring ec member
states appeared less acute than with France and Britain. There was more
ec solidarity urged from the West German and the Belgian sides than by
Paris or London, though neither country was always willing to acknowl-
edge that solidarity in public. Both West Germany and Belgium were
much more directly affected by an embargo against The Netherlands be-
cause of the importance of Rotterdam for their oil supply. This meant
that both countries, to a degree, were in the same boat as The Nether-
lands. As set out in the Dutch Foreign Ministry report mentioned earlier,
‘The Dutch policy during the oil crisis’, in his approach toward ec part-
ners, Van der Stoel made ‘maximum use of the uncertainty over the ques-
tion of whether oil destined for transit also fell under the embargo’.27 And
that meant mainly Belgium and West Germany.
This strategy seemed to work. In Bonn there was great uncertainty
over the consequences of the embargo, as the Dutch Ambassador F. Ku-
pers reported from Bonn. 28 The embassy in Bonn in fact received many
questions about the extent and the consequences of the embargo, espe-
cially over the consequences for West German oil imports via The Nether-
lands. The question was also asked whether the export controls on oil
products announced by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (see
chapter 4) also applied to the German emergency stocks prescribed by the
ec, which in part were stored in the Botlek area in Rotterdam-Europort
and were not formally imported into The Netherlands at all. An arrange-
ment had been made between the two Economics Ministers over these
stocks in December 1970, in which it was provided that they in no way
whatever fell under Dutch authority, not even in case of crisis. But, as es-
tablished by Dutch Economic Affairs on more businesslike grounds, the
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legal form of this agreement was no more than an administrative accord
between two ministers. In other words, a new minister need not feel
bound by this agreement at all.29 And in the meantime there had been a
new minister.
The West German social democratic government under the leadership
of Willy Brandt, in the Dutch view, assumed an attitude of far greater sol-
idarity than either Paris or London, even if this was partly through self-
interest. Kupers reported from Bonn that high officials of the Auswärtige
Amt (Foreign Affairs) and the Bundeskanzleramt (Cabinet Office) left no
doubt that the common market must be maintained. Even the French, it
was thought, must realize that economic decline in The Netherlands and
West Germany would have serious repercussions on France itself.30
In any case, the West German understanding for the Dutch problems
in the Arab world did not go unnoticed. The rumours and reports of arms
transports over West Germany to Israel also played a role here.31 The
Libyan Ambassador to The Netherlands tried to incite his interlocutors
against The Netherlands by declaring that if The Hague could not be
forced to adopt a ‘neutral standpoint’, the Dutch should anticipate a cold
winter, which would also endanger West German oil provisions.32
Belgium of course was also heavily dependent on oil supplies from
Rotterdam. Some 25 million tons of crude oil passed annually through
the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline, and the Antwerp refineries were totally
dependent on this supply. It was therefore of the utmost importance for
Brussels to know what exactly the embargo entailed. If it was purely di-
rected against The Netherlands as oil consumer, the consequences for the
Belgian market would be negligible, the Dutch embassy in Brussels con-
cluded. But if it was an action taken against the exploitative companies
making use of Dutch ports, then the whole question at once became more
problematic in view of the fact that Belgium depended on deliveries from
these ports.33
The Belgian Foreign Ministry took the position that solidarity among
the Nine must be the priority.34 This sounded good, but it did not prevent
problems arising between Brussels and The Hague. On October 24,
1973, a ministerial decision was announced in Belgium by which the ex-
port of a number of oil products would henceforth be subject to permits.
This order also applied to exports to The Netherlands, whereas the con-
verse had until then not been the case in The Netherlands. At the end of
October, though, the Belgian policy relaxed a little, i.e. the issue of per-
mits for exports to ec countries would in most cases be automatically
granted.35
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The O E C D
The circumstances that had arisen made it desirable for the Western con-
sumer countries to work together to combat the oil crisis, but this was not
so self-evident. From the Dutch viewpoint, an obvious framework for the
realization of such cooperation appeared to be either the ec or the oecd.
The oecd had as an additional advantage the fact that all the main,
Western industrialized countries were members, making a European
Alleingang – to which The Netherlands had always objected – impossible.
Furthermore, the matter of emergency measures in times of crisis or of
acute oil shortages had been discussed within the oecd over some years.
The problems of oil supply during the Suez crisis of 1956 had led the then
oeec (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the predeces-
sor of the oecd) to set up a scheme for sharing the burden of a reduced oil
supply between the various West European countries. The Middle East
war of 1967, when England and France were affected by an oil embargo,
had prompted the oecd to develop this scheme further.
The ruling was only applicable to the West European countries. In the
1970s, the situation on the oil market changed rather drastically as a re-
sult of rapid growth in the demand for oil and the increasing dependence
of Japan and the usa. Washington was rather unwilling to put the vast oil
production at home under the common oecd emergency system. In pre-
vious years, these developments had led to several fruitless attempts to
come to a ruling acceptable to all oecd members. Until just before the oil
crisis, ideas over such allocation schemes were still being exchanged with-
in the oecd.
Immediately following the first reports of reduced production, the
Dutch Cabinet appealed to the oecd for the enforcement of a propor-
tional sharing of oil if the embargo should go through. The embargo
should be considered as a communal matter. On October 25 the oecd
Oil Commission met. In a prior ec consultation, the Dutch Permanent
Representative made it clear that The Hague advocated the operation of
an oil-sharing scheme. If that did not work, the reactivation of the inter-
national Advisory Board would be a satisfactory alternative, a group of
representatives from the main oil companies whose job it would be to help
the Oil Commission to set up the sharing scheme.36
Former Secretary-General of the oecd, E. van Lennep, concluded in
his memoirs that the oecd allocation system based on unanimity was not
put into operation, mainly because of France and Britain.37 It appears
from a report of the oecd meeting that not only these two countries but
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also the usa played a ‘delaying’ or ‘cautious’ role. Most countries did not
yet consider the oil situation dire. Reactivating the Advisory Board also
encountered resistance. All that was decided was that the chairman of the
Oil Commission should ask members of the Advisory Board for informa-
tion.
There were four reasons for the reserved attitude of most oecd coun-
tries; or so it was assumed at the Dutch Foreign Ministry. There was a
pervasive lack of information; there was a fear of speculation; there was
the worry that ganging up (by the West) could send exactly the wrong sig-
nal to the opec countries; and finally there was the hope entertained by
some countries that they would be treated as special cases. The latter rea-
soning related to reports that Saudi Arabia considered the oil-consuming
countries under three categories: hostile, neutral and friendly. Other con-
siderations played a part in the usa, such as the problem of operating the
distribution code.38 The oecd was thus not mobilized. 
The E C
Beside the oecd, The Hague also attempted to get the ec to take meas-
ures. Within the ec, too, it was a question of proportional allocation of a
reduced oil supply and of organizing this within the commercial opera-
tion of the free market of the ec; a point of view which clearly ran counter
to the French position. To the Dutch Cabinet, intervention on the part of
the European Commission seemed the most desirable option, and in fact
the Commission did propose this. At a meeting of Permanent Representa-
tives, the Commission presented a proposal for information exchange
concerning oil imports. This was a modest proposal that The Netherlands
could live with. However, the Commission further urged on this occasion
that proposals mooted in the summer, for a communal ec energy policy,
should also be considered.
While the Den Uyl Cabinet, at the end of October, was still hoping for
an international solution to the oil problem, a string of Arab countries
had meanwhile joined the embargo against The Netherlands. The out-
look was hardly a rosy one. During an interdepartmental meeting on Oc-
tober 29 to discuss restrictions on consumption, Economics Minister
Lubbers again strongly urged European cooperation. The line of thought
at the Ministry for Economic Affairs was that the European Commission
would soon have to take measures to curtail oil consumption within the
whole ec. If they should fail to do this, then in Lubbers’s view The
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Netherlands should feel free ‘to limit its exports of oil products and natu-
ral gas to the European partners’. It was an indication of the assertive atti-
tude held by Economic Affairs throughout the entire crisis. The Dutch
Foreign Ministry, however, objected to the threat of retaliation implicit in
the point of view of the Ministry for Economic Affairs.
On October 30 the European Commission was asked by The Nether-
lands to come up with initiatives as quickly as possible so that these could
be discussed in the ec consultations of November 5 and 6. The Dutch Per-
manent Representative in Brussels was asked by his colleagues to press for
discussion of the oil problem during the approaching conference. He was
instructed at the same time to stress that all countries, when it came to
their oil supply, were threatened with involvement. A day later, the Dutch
Ambassador in Bonn was also requested to press for the oil problem to be
dealt with at the Auswärtige Amt during the discussions of November 5
and 6. The situation was, after all, sufficiently serious to justify such con-
sultations. In the first place, then, it was a question of maintaining propor-
tional supplies and at the same time of preserving the common market.39
Little was expected in the way of cooperation from London and Paris.
There was particularly scepticism in The Hague over French readiness for
communal ec action with regard to the oil problem; and any hope of
French cooperation was further diminished when it was learned that
Pompidou had put out a plan to convene a summit conference of govern-
ment leaders, to which Heath and Brandt appeared to have pledged their
cooperation. It thus seemed that the three largest ec countries were join-
ing forces in a way that held little attraction for The Hague. Furthermore,
it was feared that the political aspects of the Middle East conflict would
become the main issue during such a summit rather than the oil problem.
The Netherlands would then undoubtedly be put under severe pressure.
At first, Pompidou’s proposal did in fact deal mainly with the discussion
of the European attitude toward the Middle East. Only later did the
French agree to address the oil question.
During a meeting with the ec Ambassadors on October 29, Van der
Stoel once again argued passionately for European cooperation in the oil
crisis. He pointed to the important transit function of Rotterdam and
warned of the consequences of a sauve-qui-peut devil take the hindmost
mentality. For the time being, however, his message still fell on deaf ears.
Otherwise, The Hague was taking good care that these efforts at Euro-
pean cooperation did not get in the way of relations with the usa. The
very same day, the State Department in Washington was informed by
Ambassador Van Lynden of the meeting with the ec ambasadors. Van
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Lynden emphasized that the Dutch effort to get some form of ec action
should not be interpreted as implying any loss of interest in possible
arrangements through the oecd. Washington evidently took it for grant-
ed that the Dutch should for the present be capable of solving their own
problems within the ec. But that was not now the intention.40
On October 31 the European Commission made known a number of
draft decisions concerning commercial trade in crude oil and oil products.
These proposals came down to a procedure over the provision of informa-
tion to the Commission over oil stocks and oil imports from non-ec
countries, and additionally a duty to report exports to non-ec countries.
And finally, the Commission proposed draft regulations relating to trade
within the ec, based on the assumption that existing trade channels
should be maintained. It was thought that member states would continue
to issue licences automatically; but the Commission was given authority
to suspend temporarily the obligation to issue export licences in cases
where this would seriously endanger supplies in a member state.
These proposals met with approval in the Dutch Foreign Ministry,
though there were doubts as to whether Paris, Rome and Brussels would
agree. For tactical reasons it therefore seemed best for The Hague not to
expose itself too much. Current stocks and needs besides made it unneces-
sary to deviate from normal, automatic issuance of licences. It was more a
matter of making an arrangement such that the issue of licences could be
halted if the circumstances so required.41
In a sub-committee of the Dutch Council of Ministers, the Ministerial
Council for European Affairs, Lubbers also expressed his satisfaction on
November 1 over the speed of this action taken by the Commission. The
embargo was now at least seen as a communal problem. But he was not
entirely satisfied. Economic Affairs wanted to tackle not just the provi-
sion, but also the use of oil. The rationing of consumption should also be
dealt with at the communal level, yet there was no proposal along these
lines. Lubbers tended toward the holding of bilateral talks with his for-
eign colleagues, but that did not go down well with Van der Stoel, who
warned against holding ‘premature talks’. The first step should be a meet-
ing of Foreign Ministers in Brussels, said Van der Stoel, thus underlining
that it was primarily within the competence of the Foreign Ministry to
seek a solution to the international oil crisis.42
The Dutch Permanent Representative at the ec and the Ambassadors
in other member countries were then instructed to act as discretely as pos-
sible in order to prevail on especially the French and the British to cooper-
ate fully. Meanwhile it had become clear that the Commission’s propos-
86
als, at France’s insistence, would be dealt with highly confidentially dur-
ing the coming ec talks, possibly during a dinner for the Foreign Minis-
ters. Discretion was therefore of the utmost importance.
There were nevertheless still objections within the Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs to the Commission’s proposals. As a result, the old differ-
ences of opinion between Economic Affairs and the Foreign Ministry sur-
faced anew. As observed in a memo from the Head of the Department for
Economic Cooperation (des) of the Foreign Ministry to Van der Stoel,
the proposals provided that export restrictions to member states would
only be permitted after it had been established that oil supplies in the ex-
porting country were ‘seriously’ endangered. This, according to the Head
of des, meant that ‘The Netherlands would allow a weapon to slip from
its hands to which the Ministry for Economic Affairs was rather at-
tached’, viz. the possibility of introducing, or threatening to introduce,
restrictions on export or transit goods. After consultation with Economic
Affairs, therefore, the permanent representative at the ec was asked to
try to get the word ‘seriously’ removed. This would leave more possibili-
ties open for exceptions to the automatic issue of licences. A second prob-
lem was the provision of information that the Commission proposed.
Economic Affairs and Shell had up till then been handling industrial in-
formation confidentially, since this information could be used as the
foundation for a community policy regarding oil supplies that would
move too far in the French and Italian direction. This aspect, according to
des, seemed meanwhile less problematic. Shell appeared to change its
position on this point.43
There were more objections from Economic Affairs. As mentioned
above, the Commission also wanted to restart consultations over a com-
mon ec energy policy. Economic Affairs was not inclined, however, to
cooperate on a Community market arrangement as long as it was not
clear what goals such an arrangement would serve. Within the Foreign
Ministry the problem was viewed very differently. In a note from the
Head of the Department for European Integration (die), it was stressed
that France was only willing to cooperate on finding a solution to the cur-
rent oil crisis, whereas The Netherlands was ready to work out a Middle
East declaration under the aegis of the epc as well as cooperate on setting
up a Community energy policy. In view of the fact that the major oil com-
panies no longer had a firm grip on the situation on the international oil
market, the Committee argued, it was perhaps inevitable that the Nether-
lands would have to move with events and adapt to the new situation.44
Contrary to the view in Economic Affairs, that The Netherlands’ part-
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ners in the ec should come to some arrangement that would leave the im-
port of oil by the Nine to the oil companies, die did not want to be isolat-
ed within the ec and was ready to put aside the usual Dutch principles in
order to get discussions going there.
A Declaration by the Nine
In the meantime, several countries were arguing that the ec talks fixed for
November 5 and 6 should be devoted mainly to discussion of the Middle
East situation. Most member states wanted to concentrate on the politi-
cal aspects of the war, not in the first place about the consequences of the
Arab oil embargo. The Hague, however, was mainly interested in ec co-
operation with regard to the oil crisis, not in a common Middle East poli-
cy. However, once it was settled that the oil problem would also come up
for debate, Van der Stoel felt able to agree with the proposal to use the
talks to discuss the war in the Middle East as well.45
Yet in the event, The Netherlands’ partners paid far more attention to
the political side of the question, and consequently to the differences of
opinion within the ec on this issue. And in this context, on November 1,
the British again asked the Dutch Cabinet whether they would not bring
Arab attention to the fact that the current Dutch government, just like its
predecessor, endorsed the un resolution 2949 of December 1972. In this
resolution, rejected by Israel and the usa, the rights of the Palestinians
were recognized as an essential part of any peace settlement in the Middle
East. Van der Stoel, who as a member of the Dutch Parliament had once
criticized the Dutch support for this resolution, declined the British sug-
gestion.46
In spite of all this, in early November a new draft government state-
ment was prepared at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, which referred to the
PvdA position that the Palestinians had the right to their own political
identity. According to this draft, the government should state that it
shared this judgement. Largely because of the reference to a party politi-
cal position, the draft was quickly put aside, and a new instruction drawn
up for the Ambassadors in the Arab countries which was approved by Van
der Stoel on November 5. It was observed in this document that the Arab
countries were evidently pressing for further enlightenment on The
Hague’s position over future Israeli borders and the Palestinian question.
With regard to the first point it was said that the Israeli borders, as stated
earlier, must be approximately the same as those existing before the 1967
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war. The question of whether The Netherlands adhered to the French or
the British version of resolution 242 was not raised. On the Palestinian
question it was specified that their political aspirations had to be embod-
ied in some form or other as an essential part of any future peace settle-
ment. This signified a definite sharpening of the Dutch point of view, even
though nothing had been said about a Palestinian political identity, let
alone a Palestinian state.47
Meanwhile, the long-awaited ec ministerial conference was ap-
proaching. The week from October 30 saw the preparations for reaching
a common political standpoint in the Comité Politique. Progress was dif-
ficult, partly through fear of leaks to the press, as was later to happen dur-
ing the ministerial talks of November 5 and 6. In a first draft text the Nine
announced that they wished to play an active role in ending the Middle
East conflict, within the framework of the United Nations, and specifical-
ly on the basis of resolution 242. But on November 4, the first car-free
Sunday in The Netherlands (see Chapter 4), the British dgpa submitted
an entirely new draft statement.
On the Dutch side there was a major objection to a passage proposed
by the British in which the Nine reasserted their support for resolution
2949 and subsequently listed a whole series of ingredients that would
have to be part of any peace settlement: ‘the non-acquisition of territories
by force’, the ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forced from occupied territo-
ries’, the ‘respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independ-
ence of every state in the area’ and ‘the invalidity of changes carried out by
Israel in the occupied territories’. The British proposal also included a
recognition of the rights of the Palestinians.
It appeared in the Comité Politique that The Hague objected only to
this passage. At the suggestion of the Belgians, the reference to 2949 was
removed: a list of ingredients essential to a peace settlement would have
to be sufficient. But agreement on this list turned out to be not such a sim-
ple matter, in particular the withdrawal of forces from the occupied terri-
tories.48 From the final closing statement it seems that dgpa Van Lynden
successfully resisted the passage concerning the changes to be implement-
ed by Israel in the occupied territories. Furthermore, a passage was added
on the right to secure recognized borders, undoubtedly for the benefit of
Israel.
Finally, Van Lynden, who had been in constant contact with the Dutch
Foreign Ministry, approved the draft declaration. The Netherlands thus
adopted a position of loyalty, as was also later and emphatically repeated,
even if this approval was granted in the hope that an epc declaration
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could be ‘linked’ to a common ec action in response to the oil crisis. The
latter was referred to the ministerial discussions, which was not a good
sign.
On Monday, November 5, Van der Stoel arrived in Brussels. The Bene-
lux ministers held a meeting that afternoon and arranged to keep in con-
tact with each other. On Monday evening, Van der Stoel spoke for an
hour with his British counterpart, Douglas Home, and the British Energy
Minister, Ralph Davies. It was clear in the course of this meeting that
London was strongly against any ec measures relating to the trade in oil
and oil products. Britain and France refused to attend to the Commis-
sion’s proposals. Home declared that Britain was still receiving a large
quantity of Arab oil and that his government did not want to give the
Arab countries any pretext for stopping it. The British fear that the Arab
countries could exercise control over the transfer of the flow of crude oil
was not shared by The Hague. From the Dutch side, it was pointed out
that, according to Shell, it would be difficult to control whether in the
coming period more oil entered Rotterdam from Iran and Nigeria and
less into British ports, but the British stuck to their viewpoint.49
It was during this conversation, according to Grünfeld, that Douglas
Home threatened that London would not hesitate in an emergency to use
legal means to compel the oil companies to keep to their contracts.50 Per-
haps Home said this in reaction to a statement by Shell’s president, Wag-
ner, who had the previous day publicly stated that the oil companies
would share oil shortages in Europe between the various consumer coun-
tries. In spite of this, Van der Stoel put it to the Dutch Council of Minis-
ters three days later that the British government would not obstruct mutu-
al agreements made between the major oil companies. Then PvdA leader
Van Thijn also noted in his diary that Douglas Home had said: ‘we will
not interfere with the commercial policy of the oil companies’.51
The British Minister Davies had warned Van der Stoel about enter-
taining illusions concerning the role of the oil companies. Davies could
see no way that influence could – or would – be exerted on the oil compa-
nies to move crude oil, despite the embargo, to Rotterdam; though with
refined products it was a different matter. Van der Stoel’s argument of the
threat of disintegration of the ec did not convince his British colleague.
‘Even my plea to keep strictly secret any measures that might be necessary
– such as those proposed by the Commission – made little impression’,
Van der Stoel later reported. Home held the view that there was absolute-
ly no possibility of secrecy in Brussels.52
The fear of leaks also turned out to play a major role later, in the dinner
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attended by the nine Foreign Ministers and the Chair of the Commission,
François-Xavier Ortoli. According to Van der Stoel, it transpired that the
fear of any common action drawing to itself the attention of the Arab
countries was widely shared. Only those countries that depended on the
movement of oil through Rotterdam declared themselves to some extent
prepared to take joint action. The French Foreign Minister Jobert, above
all, would not hear of any joint action, referring to the fact that the Com-
mission proposals had meanwhile been published in the French press.
Jobert did not want to discuss these proposals over dinner.
The Ministers quickly agreed on the prepared epc declaration over the
situation in the Middle East. The communiqué of the Nine stated that the
ec wished to play a role in finding a solution to the Middle East conflict,
effectively going against the Americans’ virtual monopoly, until then tac-
itly accepted, of Western intervention in the Middle East. The Nine ex-
pressed the hope that negotiations could be opened under the aegis of the
un, and based on the implementation of all sections of resolution 242. A
peace accord must be based on four fundamental principles: ‘the inadmis-
sibility of territorial expansion through violence’; ‘an end to the territori-
al occupation of areas controlled by Israel since 1967; ‘respect for the sov-
ereignty, integrity and independence of all states in the region, as well as
the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders’; and final-
ly ‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinians’.
The Dutch acceptance of the second point appeared to be a volte-face.
Van der Stoel subsequently said that he had made an interpretative state-
ment on November 6 in which he had said that The Hague construed this
second principle as conforming with resolution 242. ‘In any case, this
back-up statement without doubt lays down that The Netherlands had
not committed itself to a formal evacuation of all occupied areas.’ He also
remarked here that making this information public would have perhaps
made his position in regard to domestic politics rather more comfortable;
but he had not done this because it would not have looked so sensible in
regard to the oil countries.53
Neither during the epc meeting nor in a subsequent closed session,
where occasionally ‘frank words were exchanged’, were any new view-
points on the oil crisis raised. Only the West German Foreign Minister,
Walter Scheel, called for solidarity with partners who found themselves
in diffculties. Van der Stoel too urged cooperation and, in view of the
Britsh fears on this score, as much secrecy as possible, but he got ab-
solutely no support from either the French or the British sides. Jobert stat-
ed in the clearest terms that the Dutch Middle Eastern politics had led to
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the embargo against Rotterdam and therefore no appeal to the Common
Market was justified.
There was thus no support for The Netherlands, despite the fact that
the majority public opinion in the ec was for help to member states which
got into difficulties (varying from 59% in England to 70% in France and
88% in Italy).54 London seemed only interested in securing its own oil
supplies. Brussels, Luxembourg and Bonn showed some understanding
of the Dutch position, but this understanding would go no further than
verbal support. Luxembourg and Belgium pushed for a press statement
on the whole oil problem, apart from anything else to avoid the ec losing
credibility.
The press statement was duly issued and spoke of the mutual interde-
pendence of member states’ economies and of the necessity to follow the
situation closely. To Van der Stoel’s exasperation, however, it announced
not a single concrete measure to be taken. He had, after all, agreed to a
new Middle East declaration on the assumption that actual cooperation
in the matter of oil supplies would also be addressed. That was evidently a
mistaken assumption. The Dutch Foreign Minister wondered whether
disintegration of the ec could in the end be avoided.55
Reactions in The Netherlands
As indicated earlier, the policy pursued by Van der Stoel was not without
its critics within the Dutch Foreign Ministry. dgpa Van Lynden and, as
we saw earlier, the Department for European Integration (die) were also
of the view that The Netherlands should avoid becoming too isolated
within the ec. This difference of outlook also involved the general ques-
tion of whether The Netherlands had to accept the epc as a European pol-
icy-determining framework more than previously. In both these respects,
accepting the statement of November 6 meant a change of policy, or at
least a first step in that direction. It meant acceptance of the epc as a poli-
cy-shaping and policy-co-ordinating executive body, and a provisional
end to The Hague’s isolation within that body. It also meant an accom-
modation, albeit a cautious one, to the British and French positions,
though the significance of this should not be exaggerated, given Van der
Stoel’s ‘interpretative statement’ cited above. The passage concerning the
occupied territories was vague (any reference to the occupied territories
was avoided), and The Netherlands had earlier expressed recognition of
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians by accepting resolution 2949 in
the un General Assembly.
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At first, at least, the epc statement of November 6 was not well re-
ceived. According to oil expert and author Daniel Yergin, Arab diplomats
considered it ‘a kiss blown from afar – which is all very nice, but we would
prefer something warmer and closer’.56 Reactions in Israel, on the other
hand, were bitter: it was felt that the statement was a step in the direction
of the Arabs. Kissinger was also dismissive, speaking of a ‘stampede of
dissociation’ and complaining of a lack of consultation on the part of the
ec. He announced that his country ‘was going to pursue its own policies
in the Middle East in any event’.57 Relations between the usa and Ameri-
ca’s European nato partners did not appear to have improved; and be-
cause of this Brandt declared a week after the signing that the Nine had
gone too far.58
In The Netherlands, too, there was much criticism of the declaration.
The progressive newspaper de Volkskrant concluded that the November
6 communiqué made far fewer compromises to the Israeli position than
the American peace plans. The declaration therefore had to be seen as a
French diplomatic success.59 Het Parool (social-democratic) also regret-
ted that The Netherlands had signed the declaration, for it had evidently
been the fruit of Arab pressure and because the Nine had been made ‘the
instrument of the French Middle East policy’.60 Trouw (protestant) spoke
of a ‘bourgeois timidity hiding behind the oil stove’.61
Of all the influential Dutch newspapers, only NRC Handelsblad found
little to object to, taking a rather laconic view. It was a question of a decla-
ration from countries not directly involved in the conflict who did not
want to engage in world politics, but merely wanted to defend their own
regional interests. The declaration contained ‘nothing more than opin-
ions, without indicating the means by which the proposed goals might be
achieved’.62 This was neither the first nor last time that NRC Handelsblad
had tended to give prime importance to the interests of the port of Rotter-
dam. Three days later the paper published an open letter from the histori-
an L. de Jong, roundly accusing Van der Stoel of having betrayed Israel
and thus ending the previous solidarity with that country, which De Jong
referred to as a ‘debt of honour’. NRC Handelsblad, in its editorial col-
umn, again reacted in pragmatic fashion. The paper called the ec decla-
ration ‘healthily realistic’, and it did not necessarily mean that Israel had
been repudiated by The Netherlands. It was merely a question of giving a
‘slight change of tack’ to Middle Eastern policy.63 Reproaches were also
voiced in the Dutch Council of Ministers, notably from Vredeling, who
regretted that the ec had not condemned the use of the embargo as a
weapon. By yielding to an embargo, one only put oneself in a more vul-
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nerable position which, according to him, could also be to Israel’s cost.
He would have preferred to distance himself from the declaration. He re-
gretted the British attitude and had let this be known in no uncertain
terms in nato’s Nuclear Planning Group, which his British counterpart
initially did not want raised for discussion, although it had eventually
happened. In the future, The Netherlands should do everything possible
to prevent the French line being followed. He again referred to the fact
that Israel was not fighting on its own strength, but with resources of
‘mainly’ American origin. All in all, Vredeling’s was a bluntly Atlantic-
oriented argument. The government had to put its trust in the usa. The
American delegation had informed Vredeling that The Netherlands
would not be left without oil.64
The Dutch Minister of Finance, W. Duisenberg, on the other hand,
had only praise for Van der Stoel, whom he thought the target of a witch-
hunt. Lubbers too supported Van der Stoel and emphasized that the busi-
ness world thoroughly approved the consistent line taken by the Cabinet,
not to submit to threats, even though Dutch economic interests in the
Arab region were great. Den Uyl also thought it prudent that The Nether-
lands had not distanced itself from the other eight, not least in connection
with the embargo. Further, the limits of what was still acceptable to Israel
had been properly taken into account in the declaration of the Nine. He
again cited the fact that Van der Stoel had had to work with the fiercely
pro-Israeli sentiment in the Second Chamber which, after the embargo,
had suddenly been reversed.65 And Den Uyl was right.
Besides, before arriving at any judgement of the signing of the new ec
declaration, it is important to point out that the character of the war in
the Middle East had changed entirely. Israel’s position had in the mean-
time so improved that it was no longer endangered, however perilous
those first days of the war had been. For this reason alone it would be a
great oversimplification to posit that the ec, and The Netherlands too,
had undergone a complete volte-face because of Arab pressure.66
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Conclusion
The embargo against The Netherlands went ahead. It was particularly
difficult to raise international support for The Netherlands’ problems.
On the contrary, it appeared that for the time being Britain and France
were only too willing to make the most of the difficulties in which the
Dutch were embroiled. Both within the oecd and the ec, it proved im-
possible to arrive at any common response to the oil crisis. Even the readi-
ness of The Hague to endorse the new ec declaration on the Middle East
had not been able to elicit support for the Dutch. In the ec, it was rather a
bruising affair with no holds barred; and for that matter, the Cabinet also
joined in. As we saw earlier, initiatives like the De Lavallette mission (see
Chapter 2) were taken outside the ec. Furthermore, Lubbers threatened
openly to turn off the natural gas tap, and Van der Stoel’s policy was part-
ly based on creating uncertainty in those countries which depended on
imports from The Netherlands.
But so far, all this manoeuvring within the ec produced little result.
The Netherlands’ ec partners, it seemed, were not inclined to a sense of
‘solidarity’. It is nevertheless the question of what concrete support could
have been expected from those ec partners. There was a considerable dif-
ference of opinion on this point between the Dutch ministries for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Economic Affairs mainly wanted
talks to deal with concrete problems: both the supply problem and the ne-
cessity for restrictions on consumption. Should there prove to be no readi-
ness for cooperation among the ec partners, argued Economic Affairs
and Lubbers, a more clinically businesslike approach would be necessi-
tated that would not attempt to disguise the existing conflicts of interest
within the ec. The Foreign Ministry was in general more cautious and
wanted to prevent such conflicts of interest being forced into the open.
Foreign Affairs even went so far that it was ready to discuss – in the con-
text of the ec – a common European energy policy if the partners, mean-
ing specifically France, would agree to take measures to support The
Netherlands if hit by an embargo.
Economic Affairs took a much more cautious view of this last propos-
al, and here the long-standing conflict of competence in the international
arena of the oil problem undoubtedly played a role. Yet it was Economic
Affairs that took the more cynical view of European cooperation than did
the Foreign Ministry. Secretary-General of Economic Affairs, F.W. Rut-
ten, later said he thought that all the pleas for ec solidarity were intended
purely for public opinion. In his view, such arguments were regarded by
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those involved in Economic Affairs at the time with considerable scepti-
cism.67
Meanwhile, it was clear that the oil companies wanted to divide equal-
ly the difficulties caused in Europe, including the embargo. The Nether-
lands was therefore not in quite such a bad position as initially thought.
The Cabinet would, in fact, review its standpoint on ‘solidarity’ during
the course of the following November; but the Den Uyl Cabinet was still
confronted with Arab cut-backs on production and the threat of reduced
oil supplies. This meant that The Netherlands, like other consumer coun-
tries, had to ready itself for rationing the domestic use of oil and oil prod-
ucts. In the following chapter, we shall therefore turn our attention to the
wide range of domestic measures taken by the Den Uyl Cabinet in order to
reduce the consumption of oil and oil products.
96
4Domestic Measures
In October and November of 1973, The Netherlands was confronted
with a series of threatening Arab moves. Following the drastic rise in the
price of oil on October 16, came the decision of the Arab opec states a
day later to reduce oil production by 5% each month as long as the West-
ern countries continued to support Israel. Almost a week later, The
Hague was confronted with a full embargo, even though in the end not all
the Arab oil states joined in. On October 18 Saudi Arabia itself an-
nounced that oil production would not shrink by 5% but by 10% month-
ly until all the Arab demands had been met with. On November 4 the situ-
ation appeared to worsen even further when the oapec countries took
the decision to reduce production by 25% from September levels. By this
time, it began to be clear that The Netherlands stood alone.
The Den Uyl Cabinet
The Den Uyl government had been in power in The Netherlands since
May 1973; a coalition consisting on the one hand of the three ‘progres-
sive’ parties, the Dutch Labour Party, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), the
progressive-liberal D ’66 and the radical Politieke Partij Radikalen
(ppr), and on the other hand, the Christian Democratic parties, the Ro-
man Catholic Katholieke Volkspartij (kvp) and the Protestant Anti-Rev-
olutionaire Partij (arp). After lengthy and difficult negotiations this
coalition was put together in the spring of 1973. With the exception of the
short-lived Cals Cabinet, the PvdA had not participated in government
since the collapse of the fourth Drees Cabinet in 1958. The PvdA seemed
to play a central role in the Den Uyl Cabinet: apart from the premiership,
PvdA party members occupied ministerial positions at Foreign Affairs,
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Defence, Finance and Development Cooperation. Furthermore, the three
progressive parties, the PvdA, D’66 and the ppr, together held a majority
of seats in the government.
The Den Uyl Cabinet would seem to have been a product of the social
upheaval of the 1960s. At the elections of late 1972, the PvdA, D’66 and
the ppr had presented the electorate with a common social programme,
entitled Turning Point ’72, which promised structural reforms in several
areas, both in domestic and foreign politics. This programme even spoke
of reducing the might of big business.
Turning Point ’72 was of course no policy for government. The Cabinet
was a coalition, and furthermore the Christian Democratic parties with
support from the right had a majority in the Second Chamber. Neverthe-
less, Den Uyl announced in May that his Cabinet would try to contribute
to a fairer distribution of knowledge, incomes, wealth and power, by
means that included adapting the system of taxation. In the autumn of
1973, various measures were announced to stimulate the economy and
improve the employment situation through increased government spend-
ing.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Den Uyl Cabinet seemed to have no ob-
vious allies among employers and big business with whom to discuss poli-
cy in times of serious political or economic crisis. Throughout the oil cri-
sis, blame and criticism were to be heard that either directly or indirectly
referred to the progressive character of the government – for having
adopted a too frivolous, irresponsible position, of having paid too little
attention to the interests and the viewpoint of employers. Van der Stoel
was also accused of being moralistic, of having unrealistic pretensions
that could actually damage real economic interests. In various ways, the
oil crisis was a first major test case for the Cabinet.
The Importance of Oil
There can be no doubt that the steps taken by the Arab opec countries
were a serious threat to the Dutch economy, and in addition a major set-
back for the Dutch government’s aim to stimulate the economy and
achieve a more egalitarian society. The announced price rises, the restrict-
ed production and of course the embargo all contributed to this threat.
The newspaper NRC Handelsblad predicted on October 20 that the dear-
er, scarcer oil would lead to a decline in affluence.1 ‘Turning off the oil
tap’, pronounced Het Parool few days later, was on paper no less than a
national disaster.2
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It was clear that the embargo could have far-reaching consequences. It
had been calculated for Den Uyl at the end of October that The Nether-
lands was dependent on oil for roughly 53% of its total energy needs.
Leaving aside the effects of the price rise announced on October 16, some
two-thirds of this oil came from the Middle East. This meant that around
40% of The Netherlands’ oil supply was now in the balance.3
On the other side of the scales, 45% of The Netherlands’ energy needs
were satisfied from their own natural gas reserves. This greatly reduced
the country’s vulnerability and its dependence on oil imports, which were
correspondingly less than many other ec member states. The uk and
West Germany with their coal and The Netherlands with its natural gas,
were in fact less dependent on oil for their energy needs than France or
Italy.4 Indeed, The Netherlands could be considered ‘the most energy-rich
country in Western Europe’; and so it was considered at the time by the
Dutch Ministry of Economics.5 Considerable quantities of gas were ex-
ported to West Germany, Belgium and France. In 1973, around 58 mil-
lion cubic metres of natural gas were produced, a figure which rose to 70
million in 1974.6
Beside natural gas, of course, the Dutch also exported refined oil prod-
ucts. In 1972, the total throughput of oil involving all Dutch ports was
around 149 million tons, of which 81 million tons were forwarded by
ship, lorries or pipeline (West Germany being the greatest purchaser).
This left a net import into The Netherlands of 68 million tons.7
However, oil was also an important raw material for the Dutch oil pro-
cessing and petrochemical industry. The Arab oil measures could there-
fore have enormous consequences and could well lead to inflation and un-
dermine prosperity, although exactly how this would come about was, of
course, difficult to tell. The dependence on oil, and the concomitant sus-
ceptibility to price rises, restricted production, and the embargo itself
varied widely between different economic sectors. Road traffic and road
transport, so important for the Dutch economy, were almost totally de-
pendent on oil; and the same was true for shipping, air transport, the fish-
ing industry and the greenhouse horticultural industry.
But in fact, oil imports were not only important as a source of energy
for the Dutch nation; the significance of Rotterdam and the Rijnmond
area lay for a large part in the supply, processing and transit of oil. In the
Rijnmond area alone, some 20,000 people were directly dependent on the
influx of oil and its processing. According to first estimates, the embargo
affected approximately 70% of all the oil arriving in Rotterdam. Refining
and chemical industries in the Rijnmond area were also completely de-
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pendent on the supply of crude oil. More generally, oil was an important
industrial raw material, particularly for the chemical industry.
The Botlek or Rijnmond area (that area of Holland where the Rhine
flows via its many mouths into the North Sea) and Rotterdam formed a
crucial link in the provision of oil to Western Europe as a whole. In 1972,
about 70% of the European oil supply came from oapec countries, about
25% of which was delivered to Rotterdam. The Rijnmond area was also
hugely important for oil processing. The refineries there, comprising
some 10% of Europe’s refining capacity, exported approximately 75% of
their product. Rotterdam was thus an extremely important centre of the
oil trade, immensely significant for the whole of Northwest Europe, and
furthermore one of the principal refuelling ports in the world.8
Depending on the point of view, the central role of Rotterdam and the
Rijnmond area in the oil sector could be seen either as a weakness or as a
strength. The dependence on oil deliveries would at first sight suggest vul-
nerability, wrote NRC Handelsblad, which continued to speak as a pow-
erful champion of the interests of the Rotterdam port throughout the en-
tire crisis: the embargo ‘could be disastrous for our image’. There was an
‘enormous danger’ that Rotterdam’s dominant position as a port would
be affected. The paper pointed out that the business climate for major en-
terprises in The Netherlands had deteriorated over recent years. If the im-
age of The Netherlands now gained ground as a country with difficulties
in the oil sector, this could be fatal for Rotterdam’s position as the largest
oil port in the world.9 De Volkskrant also feared a ‘permanent loss of
Rotterdam’s position’ as a consequence of the Arab actions.10 But Rotter-
dam’s crucial role at the same time allowed the possibility of restricting
transit, not only in the interest of Dutch economic needs but also as a way
of putting political pressure on surrounding countries. In discussions held
on October 30 between the Rotterdam City Council and the Dutch Min-
istry of Economics, there was speculation over the possibility of curtail-
ing the free transit of oil.11 Natural gas was another candidate for restrict-
ing exports and applying political pressure.
Uncertainty
Initially, there was uncertainty over what the actual consequences of the
oapec countries’ actions would be for the oil supply. In particular, be-
cause the sailing time for oil tankers from the Persian Gulf via the Cape of
Good Hope to Rotterdam was about six weeks, it would be the end of
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November before it became clear exactly what the effects of the embargo
and restricted production would be.
Clearly, it was of overriding importance to obtain accurate informa-
tion. On October 16, the same day that Kuwait decided on substantial
price increases, a letter was sent by the Deputy Director for Coal and Nat-
ural Gas at the Dutch Ministry of Economics, H.A.A.M. van Eupen, to
the oil companies, with the message that the current arrangements for
mutual exchange of information must be stepped up, and the usual
monthly supply of data on deliveries, production and stocks increased.12
Indeed, there was a general intensification of consultations between the
Ministry of Economics and the oil companies. The former director of
Dutch Shell said later that the oil companies had had ‘the closest contact’
with the Ministry ‘on a virtually daily basis’,13 usually with the Direc-
torate-General for Energy.14 Connections with other agencies and organ-
isations concerned were also strengthened by the Ministry of Economics.
Thus, on October 19 the first meeting over the energy shortage took place
with the gas and electricity companies and with the oil-producing and
distribution companies.
The Dutch Council of Ministers of October 19 was the first occasion
for the exchange of ideas involving the entire Cabinet on domestic meas-
ures for rationing the use of oil. Lubbers had in the meantime suggested
to the Second Chamber that a ban on driving would be a simple solution
to restrict fuel use; but Den Uyl, urging restraint, argued that an appeal to
exercise economies would be sufficient for the time being. Lubbers too
recognised that the first stage in any programme of measures should con-
sist of information. There seems to have been agreement that, as long as it
remained unclear how grave the situation was, an informational cam-
paign together with an appeal for everyone to economise would be suffi-
cient. In view of the currently prevailing uncertainty, the Council of Min-
isters decided that Lubbers should use his own discretion.15
During a staff discussion at the Ministry of Economics several days
later, it was in fact concluded that so far there was no question of any cut-
back in oil deliveries to Rotterdam. Although Algeria had meanwhile an-
nounced an embargo, the share of Algerian oil in the total supply was no
more than 1 or 2%. Most of those present at these discussions felt that as
long as there was no concrete evidence of a slow-down in the flow of oil,
no compulsory measures to curb consumption should be introduced. Fur-
thermore, domestic use in normal times amounted to only 40% of the
supply. If measures did have to be introduced, for the time being Lubbers
preferred that they should be limited to voluntary restrictions. He was
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therefore prepared to request the oil companies to reduce deliveries to the
distributors and to launch a campaign to encourage a reduction in oil
use.16
This, however, according to the Ministry staff, should not disguise the
fact the Dutch government had to adjust to harder times ahead. Indeed,
the first steps in this direction were taken on October 22 when it was de-
cided that the oil companies would be required to submit data weekly
rather than monthly on supply, stocks, processing and export. It was fur-
ther decided to subject the export of the more important oil products to li-
censing on the basis of the Import/Export Law, whereby the issue of li-
cences for export to ec countries was automatic. For non-ec countries, it
was a precondition for the issue of the licence that there must be no reduc-
tion in the stocks held by The Netherlands. This licence system would
also apply to the other Benelux countries, though this was not a judge-
ment immediately adopted by the Cabinet.17
As already said, it was at that time still difficult to say in real terms
what the consequences of the Arab actions would be. According to some
reports, there was in reality no embargo in actual operation (as we saw in
Chapter 2). Reports were reaching the Dutch Foreign Ministry that once
tankers had left Arab ports ‘no further control could be exercised over
their destination’.18 Elsewhere in Western Europe, there was similarly no
evidence of any reduction in the flow of oil.19
Despite this, the Cabinet’s policy of restraint was challenged, even
within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The political scientists Rosen-
thal and Scholten believe that there were probably differences of opinion
within Economic Affairs over the need for quick action; specifically, dis-
agreement between the Directorate-General for Energy (dge) and the
Directorate-General for Industry (dgi). The Directorate-General for En-
ergy advocated immediate, sweeping, across the board measures, where-
as the dgi, in view of the major importance of especially the petrochemi-
cal industry, argued for measures that would be in the first place volun-
tary and focused on private consumption.20 F.W. Rutten, at the time Sec-
retary-General of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, sees these political
differences as merely reflecting differences of responsibility. According to
several participants in this discussion, the dge point of view prevailed.21
Yet it was mainly the uncertainty of the situation that dictated a certain
caution. Moreover, within the Cabinet there was no agreement on the ne-
cessity for any restrictive measures.
The press lost no time in censuring the Cabinet for its rather laconic at-
titude. Trouw, on the assumption that arrangements were already in
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place for introducing car-free Sundays and speed restrictions, wrote that
there was no reason for not implementing them at once. Such economies
could, it was argued, turn out to have other benefits. Furthermore, speed
restrictions would help reduce road accidents.22 NRC Handelsblad also
reproached the Cabinet for its rather spineless attitude toward the embar-
go. In the view of one editorial writer, the government was simply not pre-
pared to make an urgent appeal to the Dutch people to limit petrol con-
sumption as much as possible.
‘It would be to the Cabinet’s credit to show a greater awareness of the
problems created by the identification of The Netherlands with Israel in
the eyes of the world, and a more vigorous approach to the consequences
of this situation’, the paper said.23 Over the following days, the message
was repeated by NRC Handelsblad that the Cabinet seemed not to be tak-
ing the Arab threat seriously enough. Other dailies had much the same
criticism: de Volkskrant thought that the government had for too long
shut its eyes to the situation.24
Reducing Consumption
By the end of October it was becoming clear that The Netherlands was
threatened with an exceptional position. Although it was uncertain just
how effective the embargo would be, this position could seriously dam-
age the economy. In a meeting held on October 30 with Lubbers at the
Ministry of Economics, a delegation from the Rotterdam city council
reckoned that the port was faced with considerable loss of income and
that employment would be endangered. On this occasion, different meth-
ods of combating the effects of the embargo were discussed, including the
reverse pumping of oil through the pipeline between Rotterdam and
Antwerp. Restricting deliveries to surrounding ec countries was also dis-
cussed; although to those present the possibility of actually carrying this
out seemed small. As the Alderman J. Riezenkamp emphasized, it was
crucial for Rotterdam to preserve its relationship of trust with its trading
partners. Lubbers concluded on this occasion that everything possible
must be attempted to reach the point where the burden would be shared
internationally.25
Lubbers’ view of burden sharing, however, was rather optimistic. It
was established during a staff discussion at the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs that the oecd was for the time being not prepared to put into opera-
tion any scheme for emergency oil provision. Nor was it very plausible
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that The Netherlands’ ec partners would be prepared to switch to joint
actions. Meanwhile, the oil companies, at least as far as Europe was con-
cerned, introduced a general reduction in the oil supply of around 15%: a
substantial percentage. The staff discussion group considered that this
meant a necessary reduction in domestic use of about 10%.26
In order to achieve this 10% reduction, it was decided at Economic Af-
fairs, most probably on October 29, to bring in the Rationing Law and to
activate the National Bureau for Oil Products (Rijksbureau voor Aard-
olieproducten, rba).27 Certainly no modern political instrument, the Ra-
tioning Law stemmed from 1939 and was intended to be used in time of
war or under comparable emergency situations. Putting the Rationing
Law into effect was a first step toward the actual rationing of oil and oil
products, but at the same time it provided the Minister of Economic Af-
fairs with the legal basis for less radical measures, such as a ban on using
cars on certain days. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the Drees Cabinet
had also introduced car-free Sundays under the Rationing Law.
After consulting Den Uyl, Lubbers took up the mandate the Council of
Ministers had given him the previous week. On October 30 he addressed
the Dutch Second Chamber by means of a letter, in which he announced
that November 4 would be the first car-free Sunday. In addition, he made
various other suggestions for reducing petrol consumption, viz. through
a voluntary speed limit of 100 kilometres per hour (ca. 65 mph) and by
limiting the use of cars generally as far as possible. It was further impor-
tant to reduce the use of heating fuels, by reducing the room temperature
in homes and buildings and by closing curtains. Provided they yielded the
desired results, Lubbers informed his audience, these mainly voluntary
measures should obviate the need for stricter controls on distribution.
Notwithstanding, the Cabinet had already prepared such rationing
plans.28
On October 31, a debate was held in the Dutch Second Chamber in
which both the international politics and the domestic aspects of the oil
crisis were raised. Six members of the Cabinet were present at this debate:
Prime Minister Den Uyl, the Ministers Lubbers, Van Agt, Van der Stoel,
and the Under-Secretaries M.H.M. van Hulten of Transport and Water
Management and A.P.J.M.M. van der Stee of Finance. The Cabinet took
a cautious approach. Den Uyl outlined the government measures to the
Chamber, characterizing them as ‘precautionary measures’. Although up
till then there had been ‘not a single ton less oil arriving in Rotterdam’,
Den Uyl nonetheless suggested that the Arab embargo decision had been
implemented, even though there was at that time no concrete evidence
104
that this was so. Den Uyl was effectively bluffing, as one anonymous
reader of the Foreign Ministry report on the crisis (cited earlier) later
commented.29
Van der Stoel announced that no effort had been spared to get interna-
tional consultations started to find an international solution to interna-
tional problems, pointing to the oecd Oil Commission and the ec con-
sultation process. ‘It would be a very bad outlook for European business
if such a common policy proved beyond reach.’ For this reason, the Cabi-
net had proposed to its partners that they should consider the situation
that had arisen at the coming ec sessions of November 5 and 6 which, as
we already know, sounded much more auspicious than in fact it was.30
Lubbers announced that his policy should not only be aimed at main-
taining the national provision of oil, but also the preservation of the inter-
national function of the Dutch economy, especially Rotterdam, the Rijn-
mond area and Amsterdam. He recognized that discussion within the
framework of the oecd had not been very fruitful. Every country would
first of all have to cut back its own use: ‘only in a more drastically serious
situation of real shortages would an international rationing scheme be
put into effect’. The Netherlands therefore was on its own. The policy of
the Cabinet was, he emphasized, primarily aimed at a 10% reduction of
the national oil consumption.
It was the kvp parliament member M.W.J.M Peijnenburg who again
accused the Cabinet of a rashness in its approach, while the great majority
of the Chamber were in sympathy with the steps taken. There was only
incidental dissatisfaction, such as over the fact that mopeds did not fall
under the Sunday ban. Under-Secretary Van Hulten explained that a ban
on mopeds would cause an enormous fuss and have very little effect. The
government, however, stuck to its guns when the SGP member C.N. van
Dis vainly asked whether church incumbents might not be included under
a more flexible system of exemptions. The only suggestion that was im-
mediately adopted from the Chamber was an amendment to the hours of
the ban during the night of Saturday/Sunday: instead of the ban coming
into force at midnight, it was delayed until 3 am on Sunday. The Second
Chamber then approved the proposals for economies in fuel use by a great
majority, even though there were still no concrete indications of a reduc-
tion in the oil supply.31
The Rationing Law formally came into effect on October 31, the same
day that announcements appeared in the Staatscourant – the official gov-
ernment gazette – informing the population that oil and oil products
would be considered rationed goods and announcing the driving ban for
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Sunday, November 4. The following day, at the request of the Second
Chamber, that announcement was supplemented by the further decision
that the ban should only take effect at 3 am.32
During the Council of Ministers of November 2, it became apparent
that certain ministers felt that Lubbers and his Ministry were pushing
things too hard. Boersma said he was surprised at the speed with which
measures had been taken; but Den Uyl parried this criticism with the ob-
servation that the Council had for this reason empowered Lubbers the
previous week to prepare the regulations. Lubbers had rung him during
the weekend to say that policy had to switch to action. Intensive discus-
sions at the Ministry of Economics over the Sunday and Monday led to
the conclusion that a rapid introduction of rationing was inevitable.33
After further thorough discussion of various other measures, it was
decided to set up an interdepartmental committee in order to look into
the various aspects more closely. On this basis, the Co-ordination Group
for Oil Crisis Action was instituted several days later. The Ministers also
decided that there should be preliminary talks between Home Affairs,
Justice, and Transport and Water Management if a legal maximum speed
limit were going to be introduced. In view of the possibly drastic conse-
quences of the crisis for the national economy, the question was also
raised of the relationship between government and trade unions as social
partners. The Dutch Trades Union chairman Wim Kok had already in-
formed the Cabinet that the Social Economic Council would have to con-
sider how they should respond to the consequences of the oil crisis and
that this would have to be further discussed with the government. If it
should turn out that the economic foundations of the Cabinet’s policy
were affected, this could reasonably be discussed with the trade union
movement. But the crisis need not necessarily interfere with the conclu-
sion of a general agreement.34
Yet critics of the haste with which the Rationing Law was implement-
ed were still not satisfied. The law itself was thought by some to be an an-
tiquated and cumbersome instrument for dealing with the problems that
had arisen. Van Agt sent Lubbers a letter in which he wondered whether
rationing was a satisfactory instrument to control restrictions on the use
of oil products.
The bare fact that this law originated 35 years ago and was in principle
intended for circumstances very different from those of the present may
give rise to doubt.
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An important reason for exercising caution was, for him, that the Ra-
tioning Law seemed a less suitable basis for taking criminal action
against infringements of the Sunday ban on motoring. Van Agt therefore
would have preferred creating a one-off, short-term law for rationing and
restricting the use of oil products.35
The First Car-Free Sunday
Compliance with the motoring ban on November 4 was on the whole
good, probably because restrictions on use of fuel were accepted as neces-
sary by the general public and because similar measures had been an-
nounced in other countries. And furthermore, it was reasonable. The con-
trast between the silence and the usual commotion on the roads was much
more impressive than in 1956. There also noticeably arose a certain na-
tional solidarity, partly because even Queen Juliana was publicly making
use of the bicycle. In general, this first car-free Sunday was reported by the
press in a lighthearted, cheerful vein.
Practically the whole millions-strong army of motorists had observed
the Sunday ban in exemplary fashion, reported De Telegraaf. The
Netherlands railway journal, De Nederlandse Spoorwegen, remarked
that the passenger total was 30% up on a normal Sunday. Church atten-
dance scarcely suffered at all: a poll in fifty different places showed only
the slightest fall in the number of worshippers. ‘In front of every church
stood masses of bicycles and mopeds’, according to De Telegraaf. The
border posts had no exaggerated influx of foreigners to process.
Quite a few Germans were rather surprised at the empty roads and took
…. no notice of the recommended maximum speed of 100 km per hour.
They were unaware that practically all petrol stations were closed.36
In Amstelveen, some forty boys and girls armed with sleeping bags, blan-
kets and musical instruments took themselves to Motorway 6 to hold a
picnic. After half an hour ‘the youngsters were driven off the highway by
the police’.37
‘Sunday without deaths on the road’ ran the headline of Monday’s
Haagsche Courant. And indeed this was one of the remarkable aspects of
the Sunday. Four passengers seated in a carriage were reported injured
when their vehicle overturned after the horse bolted on the Brienenoord
Bridge in Rotterdam. The Haagsche Courant was also annoyed by those
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foreign motorists (to whom the Sunday ban did not apply), remarking
that
the Dutch highways were made rather unsafe by foreign – more specifi-
cally German – drivers who abused the freedom of the empty roads to
drive at great speed; endangering all those children who had taken over
the asphalt on their roller skates.38
But apart from this, it had been fun. Not that the press had no criticism to
voice; but this disapproval was more of a continuation of the view cited
earlier that the government measures were too limited. Het Parool argued
for oil and petrol rationing, since the car-free Sundays affected certain
economic sectors disproportionately. Rationing gave the public the op-
portunity to choose for themselves when they wished to use their cars.39
And in the columns of NRC Handelsblad, the government was once again
attacked for continuing to underestimate the gravity of the situation.40
However simple the action appeared at first sight, the first car-free
Sunday did demonstrate how much administrative work was needed to
restrict the use of oil and oil products. Not everyone turned out to be pre-
pared to contribute as a matter of course; there were in all 120,000 re-
quests for exemption. In fact, 15,000 exemptions were granted for motor
vehicles. W.Q.J. Willemsen, who played an important official role in lim-
iting oil use, can recall ‘the most grotesque reasons and shameless argu-
ments produced’ to justify some of these requests for exemption.41 The
sheer quantity of requests and consequent orders gave an indication of
the administrative rigmarole that would result if rationing were intro-
duced. With subsequent car-free Sundays the number of requests for ex-
emption only increased until, in the end, in the weeks leading up to the be-
ginning of January, 74,000 exemptions had been granted.
During a discussion between the Attorneys-General, however, it be-
came evident that the first car-free Sunday had not given rise to many
problems, with relatively few infringements and impounded vehicles. In
his first report, Rutten, chair of the Co-ordinating Group for Oil Crisis
Action, reported that there had been 301 summons issued, and 239 vehi-
cles impounded.42
It also turned out that roughly 90% of motorists were sticking volun-
tarily to the 100 kms per hour speed limit, encouraging the Attorneys-
General to speak out against the introduction of a compulsory speed lim-
it. 43 This latter judgement, in fact, was adopted by the Ministry of Jus-
tice, largely on the basis of the argument that the voluntary limit had
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yielded excellent results, whereas a compulsory speed limit would cause
too heavy a burden on both police and the courts.44
According to the Attorneys-General, the biggest problems that oc-
curred on the first car-free Sunday were related to traffic entering The
Netherlands from abroad. Because some border posts were in fact un-
manned, Dutch motorists entering the country were unable to get the nec-
essary stamp that would allow them legitimately to proceed home via the
shortest route. Another problem arose from the fact that in Limburg there
were quite a few Dutch driving around in the cars of their German em-
ployers; and Dutch military personnel returning from Germany similarly
caused problems because some Group Commanders had issued exemp-
tions of questionable validity.45
Shell Helps
With the implementation of the embargo, and particularly with the par-
ticipation in the embargo of Saudi Arabia on November 2 plus the restric-
tions on production announced two days later, the Dutch government –
and specifically Economic Affairs – began to prepare for the worst possi-
ble scenario. At a staff discussion meeting on November 5, it was decided,
in consultation with the Central Planning Bureau, to look at what might
be the consequences of a 25% reduction in oil use, and what measures
would be necessary in such a situation. What would happen if the oil sup-
ply to Rotterdam and the Rijnmond were reduced by 50% also had to be
calculated.46
The situation that had arisen demanded especially close cooperation
with the oil companies, however distasteful this proved to some back-
benchers of the progressive parties. As Den Uyl told a meeting of the
PvdA party executive committee:
it was unavoidable that the Cabinet should have to form a common
front with the major oil companies because as far as oil provision was
concerned, the country was dependent on the oil companies.
Den Uyl later revealed that the government of course was concerned with
procuring a fair, proportional allocation, but at the same time ‘the suspi-
cion that the oil companies might have a positive interest in an oil scarcity
and its concomitant price rises’.47
Throughout the whole oil crisis consultations were held in various
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places between the oil companies and the Dutch government; most inten-
sively with the Directorate-General for Energy at Economic Affairs, but
regularly too with the Foreign Ministry. In any case, there was a school of
thought, certainly within the Foreign Ministry, that this contact was not
always properly co-ordinated and sometimes led to different conclusions
in different places.
In the first place, these talks mainly boiled down to the fact that Shell
and other companies ‘were sounding the alarm vigorously’ to get the gov-
ernment to act more positively. Indeed, it was partly on the basis of infor-
mation passed on by the oil companies that Lubbers switched to the intro-
duction of rationing. 48 The judgement of Rosenthal and Scholten seems
correct, since on November 1 Van der Stoel informed the Dutch Ambas-
sador in Brussels that the oil companies were suggesting that the situation
was serious. 49 Other parties involved also believe that the companies
pressed for use-restrictive steps to be taken urgently.50
It was clear by the beginning of November that the Dutch Cabinet was
to a large extent dependent on the information provided by the oil compa-
nies. Moreover, it was in fact dependent on whatever policy the major oil
companies pursued in the sharing out of the anticipated shortages. Initial-
ly, this question was regarded with the usual scepticism within the Cabi-
net, particularly by Van der Stoel, but on November 4 Wagner publicly
gave an assurance that all consumer countries would in principle receive
the same percentage less oil. This would have to be achieved by importing
extra oil from those countries that had not joined the embargo nor im-
posed restrictions on production.51
Some of the major oil companies had besides already made prepara-
tions for limited production even before the oil crisis broke. Shell had pre-
sented most government leaders with a confidential ‘Pink Book’ identify-
ing possible restrictions on the oil supply and outlining the chances of an
‘oil scramble’. Shell was at that times of the opinion that in times of crisis
stocks should be shared out fairly.
Unlike the American companies, Shell had been campaigning for an in-
tergovernmental agreement to share supplies in a crisis and, indeed, had
already begun outlining, in its planning group, how such a system might
work.52
With regard to the embargo against The Netherlands, the oil companies –
or at least the European companies – thus in fact adopted a position of
greater solidarity than The Hague’s ec partners. It was Shell and bp that
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did not walk away from The Netherlands. The supply of crude oil by the
American majors probably slumped more strongly than that from Shell
and bp. In The Hague it was feared that the supply from Chevron and
Texaco might be withdrawn entirely and that the refineries of these com-
panies might even be shut down. 53 But Shell and bp, indeed from the very
beginning of the crisis, proved themselves solid and reliable. The British
government, in fact, put pressure especially on these companies to contin-
ue supplying as per contract – and by implication therefore leaving The
Netherlands to sink. The same happened – according to Wagner – in
Paris. It was therefore concluded at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, as a re-
sult of a conversation between Den Uyl and Wagner, that for the time be-
ing little could be expected from The Netherlands’ ec and oecd part-
ners. The Dutch stood alone, according to the Head of the Department
for Economic Cooperation of the Foreign Ministry.54
Political-economic cooperation within the oecd or ec thus offered
scarcely any point of contact for the Cabinet, whereas the attitude of the
multinational oil concerns, so criticized in Turning Point ’72, seemed to
offer far better perspectives: they offered good cooperation. At Economic
Affairs too it was quickly assumed that The Netherlands would benefit
most from a course of events that left sharing the oil between consumer
countries to the oil companies. The Department for Economic Coopera-
tion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed, particularly in view of
Shell’s strong position in the international oil sector.55
The Hague thus had an interest in maintaining the free trade of the
main oil companies – the majors – and of course the government also took
risks, for it was by no means clear how these companies would react in the
event of more serious shortages. The Department for Economic Coopera-
tion of the Foreign Ministry therefore proposed that the government
ought to be consulted more in the policy and planning of Shell. It had up
till then not appeared a simple matter to get a clear picture of Shell’s atti-
tude, not least because Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs appear to
have had access to different sources which apparently did not always fur-
nish the same information.56
November 7 brought new, reassuring, news over the policy of Shell and
bp. During a meeting between Dutch Shell Director E.C. Werner and sev-
eral top officials from the Dutch Foreign Ministry, it was made clear that
both Shell and bp took the position, in defiance of the pressure from the
British government and Prime Minister Heath personally, that the oil in
Europe must be shared fairly. It was their intention to observe the meas-
ures imposed by the Arab countries, but nevertheless to achieve a redistri-
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bution by rescheduling to Rotterdam oil from Nigeria and Iran, which
previously had gone to the uk. In spite of intense pressure from the new
British Minister for Energy, Lord Carrington, Shell stuck to its principle
of non-discrimination, a policy which caused great irritation in the uk.
The London Evening Standard vented this displeasure with the headline:
‘The Dutch are getting British oil’.57
Werner assured his Foreign Affairs interlocutors that Shell would not
be pressurized by the British government. In the short term, however, it
would be difficult to achieve an increase in production from Iran and
Nigeria: in the preceding period, production in Nigeria had already been
tripled and in Iran doubled. Shell had in fact decided to experiment with
the transit of oil from one of the embargo countries via Rotterdam to Ger-
many. If this worked out, Rotterdam could be rather satisfactorily organ-
ized.58
This rescheduling or redistribution of the oil flow entering Western
Europe was to be an important means of neutralizing the effects of the
embargo in the following weeks. Of course, this rescheduling had to be
done discretely. From the beginning of November, therefore, there was
far more reticence in the public mention of any figures relating to the oil
supply. This did not facilitate the task of keeping the public informed, but
it was nonetheless considered necessary, with a view to possible problems
that might arise from the rescheduling of oil. Facts and figures concerning
the oil supply had an enormous political significance.
In this context, it should also be pointed out that some Arab countries
apparently had no interest in checking to see that oil tankers were not in
fact supplying embargoed countries. Uncertainty over the source of oil
also enabled the embargo to be circumvented. Subsequently, Wagner was
to say that Shell had throughout observed the oil embargo and that The
Netherlands was provided by countries that had not announced an em-
bargo, 59 but it certainly remains an open question whether ‘black’ oil
was also arriving in Rotterdam during the embargo. After all, that also
happened in the usa, which managed to obtain leaked Libyan and Saudi
oil during the embargo.60
Whatever the truth of the matter, the Head of the Department for Eco-
nomic Cooperation (des) at the Foreign Ministry observed that for obvi-
ous reasons Lubbers could only give the press general figures for the
dependence on Middle Eastern oil; and in any case the population was
sufficiently convinced of the seriousness of the situation. In confidential
talks with representatives of the ec countries, figures for the inflow and
transit of oil via Rotterdam had to be given, albeit general figures in the
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main, in order to demonstrate to the surrounding countries how impor-
tant this supply and transit were for them. This was necessary to induce a
certain degree of solidarity in these countries. Data on the division of the
Arab oil supply between the European countries was highly confidential.
According to des, Shell had sought
not to make these figures too clear, since they can then be changed in
due course in favour of supplies from countries not involved in the em-
bargo.61
Although there had initially been a feeling mainly of outrage in The
Hague over London’s attitude, it has to be conceded that all the West Eu-
ropean countries switched to the defence of their own interests. This also
caused conflict within the Benelux, a conflict in which the difference of
outlook between the Dutch ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairs
was again revealed. As we saw earlier, Economic Affairs wanted oil ex-
ports, with particular application to the considerable export to Belgium,
to be subjected to licenses. So far this had not happened, because of the
provisions of the Benelux treaty, although Brussels had in the meantime
taken precisely such action. Pressure for discussion with the Belgian Min-
istry for Economic Affairs had been in vain, so now the Dutch Ministry
for Economic Affairs also wanted licences as a counter-measure: export
to Belgium by the oil companies must be limited, furthermore, and thus
brought into line with domestic restrictions.
The Dutch Foreign Ministry, however, was not convinced of the wis-
dom of this kind of counter-measure. It seemed to the Head of des that a
better approach would be for the Foreign Ministry, via the Dutch Ambas-
sador in Brussels, to convey to the Belgians their disappointment with the
way things had gone. He also pointed to the risky aspects of the capped
export restriction that Economic Affairs advocated, given the Dutch ef-
forts to maintain a common market. This, after all, was the very thing
The Netherlands reproached the British government with: exerting pres-
sure on the oil companies. For these reasons, the Dutch Cabinet carefully
measured any actions with regard to Shell. Foreign Affairs was right: re-
stricting transit was a very delicate question. In the following weeks, this
would seldom be explicitly referred to or discussed, not even in confiden-
tial interdepartmental talks. Economic Affairs no longer raised the ques-
tion because, it was assumed at Foreign Affairs, nothing could be said
about this to the outside world.62
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The Co-ordination Group
Slowly, The Netherlands began to get to grips with the logistics of the oil
crisis. The Rationing Law was meanwhile in operation, and in different
places official consultative bodies came into being to prepare and execute
the government’s actions. In early November, in accordance with an earli-
er decision by the Council of Ministers, the interdepartmental Co-ordi-
nation Group for Oil Crisis Actions was created with Rutten as chair-
man. Meanwhile, in the Ministry of Economic Affairs the Oil Crisis
Working Group was established as departmental co-ordinating body for
the preparation and taking of all measures within Economic Affairs; be-
side which this body also served as advice group for the Economic Affairs
representative in the Co-ordination Group mentioned above. The Direc-
torate-General for Energy of Economic Affairs also served this particular
task to a significant extent.63 The Council of Ministers also prepared it-
self for this same function by creating a Ministerial Committee for Oil
Problems, whose task was the preparation for decision-making within
the Cabinet.64
November 8 saw the first gathering of the Co-ordination Group.
Meanwhile, the reduction of oil production carried through by the Arab
opec countries had risen to 25% compared to September levels; yet for
all that, it was also acknowledged that the consumer countries had
achieved no unity, partly in view of the privileged position of countries
such as France and Great Britain. The oecd and the ec for the time being
limited themselves to stock-taking and consultation.
At this meeting of the Co-ordination Group, the following principles
were established for any further measures that might need to be taken.
First, priority to be given to economic activity above private transport,
and concomitant preference for the industrial fuel naphtha over petrol for
motors. With regard to business life, a general restriction on use was
thought best combined with a system of exceptions. This ought to lead to
a global reduction in deliveries of approximately 15%. In the first stage,
priority would also be extended to horticulture and public transport.
The Co-ordination Group argued for maintaining the Sunday ban on
driving, even though it was clear that at Economic Affairs, and especially
within the Directorate-General for Energy (dge), there was strong sup-
port for the more radical measure of rationing. A driving ban on Satur-
days, however, was thought by the Co-ordination Group to be too dam-
aging to the catering industry. For the time being a strict policy on exemp-
tions would have to be enforced that would make allowance for doctors,
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invalids and public transport. On the first Sunday, the ban had not ap-
plied to foreigners, but from November 11 they too would be included.
Beside these regulations, the appeal to the people must continue for a vol-
untary speed limit of 100 kms per hour, to use their cars as little as possi-
ble and to restrict the use of heating fuel.65
Conclusion
Thus, the Cabinet prepared itself for the worst. There was great and con-
tinuing uncertainty over the actual effect of the Arab actions. Only by the
third week of November would it actually be possible to say whether
there was any reduction in supplies. Concerns gradually increased, how-
ever, that by the end of November would reach serious levels. But Shell, at
least, had in the meantime declared its willingness to lend The Nether-
lands a helping hand. Although it could not be taken for granted that this
pledge would be fulfilled under all circumstances, as far as the embargo
against The Netherlands was concerned, the oil companies seemed to
adopt a stance of solidarity that was all the more striking for its absence
among ec partners.
Under these unclear circumstances Lubbers and Economic Affairs de-
cided to opt for measures that would restrict oil use. Despite all the criti-
cism in the press at the time, in retrospect the Cabinet can therefore hard-
ly be accused of being indecisive. There was, after all, still no certainty
that the embargo against The Netherlands would be effective. Den Uyl’s
suggestion in the Dutch Second Chamber that the Arab embargo was al-
ready being implemented was premature and in fact a bluff. It was mainly
thanks to the influence of the Directorate-General for Energy and the oil
companies that the restrictions on use were implemented so quickly. At
this stage, the government’s measures were without doubt considered by
the public as legitimate. Apart from the many attempts to gain exemp-
tion, there was a high degree of readiness to cooperate. The appeal for
voluntary speed restriction was also given public assent on a wide scale.
People and government were in accord, although this would be a rather
different story later when it came to the introduction of rationing.
The relative success of these counter-measures, however, could not ob-
scure the fact that the oil restrictions hurt. On November 6, 1973, E.F.
Geessink, the Director-General for Agriculture and Food Supply, of the
Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries, wrote in several letters to Eco-
nomic Affairs that alarming news had reached him to the effect that sup-
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plies of petroleum to market gardeners were drying up. This meant that
thousands of market gardeners were facing serious disruption to their
cultivation schedules and the threat of losing their crops. Serious difficul-
ties were also threatening the fishing industry, with consequent dwin-
dling of the fish supply.66
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5A European Summit
The political divisions within the ec were further accentuated during No-
vember and December. France tried to exploit the crisis to press through a
common ec energy policy and, moreover, with the support of London, to
pursue a European-Arab dialogue. Washington also began to get more di-
rectly involved in managing the oil crisis. The differences between the
Nine reached a climax during the ec Summit held in Copenhagen on De-
cember 14 and 15. Although there were also hopeful reports reaching The
Hague, the situation for the Dutch during the weeks from November 6 to
December 14 seemed worse than it had been throughout the whole crisis.
It was in fact during this stage, as we shall see in Chapter 6, that tough do-
mestic measures were decided, including the issue of rationing coupons.
In this chapter, we shall look at the developments from the ec meeting of
Foreign Ministers on November 5 and 6 up to the European Summit in
December.
The Embargo
As we have seen earlier, with Van der Stoel’s signature on the ec declara-
tion of November 6, the strongly pro-Israeli character of earlier Dutch
policy had been rather watered down. It was initially assumed that sign-
ing this conscious declaration would make a favourable impression in the
Arab capitals; but the report of this declaration was swiftly followed by
rumours of the interpretative statement that Van de Stoel had put out the
same day. The Dutch representatives in the Arab countries were instruct-
ed to emphasise the strong unity of the Nine. But despite this effort, the
positive effect of the new ec declaration remained limited; nor did the po-
sition of the government and Van der Stoel, in some respects, become eas-
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ier in their own country. They were now under fire from two sides: from
those who thought that Van der Stoel’s pro-Israeli gruff lack of subtlety
had put the national economic interests in danger, and also from those,
like the historian L. de Jong, who thought the Cabinet had laid Israel open
to Arab oil blackmail. Both sides demanded further explanation from the
Cabinet of the signing of the ec statement of November 6.
The Arab side too, on several occasions, asked for clarification of the
Dutch standpoint as a condition for any end to the embargo. In Tripoli,
for example, J.J. de Roos, the Dutch Ambassador, learned that as it stood,
the position was far from adequate.1 The Dutch Ambassador to Egypt,
Von Oven, was in fact doubtful whether the Dutch position had been im-
proved at all by the ec declaration. With the approval of The Hague, he
had held talks with the Secretary-General of the Arab League, M. Riad,
who had suggested that it would be useful if Van der Stoel were to send a
letter to the League pointing out once again that The Hague’s standpoint
did not deviate from the November 6 declaration. Moreover, according to
Von Oven, Van der Stoel could also pledge that The Netherlands would
increase development aid to the Arab countries.2 Three days later, Von
Oven repeated his message that a separate statement should quell Arab
doubts about Dutch sincerity,3 a suggestion which evoked only a negative
reaction from Van der Stoel. He declined to address himself to the Arab
League separately, since he had no wish to undermine attempts to arrive
at concerted ec action.4
Several days later, the International Federation of Arab Trade Unions
demanded that The Netherlands should put out a separate Middle East
declaration. This proposal was endorsed by Egyptian officials, claiming
that The Hague had only acquiesced in the joint ec declaration under
duress. From Cairo, Von Oven warned of a hardening of the Arab atti-
tude. The Arabs saw the embargo as an effective weapon: any ‘lifting or
softening its conditions would demand an even higher price’. In any case,
Van der Stoel rejected this new demand just as he had declined to enter-
tain similar Saudi demands (see the following section). The declaration of
November 6 contained a common standpoint, according to Van der Stoel,
and ec solidarity would only be damaged if member states began issuing
their own separate statements. Syria and Jordan were also adopting a
more anti-Dutch tone by mid-November, not least because of repeated
expressions of sympathy for The Hague from Radio Israel. There were
also various rumours circulating that served to stress the anti-Arab dispo-
sition of The Netherlands. For example, according to Le Monde, Van der
Stoel had originally shown the door to the Arab Ambassadors on October
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17. When two members of the Dutch Parliament questioned the Minister
on this, he retorted that the report was a malicious distortion of the
facts.5
But there were also more favourable signs. On October 17 the oapec
countries decided in Vienna not to go ahead with the 5% reduction of oil
deliveries to Western countries projected for December. The decision was
considered by various commentators as an Arab token of recognition of
the November 6 declaration. At the same time, however, it was decided to
continue the embargo against the usa, The Netherlands and Denmark,
and a week later, at an Arab summit in Algiers, to add to the list Portugal,
South Africa and Rhodesia because of the colonial or apartheid politics of
those countries.
The question, however, was whether the embargo against The Nether-
lands was effective. The Dutch Ambassador Schorer reported from
Kuwait that the Kuwaiti Oil Minister Atiki had suggested at a press con-
ference that Kuwait was not much concerned about attempts to circum-
vent the embargo. Kuwait, Atiki said, was in no position to control the
exact destination of oil exports, or whether the destination of tankers was
changed once offshore. So long as such manoeuvres were discretely car-
ried out – ‘without irrritating anyone’ –, Kuwait had no objection.6 Sever-
al days later, De Ranitz confirmed from Paris that both Kuwaiti and Saudi
Ambassadors had let the Quay d’Orsay know that
as far as they were concerned, oil originating from their countries and
reaching countries affected by the embargo could be considered beyond
their jurisdiction.7
Similar reports were coming out of Oman. It was a matter of assumption
in Oman that The Netherlands would be able to look after itself by means
of rescheduling. The same kind of reassuring communication was also
coming from Bahrein;8 all of which confirmed the conclusions drawn by
De Lavalette as a result of his tour of the Arab capitals.
The measures taken by the oapec countries thus appeared much more
stringent than they actually were in practice; and this was true not only of
the embargo but also the restrictions on production. Thus, the news from
Bonn was that, according to informants from the steel concern Thyssen,
there was no less oil being shipped out of the Persian Gulf than normal.
Supplies to established clients were perhaps down by as much as 25%,
but this 25% was now being supplied to hitherto unknown traders. This
oil was being offered at fancy prices, but some West German companies,
Thyssen included, were willing to comply.9
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Various offers were also arriving in The Netherlands. Ambassador
Von Oven in Cairo, for example, was approached by an Egyptian consult-
ant who wanted to know whether The Netherlands might be interested in
250,000 tons of crude oil. According to the documents this oil should
have been shipped to Romania, but in reality it could go directly to The
Netherlands.10 Even bigger offers were received: Ambassador Boon re-
ported from Rome an offer of more than 80 million tons of oil, with
Beirut as the place for concluding the contract.11 The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs archive contains a series of such propositions involving, in various
cases, at first sight rather louche figures who materialised as intermedi-
aries – arms dealers and the like. Prince Bernhard also reported connec-
tions who would be able to assist The Netherlands to locate extra fuel.12
At the end of 1973, there even came an offer from Baghdad. The brother-
in-law of Saddam Hussein, Khalid M. Saloom, offered to supply two to
five million tons of crude oil from the Rumailah oil field in Southern Iraq.
Circles round Saddam apparently thought there had been enough pres-
sure on The Netherlands and that the moment had now come to relax it a
bit.13 In general, however, these offers were considered by the Direc-
torate-General for Foreign Economic Relations in Economic Affairs and
by Shell as thoroughly unreliable. Nothing was done in response – which
in itself would suggest that the shortage of oil was certainly not acute.
But despite all the offers of oil, by the end of October the supply of oil
to Rotterdam did begin to decline. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs anticipated that this shortfall would persist through the coming
weeks, and it was even assumed that it might reach as much as 40 to 50%.
In retrospect, these figures seem highly exaggerated; but the mood in The
Hague at the end of November was highly pessimistic. On December 1, a
sombre Den Uyl addressed the Dutch people on television. The world had
irrevocably changed, he told viewers: the familiar times of before the oil
crisis would never return.14
The Van Roijen Mission
Meanwhile, the Dutch Cabinet had decided on November 2 to send a spe-
cial mission – in a certain sense a ‘royal’ mission – to Saudi Arabia in the
person of the ex-Foreign Minister and one-time Ambassador J.H. van
Roijen. This mission, like that of De Lavalette, was given as little publici-
ty as possible; nor was it discussed in advance with any of The Nether-
lands’ ec partners. Van Roijen’s task was to convert the improvement in
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the Dutch image, possibly the result of signing the epc declaration, into
more concrete advantage. On the face of it, this would seem to have been
no easy task, for King Feisal had taken serious offence to The Hague’s re-
sponse to the ultimatum of October 26. The intention was for Van Roijen
to carry with him a letter from Queen Juliana, personally addressed to
King Feisal, and whose text was discussed at great length both at the For-
eign Ministry and by Shell’s Arabists.
On November 15, accompanied by the head of the African and Middle
Eastern Department of the Foreign Ministry, Van Roijen paid a visit to
King Feisal and one of his counsellors. Van Roijen tried to elicit from the
King some understanding of the Dutch position, but that was not a simple
matter. Feisal maintained that The Hague had first to condemn the Israeli
aggression publicly before there could be talk of any end to the embargo.
Van Roijen’s reference to The Hague’s signing of the November 6 decla-
ration made no impression. Feisal pointed out that The Hague had be-
haved in an ‘oppositional’ fashion in the meeting of October 13. Van Roi-
jen denied this: The Hague had merely made ‘procedural’ objections at
the settling of the October 13 declaration, and apart from that, both the
October 13 and November 6 declarations of the Nine had been wholly
unanimous. Feisal was not satisfied with this and laid down the stand-
points that The Hague had to endorse publicly: (1) the condemnation of
Israeli aggression; (2) demand for complete Israeli withdrawal from the
occupied territories; and (3) support for the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinian people. He gave Van Roijen a letter addressed to Queen Juliana in
which these demands were once more reiterated.
Van Roijen also spoke again to Yamani, who adopted a less punitive
attitude than his monarch. The Oil Minister emphasised that the ‘Saudis
are being dragged by, rather than leading, the decisions of Arab countries
concerning oil as a weapon’. In his report, Van Roijen concluded that the
visit was appreciated and might perhaps contribute to Saudi Arabia re-
fraining from any further retaliatory measures. The fact that Van Roijen
had been received by King Feisal could only be of positive benefit to The
Netherlands. Van der Stoel felt the same about the trip and thanked Van
Roijen for his efforts.15
But the problem of the embargo was of course no nearer resolution. It
was at this stage in mid-November that Van der Stoel became wholly con-
vinced that the embargo had already been prepared well before the Octo-
ber war and was aimed against the whole of Western Europe. The analysis
of Ambassador Boon, Dutch Ambassador in Rome, seemed to confirm
such suspicions. In his analysis, the embargo plan must have been worked
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out on July 6 in Algeria on the assumption that the most effective action
against Western Europe would be first to paralyse the working capacity of
Rotterdam. This strategy was supposed to have been worked out under
the leadership of a certain Ali Khodja, representative in The Netherlands
of an Algerian oil company, Sonatrach.16 On the basis of this informa-
tion, Van der Stoel felt his view confirmed that the embargo was therefore
not, or at least was not primarily, a measure aimed against The Hague’s
Middle East politics. The core of the conflict concerned Rotterdam and
thence the whole of Western Europe. The war had certainly begun unex-
pectedly, but not the embargo. ‘The scenario had long been prepared,’ ac-
cording to the minister, and there was no point in pursuing any form of
political rapprochement with the Arab countries.17
Some Dutch diplomats thought otherwise and advised a more concil-
iatory approach. Immediately after the Van Roijen mission, Ambassador
Derksen sent an analysis of Dutch-Saudi relations from Jeddah, advising
the Minister to follow up Feisal’s questions and his criticisms. Of course,
it was questionable whether giving a single guarantee to Saudi Arabia
would mean that the embargo would be lifted, but he feared that with-
holding all response would only further prejudice mutual relations and
expose economic interests in Saudi Arabia to uncertainty.18 For obvious
reasons, given his reading of the whole crisis, Van der Stoel was not sus-
ceptible to this kind of suggestion.
King Feisal’s letter was not answered till February 1974, but an initial
reaction to his demands was communicated by Van der Stoel to the Saudi
Ambassador Nowilaty.19 The Dutch Foreign Minister made it clear that
he was unable to satisfy Feisal’s first demand, condemnation of Israel,
since The Netherlands was not party to the conflict and took a neutral po-
sition. The government had already spoken its position in the unanimous
declaration of the Nine and in conformity with resolution 242. The Cabi-
net did not intend to reconsider this position. Van der Stoel again stressed
to Nowilaty The Netherlands’ determination never to condone acts of vi-
olence. The government subscribed to the view that the Palestinian ques-
tion was a political matter, but it was not for The Hague to anticipate a
future peace accord by specifying Palestinian rights.20
Van Roijen’s journey did not therefore have much effect. The Dutch
reputation seemed rather to have sunk to its nadir. Only Morocco, which
in any case had no oil to export, seemed at this stage to adopt an attitude
less unfavourably disposed toward The Netherlands. This was the mes-
sage communicated by Ambassador De Vreede from Rabat following a
conversation with the Moroccan Foreign Minister. According to the lat-
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ter, the problem of how to get oil to The Netherlands discretely, for exam-
ple through such intermediaries as France or West Germany, was now be-
ing studied in several Arab capitals.21 This sounded encouraging, and the
message was relayed by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to all diplomatic
posts in the Arab countries. At the same time, however, it was still being
insisted elsewhere in the Arab world, in Beirut for example, that the
Dutch Cabinet must publicly condemn Israel before any action against
them could be relieved. In a conversation with dgpa Van Lynden, the
Lebanese Ambassador in The Hague again repeated explicitly that The
Netherlands had to acknowledge two matters in a separate statement: 1)
the rights of the Palestinians, and 2) the necessity for Israel to vacate all
occupied territories.22
An Incident in The Hague
Meanwhile, in The Hague a second note was sent to the Second Chamber
in which it was again stated that the government’s policy with regard to
the Middle East was even-handed. A solution to the Middle East conflict
could only be achieved on the basis of resolution 242. The declaration of
November 6 contained several points that elaborated on 242, in particu-
lar with regard to the political aspirations of the Palestinians. Now that
there were genuine prospects for peace negotiations, ‘the political aspira-
tions of the Palestinians must be articulated in some shape or form’. The
note proposed that the passage in the epc statement of November 6 over
the ending of territorial occupation was in complete harmony with the
Cabinet’s position. It was stressed that in the many contacts with the
Arab countries, time and again there had been reference to the mistaken
supposition that the Dutch had offered help to Israel in the form of arms
deliveries or volunteers. The note repeated that the embargo had to be
seen against the background of the changing economic relations within
the oil sector. In other words, the embargo was therefore not, or at least
not exclusively, a punitive measure directly related to The Hague’s Mid-
dle East politics.23
At the end of November the policy was raised for detailed discussion
during the general debate in the First Chamber. The signing of the epc
statement was in general endorsed, although ex-premier P. de Jong (kvp)
thought it would have been more open and above board if a change in pol-
icy had been openly admitted. For the reality was that Van der Stoel had
shifted ground for the sake of maintaining ec unity. In response to the
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views of the First Chamber, Den Uyl gave his minister his complete pro-
tection. The storm of criticism Cabinet policy was met with was in his
view totally unjustified. The story in Le Monde, that Van der Stoel had
more or less shown the four Arab Ambassadors the door, had no basis
whatsoever. Den Uyl let it be known that one of the Arab Ambassadors
concerned, on his own initiative and on behalf of his three colleagues, had
approached Van der Stoel to tell him that he deeply regretted the piece in
Le Monde. As far as the passage of the epc statement was concerned that
spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, Den Uyl acknowledged
that the formulation here differed from that of resolution 242, but there
had been no change of policy.24
The Foreign Affairs budget debates in the Second Chamber were
scheduled for November 29. There, too, the accusation was heard that
the change of policy implied by undersigning the epc statement had sim-
ply not been acknowledged. In reply to questions about the rights of the
Palestinians, Van der Stoel answered that their political aspirations had
to be given form, a position which had meanwhile been endorsed by The
Netherlands in the un. It was self-evident, said Van der Stoel, that the
Palestinians had to have some say in the realisation of their own future.
How that should be done, however, was not in the Cabinet’s power to de-
cide.25
In the Parliamentary debate, Van der Stoel avoided the issue of hand-
ing back the occupied territories. Following the advice of dgpa Van Lyn-
den, he referred to the relevant passage in the ec declaration.26 This ma-
noeuvring was not easy for Van der Stoel. It was being solidly maintained
in the Second Chamber that there had been no change of position while,
at the same time, in the higher realm of international diplomacy it had to
be implied that by signing the ec declaration The Hague had indeed ac-
cepted the position demanded by the Arab countries, without this being
spoken in so many words. This of course was the root of the problem: that
the normally implicitly accepted diplomatic positions were not always
backed by domestic or parliamentary consensus. This, in turn, led to
complications like the so-called Thurkow affair.
The main source of the problems that arose in The Hague in early De-
cember lay in the cryptic passage in the November declaration concern-
ing the occupied territories. The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Chr. Th. F.
Thurkow, told the press that the epc standpoint implied that Israel had to
withdraw from all the occupied territories, with the qualification of pos-
sible minor border corrections. This statement was apparently made
without prior consultation with his minister. Thurkow’s pronouncement
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meant ‘a shift in the Dutch position … which may well have suited the
views of dgpa Van Lynden, but certainly not mine’, Van der Stoel later
remarked.27 Thurkow’s interpretation, which was moreover already be-
ing taken up in diplomatic negotiations, caused great commotion. On
Christmas Day the Second Chamber called Van der Stoel to account.
During the debate, although Van de Stoel insisted that his policy had
undergone no change, he did not explicitly distance himself from
Thurkow’s interpretation. He pledged that action would be taken to en-
sure that further misunderstandings would be avoided. In a television in-
terview the same evening, he reaffirmed the remark of Den Uyl who, in an
interview with the French newspaper Le Monde, had said that he thought
the definite article ‘the’, defining ‘occupied territories’, was not all that im-
portant. Assuming the possibility of minor border corrections, the discus-
sion over the English and French texts of 242 was in fact utterly point-
less.28 Van der Stoel seemed to be partly covering for Thurkow, but never-
theless his spokesman was suspended the following day. There was no
doubt in the press, however, and with good reason, that the whole
Thurkow affair was the result of the government and Van der Stoel contin-
uing to deny that the Dutch signature to the ec declaration involved a
shift of policy.29
The day following the debate in the Second Chamber, opposition lead-
ers H. Wiegel (vvd) and R. Kruisinga (chu) had a meeting with Den Uyl
and Van der Stoel, with opposition spokesmen for foreign affairs, H.J.
Koster and D.F. van der Mei, also present. The two opposition parties
thought the Cabinet should be much more explicit in acknowledging that
the epc statement of November 6 meant a change of policy. They ex-
pressed the hope that the coming Summit in Copenhagen would provide
the opportunity to clarify the European position. According to Wiegel
and Kruisinga, the Cabinet’s lack of clarity had given rise to confusion,
while the epc statement was clearly a revision of resolution 242 in a pro-
Arab sense. They asked:
Does the government not understand that its every pronouncement is
front page news in the Middle East, that our Ambassadors Bentinck in
Algiers and Von Oven in Cairo – to name but two – are deeply unhappy
because they increasingly find their task becoming untenable?30
Both Van der Stoel and Den Uyl rejected this criticism. The Netherlands,
said Den Uyl, had conducted a pro-Israeli policy for 25 years, and this
was not about to change. Van der Stoel declared that he would oppose any
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clarification of the November 6 statement at the coming Summit. This of
course did nothing to remove the impression that there was indeed a de-
liberate vagueness, or room for manoeuvre, in the Cabinet’s attitude.
The European Community
At this stage, London and Paris remained resolute in their opposition to
any activity aimed at sharing the brunt of the oil shortage on equal terms.
In mid-November, mutual relations between ec countries appeared to be-
come more acerbic than ever, with the Dutch Cabinet, and particularly
Lubbers, contributing to this frosty climate. In the meantime, Lubbers
had declared in the Second Chamber that he would not shrink from fur-
ther steps, if necessary, to safeguard the national provision of oil. This
could affect the export of natural gas, both the quantity exported and the
price. There was no obligation on The Netherlands to be ‘holier than the
Pope’ compared with other ec states. Nor did he exclude the possibility,
he said, that The Netherlands might block decision-making in other areas
within the ec. He did not intend this as a ‘threat’; rather, in the absence of
unanimity in this question of oil supply, it was a perfectly ‘normal and
level-headed observation that it would be senseless to pretend one could
engage in actual, genuine consultations on other matters’. The PvdA
Second Chamber member Van der Hek responded positively to this state-
ment. There was also support for the minister in the press.31
The oil crisis opened up fundamental differences of outlook among
member states over the future of the ec. True to tradition, it was above all
the Dutch and the French conceptions that were at variance, as was evi-
dent when Van der Stoel paid a (long planned) visit to Paris on November
8. During a tête-à-tête with Pompidou and Jobert, among other matters
the future of European integration was discussed. Both French politi-
cians made it clear that they wanted a European summit conference, in
any case before the end of the year, to discuss the question of whether or
not the Nine really were serious about working for European unity. Van
der Stoel assured his French colleagues once again that The Hague want-
ed European unity, but stressed that during this crisis it was also a matter
of defending what had already been achieved; for the embargo threatened
that achievement with disintegration. Pompidou – more than Jobert – ap-
peared to endorse this view. As far as the European summit was con-
cerned, a summit much desired by the French, Jobert emphasised that this
would have to give directives to a future Energy Council which were
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totally in conflict with the usual Dutch position on institutional relations
within the ec. Much to Van der Stoel’s relief, Pompidou seemed to enter-
tain less radical ideas. In the eyes of the President, it should be more of a
‘tour d’horizon’.32
The points of view put to Van der Stoel at this meeting by Pompidou
thus seemed less objectionable than those put by Jobert, which in fact cor-
responded to earlier (and subsequent) impressions that it was primarily
Jobert who seemed to advocate a more extreme viewpoint. Jobert was not
popular in The Netherlands in those days. Ed van Thijn noted in his diary
on November 7: ‘Jobert, rien, rien, rien’.33 Whatever the case, it was clear
that little sympathy could be expected from the Parisian side for the
Dutch wish for joint ec action. During the course of November, more-
over, rumours began circulating to the effect that Paris intended to force
the oil companies by legal means to fulfil their obligations. At this stage,
evidently, Paris had no intention of introducing any measures to limit
consumption.34
Little support was expected from the British side too, as Den Uyl re-
marked a few days later. The situation in Great Britain was additionally
difficult because of serious industrial unrest among the miners, which on
November 14 led the British government to declare a state of emergency.
As reported earlier, this was the context in which London was consider-
ing using legal measures to force the oil companies to supply Great
Britain with its oil quota in full. The British Cabinet specifically put pres-
sure on Shell and bp not to redirect to The Netherlands the Iranian and
Nigerian oil that was on its way to England. In mid-November, when it
was found that these companies were sharing out the oil shortage pro
rata, the British press mounted a fierce attack on the oil companies who,
according to The Times, were busy ‘diverting some supplies to other cus-
tomers’. The companies concerned were Shell, bp and Gulf.35
It was during a meeting of the Socialist International, for which Den
Uyl had travelled to London, as mentioned in Chapter 1, that Golda Meir
so warmly thanked the Dutch Premier for his government’s support. The
meeting was marked by a dramatic confrontation between Meir and the
majority of West Europe’s social democratic leaders, only Brandt and
Den Uyl being excepted from Israeli reproaches. These were also the two
countries that had actually supported Israel during the first weeks of the
war. This aside, it emerged that the British Labour leader, Harold Wilson,
objected to the November 6 epc statement, indicating what might be the
policy of a Labour government, which was in fact voted into office the
following March.
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At the time, however, the Conservative Prime Minister Heath occupied
Downing Street. On November 11, Den Uyl held a memorable meeting
with Heath, at which the two leaders disagreed about almost everything.
Heath said the only solution to the oil problem was to persuade the Arabs
through diplomatic contacts to give up their restrictions on production.
Calling the Arab demands unacceptable was senseless. Nor was there any
point in creating the impression that Europe was hostile to the Arab
world. It was, in fact, essential that the Arab countries should have friends
outside the Soviet camp. Heath declared his satisfaction with the Novem-
ber 6 epc statement, specifically because of its direct reference to resolu-
tion 242. It was Israel’s desire not to implement resolution 242 which
was, after all, the root cause of the war. He appreciated that The Hague
had signed the declaration and expressed his view that the ec declaration
should now be followed by a suitable diplomatic mission. Den Uyl found
himself entirely at odds with Heath’s pronounced views. A common ec
front would make it clear that the European countries were not prepared
to bend to Arab blackmail. He stressed that the embargo against The
Netherlands was in fact aimed at the whole of Western Europe.
It was clear that the two premiers were starkly opposed to each other.
They similarly held different views on the question of how effective a grip
the Arab countries had on compliance with the embargo, which was of
course an extremely important question in deciding what strategy to fol-
low. Den Uyl, according to his own report of events, pointed out that
it is highly significant that the oil companies have and continue to have
the freedom to regulate the supply of oil to different countries.
Heath, who may well have been astonished to hear this statement of prin-
ciple from the social democrat Den Uyl, gave as his opinion that the Arab
countries had a fairly good grip on the movement of tankers, but he did
not contradict Den Uyl’s opinion on the oil companies’ freedom. In fact,
it seemed to confirm the judgement of the British Foreign Minister,
Home, who three days previously had said: ‘We will not interfere with the
commercial policy of the oil companies’.36
Subsequently, in the Council of Ministers, Den Uyl declared that
Heath had fully supported the Arab countries and that he found him ‘cyn-
ical’. Den Uyl believed that Heath’s attitude was largely dictated by the
huge Arab investment in the British economy. Indeed, Heath had openly
admitted his greatest fear: that the Arabs would pull out their Sterling
credit, which would be a heavy blow to London as a financial centre.37
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London and above all Paris were at this stage without any doubt the
most important opponents of the Dutch, as was observed by Bonn with
some concern; so much so that in mid-November it was being wondered
in the West German Auswärtige Amt – the Foreign Ministry – whether
The Hague should not seriously try to improve relations with France. The
Dutch Ambassador De Beus reported from Bonn that it was being won-
dered there ‘whether we might not do well to be more obliging to the
French in other official bodies – the un, for example’. The implicit refer-
ence here was to the question of a moratorium on nuclear tests, in which
ec countries had up till then adopted a position in the un opposing
France.38 This was a suggestion which, as will become apparent, did not
misfire.
The differences of opinion within the ec gradually crystallised, threat-
ening an impasse. This proved to be the case when the Permanent Repre-
sentatives of the ec met for discussion of the oil situation on November
19. The familiar moves were rehearsed. The Belgian representative ob-
served that sharing the oil within the common market at that moment de-
pended in fact on the arbitrary decisions of the oil companies. His French
colleague said that these companies had insufficient political power to en-
sure safe supplies of oil in the longer term. Furthermore, this arbitration
worked more to the advantage of the usa than the European countries.
The French therefore wanted joint state intervention in a European
framework and not within the oecd. The British representative conclud-
ed, however, that the problem was essentially political and therefore was
only susceptible to a political solution, which should in the first place be
sought at the epc meeting of November 20. The British thus supported
the French only in working for a political rapprochement with the Arab
countries, but not if it was a question of regulating the market or of state
intervention.39 There was therefore at this stage absolutely no advance in
the question of mutually supportive action within the ec. The same was
true of the oecd.40
The pressure of the oil-producing countries was increased further by
another round of price hikes. On November 19 it was learned that discus-
sions in Vienna between opec and the oil companies had failed. The
opec members let it be known that henceforth they themselves would set
prices. Three days later, Wagner sent Den Uyl a letter expressing his seri-
ous concerns over the anticipated price rises. He appealed to the con-
sumer countries to restrict the race for oil through mutual consultation
and to warn the opec countries of the possible collapse of the world econ-
omy. Van der Stoel immediately informed all his embassies that the Cabi-
net shared the deep unease like Shell.41
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In the context of Europe, the epc meeting of November 20 had mean-
while produced a modest breakthrough with regard to the embargo. The
British delegation proposed that a common démarche be undertaken in
all the Arab capitals. The plan met with scepticism from the French, but
they pledged to support the proposal, at least if the ec member states
withheld their support in the un General Assembly for a resolution con-
demning French nuclear tests, a resolution to which The Netherlands had
initially given its support. This was the compromise that De Beus had ear-
lier mentioned in his report from Bonn.
Van der Stoel immediately promised that his delegation would abstain
when it came to voting on the resolution. The delegation would explain
the reason for its abstention subsequently by alleging that it had to do
with imbalances in the text. Bonn also promised to abstain on the same
grounds, and with these pledges Paris agreed to support the British plan.
Van der Stoel was later to say in the Council of Ministers that his promise
over the nuclear testing was bordering on the limits of the acceptable.
Nevertheless, there was now for the first time a united front presented by
the Nine with regard to the embargo. Den Uyl also referred to Van der
Stoel’s performance as ‘balancing on a knife-edge’.42
For the purpose of the common ec démarche, a joint text was subse-
quently put together in which it was claimed that the Arab actions had af-
fected the interests of the entire ec. The Arab countries had let it be
known that the ec should play a role in procuring a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East. The embargo threatened to divide the ec, however. As
a result, there was a certain contradiction between the implications of the
Arab measures and the unanimous ec attitude that they desired.43
But the démarche did not produce the desired effect. Executing such a
joint move turned out to be more complicated than anticipated. In every
Arab country, the most influential Ambassador was to be entrusted to
carry out the démarche; but this was not always regarded with confidence.
The Dutch Ambassador Van Hoeve pointed out from Damascus that the
démarche there was executed by the French Ambassador; while it was
very much open to question whether he really would be prepared to waive
French interests for those of the other member states. The same was the
case in Algiers: the French Ambassador was to execute the démarche.44
And indeed, as Dutch Ambassador De Ranitz reported from Paris, it
was quickly apparent that the French had given their own interpretation
to the joint démarche in some Arab capitals. Specifically, the French Am-
bassador in Jeddah had received instructions that did not conform with
the ec arrangement. The Director for North Africa and the Levant at the
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Quay d’Orsay positively denied this to De Ranitz, who had left it at that,
since he was unable to say ‘that access had been obtained to the relevant
instructions, which furthermore would certainly not promote the further
cooperation of the French Ambassador in Jeddah’.45 The result of this
joint action was, in fact, very little.
The end product of all Van der Stoel’s diplomatic activities and the
work of the Dutch Foreign Ministry were thus so far negligible. By the be-
ginning of December, the only thing that could be positively said was that
most ec countries meanwhile, albeit in a rather formal and not entirely
convincing fashion, had made it clear to the Arab countries that they ob-
jected to the embargo against The Netherlands. This was at least a step,
but not a great step forwards.
Two Oil Ministers in Europe
Shortly after the epc declaration of November 6, it was learned that two
Arab ministers, the Saudi Oil Minister Yamani and the Algerian Minister
of Industry, Belaid Abdessalam, were intending to visit several West Eu-
ropean countries. There was huge agitation surrounding this projected
visit, both in The Hague and in other West European capitals. As soon as
the trip was known, attempts were made to persuade the two ministers to
pay a visit to The Netherlands. On November 21, dgpa Van Lynden em-
phasized to the Algerian Ambassador to The Hague that such a visit was
thought ’particularly opportune’.46 The following day, Van der Stoel sent
a coded telegram to all posts repeating that the Cabinet was eager to re-
ceive the two ministers, although he considered the chance small that they
would actually visit The Hague. Van der Stoel suggested that other ec
governments would be able to see that the refusal of the two to visit The
Hague would cause surprise, since The Netherlands had taken absolutely
no counter measure against the embargo.47
While the two ministers had already begun their journey and had
called on Paris, in The Hague differences of opinion were revealed over
the question of whether or not an urgent attempt should be made to
arrange a meeting. During a discussion meeting between the Dutch For-
eign Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Lubbers expressed
interest in meeting the two – once again an indication of Lubbers’s more
flexible and pragmatic approach than Van der Stoel’s. According to the
latter, Lubbers and Economic Affairs were indeed more pro-Arab, but
that was hardly surprising in view of their justifiable concern for the econ-
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omy. Lubbers contested this. He said that as soon as the embargo had
been announced, in a meeting with Den Uyl and Van der Stoel, he had ar-
gued ‘without reservation, not to give in an inch politically’, which some-
what surprised the premier.48 Nonetheless, the Foreign Ministry had
doubts about Lubbers’s proposal, since such a meeting should in the first
instance be about political demands.49
In any case, on November 26 in Paris, Yamani absolutely denied ever
having received a Dutch invitation. Van Lynden later forcefully reminded
the Saudi Ambassador Nowilaty that he had on two occasions made it
quite clear that The Hague would highly appreciate a visit from the two
ministers.50 On the same day, the two ministers let it be known informal-
ly that they were ready to receive a Dutch delegation during their stay in
Brussels. Van der Stoel was fully informed of this by his Belgian counter-
part, Van Elslande. The Belgian minister thought The Hague ought to re-
spond positively to the Arab invitation; he feared the possibility of Rot-
terdam being eliminated and the consequences that would have for the
Belgian economy.51
The visit to Brussels for which Van Elslande was arguing was raised for
extensive discussion at the Dutch Council of Ministers. Van der Stoel had
little enthusiasm for a visit by himself and Lubbers to Brussels. In all
probability the two Arab ministers had no mandate to negotiate, he
thought, and were therefore only interested in gaining concessions. It
seemed to him, at least, that it would be better if he did not go himself,
thus preventing any meeting with the two ministers assuming a political
nature. Furthermore, the two had not taken up earlier invitations, even
denying there had been any, which was also unpromising. However, Van
der Stoel had no serious objection to Lubbers going. It would probably
not be a good idea to reject the invitation from the two ministers com-
pletely, the more so since that would also be likely to irritate the Belgians.
Lubbers was furthermore in a better position than himself, for he could
steer clear of the political aspect.
Boersma (Social Affairs) and Pronk (Development Cooperation) also
had little appetite for a ‘humiliating trip’ to Brussels, but on the hand, it
was felt the impression should be avoided that The Hague was unwilling
to talk. Pronk further thought that any visit Lubbers made would be use-
ful in the context of the government’s image with the electorate. Lubbers
himself declared that he was ready to meet the two Arab ministers. In his
discussions, he would above all point out the repercussions the embargo
had for the ec, because Europe was in fact an integrated entity. Den Uyl
thought that undertaking this ‘humiliating visit’ was indeed a fine balanc-
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ing act. In the publicity given to the visit, it should therefore be stressed
that Lubbers would visit his opposite number, the Belgian Minister for
Economics, and that coincidentally there would be discussions with the
Arab ministers. This was approved by the ministerial council.52
The meetings of the two Arab ministers with members of different Eu-
ropean governments did not go off with the same facility. In particular,
even though Van Elslande had meanwhile given the Belgian parliament an
interpretation of the epc declaration of November 6 that was favourable
to the Arabs, the Belgian-Arab meeting was rather unpleasant.53 The two
Arab ministers let it be known that they expected from Europe deeds
rather than words that would force the Israelis to withdraw more quickly
from the occupied territories. Van Elslande made it clear to his Arab
guests that he found the discrimination against The Netherlands unjust,
which scarcely improved the atmosphere of the meeting.
This conversation between Van Elslande and the two ministers thus
appeared to deliver very little, apart from one matter which, for The
Netherlands, was highly significant. Having been informed of the Belgian
ownership of the Rotterdam-Antwerp oil pipeline, Yamani showed him-
self interested in the possibility of getting oil to Antwerp via this pipeline.
Out of consideration he said, he would like to look into this, at least if it
could be guaranteed that the oil was in fact pumped to Antwerp and did
not end up on the Dutch market.54
The following day saw the meeting take place between Lubbers and
the two ministers. Lubbers, without a single political concession on offer,
was accompanied by dgpa Van Lynden, so that in fact the Foreign Min-
istry was directly involved.55 The meeting proceeded more or less along
predictable lines. When the ministers once again asked for a separate
statement from The Netherlands, Lubbers replied that there was no rea-
son to assume that The Hague was not foursquare behind the statement
of November 6. According to Van Lynden, this position was also set out
in the note of November 16, as well as in Van der Stoel’s account to the
Dutch Second Chamber on November 29. Both documents, in transla-
tion, were handed to the Arab ministers. Van Lynden stressed that the
epc statement, when it came to the question of the occupied territories,
left nothing to be desired as far as its clarity was concerned. To ensure
that there should be no possible misunderstanding, Lubbers added to this
that The Netherlands was ‘opposed to annexation’. Finally, Van Lynden
declared on behalf of his minister, Van der Stoel, that the Palestinian
question was not purely a humanitarian question; The Netherlands
recognised the Palestinians’ legitimate rights.56
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Lubbers and Van Lynden therefore went some way to meet the two
Arab ministers; for Van Lynden’s clarification and Lubbers’s formulation
of the Dutch attitude to annexation both implied Israeli withdrawal from
all occupied territories. The view of Trouw, that Lubbers’s attitude in
Brussels had been ‘a model of firmness and consistency upon which more
reformative brethren might reflect in admiration’, would therefore seem
to be a little exaggerated.57 Whatever the case, it was still not enough.
The Algerian minister Abdessalam in particular still desired a public dec-
laration that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied territories. Just
as Van der Stoel had said, the two ministers only wanted concessions and
were neither prepared nor able to offer anything in turn.
American Support
Throughout a large part of the whole oil crisis, there was talk of the
American willingness, if it came to the crunch, to provide The Nether-
lands with extra oil or with the necessary financial resources. This back-
ing was first explicitly expressed on November 7, the day after the epc
gathering, when the American Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, paid
a visit to The Hague and during the course of a meeting with Van der Stoel
offered assistance with oil supplies.58 The offer was kept secret from the
outside world, but almost at once the buzz of rumours could be heard.
Two weeks later it was learned that
‘the Americans let it be known, reliably and at the highest level, that if
the worst came to the worst, proposals would be put to the us govern-
ment to help The Netherlands to deal with the consequences of the em-
bargo’.59
According to Van der Stoel, Kissinger had said the various possible ways
of doing this were being studied. The American ambassadorial counsel-
lor, Steve Blodgett, informed dgpa Van Lynden that assistance would be
given only if it were requested by the Dutch Cabinet. Moreover, the deci-
sion would also depend on whether or not a European oil-sharing agree-
ment had been reached. Van Lynden assured him that such a request
would only be made in the extreme case. Notwithstanding these arrange-
ments, the Dutch Foreign Ministry was busy drawing up a damage as-
sessment; no simple matter as it turned out, because it still remained un-
clear just what the effects of the embargo on The Netherlands were.60
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The American offer was made against a background of increasing
American-European discord over the Middle East peace process. The gulf
separating Israel and Egypt was still enormous. On November 22, the Is-
raeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, had discussions in New York with
Kissinger and with un Secretary-General Waldheim over a peace confer-
ence. On the same day, Israel and Egypt appeared ready to make conces-
sions. Three days later, Tel Aviv announced that it was in principle willing
to participate in a peace conference. Egypt also agreed. The peace confer-
ence would take place in Geneva on December 18. On November 13,
American Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sisco had already in-
formed Van der Stoel that Washington saw no role for the ec at the
planned peace conference, since the content of the November 6 declara-
tion was incompatible with ec participation as an impartial broker. On
November 21, Kissinger said he could only interpret this declaration, giv-
en its content and timing, as giving way to Arab blackmail. Once again a
serious difference of opinion seemed to have developed within the At-
lantic Alliance.
The American offer of assistance met with very different responses in
the Dutch Council of Ministers, and was debated on several occasions.
Although the Cabinet certainly did not warm to it, Lubbers was all for a
positive response. He wanted to begin secret negotiations with the Ameri-
cans in early January, so that the whole affair could still be considered in
the light of an anticipated European solidarity. He realised that this was
‘a political act’. 61 At the end of November, Van der Stoel put the argu-
ment that, in connection with this support, The Netherlands should not,
in fact, ‘engage in any policy that would conflict with American policy’.
Vredeling, however, thought it more sensible not to take up the offer in
view of the fact that it would align The Netherlands even more firmly
with the usa and lead to even deeper isolation within the ec. His judge-
ment was shared by Van der Stoel, though the latter felt the offer should
not immediately be rejected. But the priority was indeed to find a formula
within the ec that could give definite form to mutual solidarity there.62
The offer certainly had its disadvantageous aspects. It also raised
doubts within the American presidential advisory body, the National Se-
curity Council (nsc), as to the wisdom of such a step: so reported the
Dutch Ambassador in Washington. A supportive action might cause ten-
sions within the ec and give the impression that Kissinger was out to fish
in troubled European waters. The question posed by nsc staff was: given
this background, to what extent would The Hague appreciate such help?
The consequences for the Dutch position in Europe were, after all, not
easily calculated.63
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Indeed, there were even more doubts within the Dutch Cabinet. In any
case, thought Van der Stoel, the whole affair must be kept out of the pub-
lic eye. That, it turned out, was not easy. Lubbers had already publicly
said that the government was in agreement with this support proposal.
Furthermore, it was meanwhile learned that the us Under-Secretary, W.
H. Donaldson, would come to The Hague in December. On the other
hand, the offer of support strengthened The Hague’s hand within the ec.
In fact, at the end of the Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel informed the
press that they had learned with gratitude of the American offer and
awaited Donaldson’s arrival with much interest.
The side effects of this possible oil assistance were subjected to thor-
ough study at the Dutch Foreign Ministry. American support would pre-
sumably mean the definitive end of solidarity within the ec. Accepting
help, furthermore, would give the impression that The Hague would
come out of the crisis rather well off. The ec partners were by now al-
ready keeping a sharp eye on The Netherlands, since although the Dutch
had been harder hit by the embargo than other European countries, they
were nonetheless in a position to escape much hardship because of their
natural gas. The Dutch position could become uncomfortable, for The
Netherlands would then be considered in ec and epc contexts as an
American protégé in matters of oil and energy. In Arab eyes, The Hague
would simply be seen as an American vassal. Indeed, it was not inconceiv-
able that the Arab countries would react by instituting further punitive
measures against Dutch interests. Even if everything went well, The
Netherlands would henceforth always be seen by the Arabs in a poor
light, separate from the rest of Europe.
In short: to accept American aid would be to accept a signal change in
the ‘balanced’ policy pursued so far. The priority must be therefore to
urge solidarity between the Nine, and a tougher attitude if possible to-
ward those countries that would threaten the economic life of the Dutch
nation. Only when all chances of a united European front had been ex-
hausted should The Netherlands turn to America for help. And in the
meantime, of course, as Van der Stoel had recommended in the Council of
Ministers, the offer should be kept alive.64
The Dutch-American rapprochement appeared to be strengthened fur-
ther when on November 30 Van der Stoel received an invitation for a bi-
lateral discussion with Kissinger on the occasion of the coming nato
Council of Ministers conference. R.B. van Lynden, the Dutch Ambas-
sador in Washington, thought Van der Stoel should accept this invitation,
especially since Jobert was opposing a proposal for a meeting on Decem-
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ber 9 between Kissinger and the Nine. Of course, there were also objec-
tions attached to such an American-Dutch meeting. There was always the
chance that Kissinger would insist on Van der Stoel choosing whether to
follow his policy openly, which would only exacerbate the tensions with-
in the Nine.65
Naturally, this rapprochement between the usa and The Netherlands
aroused considerable interest abroad. The German embassy approached
the Dutch Foreign Ministry with the question of whether there were any
more details to be told of the offer of oil and the discussions that Donald-
son was to hold.66 The offer of support (and of course the embargo itself)
seemed to make The Netherlands the fulcrum of all the diplomacy of the
oil crisis. An advisor to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, H.
Scheltema, had the impression that the usa, possibly during the upcom-
ing nato session, would try to build a greater Trans-Atlantic solidarity
against the Arabs using The Netherlands as its instrument. It did seem,
according to Scheltema, as if The Hague was the focus of all diplomacy.
The Arabs hope to pressure us, and Europe with us, into supporting
their cause, the Americans, by supporting us, are trying to move Europe
toward a less pro-Arab position. In this situation, I cannot see clearly
what we can do for the time being other than continue to play the Euro-
pean card.67
And according to De Ranitz, the French Director-General for Political
Affairs thought that the us had ultimate tactical intentions in offering
oil, and was trying to prise The Netherlands out of the ec.68
In this connection, it is striking that the offer of assistance was regard-
ed with considerable scepticism within the top levels of Shell. A.C. Hel-
frich, Director of Shell-Netherlands, later pointed out that the American
market was itself threatened with the possibility of major shortages, mak-
ing it extremely unlikely that Washington would actually support The
Netherlands in the case of a serious reduction in oil supply.69
Divisions within the EC
As we saw earlier, Paris still wanted to call a European Summit confer-
ence before the end of the year – that is, a gathering of the leaders of ec
governments (and the French Head of State). On various occasions dur-
ing the second part of November, the question was raised of what status
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exactly this Summit should have and what should be on the agenda. In the
French view, discussions should not be limited to the oil crisis. As Pompi-
dou had told Van der Stoel on November 8, priority should be given to the
principle question of whether the Nine were actually working toward
eventual European integration or not. In addition, the questions of a
communal energy and a communal defence policy should also be raised
for discussion. Among several matters, the future of the nuclear industry
was at issue because of the rivalry between the two competing enrich-
ment plants: the French uranium enrichment concern Eurodif and the
British-German-Dutch ultracentrifuge project. The oil crisis, in the
French view, should be discussed merely as a part of these wider perspec-
tives.
Furthermore, it was becoming clearer by early December that the
French government wanted to use the Summit in Copenhagen to get a di-
alogue started between the ec and the Arab countries. At the beginning of
December, Jobert delivered a speech to the French parliament in which he
argued for cooperation and dialogue with the Middle Eastern states. Ap-
proaching the Arabs now on the basis of the inconvenience Europe was
suffering as a result of the embargo would not go down well in the Middle
East. It seemed to him more sensible to try to engage Arab interest in a
longer-term dialogue. The French Prime Minister P. Messmer also argued
that the oil-consuming states should henceforth themselves come to a di-
rect understanding with the producer countries without the intermedia-
tion of the oil companies.70
It was clear that Paris thought The Hague had called down the embar-
go upon itself, and further considered the Dutch energy situation much
healthier than had been officially suggested. France’s position, as also
represented to De Ranitz, was actually more vulnerable, and it was there-
fore with good reason that France did not want to forfeit good will in the
Arab countries. And finally, it was thought that The Hague, more than
anyone else, was responsible for blocking any step towards a common en-
ergy policy.71 Taking everything together, France stood directly opposed
to The Netherlands on virtually every point. It was still the question
whether the other ec countries would support the French outlook and the
French plan. France could probably expect most sympathy from London;
yet in several respects the French and British viewpoints diverged sharply.
London was highly doubtful of plans for a communal ec energy policy.
There was also no consensus between the two countries on the question
of a common defence policy. Only when it came to a European-Arab po-
litical rapprochement was Britain likely to take the French side.
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Initially, the Dutch feared that the West German government, and
specifically the Chancellor, Willy Brandt, were inclined to share the
French orientation, but this began to change during the course of events
during November. Brandt’s policy began to move more in the Atlantic di-
rection. Differences of opinion between Bonn and Paris were accentuated
when the West German Minister of Defence, Leber, emphasized the sig-
nificance of the Eurogroup within nato at a meeting of the West Euro-
pean Union. Jobert, on the contrary, preferred a European defence policy
independent of nato, under the aegis of the weu. Bonn, Leber respond-
ed, found the idea of a European defence outside the Atlantic framework
unthinkable.72
On November 19, in conversation with Van der Stoel, the West Ger-
man Foreign Minister Scheel commented negatively on Pompidou’s pro-
posals. It was still too early to take decisions on such issues as nuclear en-
ergy. Under the present circumstances, the first matter was to share the oil
shortage on a pro rata basis. Scheel’s views no doubt were seized on by
Van der Stoel. During this conversation he was not above referring once
again to the key role of the Dutch in the oil sector and the West German
dependence on natural gas: ‘should the need for oil increase and other
members of the Community, meaning specifically France and England,
refuse to draw the consequences of European solidarity, the pressure in
The Netherlands to adopt independent restrictive measures would be-
come irresistible, which would affect the principle of solidarity and lead
to a crisis in the Community’.73
West Germany was partly dependent on The Netherlands for its ener-
gy needs. As Van der Stoel had earlier concluded in a business-like fash-
ion, this was an important reason for West German (and Belgian) willing-
ness to support The Hague. Van der Stoel was probably right. Simonian,
the author of a book on French-German relations during this period, also
holds the view that the West German change of course was largely the re-
sult of the fear of losing Rotterdam as its main transit port.74
Belgium and Luxembourg seem also to have responded rather coolly to
the French plan. Both governments had been generally supportive of The
Hague’s struggle for solidarity, despite Belgian irritation with the Dutch
attitude, not least because of the threat to restrict the flow of oil and the
export of natural gas. Over this latter question, as was remarked in the
Dutch Council of Ministers, there had developed what was even referred
to as a ‘hostile tone’.75 There was, in addition, another delicate problem
between The Netherlands and Belgium. During their visit to Brussels, the
two Arab ministers had said they had no objection to unhindered use of
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the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline to supply Belgium with oil. But in such
an eventuality the oil would have to be monitored at the beginning of the
pipeline, for example by officials from an Arab embassy. As far as this
scheme was concerned, however, the Belgians complained that they could
expect little cooperation from the Dutch.76
Italy seemed a doubtful case. There was undoubtedly a good deal of
Italian hostility towards The Netherlands, the Corriere della Sera in par-
ticular taking a viciously anti-Dutch line in its reporting of The Hague’s
role in the oil crisis. This paper depicted Van der Stoel’s role as that of
someone who did not hide his sympathy for the Jews. There were perhaps
200,000 Jews living in The Netherlands, who controlled the financial life
of the nation. In spite of this, the Dutch wanted to maintain an existing
situation in which the Arabs had to reach the whole of Europe via Rotter-
dam. For this, they (the Dutch) believed that the ec should show solidari-
ty. The analysis of the daily Messagero, however, was that the Dutch gov-
ernment was trying to ensure ‘that the multinationals who controlled
Rotterdam should continue to be given a free hand’ – which was hardly
inaccurate. According to the Corriere della Sera, The Netherlands, sup-
ported by West Germany, had in fact already won the argument with
France and Great Britain.77 The Dutch Ambassador in Rome, Boon,
thought that the Italian delegation was unlikely to follow France blindly
in Copenhagen. The French effort to get the states to negotiate with the
Arabs rather than the majors would not be shared by Rome. There was
far more understanding for the international oil companies in Italy, par-
ticularly for Shell and bp, which were seen by the European-oriented as
more European companies than as Seven Sisters.78
Den Uyl and Van der Stoel
From the moment that the French proposals became known, the Cabinet
was assailed by doubt. The French plan for a summit conference of gov-
ernmental leaders was first discussed in the Council of Ministers at the
beginning of November, only a day after the proposal had been handed to
Den Uyl, who had promised to study it carefully. Den Uyl had further in-
dicated that he was willing to participate. ‘Given the Dutch thinking
against regularly recurrent European summits, this was an extremely
obliging response’, was the view subsequently taken at the Foreign Min-
istry.79 The Secretary-General of General Affairs (the Prime Minister’s
Office), D.M. Ringnalda, had meanwhile warned Den Uyl of the Foreign
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Ministry’s resistance to summit conferences that excluded any foreign
ministers. However, Ringnalda thought that every minister was implicat-
ed in the collective responsibility for government policy and that, accord-
ingly, the premier could be empowered to defend and prosecute Cabinet
policy abroad. It was absolutely not essential that he should always be ac-
companied by his Foreign Minister.80
Predictably, Van der Stoel was in complete disagreement with this
view, restating the usual Foreign Ministry standpoint in the ministerial
council: a summit threatened to undermine the normal diplomatic coop-
eration of the ec. He concluded, as he had informed the embassy in Paris,
that his presence was necessary on constitutional grounds. But it was not
only the nature of the decision-making, the content of the issues raised at
the Summit also caused him concern. dgpa Van Lynden had meanwhile
stressed to the British Ambassador that in any case he was not much in
favour of the idea of taking binding decisions in Copenhagen, which
could only be ‘impulse’ decisions.81
On November 16, at the Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel expressed
his fear that Copenhagen would be used to make pronouncements direct-
ly opposed to American policy. His conclusion was that there was a real
dilemma, and he considered approaching Bonn to avert the possibility of
damaging Trans-Atlantic harmony. He recognised that there was a prop-
er role for the ec, but The Netherlands should not allow itself to be
pushed by that role into opposing Washington. The declaration of No-
vember 6 had already caused American-European friction, and any fur-
ther deepening of an Atlantic conflict had to be avoided.82 A week later,
after discussions on this issue between the ec foreign ministers on No-
vember 20, Van der Stoel was able to report to the Council of Ministers
that the meeting in Copenhagen was to be only of an informal nature. No
communal communiqué would be issued (which actually did happen in
the event). A collective gathering of heads of state, government leaders
and foreign ministers would be held at the beginning and end of the con-
ference; while between times consultations would take place between
government leaders and individual ministers. Van der Stoel did warn that
Copenhagen would inevitably have a strongly political character. Issues
that would be raised included: the Middle East conflict, the European-
American relation and East-West relations, and, moreover, the energy
problem, plans for a European Monetary Union (emu), and possibly even
European defence.83
This heavily political agenda occasioned great anxiety in the Dutch
Foreign Ministry. As he had previously, in the period before the epc min-
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isterial session of November 5 and 6, Van der Stoel hoped that the Copen-
hagen Summit would concern itself with the oil problem as much as possi-
ble and attend to the political objectives advanced by the French as little
as possible.
The idea was to prepare for the Summit during an ec Energy Council
meeting over December 3 and 4, but the Dutch were from the beginning
pessimistic about this meeting. During a bilateral Ministry of Economics
– Foreign Ministry meeting, Lubbers also let it be known that he expected
little from the Energy Council. He confirmed that the oil companies were
under pressure from some governments, but Cabinet action seemed un-
necessary. He did have the impression that the companies would not be
able to keep up the game of sharing out the oil (by shifting oil originally
from Nigeria and Iran).
At the moment, some Arab oil is arriving in Rotterdam (which is appar-
ent from the decreasing imports in England from Nigeria), but it is un-
clear how much is being transferred. Of course, we are exercising maxi-
mum reticence over this.84
That pessimism seemed to be confirmed when it was learned that the Eu-
ropean Commission had worked out two new proposals for implement-
ing an oil allocation arrangement and for setting up an advisory commit-
tee for the oil industries. London and Paris reacted angrily to this plan,
which Van der Stoel read as a signal that both countries ‘found the specu-
lative chance of a new political role in the Middle East more important
than optimal European cooperation’. Preparatory to the ec Energy
Council meeting of December 3 and 4, which was also taking place in
Copenhagen, Heath again stressed that the ec should concentrate on the
foreign policy aspects of the Middle East conflict.85
During the ec Energy Council of December 3 and 4 in Copenhagen,
attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Finance,
the differences of outlook within the ec were once again clearly delineat-
ed. Van der Stoel again set out his standpoint emphatically. He pointed
out that The Netherlands was now beginning seriously to feel the restric-
tions, as a result of which it was the first ec country to announce petrol
rationing (see Chapter 6). Van der Stoel was critical of those who were
only interested in the political side of the Middle East conflict, meaning
first and foremost Great Britain. It was an illusion, however, even if some
magical formula for a speedy resolution of the Middle East conflict
should appear, to think that the embargo and restricted production
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would be lifted within a few weeks. And their effects, moreover, were
likely to last for some time. There was no invisible hand ensuring equal
shares of the oil supply to all member states. Should the Nine be incapable
of taking any (discrete) communal action, the market would disintegrate
with all the consequences this implied. The only just and proper step, ac-
cording to Van der Stoel was joint, communal action.
Jobert replied that sharing the poverty would be no solution at all. And
moreover, it was quite unjust to point to France and Great Britain as priv-
ileged countries. They were absolutely not energy-rich countries; France
was in fact poor in energy reserves. Paris had long tried to promote the
creation of an energy policy and to build up stocks, repeated Jobert, im-
plicitly referring to The Netherlands. In this context, one must speak of
past, present and future, and over the energy question as a whole, i.e. in-
cluding the question of uranium enrichment, which equally called for sol-
idarity. Addressing Van der Stoel directly, Jobert suggested that panic and
psychosis had to be avoided if relations with the Arabs were not to be
made even more difficult.
The British Minister for Energy repeated his position, that openly
communal action would endanger oil supplies by provoking Arab coun-
teraction. In the uk too, preparations for rationing were in hand, and
joint diplomatic action, in his view, offered better prospects. The Arabs
had to be convinced that the ec would not be undermined.
Support for Van der Stoel came mainly from the Belgian and the West
German side. The Belgian Foreign Minister Van Elslande wondered what
would remain of the Community’s credibility if the ec was incapable of
resolving the oil problem on a communal basis. The West Germans also
favoured communal action. To the West German mind, the coming
Copenhagen Summit should begin with discussion of current energy
problems. These views were also endorsed by the Danish and Luxem-
bourg side. The Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn said he would find
it rather schizophrenic if the Nine should adopt a communal political
standpoint toward the outer world whilst not recognising the ec as an
economic entity. The Chairman of the European Commission, Ortoli,
also supported the Dutch view.86
Taken together, what this meant was that The Hague’s views on the ne-
cessity for communal action to deal with the reduction in the oil supply
were by now shared by a considerable number of ec member govern-
ments. In view of the powerful opposition of both Paris and London,
however, any movement by the ec or the European Commission was
ruled out. On the contrary, the Commission’s proposals were brushed
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aside. Nor did it look as though these would be dealt with at the Copen-
hagen Summit to be held in ten days’ time. An embittered Van der Stoel
declared after the meeting of December 3 and 4 that the ec member states
would have to suffer the consequences themselves if the Dutch economy
were radically affected by the oil crisis.87
Visible or Invisible
In The Hague, a growing sense of doubt over the relationships within the
ec gradually came to dominate the outlook.88 It was very much open to
question whether the ec partners could ever agree on any communal plan
of action to deal with the oil crisis. But in addition, it was becoming clear
that The Netherlands was perhaps not in such a bad situation as had been
assumed throughout November. In the Ministerial Council for Economic
Affairs, it was now concluded that, in view of the relatively satisfactory
Dutch position, (communal ec) sharing carried considerable risks as
well, certainly if natural gas was also involved.89 As long as the oil com-
panies shared out the oil pro rata, The Hague was actually in rather good
shape.
This is not to say that the December 14 and 15 Summit was not thor-
oughly prepared in The Hague, notably on December 6 in the Council for
European Affairs and the following day in the Council of Ministers, on
the basis of two notes prepared by the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of
Economic Affairs, respectively. The Foreign Affairs note put forward the
view that regular summits were undesirable, because they would interfere
with the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
same note recognised the major importance of communal political ac-
tion, but noted the undesirability of London and Paris being given an ec
mandate in any form. The note also rejected the idea of participation of
either country at the coming peace conference in Geneva, as well as ec
pressure being brought to bear in order to achieve that objective. Such
participation would arouse great opposition in Israel, which could only
serve to delay any peace accord. The note also rejected the idea of a new
declaration by the Nine. Kissinger’s standpoint was rather that it was
now time for quiet diplomacy. In general, in view of the importance of a
healthy Atlantic alliance for the security of the West, as well as the sound
financial-economic relations of the world, it was essential to be alert to
anything that might try to define a European identity in opposition to the
usa.90
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With regard to the oil problem, the note proposed that discussion of
this issue should have absolute priority at the Summit.
Under the present circumstances, it is clearly of the utmost importance
to The Netherlands that at Copenhagen, in some shape or form, there
should be evidence provided of an awareness of communal responsibili-
ty for the solution of this problem.91
In his clarification of this note, Van der Stoel concluded that the central
question was whether the Summit was prepared to make the oil problem a
communal issue.
The minister sketched the positions within the ec regarding this ques-
tion as follows: powerful support could be expected for The Hague’s
viewpoint from the West German Republic, Denmark and (to a lesser ex-
tent) Belgium and Luxembourg, but the attitude of Great Britain, France
and Italy gave little cause for joy. He hoped that it would be possible to
deal with the oil problem ‘above all other topics’, but he was not opti-
mistic.
The members of the Cabinet appeared to agree with the Foreign
Ministry note and Van der Stoel’s elaboration of it. Den Uyl, Pronk and
Finance Minister Duisenberg merely queried the passage repudiating the
institutionalisation of summits in general: in Den Uyl’s view, such meet-
ings often had played a stimulating role. Van der Stoel replied that sum-
mit conferences threatened to undermine the work of both the Council
and the Commission. Their regular occurrence should therefore not be
endorsed.92
Lubbers’s note, drawn up in consultation with the Foreign Ministry,
was equally pessimistic over the possibility of Copenhagen reaching a
communal policy regarding the oil problem. It dealt extensively with the
plans for a communal ec energy policy, which was regarded with some
caution by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It was clear, said Lubbers,
that Paris and The Hague took very different positions. The Netherlands,
he said, had now made its standpoint a more flexible one, but there was
no reason to take the lead. The Netherlands was ready to cooperate in
bringing about a community price policy. The communal promotion of
research was also significant. It was most important that a central role
should be reserved for the European Commission, whose outlook was to-
tally at variance with the French. Lubbers was therefore apprehensive
that more far-reaching decisions might be taken in Copenhagen, for ex-
ample over the basis of a communal energy policy, or over nuclear energy,
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while providing no guarantees for the communal operation of the energy
market.93
During the debate in the Council for European Affairs, differences of
opinion seemed to be developing along party political lines. According to
Pronk (PvdA), the Ministry of Economic Affairs note was excessively pre-
occupied with state interference. Den Uyl expressed himself more cau-
tiously, but thought there was no sense in leaving everything exactly as it
was; for one would then be entirely in the hands of the oil companies. In
this context it was good to remember Edward Heath’s behaviour at the
start of the oil crisis. Den Uyl also wanted to know why The Netherlands
had for so long resisted a communal energy policy. In response to this
question, the acting Director-General for Energy from the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, A.T.T. van Rhijn, said that The Netherlands had ob-
structed such a policy because of its natural gas reserves and because of
Rotterdam’s special position. Moreover, it was feared that France, whose
oil politics were closely tied to foreign policy, would be able to push the
ec into a Middle Eastern policy that was unacceptable to The Nether-
lands.
A last, striking aspect of the debate in the Council for European Af-
fairs was the question of natural gas. Lubbers declared that, domestically,
oil was increasingly being replaced by natural gas, which had its reper-
cussions on export. There should be no reduction in exports because of
this, but there should be a deceleration of export growth. He wondered
why this could not be said publicly. Not speaking about this would only
lead to speculation over The Hague’s plans for natural gas. In the end, one
ran the risk of political arrangements over the inviolability of natural gas
contracts, both in relation to volumes and prices.
On this point, as so often, Van der Stoel was more cautious. The first
priority was solidarity. It was scarcely possible to demand solidarity and
at the same time threaten other partners with export restrictions. And in
the end, such an action would predominantly affect precisely those coun-
tries that supported The Netherlands. Den Uyl appeared to be more
Machiavellian than his party colleague. He thought that one should paint
the nation’s situation as it was, without threats. There was nothing im-
proper in taking up a position openly.94
The following day, this exchange of views was largely repeated and
reaffirmed in ministerial council. The Council decided in principle to go
along with a communal energy policy together with research and devel-
opment. In the first place, however, the question was about taking com-
munal action to combat the oil shortage, and above all directed at bring-
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ing down the level of consumption. The chances of success were not esti-
mated highly. Van der Stoel pointed out that London was on the whole
not in favour of a communal energy policy. He once again warned of the
French plans for a Euro-Arab dialogue. France was working hard for this,
using other means than purely through discussions between producers
and consumers. Such a dialogue would create serious friction with Wash-
ington, while Kissinger undoubtedly would totally reject any thwarting
of his political aims in the region.95
Van der Stoel’s expectations of Copenhagen remained low. On Decem-
ber 4 he had tried to convince his Belgian and Luxembourg counterparts
that a common Benelux standpoint would be useful, referring to the dan-
ger of the French plans for a Euro-Arab conference, specifically with an
eye to American-European relations. Van Elslande was not convinced by
Van der Stoel’s argument and became more positive in his attitude to the
French ideas.96
Attempts at consultation with Paris and London also failed to deliver.
De Ranitz reported that urging ‘solidarité de fait’ had produced no result.
The French attitude toward The Netherlands in Copenhagen would be a
hard one: if the Dutch were unwilling to cooperate on the French plans,
they would themselves be responsible for their own oil problems. Shortly
before the conference, it became apparent, not for the first time, that
there was no support to be expected from the British side. Van der Stoel
had emphatically put the question to Home, the British Foreign Minister;
while the following day Ambassassador Gevers reported a conversation
with an Assistant Under-secretary of the Foreign Office. Open expres-
sions of solidarity with The Netherlands, according to this British diplo-
mat, were counterproductive. Furthermore, The Hague was at the time
no worse off than its other ec partners, thanks to the operations of an ‘in-
visible hand’. Why then demand a ‘visible hand’ (i.e. ‘sharing’ between
member states) that could not itself produce any oil to share out, when the
result would be merely to restrict the activities of the ‘invisible hand’.
This was a view shared by Shell. The oil companies were well prepared
to take care of a fair share-out of oil with their ‘invisible hand’. Wagner
was also unconcerned about possible practical problems. His advice to
Van der Stoel at the Copenhagen Summit was ‘to play it in such a way that
the Dutch should for the time being be content with a solidarité de fait
and should keep this as much as possible to themselves’. Should the
British and the French proceed with their restrictive practices and should
they, for instance, announce formal unilateral measures, The Hague
could always resume its own freedom of trade.97
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The visible hand was therefore wholly unnecessary; The Netherlands
was in good shape. Self-confidence in The Hague received a further boost
when, on December 9, on the eve of the nato conference of ministers,
Van der Stoel met Kissinger in Brussels. Kissinger expressed wholeheart-
ed appreciation of the Dutch attitude, and not without reason. On differ-
ent occasions, The Hague had tried to act as mediator between Washing-
ton and the Nine. On November 28, the Dutch dgpa Van Lynden had as-
sured the American ambassadorial counsellor that The Hague would do
its best within the framework of the European Political Cooperation to
exercise a moderating influence. Van der Stoel’s meeting went very well,
despite Kissinger’s initial distrust of his socialist opposite number. In the
event, the two ministers agreed on almost everything. Kissinger objected
strongly to the construction of a European identity on the basis of anti-
Americanism. Van der Stoel assured him that European solidarity, in The
Hague’s view at least, must always be placed in an Atlantic context. Of
course, Van der Stoel was curious to know what Kissinger thought of the
embargo. Kissinger’s response sounded highly promising. He let it be
known in strictest confidence that Yamani had promised him in fact to try
to get the embargo against The Netherlands lifted.98
Van der Stoel also adopted the position at the nato ministerial confer-
ence that one would expect of an Atlantic statesman. The meeting was
distinguished mainly by the sharp confrontation between Jobert and
Kissinger. Kissinger did not hide his irritation over the attitude of the
Community, while Jobert argued precisely for more drastic, independent
European moves in the Middle East conflict. Van der Stoel tried to sup-
port Kissinger during the conference, which ended finally in a much more
pleasant atmosphere than it had begun. Certainly, there was no hint of
conflict in the final communiqué. However, Van der Stoel had found him-
self in an awkward predicament, given that The Netherlands had con-
stantly exerted itself to prevent European-American estrangement. It was
an important effort for the Dutch, since ‘The Netherlands more than any
other ec country saw the maintenance of the link between the two conti-
nents as an important goal of its foreign policy’.99
At the close of the conference, a conversation with his Benelux col-
leagues left Van der Stoel with an even more despondent outlook on the
coming Copenhagen Summit than before. His gloomy reflections were
conveyed to the Dutch Foreign Ministry:
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A working breakfast with Benelux ministers (plus Directors-General)
… led to an extremely depressing prognosis for the coming summit,
where the French want to take all the decisions (in league with the uk,
but hopefully opposed by West Germany) through a series of faits ac-
complis, largely setting aside or circumventing community institutions
and procedures.
The French proposals were revealed the same day. One striking passage
was the suggestion of creating a European Security Council, possibly
comprising Under-Secretaries of State, which could meet at any desired
moment in crisis situations. From Paris, De Ranitz found these proposals
remarkably similar to the Fouchet plan of the early 1960s, plans against
which The Netherlands, under the leadership of Minister Luns, had
fought tooth and nail at that time. Nonetheless, it hardly seemed an at-
tractive prospect to the Dutch that they would be made scapegoats if the
proposals were not accepted by the Summit.100
Meanwhile, it was also learned that several Arab ministers were com-
ing to Copenhagen for consultations with European leaders. It seemed
highly likely that this visit had been arranged at French instigation. Such
a meeting was totally unacceptable as long as the embargo was in place. If
the talks with the Arabs were to go ahead, Van der Stoel demanded as pre-
conditions that discussion should first be held between the Nine over the
manner of their reception; that there must be no discrimination between
the ec partners; and that any real exchange of views with the Arab minis-
ters must be avoided. In any case, the peace conference in Geneva must
not be frustrated. These conditions were handed to the Belgian and
French governments.101
Matters were complicated still further on the eve of the Summit when
Kissinger, in an address in London on December 12, dealt at length with
the oil crisis. He called on oecd countries to develop joint initiatives re-
garding oil production, a more rational use of energy and the develop-
ment of alternative energy sources. Kissinger proposed setting up an en-
ergy action group to discuss these proposals further (see Chapter 7). Van
der Stoel responded immediately and positively to these proposals, which
were of course intended to influence the Copenhagen Summit and to
stymie any European go-it-alone, such as the French were trying to pro-
mote. The French daily Le Monde branded the speech as a crude med-
dling in European affairs.102
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Copenhagen
The Summit began on December 14. The afternoon saw the arrival in
Copenhagen of government leaders and foreign ministers. Preliminary
talks had been arranged for the first evening, followed by the arrival –
highly undesirable in the Dutch view – of the foreign ministers of Algeria,
Tunisia, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. During conversation, the
four expressed their hope that the ec would play an active role in the com-
ing peace process and that this should not be left to the two superpowers.
The ec should insist on Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territo-
ries and on respect for Palestinian rights. The Arab countries wanted clos-
er cooperation in general with Europe, in economic, technical and cultur-
al fields. At the same time, it was not expected that Europe would turn
against Israel, but it was hoped that the future would bring greater activi-
ty in favour of the Arabs.
The Nine, however, at least a majority of the Nine, appeared unwilling
to meet the Arab delegation. As recorded in a report from Van der Stoel, it
was decided that the Danish Prime Minister, A. Jörgensen, and Foreign
Minister, K.B. Andersen, would receive the Arabs once more, ‘so that
aside from courtesies, the damage caused by the Arab actions to the Euro-
pean economies could be discussed’. Promises were given to look further
at the Arab wishes, but that was all.103
Pompidou had originally expressed his preference for further talks
with the Arab ministers and wanted the Nine to work out a mutually
agreed standpoint over the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territo-
ries. But it was Brandt, in particular, who insisted that the declaration of
November 6 was absolutely sufficient and that with regard to resolution
242 Europe must not be more pro-Arab than the Soviet Union.104 The
Italian Prime Minister also stressed that negotiations with the Arabs
should be avoided. Den Uyl naturally endorsed the West German stand-
point. The further talks that Pompidou wanted did not happen.
The atmosphere was not improved when it was suggested by some –
specifically the smaller – member states that the Arab visitors had been se-
cretly invited by Paris and possibly also by London.105 In the event, how-
ever, the French delegation did not succeed in notching up a single victory
over the Middle East conflict. West Germany, The Netherlands and Den-
mark forcefully resisted a French proposal regarding the evacuation of
the Israeli occupied territories. A rather milder text from the British was
also seen off. In the end, the French President proposed expressing the
hope that Israel realised the significance of the fact that the Arab countries
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had accepted peace negotiations. Den Uyl resisted this proposal too, be-
cause it could be construed as a one-sided appeal to Israel. With support
from Brandt, pre-eminently, and from the Danish Prime Minister, Jör-
gensen, and his Foreign Minister, Andersen, this text was also struck
off.106
Pompidou thus achieved none of his aims, which was partly explained
by his poor health. It struck Den Uyl that Pompidou looked ill, ‘complete-
ly swollen up by cortisones’, according to the Dutch Premier. It was for
this reason that Pompidou was incapable of standing long meetings. His
poor condition was confirmed by the Danish Prime Minister, Jörgensen,
who noted in his diary that the French President was on the verge of col-
lapse, with an ambulance waiting permanently at the ready.107 The most
important reason for the French failure, however, was the growth of op-
position during the preceding weeks, notably that of the West Germans.
In the end, the press communiqué contained no more than an appeal to
reach a just and lasting peace accord, referring to the declaration of
November 6 and resolution 242 in all its parts.
Pompidou refused to enter into discussion of the current oil problem,
partly in reaction to the preceding attitude of the majority of member
states. He declared that this question should only be raised as an integral
part of discussion of a communal ec energy policy. But it was very quick-
ly evident that there was no agreement over the communal, more us-inde-
pendent ec energy policy being pushed by the French. Only Heath, who
during the dinner had called Shell ‘a curse’, was ready to support the ex-
treme French proposals, although it was open to question whether Lon-
don was really prepared to cooperate with a communal energy policy.
The other member states turned against the French proposals, thus open-
ing the way for the discussions between consumer countries that
Kissinger was arguing for. In the end, it was decided to ask the Council of
Ministers and the European Commission to develop proposals and to
take appropriate action toward establishing a communal ec approach,
especially to the current oil and energy problems.108 From the very begin-
ning, the question had been whether this would actually happen.
All in all, Copenhagen had produced more conflict than cooperation,
and for this very reason had delivered a result that was wholly acceptable
to The Netherlands. The Euro-Arab dialogue, for the time being, was a
non-starter. The radical French plans for a communal ec energy policy
had only been discussed in the most general terms and had led to nothing
in the way of decisions. Nor had anything concrete been arranged over
nuclear energy. The American proposals for consumer discussions had
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not been rejected, and, furthermore, the final communiqué referred to the
need for Atlantic unity. The possible institutionalisation of summit con-
ferences of government leaders was mentioned, but the idea of a Euro-
pean security council was turned down, specifically by Willy Brandt.
France and Great Britain, in fact, had suffered a defeat, while the Dutch
position appeared considerably strengthened. Van der Stoel subsequently
expressed his satisfaction over the Summit.109
Another feature of these events that had become clearly apparent was
further estrangement between the Germans and the French, which also
suited The Hague. This was in part caused by the fact that Bonn was not
prepared to go on financing a large part of the joint community agricul-
tural policy, which favoured the French.110 For similar reasons, this time
to do with regional support given to Great Britain, British-German rela-
tions had also become rougher.
There still remained a few unpleasant aspects of the Copenhagen Sum-
mit. In all probability leaked by the French, reports appeared in the press
to the effect that particularly Bonn and The Hague had resisted a more
critical statement on the Israeli position in the Middle East conflict. The
content of the French draft text, which in the event was not accepted, was
also published before the final communiqué. The resentment which this
caused was brought to the attention of the French Ambassador by the
Dutch dgpa Van Lynden.111
But by then this could not harm The Hague. Two days after Copen-
hagen the postponed visit of American Secretary of State Donaldson took
place. Lengthy discussions were held with him in the presence of Ambas-
sador Gould. The first session of these discussions was led by Van der
Stoel, who expressed his satisfaction with the outcome of the Summit,
since the principle of community action had now finally been accepted. At
the same time he stressed the importance of consultation with other oil-us-
ing countries, specifically the usa. From the American side, admiration
was expressed for the Dutch Cabinet’s attitude and its refusal to be black-
mailed by oil, so unlike other European countries. On the other hand,
there was disappointment at the fact that the final communiqué omitted
any explicit reference to the Kissinger plan. Gould and Donaldson made it
clear that the aim of their visit was to be informed of the situation in the en-
ergy sphere. It should therefore be said at once that any American possibil-
ities for lending assistance were limited. It was also not the intention to put
The Netherlands into a difficult position within the ec by lending help.
At the second session, led by Lubbers’s the main topic of discussion
was the practical situation. Lubbers explained that the government was
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in the meantime busy saving over the odds on petrol consumption in order
to be able to pass on sufficient oil products, specifically naphtha, to the
chemical industry. He enquired about the possibilities of American oil be-
ing supplied to Rotterdam refineries from American companies, about
the possible supply of American coal to the Hoogovens steel works and
about the use of nato oil stocks by the Dutch armed forces. All this
would have to be looked into in Washington.
These discussions would have no immediate, material, sequel. It was
more a matter of political and psychological gesture, a helping hand. A
brief account was distributed to the British and the French Ambassadors
stressing that The Netherlands preferred solutions within the context of
the ec and oecd, and that if there were any American help with oil there
would be no conditions attached.
Conclusion
In various ways, Copenhagen can be seen to have been a failure. The
route to a communal energy policy was blocked; and no concrete, com-
munal approach to the consequences of the oil shortages was achieved.
Dutch politicians at The Hague publicly spoke of their great disappoint-
ment. Press opinion over the Copenhagen Summit was also bitter. ‘Eu-
rope – does it exist?’ Het Parool wondered. When needed, ‘the Brussels
machinery was full of the sand of nationalism’, concluded the Amsterdam
newspaper.112 Trouw found it astonishing that, 22 years after the institu-
tion of the European Community for Coal and Steel, Western Europe
‘was still toiling over the creation of a communal energy market’.113 Oth-
er dailies also remarked on the total absence of any perceivable ‘commu-
nal solidarity’ within the ec.114
Yet more privately in The Hague, the feeling was mainly one of satis-
faction at the outcome of Copenhagen. In PvdA circles, too, the Summit
was seen as a Dutch success. This is very evident from a note written by
Harry van den Bergh, Secretary of the PvdA ec Committee.
Though practically ignored in the Dutch press (in contrast, for example,
to the English press), one can safely say we are looking here at an impor-
tant political and diplomatic success for this Cabinet.
According to Van den Bergh, the two most conservative governments in
Europe, France and the uk, found themselves opposed by a united front
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of The Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and
Italy. Pompidou had not come to Copenhagen to talk about the energy
crisis. At the very outside, he would have been prepared to deal with this
in order to coerce the other member states, apart from Britain, into ac-
cepting the French political line. ‘Yet one must suppose that, as far as this
is concerned, the planning in Paris for Copenhagen went somewhat
astray’, he observed. The final communiqué from Copenhagen reflected
the lack of results achieved by the French and British.115
The Netherlands had rather effectively contributed to this outcome. It
had throughout forcefully resisted the French and British standpoint,
both the political and economic aspects. Of course, it was mainly the
powerful attitude of West Germany that had defeated the French and
British proposals, but it is not entirely unlikely that the West German de-
pendence on oil supplies from Rotterdam and on Dutch natural gas had
contributed to the West German point of view. In any case, Lubbers and
Van der Stoel had on several occasions referred to this dependence.
No definite arrangements were made over any communal approach to
dealing with the oil shortage, for which the Cabinet and Van der Stoel had
so trenchantly fought. But was that in fact such a disaster? By that time,
the Cabinet had come to see clearly that The Netherlands stood to gain lit-
tle from such a policy. On the contrary, The Netherlands might well find
itself worse off if oil provisions were in some form or other equalised
within the ec. The invisible hand of the oil companies was highly gener-
ous to The Netherlands, as Wagner had emphasized to Van der Stoel. It
was therefore essential to prevent a situation within the ec where mem-
ber states would try, through legal means for example, to hold the oil
companies to their contracts. As long as that could be avoided, The
Hague’s position was actually not bad. Furthermore, there was the offer,
albeit a rather vague one, of American support. All in all, The Nether-
lands stood to suffer under the Arab actions no more – and possibly a
good deal less – than the other ec countries. Added to which, the Dutch
commanded considerably larger reserves of their own energy in the form
of natural gas.
Van der Stoel had by now come to the conclusion that making political
concessions to the Arab countries was not going to produce results. Steps
taken towards the Arabs had so far led nowhere; the outcome of the new
ec declaration of November 6 had been disappointing. The meeting Lub-
bers had held with the two Arab ministers had similarly produced noth-
ing. The Hague, moreover, had been pushed into a point of view that
seemed scarcely different from that of most other ec countries. Without
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ever explicitly admitting it, the Den Uyl Cabinet had also adopted the
standpoint that Israel must vacate all the occupied territories. Only in
The Hague must this not be said in so many words. When Foreign Min-
istry spokesman Thurkow lost sight of this tacit understanding, he also
lost his position. The time for explicit support for Israel at the beginning
of the war was past. Nor was it necessary, since Israel had emerged from
the conflict as victor. The areas under Israeli control had enormously ex-
panded, although this also meant much greater sacrifices.
None of this, however, much altered the fact that The Netherlands,
along with the other ec countries, was confronted with production re-
strictions. In the next chapter, we should therefore pay some attention to
the domestic measures introduced at this stage to reduce domestic energy
consumption.
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6Rationing
In this chapter we shall turn our attention again to the policy adopted by
the Dutch Cabinet to compensate for the reduction in the oil supply. We
pick up the thread early in November, when the first restrictive measures
were introduced to limit oil use. Throughout the course of November, as-
sessments in The Hague of the consequences of the Arab oil actions be-
came increasingly gloomy. This pessimism reached its peak at the end of
the month when the possibility of a future reduction in the oil supply of
some 40 to 50% was being discussed, even at the level of the Council of
Ministers. In addition, the Dutch Central Planning Bureau was predict-
ing that the oil embargo would lead to growing unemployment and to in-
flation.
Other noises were also being heard: the view was taking root in vari-
ous quarters that maybe The Netherlands was not in such a bad state af-
ter all, certainly when compared with most other ec countries. Yet no-
body could say with any certainty how the supply would develop, and for
this reason the dominant general feeling was that radical measures would
have to be taken to compensate for the effects of the oil embargo. It was in
this phase of uncertainty that the Cabinet took the decision to set in mo-
tion the preparations for rationing.
At this stage, the Dutch Cabinet not only decided on rationing but also
submitted to Parliament the so-called Enabling Act. This law authorised
the government to take socio-economic measures on a sweeping scale in
order to cope with the crisis situation caused by the embargo. With ra-
tioning and the Enabling Act, the political-economic heavy artillery was
in place. It was also at this stage that the Ministry of Economic Affairs
lost its leading role in the introduction of measures to limit consumption,
as combating the effects of the embargo became increasingly an affair of
the entire Cabinet, led by its Minister-President.
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Car-Free Sundays
As we saw in Chapter 4, several authorities were called into being at the
beginning of November to deal with the consequences of the oil crisis, and
specifically with a reduction in the domestic use of energy. The most im-
portant official body was the Co-ordination Group, consisting of civil
servants from various Dutch ministries under the leadership of the Secre-
tary-General of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, F.W. Rutten. The Co-
ordination Group played an important role during November and De-
cember as the supplier of plans, data and decisions to the Council of Min-
isters, where the group’s suggestions were in many cases taken on board.
Although various ministries were represented in the Co-ordination
Group, Economic Affairs initially took the lead in developing measures to
limit consumption. The Director-General for Energy and his deputy Di-
rector-General Van Rhijn had enormous influence on Economic Affairs’
policy-making. The preparation of policy at Economic Affairs was to an
important extent co-ordinated by the Oil Crisis Work Group.
Economic Affairs provided the Co-ordination Group and the Council
of Ministers with information on the supply of oil and oil stocks, with
regular meetings taking place between Economic Affairs and the oil com-
panies, at different levels and in different contexts. For instance, consul-
tations were arranged within the so-called Oil Contact Committee,
where representatives of Economic Affairs and participants from the
world of the oil companies held sessions together. As we saw earlier, pro-
vision of information on supplies, stocks and estimates by the companies
had been raised to a new level since the beginning of the crisis. As far as
can be judged from the documents, the policy advocated by Economic
Affairs was generally supported by the oil companies. In fact, it some-
times seemed as though Economic Affairs served as the mouthpiece for
the main oil multinationals; so much so that within the Council of Minis-
ters the figures presented by Lubbers and his Ministry were sometimes
queried.
The most significant of the measures enacted to restrict oil use was the
car-free Sunday, introduced at the beginning of November. At the same
time, the Dutch people were called on to cut back on their use of energy.
On November 14 it was confirmed in the Co-ordination Group that the
car-free Sunday resulted in a drop in petrol consumption of around 10%.
Furthermore, roughly 90% of motorists had observed the voluntary
speed limit, leading to a further reduction of 5% in petrol consumption.
In all, a total reduction of some 15% had thus been achieved. The oil
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companies wanted Economic Affairs to limit the production of various
products – petrol, gas for cars, diesel, paraffin and fuel oil.1
Nevertheless, the dominant feeling in early November was that the car-
free Sunday and the speed restrictions would not be enough: further meas-
ures were going to be needed. At its very first session, the Co-ordination
Group discussed various other possibilities, such as banning driving on
other days beside Sundays. This kind of alternative invariably provoked
numerous objections. A driving ban on weekdays would lead to total dis-
location of the nation’s economic and social life, it was felt. A driving ban
on Saturdays would mean an extra blow for the catering industry, which
had already been badly affected. The ban on Sundays could possibly be
extended to three o’clock on Monday morning, but that had to be the lim-
it. A driving ban over the Christmas holidays was also rejected.
A legally enforced maximum speed limit was seen as a possibility; the
legal implications of this possibility would have to be thoroughly looked
into. There was apparently little confidence in the Dutch motorists’ will-
ingness to hold voluntarily to a 100 kms per hour speed limit over the
long term. During the following week, ideas were exchanged between
various bodies over this legal speed restriction, including even the Coun-
cil of Ministers. During the session of November 9, it was already evident
that the Ministry of Justice had objections, not least the limited possibili-
ty of enforcing such a speed limit. Lubbers therefore argued for creating a
special law, to which end talks would need to be held between the Min-
istries of Justice, Transport and Water Management, and Economic Af-
fairs. The Council accepted Lubbers’s proposal, but in the end, and de-
spite all the consultations, no such emergency law was introduced.
Throughout this discussion and indeed from the outset, it had been re-
alised within Economic Affairs and in the Co-ordination Group that,
should the worst come to the worst, measures like reducing the speed lim-
it were hardly going to be of much use. The only truly effective way of re-
ducing consumption was rationing; and indeed far greater reductions
could then be achieved. Rationing would allow the government to have its
own hand actually on the oil tap. The great advantage, moreover, was
that all driving prohibitions could be dispensed with. It would become un-
necessary to prohibit road traffic either partially or wholly on any partic-
ular days, with all the consequences of such bans; motorists would them-
selves decide how and when they should use their scarce resources.2
On November 9 the suggestions of the Co-ordination Group were dis-
cussed in the Council of Ministers. For the first time, the ministers seri-
ously took on board the possible implementation of rationing, with Den
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Uyl as advocate. Should the embargo persist, he said, rationing would be
inevitable. Most of the others were of the same mind. The decision was
therefore taken to put in motion all the necessary preparations for ra-
tioning, using vouchers, although the final decision to actually implement
rationing was not yet taken. Effectively, however, the decision set in mo-
tion a bureaucratic machine that could no longer be stopped.
The Dutch Council of Ministers also agreed to a rise in the price of
petrol and other oil products. Lubbers told the Council that ‘with heavy
heart’ he had approved the price rise for oil products, necessitated by the
higher cost of crude oil, the increase in the price of petrol being 2.5%. It
was conceivable, he thought, that some of the majors might be taking ad-
vantage of this, because of the fact that they still held stocks bought in at
the earlier, cheaper, price; but this was no reason to postpone the deci-
sion.3 In the following months the price of oil products was to rise still
further.
During the course of November, the introduction of rationing became
increasingly inevitable as alternative methods of reducing petrol con-
sumption were rejected by the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers, follow-
ing the conclusions of the Co-ordination Group, found it difficult to ex-
tend the system of banning car travel. Car-free holidays were unaccept-
able, in view of the radical consequences this would have for family life,
as well as for the catering industry. After long debate it was decided to
maintain the Sunday motoring ban that was due on December 2,
notwithstanding the approach of the feast of Sint Nicolaas on December
5. A week later, it was decided to extend the car-free Sunday to 3 am
Monday morning, as the Co-ordination Group had proposed.4
Meanwhile, the first consequences of the Arab actions were felt in the
port of Rotterdam. The predictions over supplies of oil in the near future
were more pessimistic than ever. Against this background, the Dutch
Cabinet decided on November 23 to initiate the concrete arrangements
needed for introducing ration vouchers.
Estimates
By mid-November, estimates in The Hague of future reductions in the oil
supply and their consequences were grim. Although it was widely estab-
lished that the actual situation was still satisfactory, it was mainly the an-
ticipation of shortages in the coming months that became more and more
pessimistic. This pessimism was in the first place propagated by the Min-
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istry of Economic Affairs on the basis of data and expectations communi-
cated to them by the oil companies. In a meeting of the Economic Affairs
Oil Crisis Work Group on November 21, it was assumed that it would be
necessary to reduce petrol consumption by 20% in December, and 40%
in January.5 Obviously, the car-free Sundays and voluntary speed restric-
tions would be inadequate to achieve targets of that order.
These gloomy predictions originated with the oil companies, and they
were the main compelling reasons for switching to rationing. In retro-
spect, it can be seen that these estimates for December and January were,
to say the least, on the bleak side. An ex-director of Shell-Netherlands,
A.C. Helfrich, acknowledges that these estimates from the oil companies
were rather ‘conservative’. One of the factors affecting these estimates
was the fear that the American market might suffer shortages and exert
its enormous pulling power on available oil supplies.
According to Helfrich, Shell was opposed to rationing.6 But from the
minutes of the Co-ordination Group, it would appear that the oil compa-
nies were at any rate advocating further restrictions on consumption be-
yond the 10 to 15% maintained thus far.7 This standpoint inevitably im-
plied rationing. The companies were thus partly responsible for setting in
motion a series of measures which would, in the new year, finally lead to
rationing being introduced. In general, as ex-minister Westerterp later
commented, one could still talk of close consultation between govern-
ment and oil companies, and the companies supported what the govern-
ment was doing, including the introduction of rationing.8
On November 23, the Dutch Council of Ministers also learned of the
pessimistic forecasts of the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Oil Crisis
Work Group and the Co-ordination Group, which, as Den Uyl reported,
were confirmed by a letter from Shell’s Chief Executive, Wagner. The tone
of this letter was sombre. Wagner thought the rapid, drastic price increas-
es would have a disastrous effect on the chemical industry and that the
whole world economy would suffer. At that time, American oil compa-
nies were already buying Nigerian oil at prices three or four times the nor-
mal price of oil. The price of petrol in The Netherlands, Wagner thought,
would shortly have to go up by some 20%.9
These gloomy prognoses were to play a principal role during the com-
ing weeks in decision-making by the Council of Ministers. The Central
Planning Bureau added its own voice to the chorus of pessimism. On No-
vember 7 Lubbers, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, had
asked the Central Economic Committee for their advice on the initial
global consequences of the oil embargo. This advice, which was based on
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a note of November 15 from the Central Planning Bureau, was sent to
Lubbers at the beginning of December. It painted a sombre picture. It was
assumed that the oil supply in January would be about 50% lower than in
1972, leading to little or no economic growth, increased inflation and
rapidly rising unemployment. The Central Economic Committee con-
cluded from these figures that the government had to implement a string
of measures if they were to keep in check the consequences of the embargo
and the sharp rise in oil prices. The note would play an important role in
the tabling of the Enabling Act and in persevering with the voucher sys-
tem of rationing.
Economic Affairs was also assuming at the end of November that the
oil supply in December would fall by around 35%, and even by 50% in
January. It was widely thought that the shortfall during the subsequent
months would remain at about 30 to 35%. By eating into existing oil
stocks, the necessary reduction in the domestic consumption of oil prod-
ucts could be held at around 25%; but in this case it would be necessary to
give priority to the supply of energy and raw materials needed for trade
and industry. At a meeting of the Oil Crisis Work Group in Economic Af-
fairs, the conclusion was drawn that petrol rationing would have to lead
to a 40% reduction in the use of private vehicles, and a reduction in busi-
ness traffic of 20 to 25%. The total reduction in petrol consumption
would have to amount to approximately 30% if sufficient freedom were
to be maintained for trade and industry.10
Gloom over the immediate future reached its deepest point in the
Council of Ministers on November 30. Lubbers informed his colleagues
that the beginning of a reduction in supplies had been confirmed in Rot-
terdam. In December, the reduction in supply would reach 60% com-
pared with the previous year; while the figure should be 50% in January,
he said. This would probably mean a drastic cutback of production at the
refineries. The oil stocks would have to be opened. Above all, the drop in
production of naphtha could cause problems for the chemical industry.
Lubbers therefore wanted to maintain naphtha production as far as pos-
sible at an optimal level, which would mean cutting back on petrol for
road transport. By mid-April or May of 1974, stocks could be expected to
have fallen to a reserve sufficient for only 40 to 45 days.
Lubbers said the reduction in supplies could in the longer term amount
to as much as 60%, since two-thirds of the total supply came from coun-
tries enforcing the embargo. Because of the increased supply from Nige-
ria and Iran, the total drop now was around 50%. In comparison, other
West European countries were confronted with reductions of around
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25%, and for this reason Lubbers thought that Dutch exports could be re-
duced without causing serious problems to other ec countries. In council,
he urged once again to speed up the introduction of rationing, though he
realised that it would not be possible to achieve this in December. Both
the oil companies and the consumers were pressing the government to set
out a system of priorities. If the Council of Ministers were to decide to be-
gin rationing on January 7, he wanted the power to be able to instruct the
oil companies to deliver 20% less to the petrol pumps.
The Council appeared to be convinced by Lubbers’s argument. Den
Uyl himself concluded that oil consumption must fall by 20% and petrol
consumption by 30 to 35%. The Council of Ministers therefore took the
decision to bring in rationing on January 7. On January 13, the general
ban on Sunday motoring would lapse, and legal enforcement of the speed
limit could be forgotten once rationing was in place.
However, doubts still remained over the data provided by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs. By the end of November, it was clear to several min-
isters that The Netherlands’ position was not as bad as it had been por-
trayed. On November 22, 1973, Van der Stoel received via Rutten a mem-
orandum drafted by the Directorate-General for Energy, in which every-
thing was once again worked out, with the accompanying request not to
employ these figures outside the Council of Ministers. It was assumed in
this memorandum that the oil companies, in anticipation of the restric-
tions, had increased their stocks as much as possible; and therefore, it was
inferred at Economic Affairs, over ten weeks the stocks need not be con-
sidered so disastrously low.11
Doubts were also expressed in the Council of Ministers over the relia-
bility of the data provided by Economic Affairs. In fact, Vredeling asked
whether they depended for these figures entirely on the oil companies.12
Transport Minister Westerterp, as he later said, was also unconvinced of
the correctness of Economics Affairs’ figures. ‘Supplies to The Nether-
lands were greater than revealed by the official figures’, he said. ‘We had a
man in the pilot service at Hoek van Holland diligently keeping a tally. At
any given moment there was more oil coming in than was reported by the
official figures.’13 In spite of this, the Council of Ministers decided to
switch to rationing.
The need for more accurate data concerning oil supplies did not stop
here. Further information was provided in the Ministerial Council for
Economic Affairs on December 5. Van Rhijn announced that the interna-
tional oil companies, as had earlier become clear, were in fact more or less
spreading the shortfalls over the consumer countries; the embargo was
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not working. The result of this was certainly not unfavourable to The
Netherlands: the reduction amounted to some 20 to 25%, much less dras-
tic figures than those presented by Lubbers in the Council of Ministers.
According to Van Rhijn, only France and Britain were getting more oil.
‘Switching’ to benefit The Netherlands, besides, was not so simple, given
the specific kinds of crude oil that refineries needed. And furthermore, not
all oil companies were in a position to supply The Netherlands. Imports
by Texaco were lower than other companies, while Chevron did not man-
age to import any oil at all.
Anyway, The Netherlands was not in such a bad situation, and yet the
mood among some of those at the Ministerial Council for Economic Af-
fairs meeting was still a sombre one. It was assumed that the embargo
could still prove effective and that a general drop of some 40% could
shortly be expected. Rutten, on the other hand, thought things could turn
out all right. If the embargo countries did allow transit (together with all
extra possibilities for switching), the situation would be far less serious
than the gloom-mongers were assuming. Rutten was right, but the Coun-
cil majority remained cautious. In fact, they remained cautious precisely
because there were no accurate data to go on.14
Doubts over the supply data remained. During the Council of Minis-
ters of December 10, the reliability of these figures was again raised for
discussion. Den Uyl wondered if the National Bureau for Oil Products
(the Rijksbureau voor Aardolieproducten, rba), which was to lead the
rationing, had sufficient expertise to monitor the figures from the oil com-
panies. According to Lubbers, these data reports now fell under the oper-
ation of the Rationing Law, which made the provision of data obligatory
with the backing of possible sanctions for non-compliance. The reports
were now not monitored by the rba, but the companies would be request-
ed to do this themselves as accurately as possible. Vredeling emphasized
again that the pilot service also had data at their command, although this
service was not equipped for surveillance. Duisenberg added to this that
customs also possessed information, but that this information could only
be used in restricted circles. The Council of Ministers maintained their in-
terest in other, alternative, figures, but the question remained unan-
swered as to what conclusions could be attached to such data. In any case,
according to Den Uyl, what had to be prevented was the circulation of fig-
ures relating to oil stocks that were higher than those presented by the
Cabinet itself.15
It is striking how uncertain the Council of Ministers was during these
crucial weeks of November and December where the reliability of these
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figures over oil supplies was concerned. Time and time again there were
pleas for alternative, supplementary information that could corroborate
the estimates supplied by the oil companies. But apart from the need for
alternative sources, the argument for using information from the pilot
service seems in retrospect rather dubious, since such estimates are in-
evitably crude and make no distinction between supplies destined for the
Dutch economy and those destined for ec partners’ use. It is therefore cu-
rious that the data from customs, especially, played no part in the deci-
sion-making in ministerial council. Although there were doubts, and per-
haps even a degree of scepticism, the government in any case was in no
position to cut loose from its dependence on the oil companies. Still, the
Cabinet was sufficiently convinced of the seriousness of the situation to
introduce rationing.
Export Restrictions
Most commentaries on Cabinet policy regarding the crisis laid (and still
lay) great emphasis on the domestic measures introduced to restrict the
use of oil products. But that was not the only and possibly not the most ef-
fective method of combating the consequences of reduced supplies. Re-
stricting the export from, and the transit of oil products through, The
Netherlands was more effective, and was to create considerably higher
percentage reductions than those achieved by the cuts at home. It involved
enormous quantities of oil. In 1972, the total supply of crude oil reaching
The Netherlands from abroad was approximately 130 million tons, of
which circa 54% (71 million tons) was destined for further processing in
The Netherlands. The other 46% (59 million tons) was immediately
passed on to other countries, either by transit or re-export. Of the oil im-
ported into The Netherlands, a considerable fraction was exported after
processing: some 50 million tons in 1972.16
From the outset of the oil crisis, both government and other concerned
bodies had been investigating possibilities of restricting, in one way or an-
other, the transit of oil passing through Rotterdam and the export of oil
products, with a view to liberating oil for domestic usage. It is not easy to
get a clear picture of the reduction of transit and export in relation to the
supply of crude; but the problem was discussed on several occasions in the
Council of Ministers, and in other contexts too. There was the further
possibility of restricting the export of natural gas, thereby cushioning the
effects of the oil shortage on the Dutch economy.
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On November 9, it was affirmed in the Council of Ministers that, in
spite of all free market ground rules, the Dutch export of oil products
throughout the ec would be subject to licensing. The way this was to op-
erate was by applying the Toute License Accordée (tla) procedure,
which meant the automatic extension of licenses; but if necessary, this au-
tomatic granting of licenses could be waived. In this way, control could be
exercised over the export of oil and oil products. The atmosphere in this
Council was sometimes rather belligerent, for oil and gas exports were in-
volved. Several ministers, particularly Van der Stoel and Van der Stee,
proposed also bringing gas export under the tla procedure. Others,
however, were more cautious and pointed out that there was no shortage
of natural gas and that such a measure would therefore be seen purely as a
retaliation against the lack of European solidarity.17
The question of export was not only being discussed in the Dutch
Council of Ministers. The same day, Lubbers and a Rotterdam municipal
authority delegation discussed the possibilities of using the transit func-
tion of Rotterdam to relieve the situation in The Netherlands, for exam-
ple by restricting supplies to surrounding countries, reversing the flow of
the Rotterdam-Antwerp oil pipeline, and possibly supplying Rotterdam
from other European ports. It was clear that such actions might well
damage Rotterdam’s position. If transit were to be restricted, it would
have to be done very discretely.18
Not everyone favoured this kind of action. There was a fear at the
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the repercussions of any
such cutback on exports. Referring to the first meeting of the Co-ordina-
tion Group, the Head of the Foreign Ministry’s Department for Econom-
ic Cooperation (des) pointed out the following in a memo to Van der
Stoel. It had been made clear at that meeting that Economic Affairs want-
ed to apply the same export-licensing system to Belgium as to other coun-
tries. Up till then, licensing had not been applied to Benelux, even though
the Belgian government had itself decided to introduce such export licens-
es. Since calling for consultations at the Belgian Ministry of Economic
Affairs in Brussels and within Benelux had been in vain, the Dutch Min-
istry of Economic Affairs now wanted licensing as a countermeasure.
With the assistance of the oil companies, export to Belgium could be re-
stricted in line with domestic restrictions. It would seem a good idea,
thought the Head of des, if Foreign Affairs could ‘again communicate
Dutch disappointment over this turn in the course of affairs’ via the Bel-
gian embassy. There were, after all, risky aspects of ‘this concealed re-
striction of exports’, given all the Dutch effort, to maintain a common
market.
166
The Dutch Cabinet blamed the British government for pressurising the
oil companies not to divert to The Netherlands any oil bound for Great
Britain. Any action in relation to Shell would therefore have to be careful-
ly judged.
I assume that the Ministry of Economic Affairs is in agreement, yet giv-
en the importance of the matter, it is essential in my view that the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs be consulted over these aspects of the consulta-
tions with Shell.19
wrote the Head of des. He also pointed out that, after some discussion
the previous afternoon, the Co-ordination Group had merely agreed that
a license system would have to be introduced for exports to Belgium. The
reason Rutten had not then wanted to raise the possibility of voluntary
restriction of exports, the head of des supposed, was ‘because it would
be better if nothing could be repeated outside about this’.20
On November 14 the Dutch Ambassador in Brussels was instructed to
request that ‘high level’ attention be given to this question. Van Elslande,
the Belgian Foreign Minister, let it be known that he agreed with the
Dutch view on this, but given the sensitivity to Arab reactions, there must
be no publicity given to the matter.21 There could be no question of any
public retraction of the Belgian action already taken . The Hague did not
press the matter further, but simply went ahead with the decision to bring
oil exports within the Benelux trading area under license. Although the
tla principle was assumed, this move involved more than merely a for-
mality; the licensing system opened the way to a form of export restric-
tion that, as the Foreign Ministry had warned, was not without its conse-
quences.
Matters did not rest at restricting exports of oil products. As we saw
earlier, Lubbers had declared in the Dutch Second Chamber on Novem-
ber 14 that, if the ec could not function as a community where energy
was concerned, The Netherlands had to defend its own interests. ‘I shall
involve natural gas in this’, he had added. In certain situations The
Netherlands must not shrink from drawing the logical inferences, or even
from acting in anticipation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted cool-
ly to this fighting talk from Lubbers.22
Throughout November, the export of oil products declined drastically.
On November 22 a memo to Van der Stoel observed the following. Since
October 23, the export of oil products, initially with the exception of Bel-
gium, had been subjected to licensing. As a consequence, these exports
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had declined: for instance, the export of petrol compared with the fourth
quarter of 1972 was down by some 40%, while the export to Belgium
was only subjected to licensing from the beginning of December.23 This
meant an initially greater reduction than the fall in the supply of crude oil
during the same period. It was also concluded at General Affairs that
there had been a greater reduction in exports than was strictly justified on
the basis of a proportional adjustment to the level of domestic sales.24
Nevertheless, at a meeting of the Economic Affairs Oil Crisis Work-
shop on November 21, it was assumed that in view of the drastic reduc-
tion expected in supplies, ‘additional export restrictions’ would have to
be adopted. Before taking such a decision, the Dutch Council of Minis-
ters had to consider fully the consequences of the reduction in domestic
consumption. When it came to restricting exports, great care would be
needed if the chance of international cooperation were not be put at
risk.25 In the first half of December, nonetheless, exports of oil products
would drop by more than 50%.26
Restriction of exports applied not only to oil products but also to crude
oil. Stocks of oil stored in the Botlek area were partly destined for transit
or re-export. In fact, these stocks could be divided into three categories.
Firstly, there was the oil for the Dutch national market and the oil to be
processed in The Netherlands before being exported. Secondly, there
were stocks laid up in the Botlek area under an ec agreement to maintain
stockpiles on behalf of third countries and on the basis of bilateral
arrangements; and thirdly, there were stocks belonging to foreign, i.e.
West German, companies, stocks which in customs-technical terms were
not stored on Dutch territory at all.27
Although no concrete measures had yet been considered, the Ministry
of Economic Affairs was thinking of the possibility of somehow taking
advantage of Rotterdam’s transit function. In an emergency, the oil
stocks of ec partners that had been stockpiled in the Botlek area under ec
storage regulations could – at least in part – be requisitioned, although
that would of course damage relations with the countries concerned. As
we saw earlier, it had already been rationalised at Economic Affairs in
October that the arrangements previously made in 1970 over these stock-
piles had to be considered as merely administrative agreements of that
time and were not binding on Lubbers, the current minister.
In time of need, part of the foreign stocks could thus be taken over.
This was discussed in a thoroughly business-like fashion at Economic Af-
fairs, on the assumption that the foreign emergency stocks would be suffi-
cient to last a hundred days. As we saw earlier, the European Commission
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had directed member states to lay in emergency supplies for 65 days by
January 1, 1971, and for 90 days by January 1974. Because it was not yet
1974, stocks for only 65 days were obligatory, and there was therefore
more oil in these stockpiles than strictly necessary to meet the regula-
tions. In the event of serious need, therefore, one could consider taking
over the oil in this emergency reservoir that was surplus to strict require-
ments. Of course, various problems were raised by this, not least that the
Dutch reputation as a transit country would be involved.28 Nonetheless,
on December 10, it was remarked in the Council of Ministers that in prin-
ciple it would be possible to requisition part of the international stockpile
laid up in the Botlek area.
At the end of November, the Cabinet decided not only to introduce ra-
tioning and to reduce the domestic consumption of oil products by 20%,
but to look to a reduction in export of 40%.29 A day later, it was again
agreed in the Council for Economic Affairs that it was not unreasonable
that The Netherlands should cut back its exports more than proportion-
ally in order to compensate for the expected reduction in supplies. What
is remarkable here is that several of those involved, as the above-men-
tioned Economic Affairs memorandum shows, had by now come to be-
lieve that The Netherlands was in a rather favourable position.
In a draft version of a note on energy-political action in relation to the
reduced supply of crude oil to The Netherlands, which was discussed in
the Council of Ministers on December 10, it was remarked that interna-
tional stocks could be brought under Dutch control by government inter-
vention; but this would seriously damage Rotterdam’s trading position.
And yet restricting exports was an obvious expedient. According to the
text of this note, this was already occurring, and ‘on the basis of the
arrangement made with the oil companies’. This restriction was linked to
the highly important initiative taken by the main oil companies, to try to
ensure that sales were reduced equally in all countries. This unpublished
passage concluded that this
had in fact led to a greater reduction of exports than was strictly justi-
fied at this moment on the basis of proportionality with the reduction in
domestic sales.
The aim of introducing export licenses had been ‘to be able to control the
implementation of this regulation’.30
As we have already seen, the predominant view within the Dutch Cabi-
net on December 5 was that little more could be expected of European
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sharing, and that it might even entail disadvantages. In the Ministerial
Council for Economic Affairs, it was agreed that negotiating over sharing
involved running serious risks since, without doubt, the relatively
favourable energy situation of The Netherlands would be taken into con-
sideration. A tougher method of negotiation, including natural gas ex-
ports as a counter, was therefore preferable to sharing. Den Uyl con-
curred with this view and pointed out that The Netherlands would be a
very poor businessman if it were incapable of taking the political stance
needed to get extra oil in exchange for natural gas.31 These conclusions
were drawn, as we saw, well before the Summit in Copenhagen in mid-
December.
Where natural gas was involved, the Cabinet showed itself an assidu-
ous promoter of Dutch interests. It was concluded in a note that a brake
had to be applied to the increasing volume of natural gas exported. Where
possible, that extra gas should be diverted to replace oil. The energy crisis
meant that it was entirely rational to reconsider the optimal use of the
Groningen natural gas. Furthermore, there had to be a clear statement of
the price of gas; and of course it was obvious to assume some linkage be-
tween the price of gas and the oil prices. Lubbers was empowered to begin
negotiations over a rapid conversion to this linkage. After adapting the
prices, it ought to be possible to arrive at a balanced relation between oil
and natural gas in the ec. If such were the case, it would then be unneces-
sary to bring into discussion the contracted volumes of gas exports.32
All in all, in the matter of the export of oil products, oil stocks and nat-
ural gas, the Dutch government had by now taken up a position that
brooked few scruples. Although Heath, the British Prime Minister, had
been reproached with his tough and purely self-interested attitude, the at-
titude of the Den Uyl Cabinet was essentially no different. Initially, it had
still been hoped that there might be mutual cooperation within the oecd
or the ec. Once that hope had evaporated, the Dutch government’s posi-
tions hardened. Given the relatively favourable situation The Nether-
lands found itself in, with the American offer of support a very welcome
boost, however illusory it might be, the Dutch Cabinet seemed to have
lost all interest in sharing. Further, it had for some time no longer been
considered in the nation’s interest.
Preparations for Rationing
In fact, it is all the more remarkable that, despite this relatively favourable
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position, the Dutch Cabinet was the only West European government to
switch to the introduction of rationing. The initiative for this move came
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As early as November 7, the Oil
Crisis Work Group came to the conclusion that the best way to cope with
the problems that had arisen would be to introduce a rationing system as
rapidly as possible. It seemed to the Work Group that an extension of the
ban on motoring would affect road transport too adversely, with all the
ramifications that would have.33 This assessment was adopted by the Co-
ordination Group the following day; and one day later the Council of
Ministers also decided to set in train the preparations for rationing.34
There were objections expressed, notably by the Ministry of Justice,
but from that moment on, the introduction of rationing was pursued in-
defatigably. On November 13 an important step was taken by activating
the National Bureau for Oil Products (the Rijksbureau voor Aardolie-
producten, or rba), which according to the stipulations of the Rationing
Law would direct the rationing of natural gas products. Initially, the rba
was preoccupied with the difficulties and the complaints caused by the re-
duced supply of oil products. This was often dealt with by officials tem-
porarily detached to the Bureau. At a later stage, the rba played a central
administrative and informational role in preparing for the implementa-
tion of rationing.
On November 16, however, the Council of Ministers hesitated over
whether to continue with the introduction of rationing at short notice,
even though Economic Affairs argued strenuously that if it did not hap-
pen before December 17, because of technical problems, the entire opera-
tion would have to be postponed till January. But the Council was more
cautious than Economic Affairs. At that moment the oil supply was un-
changed: there was no question of eating into reserve stocks.35
The oil companies, however, thought it inevitable that effective restric-
tions would have to be introduced quite shortly. Pressure was thus being
exerted on the Cabinet. It was also argued in a memo from one of the
council advisors from General Affairs that fundamental decisions had to
be taken before the end of the year; it was not possible to wait any
longer.36 But the Council of Ministers decided that the introduction of ra-
tioning was not yet possible because of the multiple legal complications
and transport-technical problems. There would first have to be consulta-
tions involving, in any case, the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Trans-
port & Water Management. And so it turned out.
Five days later, the Co-ordination Group again pressed the case for a
swift introduction of petrol rationing. A number of decisions over data
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would have to be taken within a very short time, as December 10 was the
deadline for beginning to distribute coupons. This meant that authorisa-
tion forms and circulars would have to be sent to local authorities as soon
as possible, particularly in connection with supplementary allocations.
In the light of the deteriorating situation, the Co-ordination Group
thought any postponement of preparations at this stage would be irre-
sponsible. Supplies were now beginning to decline, and the forecasts were
gloomier than ever, or so it was assumed. The oil companies also found
further restrictions on consumption necessary. Postponement would
mean that introduction could not begin until mid-January.37
And yet on November 23, the Council of Ministers once again decided
to wait, even though preparations had gone ahead and approval had been
given for the Ministry of Transport and Water Management to send out
all the authorisation forms. The Ministerial Committee for Oil Problems
was also instructed to prepare the rationing as effectively as possible. The
first discussion over this took place on November 29. The idea was to
meet every Thursday to discuss, among other topics, the reports issued by
the Co-ordination Group, which met every Wednesday afternoon. But
the definitive decision to implement rationing was postponed till Novem-
ber 30. There were various problems to sort out in the meantime, meas-
ures that would have to be prepared in advance, including the car-free
Sunday, public transport, freight transport, the costs of rationing and the
bearing of the anti-discrimination regulations of the ec on the question of
foreign motorists.38
At the end of November, the Oil Crisis Workgroup at the Ministry of
Economic Affairs concluded that petrol rationing would have to reduce
private motoring by about 40% and the use of cars for business purposes
by some 20 to 25%, yielding an overall reduction of some 30%.39 These
objectives were accepted by the Co-ordination Group and by the Council
of Ministers. As a consequence, on November 30 the decision was taken
by the Council of Ministers to introduce petrol ration coupons with effect
from January 4, 1974, and also for lpg and propane. A reduction of 25%
was thought appropriate for the latter two types of fuel, for petrol 30%.
Diesel was not included in the rationing scheme on account of the impor-
tance of freight and public transport, though controlled sales of diesel oil
were thought necessary, to be achieved by the main companies limiting
their deliveries.
In the first instance, it was thought that rationing would be introduced
for a period of four weeks. Because of all the preparatory work involved,
this could not be introduced in December, the original preference of Eco-
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nomic Affairs, but would have to wait until January. Meanwhile, Lub-
bers could distribute to the oil companies all the necessary guidelines con-
cerning petrol deliveries that would lead to a 20% reduction at the petrol
pumps. Various other measures were also prepared to anticipate the con-
sequences of rationing, in particular to guarantee the maintenance of
public transport and to stagger working hours.40
These measures prepared by the Cabinet were set down in a note for
parliament. In Restriction of the oil supply and its consequences, the
packet of measures put together by the government was set out in a list, on
the basis of an assumed 50% reduction in the oil supply by January, fol-
lowed by a further 30 to 35% drop in the following months. This note
was based to an important extent on the material supplied by the Central
Economic Committee. The measures themselves, both short term and
longer term, were as follows:
– limiting petrol consumption by some 30% through rationing;
– substituting oil consumption at Hoogovens and electricity-generating
stations by coal, and by extra use of natural gas;
– switching to natural gas for domestic use, in horticulture, and large-
scale users;
– accelerating programmes of exploration and exploitation of natural
gas and oil;
– encouraging the insulation of homes;
– lower heating levels, and reducing electricity use for lighting by
10%.41
Over the course of December, various other decisions were taken. A gov-
ernment decree restricting the use of electricity for commercial lighting
was issued, with the result that over the Christmas period the major cities,
as elsewhere in Europe, assumed an atmosphere reminiscent of the 1950s
as the illuminated advertisements were switched off. Because diesel did
not fall under rationing, the Ministry of Transport & Water Management
called on freight vehicles to observe a speed limit of 80 kms per hour, un-
der the slogan ‘Plankgas oliedom’ (‘Foot down, fuel-dumb’).
But there were still knots to cut through. It was announced that ra-
tioning applied to delivery vans and small trucks and lorries. Passenger
cars with a diesel engine escaped the rationing, but most mopeds did not.
Furthermore, it was decided that all passenger cars, irrespective of engine
capacity or weight class, would be allocated fifteen litres per week. This
basic assumption, the same petrol allocation for all classes, ran counter to
173
the rationing plans in the filing cabinets of the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs. The Secretary of the Co-ordination Group, Willemsen, later gave as
his opinion that this kind of equal treatment for everyone was a typical
expression of the Den Uyl Cabinet’s ‘sharing philosophy’.42
Meanwhile, in mid-December a working group of officials drawn
from the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Transport
& Water Management drafted a regulation for foreign motorists. To the
satisfaction of the Foreign Ministry, the European Commission was in-
formed that The Netherlands had adopted a liberal regulation for for-
eigners that involved no hold-up at border crossings. The thinking behind
this was the anticipation that reciprocity would be observed should petrol
rationing be introduced in other ec countries. This argument for a non-
discriminatory treatment of foreigners was repeated in the broader con-
text of the ec Working Group for Transport and Energy. In addition, it
was agreed there to extend preference to international motorway and air
transport, as well as to domestic shipping.43
The Enabling Act
In the meantime, the Den Uyl Cabinet was busy getting the heavy ar-
tillery in place to deal with the consequences of the embargo. On Decem-
ber 8 the Cabinet submitted to the Second Chamber the proposed legisla-
tion, the Enabling Act, or to give its full title, the Act enabling legislation
to regulate the creation of income and protection of employment in 1974.
The aim of the Act was to allow intervention in wages and salaries, and in
conditions of employment, as well as prices. In the Explanatory State-
ment accompanying the Act, it was explained that the oil crisis, and the
economic problems arising from it, such as growing unemployment, had
necessitated the introduction of the Enabling Act.44
It was pointed out earlier that the Enabling Act cannot be seen purely
as the consequence of the oil crisis, even though the Cabinet continued to
take for granted the connection between the Act and the specific measures
designed to deal with the oil crisis.45 The law came into force in a period
of tense socio-economic relations and of inflationary tendencies. In the
previous year, the Biesheuvel government had striven – with limited suc-
cess – to establish a general agreement between employers’ and workers’
organisations in an attempt to gain control over rising prices and incomes.
Attempts at wage restraint, however, had been rejected by the trade
unions.
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In the spring of 1973, differences of opinion over index-linkage led to
serious conflict between industrial unions and employers. Despite strike
actions, the employers did not yield, leading the Union Federations, the
nkv and nvv to withdraw from talks in the Social-Economic Council
and the Joint Industrial Labour Council. In the autumn of that year, be-
cause of the oil crisis, negotiations over a general agreement for 1974
took place under rather dramatic circumstances. These negotiations led
to new and serious disagreement over complete index-linkage. Under
Cabinet pressure, a compromise was reached on November 5, but this
was rejected the following day by the rank and file of employees’ organisa-
tions. Consequently, the unions announced that any further central dis-
cussions were pointless. Promises earlier conceded by the employers’ or-
ganisations, it was insisted, would have to be adhered to at the collective
labour agreement negotiations, which would now have to take place sep-
arately for each branch of trade and industry.
The Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, Boersma, also took the position
that the accord of November 5 would still have to be implemented. The
Minister told the Chamber that the government was of a mind to bring in
an Enabling Act, on the basis of which binding conditions of employment
could be laid down. The November accord, he said, would be taken as the
starting point for government action. The government submitted its Bill
to the Second Chamber on December 8. It was explained that a number of
powers had been included in the Bill in order to act with the necessary de-
cisiveness needed to bring in adjustments to the social and economic or-
der, specifically in those areas where existing powers were either inade-
quate or non-existent. The areas in question were pay and other condi-
tions of employment, foreign labour, the conditions of employment of
civil servants, the salaries in the professions, dividends, leases and rents.
Furthermore, the Enabling Act embraced a number of changes in existing
laws, most notably in the Price Law.46 The most important reason for
submitting the Bill to parliament was the oil crisis, which threatened the
provision of energy and the employment situation, and the steep rise in
the price of raw materials, leading to fears of inflation.
The Enabling Act was speedily dealt with by parliament, though cer-
tainly not without occasionally heated discussion. Moreover, both
Chambers added their different amendments to the Bill, which before be-
ing submitted had already been modified on advice from the Council of
State. The Bill was discussed by special committees within a matter of
days; and in mid-December followed the memorandum in reply and the
first government amendment, to be followed several days later by three
further amendments.
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The PvdA and to a lesser extent the arp supported the Bill. In contrast,
the vvd was not entirely convinced of the need for the government to be
given such a mandate to intervene in socio-economic relations. According
to the vvd, the oil crisis had been seized upon as a means of pushing
through a social democratic pay policy. Furthermore, in the view of the
vvd, parliament had been by-passed, a point of view also shared by the
Christian Democratic parties. In response to this criticism, Den Uyl as-
sured parliament that the intention was in no way to achieve specific in-
comes-political objectives. It was a matter of an emergency that had been
created by the oil crisis. Although this explanation was accepted by the
majority, a series of amendments were introduced by the Chamber. In the
first place, it was arranged that Boersma must confer with the Ministry of
Economic Affairs in different situations. Evidently, the Chamber wanted
to defend the position of Lubbers and Economic Affairs. Furthermore,
the Social Economic Council and other consultative organs must be in-
volved in some decisions. And finally, parliamentary control should be
strengthened, which meant, among other things, insisting that certain
government decisions must be reported to the Chamber.47 On December
20, the Second Chamber voted by a majority to pass the Enabling Act.
The First Chamber, however, decided to deal with the Bill only on Janu-
ary 8 and 9.
Meanwhile, the Cabinet had sent the Second Chamber a second note
over the oil crisis, entitled Policy note limiting consequences of oil shor-
tage.48 This note, also partly based on material delivered by the Central
Economic Committee, was comprehensively dealt with in the Ministerial
Council for Economic Affairs. The aim of the note was to flesh out the in-
tentions announced in the first note concerning the oil shortage and in the
Enabling Act. The Cabinet reiterated that, in view of the great uncertain-
ty over oil supplies, it was inevitable that measures be taken to control
prices and wages and the growth of government expenditure. The re-
stricted oil supply and the rise in oil prices would contribute to a steep rise
in prices and wages, coupled with stagnating or falling production, pro-
ductivity and imports/exports. Apart from the measures announced earli-
er, the note announced capital spending on the extra commitment to nat-
ural gas and on increasing the profits from natural gas. With regard to in-
dustrial relations, the Cabinet announced measures aimed at maintaining
the level of employment as far as possible, such as support for businesses
finding themselves in difficulties, and the creation of new jobs, specifically
a programme of insulation in the building industry. Rising wages must be
carefully monitored (even though wages in 1974 would increase consid-
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erably), possibly requiring the introduction of a ‘rest period’ in connec-
tion with the uncertainty surrounding oil supplies.
Doubt and Postponement
At the end of December, another wave of doubt assailed the government
over whether the rationing, already prepared and at the ready, was really
necessary. The forecasts concerning oil supplies were more optimistic,
even within the Council of Ministers. On December 21, for the last time in
1973, the question of the oil shortage was raised in the Council of Minis-
ters, and with it new data on current supplies were provided. During the
handling of the Enabling Act the previous day, with the presentation of in-
formation on the oil situation, the Cabinet had ‘passed through the eye of
the needle’, as Den Uyl remarked. 49 Den Uyl pointed out in the Council of
Ministers that there was a general distrust of the figures. Could not more
exact figures be obtained from the Customs and pilots services on the New
Waterway, so that the Cabinet might be properly informed of the situa-
tion?
It was clear in this ministerial council that Lubbers was no longer con-
vinced of the need for rationing. In the following weeks he would more
and more explicitly wonder whether it would be more sensible simply to
blow the whistle on the entire operation. During these weeks it was pre-
dominantly the PvdA ministers, not least Den Uyl himself, who would
persevere with putting rationing into operation in spite of Lubbers’s
reservations.
Lubbers pointed out that there had been a one million tons deficiency in
December’s incoming oil supply, which was much better than the earlier
prognoses. His impression was that the oil supply in December had been
better than was expected at the end of November. The situation was also
better because road transport had been effectively cut back, the oil compa-
nies commanded vast stockpiles, and more oil than anticipated was still
arriving. He concluded that it would be better to postpone rationing, even
though from the point of view of policy continuity it might perhaps be bet-
ter to carry on with it. If the rumours of huge oil stocks were correct, the
Cabinet would have to reconsider its policy.50 Once again it was evident
that the Cabinet was not in a position to command an adequate picture of
the situation; and nowhere was this more in evidence than in Lubbers’s
own doubts as to whether rumours of overflowing oil tanks in the Rijn-
mond area were true or false.
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These doubts grew. In early January, NRC Handelsblad started ques-
tioning the government’s efforts to introduce rationing, predicting a tide
of protest from trade and industry. There was also doubt in the Second
Chamber, the paper thought, over the necessity of rationing. Very little
inconvenience had so far been suffered as a result of the embargo and re-
duction in oil supplies. Lubbers himself had said that he was not pes-
simistic about this. The oil supply was, in his view, still reasonably up to
the mark.
Clearly, from this statement, the government must now realise that the
situation with regard to the oil supply is better than anticipated. Why
then persist with a complicated and, for many, inequitable system of ra-
tioning?51
Such doubts as to the need for rationing spread within the Council of
Ministers at the beginning of 1974, doubts mainly fed by Lubbers. There
were technical problems, he said, such as the allocation of petrol: such al-
location could only be completed two weeks after rationing had been in-
troduced, causing great uncertainty for many applicants. But the most
important reason for postponing or even cancelling rationing was for
Lubbers the fact that oil stocks on December 31 were ‘virtually intact’.
Supply, moreover, was greater than anticipated. At any event, he pro-
posed postponing rationing by three weeks.
This went too far for the majority of the Cabinet. The Council of Min-
isters decided to compromise with a one week postponement, with no
shifting of this deadline. The consequence of this decision was important
and remarkable, for it meant that the first period of rationing would last
only three weeks, not four. The total quantity of petrol that could be used
in this period, however, remained the same as originally provided for four
weeks, which in turn implied that every private vehicle now had the right
to twenty rather than fifteen litres per week.52
It was a decision that did the government’s reputation no good. The
press accused the Cabinet of irresolution and panic; ‘Poorly organised’,
ran the headline of the lead editorial in de Volkskrant. ‘What is hard to
swallow is the government’s panicky play from one day to the next.’ Min-
isters contradicted one another; the measures taken were deficient, and
many administrative problems not foreseen. The petrol ration suddenly
went from sixty litres per four weeks to sixty litres per three weeks.
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Analysing this policy – if policy it can be called – leads one to conclude
that the government set sail on its mission with nothing better than a
wet finger held up to the wind.53
‘Unfortunate’ was how Trouw characterised the five-day postponement
of petrol rationing: not only the time period, but part of the reasoning also
seemed at fault. ‘Why did the government have to wait for this postpone-
ment until two days before rationing should have been implemented?’
Public transport could no longer reverse the extra schedules. Inevitably,
and justifiably, there was huge irritation. Furthermore, the reason – that
the oil supply had slightly improved – did not hold water.
The Cabinet has always acted as though it was incapable of tuning its
rationing policy to such minor fluctuations… By giving the impression
now that it can, the Cabinet has provided with ammunition for some
time to come to its many critics who will soon be wanting to see daily
proof of that rationing is necessary.54
NRC Handelsblad was also critical. ‘The unexpected U-turn in policy
does not suggest well-considered policy-making,’ was the paper’s judge-
ment. The question of whether rationing was in fact urgently needed had
not been adequately answered by the Cabinet.55
The Cabinet Ploughs on
On January 11, the decision was taken in the Council of Ministers to
press ahead with the prepared rationing scheme, in the first place for three
weeks, from January 12 till February 3. It was by now believed that this
rationing would lead to a saving of 20%, considerably less than the 30%
previously assumed. If this 20% saving was no longer necessary, the sys-
tem would revert to one or two car-free Sundays in combination with a
speed limit of 90 kms per hour.56
In the Council of Ministers of January 11, confusion once again
reigned over the true figures for stocks and supplies. Lubbers informed
the Council that, in any case, supplies at the beginning of the year were
greater than anticipated. Consumption now lay in the region of 67% of
its normal magnitude, while supplies amounted to some 70%. Lubbers’s
main concern was the development of prices, not oil supplies. Den Uyl,
however, disagreed. In his view, the December supply had been lower
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than had been reported at the time, in fact some 50% lower than the pre-
vious year. In public, however, a figure of 30% had been discussed in or-
der to avoid too much disquiet.57
Den Uyl’s line of reasoning contradicted the earlier statement from
Lubbers, that oil stocks were more or less intact at the turn of the year.
Furthermore, from Lubbers’s report it could be construed that domestic
oil use had been reduced by roughly the same amount as the oil supply;
and finally there seemed to be a clear improvement in the provision of oil.
And yet the decision had been taken to implement rationing, even though
the Council of Ministers accepted that it need not last long.58
The Cabinet decision seems, certainly in retrospect, highly con-
testable. Stocks were being maintained, the oil supply was recovering,
and there was already on the cards a considerable reduction of exports
and reduced consumption. The circumstances in which the Cabinet de-
cided to go ahead with petrol, lpg and propane rationing are perhaps
best illustrated by a telex that same day by bk Gas to the National Bureau
for Oil Products (the rba), asking that the rationing of lpg be postponed
until genuine shortage could be detected. According to bk Gas, stocks for
the coming months looked good. In fact, given the excess stock, there was
the danger that a good deal of unsold gas would ‘have to be burnt’.59
A last striking aspect of the introduction of rationing was that, at this
point, the government clearly began to deviate from the policy imple-
mented by surrounding countries. The announcement of rationing had
caused surprise in the West German Republic, as the Dutch Ambassador
in Bonn reported to The Hague; for there it was considered that the car-
free Sundays and the speed limit would be sufficient. Nor was rationing
introduced in Belgium. The only other European country that had intro-
duced rationing was Romania.60 This fact that countries bordering The
Netherlands had not found it necessary to introduce rationing would
soon prove an insuperable problem for the rationing experiment.
Why was rationing implemented, in spite of all the ambivalence and in
spite of the increasingly optimistic data? By now, Lubbers was no longer
advocating it and was essentially expressing doubt. According to Rutten,
this was mainly attributable to Lubbers’s uncertainty.61 But on the other
hand, there were also good reasons to doubt the sense of rationing. It was
mainly the PvdA ministers, Den Uyl above all, who pushed through the
decision. However, beside this, one has to set the role of the Co-ordination
Group and of Rutten himself, as chairperson of the Group. Rutten had
also argued for implementation at the gathering of the Ministerial Com-
mittee where he had represented Economic Affairs in the absence of Min-
ister Lubbers.62
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The majority of the Cabinet, for a variety of reasons, did not share
Lubbers’s view. One argument was the uncertainty of supplies in the near
future, despite the satisfactory figures on parade. A second argument, ad-
vanced by Van der Stoel among others, was the political instability in the
Middle East, which might in time lead to the announcement of further re-
strictive measures. A third argument, also stressed by Van der Stoel, was
the fear of repercussions from the Arab side should they perceive from the
Cabinet’s decision-making that the embargo was ineffectual.63
And yet these considerations were not the main reasons for pushing
ahead with rationing. The most important point was the credibility of the
Cabinet’s policy. It was concluded by several members of the Cabinet, not
least Den Uyl, that postponing rationing, and especially any ostentatious
change of policy, would create a very bad impression with the Dutch elec-
torate and arouse doubts as to the government’s strength of purpose.64
This, however, certainly after the postponement of the previous week and
the public reactions to that, was a rather contentious argument.
The idea that rationing was mainly an exercise of a social democratic,
centrally controlled, economic policy of austerity, which was for example
the view subsequently expressed by the then director of Shell-Nether-
lands, Helfrich, is surely an exaggeration.65 Rationing, after all, can
hardly be seen as an example of progressive economic politics. The intro-
duction of the Enabling Act, passed by the First Chamber in the second
week of January, went much further in that direction. Although the intro-
duction of rationing was championed in Cabinet by the PvdA ministers
above all, it was the bureaucratic weight of all those preparatory meas-
ures that played such an important role in the decision to keep on going.
Even Secretary-General Rutten of Economic Affairs was in favour of
pressing on; there was simply too much civil service labour invested in the
preparation.
Three Weeks Rationing
The rationing system was in fact based on a vast mass of paperwork. In
the final report of the National Bureau for Oil Products (rba), it was later
found that there had been 47 different forms in circulation, two types of
permit, seven kinds of ration card, one authorization, five categories of
ration coupon and three kinds of allocation. Furthermore, a large number
of government and other organisations were involved in the whole opera-
tion: various ministries, municipal and provincial institutions, the
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National Traffic Licensing Authority, the Central Office for Motor Vehi-
cle Taxation, Chambers of Commerce, the Dutch motorists association
anwb, not to speak of all the petrol pump owners and oil companies.
In the allocation of coupons for the initial rationing period – originally
four weeks – it was assumed that these would remain valid for six
months. The disadvantage of this long-lasting validity was the increased
risk of fraud, but that was simply accepted as part of the costs. The great
advantage was the flexibility afforded, and for this reason trade in
coupons was not forbidden. Allocation was determined on the basis of
data supplied by the Office for Motor Vehicle Taxation. A total of 3.1 mil-
lion ration cards were issued. The rba made full use of the possibility of
involving other governmental bodies on the basis of their expertise,
specifically in issuing extra coupons for a whole series of exceptional cate-
gories: business vehicles, commuter traffic, rental vehicles, invalids (who
would need to produce evidence of their invalid status). Where road traf-
fic was concerned, this authority was the Directorate-General for Road
Transport (under the Ministry of Transport and Water Management); for
the agricultural sector it was the Directorate-General for Food and Agri-
culture; and for the diplomatic service, the Cabinet and Protocol Depart-
ment in the Foreign Ministry. The apparatus of the Directorate-General
for Road Transport quickly proved inadequate to the task. Out of necessi-
ty, 93 distribution circuits subsequently had to be set up to issue supple-
mentary allocations for the business use of private vehicles. Inevitably,
there was confusion among the public as to which was the appropriate
authority to turn to. There was also considerable uncertainty over what
exactly qualified for extra allowances. By shifting the date of implemen-
tation to January 12 and because of the simultaneous improvement in the
general outlook, there was also more room to improve the allowance of
extra petrol.66
Soon enough, however, rationing proved an efficient means of generat-
ing political and social discontent. As early as January 8, the Cabinet pol-
icy came under fire in the First Chamber: the need for the entire rationing
operation seemed so dubious. The Cabinet stood its ground although
Lubbers declared that a reduction of 20% would be sufficient rather than
the 30% deemed necessary in the December note. A motion was submit-
ted to change government thinking but was rejected by 45 votes to 24, de-
spite the support it received from eight representatives of the ruling par-
ties.67
Against this background, the debate in the Council of Ministers over
January 18 and 19 centred on the question of whether rationing should
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last beyond three weeks. There were immediately differences of opinion
evident. Westerterp cast strong doubt on the need to continue. Business
traffic, in his view, was encountering considerable hindrance, while the
agreement between Egypt and Israel over disengagement gave cause for
optimism. Lubbers seemed to be in doubt. Den Uyl, in contrast, thought
that as long as the oil supply was less than 80% of the previous year, it
was necessary to prolong rationing by a further three-week period. This,
in the end, was what was decided.
In practice, however, rationing rapidly lost its effectiveness. Along the
Dutch borders, motorists were crossing the frontier to buy up foreign
petrol on a large scale, resulting in a drastic slump in sales at the pumps in
The Netherlands. As a result, the Dutch petrol stations were reverting to
the sale of petrol without coupons. Nor was this flouting of rationing re-
stricted to the pumps in the border areas. In increasingly wider circles, it
was felt that the rationing system was being discredited. At this stage,
during talks between the National Bureau for Oil Products and the oil
companies, it appeared that the difference between supply and demand
was estimated at 15%, less than the 20% limit set by the Cabinet.68 The
question was therefore what purpose the colossal effort of paperwork ac-
tually served. On January 22 the General-Secretary of the Cycle and Mo-
tor Manufacturing Industry (rai), W. Hustinx, pointed out to Lubbers in
a telex that calculations showed that, on an annual basis, 4866 million
litres of petrol had been distributed under rationing, not including extra
allocations for police, fire service, invalids etc. The total petrol consump-
tion for 1973, had there been no oil crisis, would have been 4865 million
litres. In short, rationing was pointless. The rai therefore would prefer,
as Hustinx delicately remarked, that the dislocation of the motor indus-
try and trade could be ended by reverting to more normal relations, on the
basis of voluntary savings in petrol consumption.69
In the second week of rationing, it became clear that the organisations
involved, the oil companies as well as the distributors and pump owners,
were simply not sticking to the prescribed rules. On January 22, the Asso-
ciation of Automobile Dealers and Garage Owners told Lubbers in no un-
certain terms that they were no longer willing to cooperate in the ‘ra-
tioning circus’. Many petrol pumps had for some time gone their own
way; some had even succeeded in importing petrol from abroad. But the
companies were also delivering generously. On the basis of a current ac-
count system, the oil companies were allowed to supply the pump owners
with extra petrol, which would be taken into account subsequently on re-
turn of the coupons from sales. This regulation was probably rather freely
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interpreted by some oil companies. It was subsequently concluded by the
government that the current account system had probably let ‘too much
air’ into the rationing system.70
On January 21, Rutten was talking of ‘rebellion’. The question was
how the government would react. The view within the Ministry of Justice
was that it would not help to maintain rationing with a heavy hand. The
legal possibilities inherent in the situation were complex. Furthermore,
there was a good chance that rationing would be abolished within days,
which would make the Ministry of Justice look a little ridiculous. Discon-
tinuing rationing completely, however, seemed equally undesirable. After
all, the Cabinet had just announced three further weeks of rationing. It
was thought at the Ministry of Justice that the Foreign Ministry was also
against abolishing the scheme as long as the embargo against The Nether-
lands was not lifted. A system of extra measures and exceptions was
thought too complicated. The best way out therefore seemed to be ‘a tem-
porary suspension of the disposition’.71
Meanwhile, the estimates of stocks and supplies were looking even
more favourable. On January 9 it was still being assumed by the Co-ordi-
nation Group that supplies in January and February would be 30% down
on the previous year. But two weeks later, the shortfall was assumed with-
in the Ministry for Economic Affairs to amount to only 22%. It was ex-
pected on January 9 that 28% less crude oil would be processed in The
Netherlands; whereas two weeks later the figure cited for this reduction
was 19%. In fact, it was concluded on January 24 that the outlook for
most oil products was favourable.72 On January 17 the Ministerial Com-
mittee therefore decided to go over to publication of the figures, though
there was some doubt on this score within the Foreign Ministry. The
Head of the Department for Economic Cooperation (des) pointed out to
Van der Stoel that there remained some doubt about the assumption that
the Arab countries by now  no longer had any objection to the redirection
of the oil stream. This idea had played a part in the decision of January 17
but it was by no means certain that a government demonstration that the
embargo had been ineffectual would not irritate some Arab countries. On
the other hand, the Head of des appreciated that there were good domes-
tic reasons for resuming publication of the data on oil supplies.73
On January 23 the situation in the Council of Ministers had changed
from four days earlier, when it had been decided to extend rationing to
February 25. A memo from Rutten to Lubbers was submitted in which it
was confirmed that ‘rationing was being circumvented in diverse ways
and on a vast scale’. Meanwhile, Van Agt concluded in a letter to Den Uyl
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‘that maintenance of the ban on supplying petrol other than on produc-
tion of coupons had gone completely haywire’. There were far too many
coupons in circulation, which was mainly the consequence of their lavish
distribution for road vehicles. There was unrestrained sale of petrol in
border areas, given the competition from free trade in fuel over the fron-
tiers. Van Agt noted that Den Uyl had apparently proposed a ban in order
to import more extra petrol from abroad; but the law did not provide for
this, quite apart from the problems with the other Benelux countries and
the ec.74
Den Uyl concluded that the pressure from both parliament and the
country to dispense with rationing at once was growing because it was
being assumed that there were sufficient stocks of petrol. This assump-
tion was fostered by remarks by the head of the Rotterdam trade unions,
A. van Schravenmade, who had stated that the reserve tanks in the Botlek
Rijnmond area were more than full. The oil companies had let it be
known that a saving of 15% would be necessary in the coming weeks, less
than the 20% that had served as reason for the Cabinet to introduce ra-
tioning. The Co-ordination Group had meanwhile proposed, in line with
the Cabinet decision of the previous week, to call a halt to rationing on
February 25; but Den Uyl was now considering a much earlier date, viz.
February 4. Pronk put forward the most explicit objection to this: there
were no reasons for an immediate cessation. The supplies, after all, had
not become much better.
To most members of the government, however, it seemed the situation
was becoming uncontrollable. Van Agt again emphasized that large num-
bers of cars were crossing the borders to fill up in neighbouring countries.
The result was more and more petrol pumps were supplying petrol with-
out coupons. Maintaining rationing until February 24, in his view, would
be impossible. He shared Den Uyl’s point of view that the scheme should
be wound up on February 4. Nonetheless, there remained doubts to the
last. There were in fact two draft decisions on the table: one to extend ra-
tioning by a further three weeks, the other to stop. In the end, the council
decision was to end rationing on February 4, but to continue with efforts
to reduce petrol consumption, specifically through the maximum speed
limit.75
The series of decisions taken by the Den Uyl Cabinet ensured the in-
evitable outcry in the press. De Volkskrant had many questions it wanted
answered over the ending of rationing. Why had the Cabinet found it nec-
essary only one week previously to decree a new period of rationing? Had
the oil supply unexpectedly become so much more favourable? With due
185
respect to all conceivable arguments, the paper retained the impression
‘that the early abrogation of rationing is rather to be attributed to the
growing chaos than to a better than anticipated oil supply’.76
The paper expressed itself even more forcefully two days later. After
the announced end of petrol rationing on February 4, the remaining peri-
od under rationing had become a joke. De Volkskrant spoke of ‘govern-
ment drift’: certainly, the paper said, the epithet ‘bungling’ seemed well-
deserved for the policy of the recent period.77
The story of rationing seemed to the eyes of NRC Handelsblad both
brief and strange. Lubbers had not been able to make completely clear
why it had been decided to abandon rationing. In spite of the encouraging
figures, it hardly chimed with the long-term objectives that Lubbers had
always presented.
It is not so long ago that optimistic views of the oil supply in The Econo-
mist were being rubbished by various members of the Cabinet.78
Two days later the paper returned to this question. The cancellation of ra-
tioning had been more or less dictated by the oil companies and the Asso-
ciation of Automobile Dealers and Garage Owners (bovag), with the
companies playing a particularly significant role. They had initially
promised the government to cooperate with implementing instructions
through to the end of the rationing period. In fact, because of the extraor-
dinarily flexible delivery rules for petrol pumps, implementation of ra-
tioning had been less than scrupulous. Pump owners had in various ways
managed to lay in extra quantities of fuel. Furthermore, as it turned out in
practice, the stipulation that petrol could only be supplied on the produc-
tion of coupons had generally been ignored. The whole affair only served
to illustrate the shortage of trust between companies and government.
This is perhaps explained by the growing belief that the oil companies
have provided government with insufficient insight into the circum-
stances and the consequences of the oil crisis.79
Once it became clear that rationing would be abandoned, it became even
more difficult to maintain any sort of control over the petrol pump own-
ers, as was clearly realised at the Ministry of Justice. In a memorandum to
the Secretary-General at the Ministry, it was suggested that it would be
inconceivable to come down hard on the pump owners. But the real vil-
lains had undoubtedly been the Association of Automobile Dealers and
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Garage Owners (bovag), and a prosecution of this organisation might
well help remove the impression of impotence. The Cabinet could demon-
strate that important issues were at stake if a monopoly organisation like
bovag resorted to ‘civil disobedience’. But of course there were also risks
attached to such a judicial course of action. The most important policy
objection was that by involving the courts, government would be mani-
festing a rather convulsive need to justify itself in what was, after all, a
fairly feeble matter.80
This, then, was how rationing ended: in civil disobedience and chaos.
There was much discussion at the Ministry of Economic Affairs over the
question of whether it needed winding up and the cost counted; but in the
end the instructions were simply to leave matters as they were. The Co-
ordination Group also later admitted that there had been far too many
problems involved. The group thought the way the oil companies had act-
ed had been very variable: Shell had probably exploited the opportunity
to restock (as was later established in the Council of Ministers). The Co-
ordination Group concluded that petrol consumption in January had
been approximately 20% less than normal.81 The target figure had thus
been achieved, but the question was whether this might not have been
achieved even without rationing. Furthermore, it turned out that the com-
bination of this reduction in consumption together with the recovery in
the oil supply was by now causing storage problems.
Following the end of rationing on February 4, there were initially no
additional measures prepared. It was a matter of re-introducing the car-
free Sundays, at least once or twice a month, and the legal fixing of a max-
imum speed limit. Even these measures quickly became superfluous, how-
ever, for there was now no shortage of oil. When, at the end of January,
the possibility of improving both oil provisions and The Hague’s image
was considered at Economic Affairs, the question was raised whether
there was actually any need for an increase in supply. The answer was
‘no’.
In view of the unusually mild winter, the ban on reporting incoming
tankers, information that tankers are being diverted to other ports, as
well as the rumour that old tankers are being filled offshore because of
lack of storage space on land, this question can be answered in the nega-
tive.82
Helfrich later confirmed the truth of these rumours that old tankers had
been used to store oil on the North Sea. Furthermore, Shell had instructed
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tankers en route to Rotterdam to sail slowly, since their oil could not be
stored in the Botlek area.83
Conclusion
The storage problem stands in stark contrast to the apprehensive suspi-
cions voiced in the double Cabinet note to parliament in mid-December.
For this reason alone, according to various authorities involved, it was
not surprising that rationing had been a failure. According to one note
from the Ministry of Justice, during the three weeks of rationing petrol
had been widely sold without coupons and without any corrective action
being taken. Not that it would have been easy to take effective action, giv-
en the economic unity within the ec and free traffic between Benelux
countries. More generally, the note argued, a rationing system can only
work in times of scarcity, and during these three weeks there had been no
genuine scarcity.84
More radical criticism was expressed in a report on the experience of
the Amsterdam distribution circuit. The government had hesitated far
too long, and the procedures by which rationing was implemented had
been inadequate and confusing. Above all, the decision to reduce the ra-
tioning period from four to three weeks, while the allowance itself re-
mained unchanged, had seriously undermined the credibility of the whole
rationing scheme. Different members of the government, moreover,
seemed regularly to contradict one another, which had made a very poor
impression on the public.85
The National Bureau for Oil Products (the rba) subsequently con-
cluded that rationing was a means of defending scarce basic materials as
effectively as possible under conditions of war and concomitant major
shortages. But because such problems no longer existed by January 1974,
the public had no belief in the legitimacy of the measures. Petrol was sold
illegally on a wide scale, and the government turned out to be in no posi-
tion to take any countermeasures. More generally, serious mistakes were
made: information had been inadequate, co-ordination had been lacking,
there were far too many coupons in circulation. In fact, a great deal had
gone wrong.86
But the most important problem was the fact that stocks and supplies
in January were in so much better health than initially assumed. Why did
the situation turn out so favourably? Here it is relevant to pay attention
not solely to the figures for supply, for in December these were indeed
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scarcely encouraging. In that month, supply fell back by a huge percent-
age in comparison with December 1972. And yet at the beginning of Jan-
uary, Lubbers was able to establish that stocks were virtually intact.87
There could have been several reasons for this striking fact. In the first
place, it was evident that some companies, with an eye to the coming win-
ter and because of an anticipated rise in oil prices, had transported extra
stocks of crude oil to The Netherlands. The rba even spoke of ‘record
stocks’.88 In the second place, the export of processed oil products was in
all probability drastically reduced. Thirdly, there was a drop in the do-
mestic use of processed oil products as the result of restrictive measures,
and on the basis of voluntary action, also helped by such coincidental fac-
tors as the mildness of the winter. Fourthly, supplies recovered in January
much faster than expected as a result of the switching policy operated by
the oil companies. Furthermore, it became clear that the embargo was not
everywhere being effectively enforced. And finally, after the price rises of
December, the production limits were made more flexible by the oapec
countries.
By the time it became apparent in January that supplies were begin-
ning to recover, rationing had in fact become superfluous. Lubbers, who
had originally been a champion of the rapid implementation of rationing,
had by then come round to the position that the entire operation was too
late in the day. And of course he was right. The system quickly collapsed
when several of the players involved simply chose not to abide by the rules:
the Cabinet was confronted with ‘civil disobedience’ on a wide scale.
Even the oil companies – or at least some of them – seem not to have stuck
to the distribution regulations, and as a result the major companies played
a remarkable role, since they had originally argued for more radical meas-
ures than the car-free Sunday and voluntary speed limits. Even the Cabi-
net, in justifying the introduction of rationing, later referred to ‘the dark-
er prospects outlined by the oil companies at the time of the decision-
making in question’.89 And in all probability they continued to paint this
dark picture until well into December. When the government decided to
put into operation the rationing mechanism prepared so long in advance,
the oil companies appeared by then to be no longer convinced of the need
for any drastic reduction in consumption; in fact, they contributed to the
evasion, discrediting and abandonment of the whole rationing scheme.
The Den Uyl government was always one step behind events. This was
partly the consequence of the fact that the Cabinet was so dependent on
the information provided by and the behaviour of the major oil compa-
nies. It was understandable that various ministers felt uneasy with this
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situation and in ministerial council demanded more information. The
Cabinet, however, never did succeed in cutting loose from this dependen-
cy.
It is striking that the government never had a proper picture of the oil
supply, whereas former employees of the Foreign and the Military Intelli-
gence Services believe that they themselves had had a reasonably adequate
picture. The services were together reading the coded reports and com-
munications of Shell and Mobil, but apparently this information never
found its way to the Cabinet.90
In this situation, mutual relations between the departments involved
were not always optimal. The Ministry of Economic Affairs seemed to
have a monopoly command over data relating to oil supplies. Subse-
quently, dissatisfaction was expressed within the Foreign Ministry over
the lack of information that had been passed on by Economic Affairs.
This lack of information, as a later Foreign Ministry report rather chari-
tably put it, was partly the consequence of the Economic Affairs appara-
tus being over-taxed, but at the same time ‘Economic Affairs did not keep
to the arrangement that talks between their officials and the oil compa-
nies could also be attended by Foreign Office officials’.91 Westerterp also
expressed the view later that the information on oil stocks and supplies
passed on by Economic Affairs had not always been adequate.92 Unques-
tionably, this lack of effective communication between departments
played a damaging role.93
In the rationing phase, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Lubbers
lost their leading role as initiators in matters and measures of limiting
consumption. The car-free Sunday had been the result of a mandate given
Lubbers by the Cabinet to take whatever action the circumstances de-
manded. With the Enabling Act and rationing, the oil crisis had taken a
turn which made it the concern of the entire Cabinet in which Boersma
and, especially, Den Uyl increasingly played the more prominent roles,
while Lubbers himself increasingly came to entertain doubts. These shifts
were not conducive to decisive or adroit action, and the effectiveness of
the policy suffered badly.
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7From Copenhagen to Washington
In this chapter we shall return to the international aspects of the oil crisis,
to the stage after the failure of the European Summit of December 14 and
15 in Copenhagen. At that time, the predominant feeling in The Hague
was of great uncertainty over the oil supply. Although it was clear by then
that some oil companies were trying to share out the oil between Euro-
pean countries as equitably as possible, it was felt that the oil supply
would remain uncertain for the immediate future. Seen in retrospect, De-
cember 1973 was the worst month for the oil supply. This was the time
that the decision was taken to introduce rationing and to submit the En-
abling Act to Parliament. By the end of the year, however, it was becom-
ing clear that the worst was already over and that the supply of oil would
recover within the foreseeable future.
The Cabinet, in spite of everything, was taking a more business-like –
even pugnacious – approach to its judgements of the oil crisis and the em-
bargo, although its Middle East policy remained low-profile. All mention
of the Arab-Israeli war was to be avoided for the time being, all public
declarations suppressed, as the Arab countries wished. Any hope of Euro-
pean solidarity had been discarded, and even more: the Cabinet, as we
saw, had in the meantime reached the conclusion that sharing was, in the
end, probably not to The Netherlands’ advantage. The national energy
situation was in all respects in reasonable shape and more favourable
than in several other ec countries. For this reason, the failure of the
Copenhagen Summit was certainly not lamented in The Hague.
American Leadership
This chapter deals with all the political twists and turns from the Copen-
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hagen Summit till the Washington Conference called by President Nixon,
which opened on February 11, 1974. During these weeks the American
government began to get more actively involved in the politics of the oil
problem. In the first weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, Kissinger had
mainly concentrated on ending the state of war in the Middle East. This
was no easy matter. American attempts were made more difficult by the
fact that elections in Israel had considerably strengthened the political
right, leaving the government of Golda Meir much less room for manoeu-
vre. Nevertheless, negotiations were opened on December 21, although
Syria took no part. Discussions proceeded with difficulty, indeed they
were initially adjourned, yet despite this, they led to the signing on Janu-
ary 18 of an Israeli-Egyptian accord guaranteeing disengagement.
Washington’s relations with the West European countries at the begin-
ning of the 1970s were not unproblematic. As already discussed in Chap-
ter 3, a number of problems in the area of monetary and trade policy, not
to mention the Vietnam war, stood in the way of easy cooperation. It is
not so surprising therefore that the first weeks of the oil crisis should wit-
ness such a marked lack of harmonious cooperation between the usa and
its European partners. Paris, in particular, could not come to terms with
the American role in negotiations for a settlement of the October War.
Kissinger, on the other hand, had no time for European interference.
France tried to get the ec to take a position more independent of the usa
in relation to the Middle East conflict; but the ec proved too divided to
play any consistent role. In part, this was due to opposition from The
Hague. The Dutch Cabinet firmly believed that the ec should not thwart
Kissinger’s efforts to reach a peace accord, efforts to which much energy
had been devoted. At a meeting held in Geneva in December 1973,
chaired jointly by the usa and the Soviet Union, the main stumbling block
was the question of the participation of an independent Palestinian dele-
gation. The meeting was adjourned shortly after the opening ceremony.1
Kissinger’s address of December 12 marked the moment when the usa
tried to establish its position at the head of the Western world in the prob-
lematic area of oil and energy needs. Kissinger called on the oecd coun-
tries to develop joint initiatives regarding oil production, the use of ener-
gy and the development of alternative energy sources. He proposed set-
ting up an energy-action group to discuss these proposals further. It was
this initiative which led to major changes in the whole context in which
The Netherlands’ oil policy was determined. This was already evident in
Copenhagen.
The Den Uyl Cabinet, especially Van der Stoel, had immediately wel-
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comed the American initiative. American opposition to French efforts to-
ward an independent European Middle East policy could only be in the
interest of the Dutch, it was thought. Furthermore, commercial rivalry
between the consumer countries had intensified since Copenhagen, with
various countries attempting to conclude bilateral agreements with the
Arab oil-producing countries with the aim of guaranteeing longer term
security for their own oil supply. This increasing tension and the politicis-
ing of the oil market were remarked on in The Hague in fiercely critical
terms. It was hoped there that American leadership might help put an end
to this disarray.
Production Limits and Oil Prices
Although the oil price rises had elicited great concern in The Hague from
the very beginning, it was initially the production limits that caused the
most disquiet. These limits and the embargo seemed to threaten The
Netherlands most directly. In October the oapec countries had an-
nounced a monthly reduction in oil production of 5%. An extra 5% was
added to this figure at the beginning of November, as a result of which
November oil production in the Arab world would be some 25% less than
in September (if we include the embargo against The Netherlands, Den-
mark, Portugal and the usa). Moreover, it was decided at the beginning
of November that production in December would also be reduced by a
further 5%, though this further reduction would not be put into effect
against ‘friendly’ states. On November 18 the oapec countries an-
nounced that, out of appreciation for the ec communiqué of November 6,
the ec countries (apart from The Netherlands and Denmark) were ex-
empted from the limit set for December. But at the beginning of 1974, a
general restriction would again be imposed, a decision confirmed at a
meeting of Arab Oil Ministers over December 8 and 9.
At the end of December it was clear that the character of the crisis had
begun to change. From that moment, it centred more and more on prices
and increasingly less on production limits. On November 19 the negotia-
tions in Vienna between the opec countries and the oil companies had
become deadlocked. The opec countries had subsequently announced
that they would in future set the oil prices unilaterally. On November 22,
Wagner had sent a letter to Den Uyl expressing his great alarm at the price
rises. On November 30, Dutch diplomatic representatives were fully in-
formed of Wagner’s apprehensions via the Foreign Ministry. Van der
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Stoel explained that, although the government shared Wagner’s view, in
view of the embargo it would not seem to be the responsibility of The
Netherlands to take any specific initiative within the oecd.2
On December 23, the Arab Oil Ministers, meeting for an opec con-
ference in Tehran, let it be known that they wanted to double the price of
oil. They decided to recommend to their governments to raise the price of
the so-called light Arab crude oil to around $11.60 per barrel. Several
days later, the other opec members followed suit. On December 25 the
opec countries announced that the production limits then in operation
would again be relaxed. All measures previously announced now lapsed,
and in addition, the restriction that had reached the 25% figure was now
relaxed to 15%. The oil flow would resume, but at a price three times
higher than before the war.3
The Western countries reacted with shock to these spectacular price
increases, even the usa, which had originally supported the idea of a price
rise. As early as December 22, the Dutch Director-General for Political
Affairs, Van Lynden, received a worried American aide-mémoire over the
opec plans which would lead to a threefold or even fourfold increase in
oil prices compared with the pre-crisis period. Price rises of this magni-
tude would have highly serious consequences for all users, the aide-mé-
moire observed. For this reason, American embassies in the opec capitals
had been instructed to express their alarm at these rises at the highest level
possible. The Hague was likewise asked to take similar steps.4
Van der Stoel, however, reacted coolly to this request. Shortly before
the opec gathering in Tehran, the Dutch Ambassador in Jakarta had re-
ceived instructions to approach the Indonesian authorities cautiously and
to make clear The Hague’s concerns over the rise in oil prices. But Van der
Stoel had no wish to make any comparable attempt in other opec coun-
tries. The special position of The Netherlands, i.e. as the target of the em-
bargo, did not after all allow for The Hague to play an active role in the
matter of a price dispute. This was why Indonesia had been chosen as the
conduit. Van der Stoel also reacted warily to the American request of De-
cember 22. The Dutch Ambassador in Tehran was merely informed in full
of the American steps, but was not instructed to support them.5
It was not only Washington that tried to get the opec countries to
show moderation and restraint. As it turned out later, there were also
British attempts. On January 2, in conversation with the Dutch Director-
General for European Cooperation, the British Ambassador at The
Hague said that London was highly alarmed by the price rises that had
been carried through. In his view, a positive response should be shown to
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the suggestion of the Shah of Persia for a dialogue between opec and the
oecd. The British government proposed a formal approach to the opec
countries to appeal for reason and moderation. Anxiety should be ex-
pressed over the December 22 price decisions of opec and the Gulf
States, and it should be requested that these be introduced in stages. Final-
ly, any new destabilising decisions at the coming opec meeting on Janu-
ary 7 should be prevented.6 It would be helpful if as many oecd countries
as possible would support this effort, the British Ambassador thought.
After discussing this internally, the Director-General reported back that
The Hague was of roughly the same opinion and supported the British
plan.7
Evidently, bilateral steps were going to be of little help for the time be-
ing: talks between producers and consumers were required. But there did
seem to be common points of contact. At a press conference on December
23, the Shah had appealed for a dialogue between opec and oecd,
which should take shape within the next six months. The opec Secre-
tary-General, Abderrahman Khene, had also expressed the same kind of
idea. The appeal was endorsed by several Western governments, includ-
ing The Hague, where it had been realised that these price rises would
have enormous consequences for the Dutch and for Western economies in
general. Particularly within the Dutch Directorate-General for Interna-
tional Cooperation, there was also increasing concern for the position of
the developing countries.
The Embargo
However much the crisis was beginning to change in character, the em-
bargo was still in force. Throughout the latter part of December and in
January, the Cabinet took a very cautious position on the Middle East
conflict: theirs was still a ‘low profile’ policy. In any case, The Hague de-
clined to make public pro-Arab pronouncements and as a consequence
came in for some criticism. The conservative-liberal vvd reproached the
government for doing too little to defend the Dutch national interest in
the Middle East (as Brussels had succeeded in doing by giving its own in-
terpretation of the ec declaration). Van der Stoel was accused of conduct-
ing ‘bystander politics’ which simply ignored the economic interests,
whereas other West European countries did not hesitate to act blatantly
in whatever way necessary to secure their oil supplies from the Arab
countries.
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The Minister also received various suggestions, even from his own
diplomats, that he might try to meet the Arab countries halfway. The
Dutch Ambassador in Bonn, De Beus, for instance, conveyed the Egypt-
ian suggestion that Den Uyl might once again confirm the November 6 ec
declaration in an interview. A separate communiqué would be best, but it
was understood in Cairo that this was not feasible: an interview would
perhaps be a satisfactory solution. The German Chancellor Brandt also
had a similar conversation with a Syrian journalist. This journalist was
prepared to arrange in detail questions and answers so that Den Uyl need
not be drawn any further than was possible. De Beus hoped that the Pre-
mier would permit such an interview since, after all, even if the worst
came to the worst, there was nothing to lose.8
This plea from De Beus was not unsupported; throughout the entire
crisis there had been suggestions from a number of Dutch diplomats that
the government should, in some way or other, do more to accommodate
the Arab countries. Similar suggestions were heard from the Directorate-
General for Political Affairs, including from Director-General Van Lyn-
den himself. But Van der Stoel remained resolutely opposed to such a pub-
lic declaration on the basis that any such declaration would only invite
new demands.9
Moreover, The Hague’s position became no simpler when the Arab
countries decided in Kuwait on December 23 to reward some countries
for their friendlier attitude. It is possible that a certain reconsideration of
the economic effects of the earlier sanctions played a part in this. In any
case, it was decided to consider Belgium as a ‘friendly country’ and thus
to give it a more favourable treatment. It certainly seemed like a reward
for the fact that Belgium had publicly taken the line that Israel had to
withdraw from all the occupied territories. It was decided, furthermore,
to allow oil supplies to Belgium via Rotterdam once again, a decision that
was also significant for The Netherlands. On January 4, Van Schelle re-
ported that the Saudis were indeed pleased with the Belgian guarantee
that oil intended for Antwerp really would be pumped to Antwerp via the
Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline. The quantity and quality of the crude oil
arriving in Rotterdam for this purpose would have to be determined by
attested Belgian shipping inspectors.10 Japan, one of the most oil-depend-
ent countries in the world, was also rewarded. Despite heavy American
pressure, the Japanese government had already publicly stated on No-
vember 22 that Israel must withdraw from all the occupied territories.11
But The Netherlands was not considered to be ‘friendly’, nor even neu-
tral. This was evident toward the end of December when Great Britain,
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among other countries that hitherto had hardly or not at all supported
The Netherlands, appeared ready to undertake diplomatic activity to try
to get the embargo lifted. At the end of 1973, it was evident in The Hague
that the British embassies in the Middle East had been instructed to make
efforts to get the oil restrictions relaxed and, further, to argue the Dutch
case. This effort, however, bore little fruit. The Egyptians perhaps recog-
nised that the time had come for the Arabs to change their attitude toward
The Netherlands, but they were not yet ready to undertake any concrete
step, in that direction. Elsewhere, it was clear that British efforts in
Kuwait had accomplished nothing, while the prevailing judgement in
Syria and Libya gave little cause for optimism.12
It became clear after several weeks, however, that the problem lay
mainly in Saudi Arabia. Yamani may have admitted that the embargo
against The Netherlands and the usa was completely ineffective,13 but
King Feisal was not to be persuaded to lift the embargo. His stubborn-
ness, according to the Dutch Ambassador Derksen, could only be soft-
ened by some new Dutch gesture, which might consist of a reply to the ul-
timatum of October 1973, delivered by Feisal personally in his talk with
Van Roijen and repeated in his letter to Queen Juliana.14 Little in the way
of a favourable result should be counted on from the pressure exerted by
other Western countries. As Derksen on another occasion observed,
American mediation, specifically through the us Ambassador in Jeddah,
had earlier had an adverse effect on the Dutch cause.15
Van der Stoel was not convinced by Derksen’s argument, and declined
to put out any new statement or to send a mission to Jeddah. Wagner, the
chief executive of Shell, shared this viewpoint. He stressed on January 11
that the Dutch position in the Arabian Gulf States had not improved, and
that there was therefore little point in once again sending representatives
to the relevant capitals.16
In mid-January, however, there were briefly rumours in The Hague of a
possible end to the embargo, fed by remarks of the Kuwaiti honorary
consul, Rabbani. On January 14, the latter stated on Dutch television
that the embargo had done its job. At the same time, there was now a
much better understanding in The Netherlands of the Arab side of the
conflict. Rabbani therefore showed himself ready to urge his Arab col-
leagues to lift the embargo. NRC Handelsblad reacted ironically to Rab-
bani’s remarks, and with good reason: within a few days, his suggestions
were repudiated by the Kuwaiti government.17 At the same time it was
put about that Rabbani had fallen into disfavour.18
Despite this, from other quarters it became evident in January that
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there was movement on the embargo front. After a tour of the Gulf capi-
tals, the Dutch Ambassador Schorer reported that Abu Dhabi, Bahrein
and Qatar seemed to feel more inclined to lift the embargo than to contin-
ue with it. The situation in Kuwait was rather opaque, but Schorer
thought that
steadily diminishing communication between our country and the Arab
world, a situation that appears to be deliberately encouraged by some
influential Arab countries, could have extremely undesirable conse-
quences.19
One hears yet again in this report the echoes of criticism of Van der Stoel’s
policy of passivity.
The hope of a speedy end to the embargo received a boost by the sign-
ing in Geneva, on January 18, 1974, of a disengagement agreement be-
tween Egypt and Israel. On January 19 and 20, Kissinger subsequently
held discussions with the Jordanian King Hussein and with the Syrian
President Assad. Although after these talks Kissinger spoke positively of
suggestions made by Assad concerning disengagement, there remained
problems over prisoners of war. Syria was not prepared to publish a list of
the names of Israeli prisoners of war.20
Nevertheless, the situation in the Middle East had markedly improved.
On January 22 Kissinger therefore declared that the Arab countries
should now rescind the embargo measures, which was construed in the
Dutch press as a sign that the embargo would indeed soon be over. But at
the Dutch Foreign Ministry the possibility had been taken into account
from a very early stage that the embargo against the usa might be with-
drawn without lifting the embargo against The Netherlands. On January
12 the Dutch Ambassador in Washington was given the job of urging the
State Department to do everything possible to get the embargo against
the Netherlands ended. Ambassador Van Lynden received an assurance
from Under-Secretary Donaldson that Kissinger had the Dutch interests
‘very much at heart’.21 Over the following days, however, some Arab
diplomats made it abundantly clear that, should the embargo against the
usa be lifted, it would continue against The Netherlands as long as the
Dutch Cabinet made no explicit call for a complete withdrawal of Israel
from all the occupied territories.
Furthermore, despite all the secrecy over exact figures, it had by this
time become clearer that the embargo had been more or less ineffective. In
early January there was renewed anxiety in the Hague when it became ap-
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parent that Parisian governing circles were convinced that the oil situa-
tion in The Netherlands was far less serious than represented by the
Dutch government. In this context, some French officials referred to re-
marks of such Dutch authorities as the Mayor of Rotterdam, W.
Thomassen. Pompidou had made similar comments at a press confer-
ence. At a New Year’s reception on January 3, the French President jok-
ingly remarked: ‘On va connaitre la solidarité, car le gaz hollandais va se
solidariser avec le pétrole’, referring of course to the price of natural
gas.22
In fact, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris, De Ranitz, was not at all sure
how to deal with such talk.23 He was instructed to make it clear that it
was difficult to judge whether The Netherlands was in a better position
than other ec countries or not. The Dutch government had often called
for a more adequate system of information within the ec, and The Hague
could not be reproached with reluctance to provide comparative informa-
tion. In general, the Ambassador should be on the alert for optimistic ex-
pectations of the future; after all, the embargo was still in force. The gov-
ernment regretted the fact that, because of existing differences within the
ec, the French press should so rapaciously seize on reports of the Dutch
oil supply turning out better than anticipated. It was also regretted – al-
though this sounded rather hypocritical – that the Dutch media were not
themselves free of a certain Schadenfreude over the problems of supply
that the French were also wrestling with. Referring to the recent price ris-
es, De Ranitz should stress that oil problems had to be tackled communal-
ly. The ‘autonomous actions’ preferred by Paris had only had adverse, e.g.
price-increasing, consequences. Besides, De Ranitz could point out that
the companies themselves had in fact assumed the responsibility for shar-
ing out the oil. Had this not been the case, The Netherlands would cer-
tainly have found itself in a far worse situation. But at the same time, he
should point out that the Dutch Cabinet also found it difficult to accept
that, in the absence of any agreement between the governments, this role
should have to be entrusted to the multinationals. As Den Uyl proclaimed
at the end of January: ‘It is unacceptable that private enterprise should de-
termine where the oil goes to…’24
Nonetheless, by the beginning of January, the oil situation in The
Netherlands had not been bad for some time; and as far as other measures
taken against the Dutch were concerned, the situation was now beginning
to improve. For instance, it was reported from Kuwait that trade and
business in the Gulf States no longer experienced any difficulties, al-
though it had to be said that goodwill was in short supply.25 Matters were
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not so clear elsewhere. Some Martinair flights, to Tripoli for example,
were resumed in mid-January, but klm had not yet resumed normal serv-
ices. In Libya, Syria and Iraq, the ground staff still refused to provide
ground services for klm, while in Iraq and Egypt several other boycott
measures remained in force. At the beginning of February, the Syrian re-
strictions against Dutch shipping and air flights would be lifted; those in
Iraq and Libya, however, were to continue for some time. All considered,
in the judgement of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the damage suffered by
Dutch trade as a result of The Hague’s stance in the Middle East conflict
remained limited.26
Oil for Arms
The situation surrounding the oil supply in Western Europe was compli-
cated in this period from mid-December to February by the attempts of
several countries, certainly after the failure of the Copenhagen Summit,
to secure their own supply of Arab oil through bilateral agreements.
France and Great Britain especially tried to conclude such bilateral agree-
ments, but Belgium, Italy, Japan and West Germany also had a try. These
moves usually went hand in hand with political statements which went
some way to meeting the Arab standpoint. Furthermore, in the context of
such agreements, the oil purchasers appeared ready to accept remarkably
high prices. In order to limit the consequences of these high prices, Paris
and London tried to strike deals whereby oil would be exchanged for
technology and weapons. To the Dutch way of thinking, bilateral agree-
ments of this kind had to be categorically rejected as merely serving to
drive up the oil prices.
There had already been reports in The Hague, before Copenhagen, of
the bilateral activities of several non-ec states. Madrid, for example, had
successfully sent a mission to the Arab oil countries. Saudi Arabia, Alge-
ria and Iraq specifically were to continue normal deliveries to Spain and in
some cases even increase them. Madrid had for some time wanted to re-
duce its dependence on the major oil companies by dealing directly with
the producers. The Spanish position with regard to the oil crisis was
much like the French, according to the Dutch Ambassador in Madrid.
The Spanish government was against any action by the consumer coun-
tries that might be construed by the Arab world as ‘ganging up’.27
Under pressure from their commercial and industrial community, and
from Japanese public opinion, the Japanese government also decided to
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send a mission, led by Vice Premier Takeo Miki, to various Arab coun-
tries. Japan was 100% dependent on oil imports for its energy, specifical-
ly oil from Iran, which was evident in an Arab-inclined foreign policy.28
The Japanese mission visited several Arab countries and tried to secure
the oil supply in exchange for economic and technical assistance. In Janu-
ary, a Japanese-Iranian agreement would be concluded which guaranteed
oil deliveries in exchange for Japanese support in building a joint refinery
and other petrochemical projects. Several days later there followed an
agreement with Iraq, and at the end of January also with Saudi Arabia.29
On December 21, several days after the failure of the Copenhagen
Summit, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris reported that France was also
engaged in trying to conclude a bilateral deal with Arab countries. The
country mainly concerned was Saudi Arabia. However, it was unclear
whether any credence should be attached to these ‘arms-for-oil’ reports,
which were also starting to be reported in the Dutch press in early Janu-
ary.30 According to a French spokesman, the delivery had been guaran-
teed of 800 million tons of oil over a twenty-year period, in exchange for
technological help and military supplies. 31 American sources were re-
porting that only 200 million tons of oil were involved over a three-year
period. This report subsequently turned out to be the more accurate. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute later confirmed that a
deal was concluded in December 1973 whereby France would receive 200
million barrels of oil in exchange for 38 Mirage jets, rockets, amx-30
tanks, frigates and minesweepers over three years.32 But the discussions
with Saudi Arabia of early February 1974, over a long-term agreement,
ran aground.
At the end of January, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris sent word that
there was now also talk of an arrangement between Paris and Kuwait,
providing for oil deliveries for twenty years in exchange for technological
help (in the construction of a nuclear power station). The agreed oil price,
it was said, was probably high. It was later admitted by the French that
the price was on the high side. In Paris, however, such an agreement was
thought preferable to having no agreement at all, when supplies would to
a large extent be dependent on the international oil companies.33 Initially,
it was denied in Paris that there was any agreement included in this deal to
supply weapons, but of course this was later found to be so. In February
there followed agreements with Iran and Libya, always following the
same pattern of long-term oil supplies in exchange for technology, nu-
clear reactors and arms.34
In The Hague’s view, this approach went hand in hand with radical
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concessions to the Arab point of view. There was therefore little sympathy
to be expected for the Dutch problems from the French side. De Ranitz re-
ported that it was highly unlikely that Jobert, in his travels through the
Middle East, would have had anything favourable to say on behalf of The
Netherlands during talks with Arab members of government.
Such would not be wholly in keeping with the idea, also entertained by
President Pompidou, that France must now capitalise on their acknowl-
edged pro-Arab policy, so unpopular with the French people but pur-
sued by their government for many years.
The question of the embargo against The Netherlands, in the French
view, had to be resolved within the context of a European-Arab rap-
prochement.35
It was not only the French who were trying to follow the bilateral route
to securing their oil supplies. The British were at it, too, although they
were doing so with rather less ambitious aims than the French, who were
advocating a European-Arab political rapprochement. For the British it
was solely a question of oil. On January 4, Gevers, the Dutch Ambas-
sador in London, following a conversation with Under-Secretary Taylor,
reported that Great Britain and Saudi Arabia were going to conclude a
deal involving the supply of thirty million tons of oil per year in exchange
for machines and arms. Taylor emphasized that no agreement had so far
been reached, but that it could well materialise. At that moment, more-
over, a British mission was on its way to Iran. He admitted that this bilat-
eral approach could lead to playing off one industrialised country against
another, but the alternative was buying by auction, with enormous price
rises as a consequence. Furthermore, the oil-producing countries would
shortly assume a far greater share in oil production, as a result of which
the Western countries would be forced to negotiate bilateral agreements.
The British government absolutely did not want to put the majors offside,
but there was now simply no alternative to bilateral oil diplomacy.36
Later supplementary reports of British oil diplomacy followed, which
incidentally paid more attention to the anti-Dutch embargo than had the
French. The mission to Iran had been promising, in spite of Japanese com-
petition, but talks in Saudi Arabia had come to nothing. In the case of
Iran, five to six million tons of oil extra in 1974 had been discussed, in ex-
change for the supply of such basic industrial materials as paper, steel, ce-
ment and textile fibres of a total value of 240 million dollars. The Iranian
deliveries were achieved through extra production, not to be deducted
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from normally available quantities. The British appeared not to pay a
higher price than was asked of the oil companies, which the French cer-
tainly had. This transaction was labelled by the Americans as ‘aggressive
bilateralism’ and condemned as ‘naïve and dangerous’.37 Shell, of course,
also regarded all these bilateral activities with cynicism and distrust. The
British director of Shell Transport and Trading, Frank MacFadzean, iron-
ically observed:
Delegations and emissaries, politicians and friends of politicians, most
of them with little knowledge of the oil business, descended on the Mid-
dle East like a latter day plague of near Biblical proportions.38
The end of January brought Yamani and Abdessalam on another visit to
Western European countries, an occasion of further European-Arab rap-
prochement, this time involving Italy and West Germany. The West Ger-
man government also tried to come to some barter arrangement with
Arab countries, which included the prospect of the sale of Leopard tanks.
This was tied to concessions to the Arab political standpoint. As was later
to be revealed, the West German Foreign Minister Scheel, who on Janu-
ary 1, 1974, succeeded his Danish colleague as the new chairman of the
European Community, sent a letter to Yamani and Abdessalam which
(according to the Dutch Ambassador De Beus) went further than the dec-
laration of the Nine. Bonn may have recognised in this letter the possibili-
ty of border changes, but declared that extending territories through the
use of force was no longer possible in our time. So long as it remained im-
possible to reach any other voluntary agreement, a peace settlement
would have to be based on a total end to the occupation of foreign territo-
ries and thus a complete withdrawal of foreign troops. One had to base
any accord on the borders existing before 1967. No peace accord could be
possible without settling the Palestinian question, which was not to be
understood as purely a problem of refugees.39 It was afterwards conclud-
ed in The Hague that the Bonn government too had been prepared ‘to
prostrate themselves just to please the Arab countries’.40 At the end of
January, a cooperation agreement was signed between West Germany
and Iran worth 2.2 billion dollars.41
The Arab Oil Ministers’ visit also set the Italian government in mo-
tion. The Prime Minister Aldo Moro told the Senate on January 23 that
Israel must pay the price for peace and secure borders: unconditional and
complete withdrawal from the occupied territories. This was how Rome
came halfway to meet the Arab demand for a further, more explicit,
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standpoint than that voiced by the declaration of November 6, a demand
which Moro had up till then refused. According to the Dutch Ambas-
sador in Rome, this U-turn was the result of pressure from Moro’s fellow
party member Fanfani, who in contrast to the ‘European’ Moro belonged
to the ‘Mediterranean’ school. Perhaps the oil-grabbing trips of the
French and the British had also given Moro pause for new thoughts on the
matter.42 In fact, in February agreements were struck with Libya and
with Saudi Arabia. A trip undertaken by Moro to several other Arab
countries shortly afterwards, however, was without further success. But
in June yet another accord was signed with Iran over cooperation in the
field of energy.43
The Netherlands emphatically rejected this bilateral oil diplomacy.
Such activities not only undermined any possibility of communal policy-
making within the ec, as Van der Stoel told the Dutch Council of Minis-
ters, they also thwarted American attempts to reach a peace settlement.
European countries, France above all, were now even providing the Arabs
with weapons.44 This did not obscure the fact that interested Dutch con-
cerns were urging a comparable, more active involvement in the Middle
East. A highly placed official of klm thus suggested that Van der Stoel
should visit several Arab countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, but the latter was as resolutely unreceptive to the idea as usual.
There was furthermore another complication, according to Van der Stoel:
Of course, for my part, were a visit to Arab countries to be considered, I
should then also be obliged out of the need for balance to think of pay-
ing a visit to Israel, which only complicates the whole affair.45
Van der Stoel did, however, consider contacting Arab colleagues in the
lobbies of the un at the coming session of the General Assembly.
The Dutch Foreign Minister thus maintained his reserved stance, cer-
tainly reserved in comparison with most of his ec counterparts. It was
not only some of those whose economic interests were at stake who
queried this attitude; in the Council of Ministers, too, doubts could some-
times be heard voiced over Van der Stoel’s categorical rejection of bilater-
al diplomacy. For example, on February 1, Minister for Economic Affairs
Lubbers warned against a too absolute condemnation of bilateral agree-
ments, for The Netherlands too could find itself forced to take the bilater-
al route in order to secure its oil supply.46
In fact, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs was inclined to follow
the example of the other ec member states. At this stage, in line with Lub-
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bers’s construction of the situation, the Ministry of Economic Affairs
was considering the possibilities of improving bilateral economic con-
tacts with the oil-producing countries. But this conflicted with Foreign
Ministry policy. Nevertheless, it was on record that various ec countries
had already made arrangements to the effect that oil deliveries had been
agreed in exchange for ‘compensatory transactions’, which in the case of
Britain, France and West Germany included supplying weapons. In the
view of Economic Affairs, a prompt stand by The Hague was essential ‘if
we were not to wake up and find we had missed the boat, because already
some Western countries had stolen a lead on us’. One of the possibilities
discussed in this context was the use of development aid, though it was
assumed that such an approach would be blocked by objections from
Minister for Development Cooperation Pronk,47 who was indeed in total
disagreement with Lubbers in the Council of Ministers. The oil problem,
in Pronk’s view, had to be resolved in a multilateral framework so that the
developing countries could also be involved.48
An Invitation from Nixon
In Copenhagen the ec countries could not agree on a common Middle
East policy. Neither had it been found possible to put in train a communal
policy regarding oil and energy provision. Moreover, several ec countries
had by then become entangled in attempts to secure their own oil supply
by bilateral negotiations. There were accordingly powerful centrifugal
tendencies apparent within the ec; and not only within the ec, but
throughout the entire Western world.
Shortly before the European Summit, the American government had
called for talks between consumer countries. In his December 12 address
to the Pilgrims Society in London, Kissinger had warned against achiev-
ing European unity at the cost of the Atlantic alliance. There had to be a
unified effort by the Western countries to find a common solution to the
energy problem. The usa could only with great difficulty realise such a so-
lution through her own power, and an isolated Europe would find it com-
pletely impossible. For this reason he had proposed that the usa, Canada,
Western Europe and Japan should set up a Joint Energy Action Group.49
Against the background outlined above, this initiative appeared to be
aimed as much against unilateral West European moves as against the de-
velopment of an omnipotent opec cartel (with the concomitant danger
of steeply rising oil prices). In a conversation in The Hague between the
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Department for Economic Cooperation (des) and Shell representatives,
it was assumed that Kissinger had indeed two concerns in mind, viz. the
danger of further bilateral agreements with producer countries, and the
risk that the opec success would lead to comparative initiatives for other
basic materials.50 Kissinger himself later wrote that the initiative was
mainly an attempt to thwart the bilateral activities of certain West Euro-
pean countries.51
As he explained in the Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel took a posi-
tive attitude to the initiative, despite all the complications. Immediately
after Kissinger’s speech, he had ordered his civil servants to look into the
American proposal. In consultation with the Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs, a mixed workgroup was assembled to work out a course of action.
The topic of discussion at the first meeting of this workgroup was more
effective international cooperation in the field of energy. There were three
areas where this could happen. In the first place, through the co-ordina-
tion of national measures to cut back on energy use; secondly, by stimu-
lating the exploration of oil and gas and the development of alternative
energy sources; and thirdly, by encouraging producers to expand the sup-
ply of oil and gas in order to tide over the interim period before alternative
energy sources were adequately available. One option was to get the pro-
ducers to invest their profits in alternative energy sources, which could
also secure their own future once the age of oil was past.
In any case, the workgroup concluded, what had to be prevented was
that the American plan should simply sink in the boggy swamps of the
ec.52 In fact, the Kissinger plan rapidly led to open dissension within the
ec. At the beginning of January, it is safe to say, the Dutch and British
standpoints over Kissinger’s proposed ‘energy group’ did not significant-
ly differ, but it was entirely otherwise with the French. Paris strongly pre-
ferred talks between consumer and producer countries in which the poor-
er developing countries would be directly involved. Kissinger’s proposal,
on the contrary, came down to discussions between consumer countries,
with the producer countries excluded. But the French point of view was
not entirely clear: the exact wording of Kissinger’s initiative, according
to De Ranitz, could be important.53
On January 9, 1974, Den Uyl received an invitation from Nixon which
included a copy of Kissinger’s text with its exact wording. The aim of the
conference, Nixon explained, was to construct a common position re-
garding the energy question. The Netherlands was therefore invited ‘as a
first step’ to a gathering of Foreign Ministers from the ‘major industrial
consumer nations’ that would be held on February 11 in Washington. The
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Ministers’ job would be to put together a task force ‘drawn from the con-
suming countries which would formulate a consumer action program-
me’. The objective was the solution of those problems that had arisen as a
result of the explosive growth of the world-wide energy demand, includ-
ing the search for alternative sources; in addition a ‘concerted consumer
position’ had to be developed
for a new era of petroleum consumer-producer relations which would
meet the legitimate interests of oil producing countries while assuring
the consumer countries adequate supplies at fair and reasonable prices.
The interests of the developing countries must at the same time also be
kept in mind. After ninety days, a further meeting of ‘consumer and pro-
ducer representatives’ should be held. Nixon mentioned that a simultane-
ous letter had been sent to the opec capitals, announcing and elucidating
the American proposal. In the first instance, among the ec countries only
Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Norway and The Nether-
lands had received an invitation, as well as Canada and Japan. Bonn,
charged with the chairmanship of the ec, was asked how the other coun-
tries should be represented.54
In The Hague, a session of the Foreign Ministry-Economic Affairs
workgroup was held on January 9 to discuss Kissinger’s call for multilat-
eral talks, a meeting which concluded that Nixon’s invitation should re-
ceive a positive response as promptly as possible. The workgroup had
meanwhile come to the conclusion that the objectives of international
talks in Washington had to be as pragmatic and as concrete as possible.
The workgroup argued
that the consumer countries represented there should not attempt to re-
alise a complete, fully worked-out standpoint regarding the energy cri-
sis, since this would take much too long.
Consultations with the producer countries should be begun promptly, be-
cause this could possibly ‘put a brake on the trend of consumer and pro-
ducer countries negotiating separate deals, as well as autonomous actions
by producers.’ In addition, developing countries should also be drawn
into these talks between consumer and producer countries as soon as pos-
sible.55
On this point, there were considerable differences of opinion within
the ec. Some ec countries, France specifically, were first of all striving for
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negotiations between the ec and the producers. The Netherlands wanted
such talks to follow from the Washington Conference, so that the usa
would also be present. As far as the ec’s role was concerned, it had to be a
case of translating global arrangements into communal ec policy. But, as
was clearly realised by the Dutch Foreign Ministry, this principle was en-
tirely counter to French policy.56
Despite all differences of opinion, an attempt was made to reach a
common ec position at the Washington Conference. In preparation for
this conference, the European Commission made a number of proposals,
but the Dutch Foreign Ministry doubted whether such ec discussion was
necessary or sensible. There was growing resentment within the Ministry
over the role of some ec partners. After all, the ec partners had seen no
need for joint consultations in their bilateral dealings over oil.57 Van der
Stoel shared this scepticism. To put this surliness of the Dutch attitude
into context, it has to be remembered that at that time not all ec countries
had been invited. Only the major consumer countries had been ap-
proached by Nixon. Only at a later stage would all the ec member states
be involved.
On January 10 the Ministerial Council for European Affairs discussed
the question of possible ec preliminary consultation. Van der Stoel
warned of American frustration if the ec countries responded to Nixon’s
invitation by stalling until they could first reach a common standpoint.
The Netherlands should straightforwardly accept the invitation. Howev-
er, Under-Secretary for European Affairs Brinkhorst thought that The
Netherlands would place itself in an incredible position if it by-passed
communal ec deliberations, a point of view endorsed by Den Uyl. The
Council for European Affairs voted accordingly.58 On January 10, vari-
ous diplomatic outposts were informed that the Cabinet welcomed
Nixon’s initiative. The Hague shared the President’s view that the Wash-
ington Conference should be followed promptly by talks between con-
sumer and producer countries, talks in which the developing countries
should also be involved.59
This was the standpoint more or less agreed on. However, during the
Dutch Council of Ministers of January 11, it emerged that Minister
Pronk had principle objections to the Washington Conference, which he
considered a manoeuvre to exclude not only the oil-producing but more
especially the developing countries. He preferred direct talks between
consumers and producers, in which the developing countries must be in-
volved, as advocated by the French. Despite Pronk’s objections, however,
the Cabinet agreed to accept Nixon’s invitation.60 Given the wording of
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Van der Stoel’s earlier circular, there was in fact no option.
A meeting of ec Foreign Ministers was held in Brussels on January 15
at which the Nine were to work out a common standpoint for the Wash-
ington Conference. At first, it looked as though agreement would be un-
likely: Belgium and Denmark both had reservations over the American
initiative because, like Ireland and Luxembourg, they had not been invit-
ed. As regards this criticism, all ec Member states plus the oecd Secre-
tary-General were subsequently invited. During the discussion, Jobert
initially resisted a joint acceptance of the American invitation, which
hardly came as a surprise, since the French government had already indi-
cated that it found the meeting in Washington neither expedient nor de-
sirable. It was clear that in several respects the basic assumptions of the
conference were in conflict with the French Middle East and oil policy.
In Brussels, Van der Stoel’s stance was one of strong support for the
American initiative. Rather opportunistically, he observed that the invi-
tation could have a very positive effect in stimulating the search for a
common ec energy policy. Of course, it was not so simple; but after
laboured discussions agreement was eventually reached. All ec member
states should be able to participate in the Washington Conference, and in
addition the chairmen of the ec and the European Commission, Scheel
and Ortoli, should also participate, on behalf of the ec as a whole. The
intention was that the Committee of Permanent Representatives should
work out a common standpoint on the basis of proposals from the Com-
mission. That was to prove difficult. Jobert remained fiercely opposed to
the Washington Conference and said as much in a letter to Kissinger. The
French attitude to the plan was subsequently described by Kissinger as a
‘lack of enthusiasm bordering on hostility’.61
French Obstruction
As a result of French opposition, but also because of the sometimes less
than thorough preparation on the part of the Americans, it remained for
a long time unclear what exactly was going to happen in Washington.
On January 18, a conversation took place in The Hague between Foreign
Ministry officials and representatives from Shell, who reported that
there were by now some seven working groups set up to look into the
various aspects of the oil crisis. Their reports were to be ready by Janu-
ary 23 and would provide the groundwork for a round trip by Under-
Secretary Donaldson, who would inform the participant countries as to
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the agenda.62 Even the Dutch embassy in Washington sent word back to
The Hague of the intended Donaldson trip; but in the event, it never took
place.
On February 1, Van der Stoel received an aide-mémoire from the us
Ambassador in The Netherlands with the proposals for the Washington
Conference, which were in fact already known in The Hague in outline.
On February 8 a preliminary meeting of high officials would be held un-
der Donaldson’s leadership. With reference to the American proposal to
discuss the economic and monetary aspects in separate workgroups, Van
der Stoel said that Finance Minister Duisenberg would willingly come.
Ambassador Gould emphasized that his government would find it regret-
table if at this stage, through informal contacts with Arab countries, ba-
sic principles began to be established that anticipated the outcome of
Washington. His government, he said, attached great importance to
avoiding ruinous competition. These were known views, thoroughly en-
dorsed by Van der Stoel. He pledged to prevent damaging ec initiatives,
but warned that other ec member states had other ideas on this.63
It also emerged from the American aide-mémoire that no immediate
discussions between consumers and producers, so devoutly desired by
The Hague, were on the agenda. Van der Stoel spoke his mind on this in
Dutch ministerial council, complaining more generally of the inadequate
preparations. He had been unable to get any clarity on the agenda of the
energy conference. On the one hand, it was about analysing the energy
situation, on the other, a question of what could be done between coun-
tries with energy problems in order to master those problems. There was
also uncertainty over the role of the ec. Paris had not yet responded, and
it was very much in question whether the ec could come forward with a
common standpoint.64
Indeed, it turned out to be very difficult to formulate a common stand-
point. This was already evident during the discussions of the Committee
of Permanent Representatives. The Dutch pr had received instructions to
strike a positive attitude and especially to emphasise the need for reason-
able and stable price developments, and for this reason the necessity of re-
fraining from bilateral actions that drove up prices. The French pr, how-
ever, took a contrary stance, insisting that the main issue for discussion
were the objectives of the Washington Conference. He declared that in his
view the problems were of a world-wide nature and therefore should be
discussed in a world-wide context. In the meantime, France had therefore
taken the initiative of raising the problem for discussion within the un.65
The French pr also stressed that the Community had its own responsi-
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bility with regard to relations with producer countries. This appeal for an
independent European energy policy was going too far for London,
which up to that point had supported Paris. The British pr, Michael Pal-
liser, emphasized that the great problem of energy could not be resolved
without cooperation with the usa. London was therefore no advocate of
a European ‘go-it-alone’ policy.66 It was clear that Great Britain and
France had reached fundamentally opposite positions on this issue.
Subsequently, the Dutch Ambassador in Paris, De Ranitz, reported
that the French Director-General for Political Affairs, Puaux, believed
that Western Europe needed to make itself independent for its own energy
requirements, which in the first place would have to take place through
closer European-Arab cooperation. The French obstruction of the Wash-
ington Conference was partly aimed at making clear to the Arab coun-
tries that Europe distanced itself from American policy in the Middle
East. Puaux considered the whole meeting part of a new American plan to
re-exert its dominance over Western Europe again, after the failure of its
‘Year of Europe’. As far as talks with the producer countries were con-
cerned, Puaux confirmed that France had in the meantime contacted the
un Secretary-General, Waldheim, with the proposal to raise the oil prob-
lem for discussion under un auspices.67
These developments within the ec were met with cynicism in the
Dutch press. Trouw commented that rough play was increasingly getting
the upper hand.
The European Community has already been playing in injury time for
the past month or more: an unmistakable sign of European rough play
… – It all raises the strong suspicion that the term ‘European Communi-
ty’ is gradually becoming little more than a flag on a farm barge sinking
in a pool of nationalism and self-interest.68
On February 5, nonetheless, a communal mandate was drafted for the ec
delegation, in which ample concession was made to the French objec-
tions. Thus, no permanent consultative arrangement should be set up be-
tween consumer countries, as the Americans wanted. A confrontation be-
tween consumer and producer countries must at all cost be avoided. The
tone of this French-oriented mandate clearly indicated a preference for re-
solving oil problems through direct contact with the producer countries,
for which purpose a permanent dialogue needed to be established.69
Van der Stoel remarked afterwards that the result actually suited him
better than he might have expected, given the negative French attitude.
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Although the effort to reach bilateral agreements was not clearly repudi-
ated, there had been agreement that countries should not take separate
measures that could seriously damage international trade. And although
the conference must not become a permanent consultative body, the pos-
sibility of working groups remained open.70
All in all, the Cabinet was generally positive over the American initia-
tive. There were, of course, second thoughts over the Nixon govern-
ment’s attitude, as on a number of other grounds (finances, trade, etc.).
Such thoughts were voiced by the Dutch oecd Secretary-General Van
Lennep, who confessed himself pessimistic over the conference and had
doubts about the way that Nixon was fulfilling his executive role. He
thought the invitations had been sent out without any prior consultation;
the climate had only been worsened by Kissinger’s criticisms of the
French, although in his judgement the American presentation required a
solid consumer front; and furthermore, the us approach had so far by-
passed what Van Lennep saw as essential: the immediate beginning of dis-
cussions with the oil-producing countries over the long-term substitution
price for oil. Finally, he had the impression that there was a bilateral
American action afoot, with the help of private banking, to stimulate in-
vestment in the usa. This could be disastrous, since it only made the recy-
cling of oil capital to countries most in need of it more difficult.71
Deliberations in European Political Cooperation
The American attempt to take the lead once more in the field of energy
provision had its impact on the Dutch government’s attitude toward the
oil crisis. This was evident, for example, in their handling of their own
proposal for providing aid to the Middle East. This plan, of which there is
scarcely a trace to be found in the Dutch Foreign Ministry archives, was
undoubtedly intended, at least in part, to win Arab appreciation. It had
been briefly raised during the Summit, but it had been decided in short or-
der to refer it to the Comité Politique (of European Political Coopera-
tion). After Copenhagen, doubts began to gain currency at the Foreign
Ministry as to whether it was so sensible after all to press ahead with the
proposal. Van der Stoel stated that, in any case, the American initiatives
had to be taken into account when presenting the proposal. It should not
be seized on simply to frustrate European cooperation. At the Foreign
Ministry it was decided on January 4 to defer publication of the plan until
February. The Dutch embassies in ec member states were informed that
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the Director-General for Political Affairs, Van Lynden, would suggest in
the Comité Politique that the proposal be postponed.72
But it was not such a simple matter to drop the plan. Furthermore, it
emerged that there were considerable differences of opinion within the
Comité Politique, specifically between The Netherlands and France, over
the details of the plan. The French dgpa proposed limiting cooperation
to the Arab countries and excluding Israel. In addition, consultations
should have a predominantly political character. The Comité Politique
drafted a compromise that would go some way to satisfying both Dutch
and French conceptions. Even so, there were serious qualms at the Dutch
Foreign Ministry, because the plan now threatened to pre-empt the out-
come of the Washington Conference. It was decided to ask the European
Commission to develop the aid plan further, which would gain a bit of
time. Furthermore, ‘non-Arab countries’ also had to be involved in the co-
operation between the Nine and the Middle East.
The Hague made no more fuss about the plan, though of course it re-
mained an attractive proposition to win favour in the Arab world. On
January 21 Van der Stoel gave the Dutch diplomatic posts in the Arab
countries permission to make known the outlines of the plan where occa-
sion arose. Ambassador Bentinck immediately warned that this could
backfire, as the plan referred to the whole region and could therefore be
considered as an attempt to provide support for Israel via a roundabout
route. It was a warning the Dutch Foreign Ministry took to heart.73
The question of the aid plan became increasingly dominated by the
French effort to bring about a dialogue that would be both economically
and politically oriented, an effort regarded by The Hague with great dis-
trust. But this notwithstanding, the French managed to achieve an impor-
tant success in January in the context of European Political Cooperation.
During a session of the epc Middle East working group, it emerged that
West Germany was prepared to support the French proposal for joining a
European-Arab dialogue. Paris wanted to begin at the level of experts and
later to let this turn into a conference of Foreign Ministers.74 Bonn proba-
bly hoped by adopting a more accommodating attitude to get Paris to
participate in Washington. The Netherlands, however, like Denmark,
had serious objections to the French proposal. According to The Hague,
such a dialogue could damage already existing forms of cooperation, as
well as the peace talks in Geneva. The Netherlands argued for this affair
to be dealt with in the ministerial discussions of February 14 and 15,
which in effect meant postponing it until after Washington. And further-
more, it meant taking the matter out of the official framework of epc.
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But most ec members followed a proposal from the European Com-
mission, which argued for a joint venture of the ec and epc, in which the
ec would take care of the economic content and epc would look after the
political share. The Netherlands was the sole member state with objec-
tions to such a construction, while most others were very much in favour
of getting on with it and saw no problem in simultaneous preparations for
both the Washington Conference and the European-Arab dialogue. On
February 7, the Dutch dgpa Van Lynden reconciled himself to the major-
ity view, but not before a certain qualifying spin had been introduced into
the decision, which implied that it had avoided ‘the Nine already commit-
ting themselves too firmly at the present stage to modalities and timeta-
bles’. To the displeasure of The Netherlands, the suggestion that the
American government be informed of the planned dialogue was blocked
by Paris.
Once again, The Netherlands found itself playing a tricky Atlantic
role. As we saw earlier, the American Ambassador Gould had made it
clear to Van der Stoel that his government was concerned over the devel-
opment of European-Arab relations. At the time, Van der Stoel had said
that he would resist any attempts to thwart the conference in Washing-
ton. This would prove to be no idle promise, although The Hague was in
no position to block the European-Arab dialogue, which would have
done the Dutch reputation no good at all – it had been discovered earlier
that the contents of epc discussions were promptly leaked to the press.
But at least The Hague contributed to the postponing of the decision.
Much to the Dutch satisfaction, the epc meeting of February 14 was ad-
journed until March 4.75
The Washington Conference
There was a great deal at stake, but the outcome of the meeting would be
disappointing. The conference took place under poor auspices. In gener-
al, American-European relations at the time were not exactly charac-
terised by high mutual esteem; while Jobert had on various occasions
made it quite clear that he had little confidence in any useful outcome.76
The reaction in most Middle Eastern countries was, predictably, to repu-
diate the conference. The gathering was seen, especially by the more radi-
cal countries like Algeria and Libya, as an American attempt to organise a
block of rich consumer countries against the oil-producing countries and
the Third World.77 Algeria had in the meantime proposed dealing with
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energy problems in a special session of the un General Assembly.
A heavyweight Dutch delegation made the trip to Washington, con-
sisting of Van der Stoel, Duisenberg and Lubbers, as well as several high
officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Fi-
nance. It was uncertain till the last moment whether Lubbers would go,
largely because of his involvement in a road accident in The Nether-
lands.78
The conference was opened by the hosts. In his opening address,
Kissinger proposed setting up a ‘semi-permanent’ co-ordinating group to
see to preparations for a second consumers’ conference. At a subsequent
stage, a world energy conference that also involved the producer coun-
tries would have to be convened.79 Van der Stoel was the first non-Ameri-
can invited to speak, undoubtedly an intentional gesture of appreciation
for his stance.80 In his address, during which he only incidentally referred
to the embargo, he pointed out the scale of the consequences the oil crisis
had had. Solutions had to be found that were acceptable to all countries.
Although an increase in oil prices was justified, an escalation of prices
could destroy the entire structure of the international economy. And that
was not the aim. The developed countries must resist the temptation to
think too much of themselves. The Netherlands was therefore an emphat-
ic opponent of bilateral oil diplomacy. Some way of finding a common so-
lution must be found ‘to increase the flow of assistance’ to the non-oil-
producing, developing countries. Van der Stoel’s address signalled sup-
port for the American plans, but not in their entirety. In fact, he specifi-
cally welcomed the Algerian plan for a special session of the General As-
sembly, and he omitted any supportive reference to Kissinger’s proposal
for a follow-up consumers’ conference.81
After this, the conference progressed with difficulty, first and foremost
caused by the surly, uncooperative attitude of the French. The signs were
initially not so grim; the French government had at the last moment de-
cided to let Jobert set out, although Pompidou had forbidden his Minister
of Finance, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, to accompany him. Jobert, whom
Pompidou referred to as ‘mon Kissinger à moi’, tried to prevent any form
of practical decision-making and refused to have anything to do with a
follow-up conference.82
The European split on the issue of energy now came into the spotlight.
The British standpoint had in the meantime moved in the American direc-
tion. West Germany, then holding the ec chairmanship, was also pre-
pared to go a long way to meet the Americans. Increasingly, France was
finding itself isolated.83 Jobert accused his European colleagues of adopt-
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ing a far too docile attitude toward the Americans and at one point even
saluted them with ‘Bonjour les traitres’. No punches were pulled within
the closed doors of the internal ec consultations, the clashes between
Jobert and Helmut Schmidt being particularly bruising.84 The West Ger-
man Minister of Finance, who because of Scheel’s role as ec Chairman
was leading the West German delegation, took an outspokenly Atlantic
position, emphasizing that relations with Washington were more impor-
tant for Bonn than those with the European Community.85
Jobert refused at the end to sign the final communiqué, but nonetheless
voted for the setting up of a high-level group to implement the various
agreements reached. These included further study of the global energy sit-
uation, cooperation in monetary and economic areas, and ‘the develop-
ment of a cooperative multilateral relationship’ between producer and
consumer countries. This high-level group, soon to be known as the Ener-
gy Co-ordinating Group (or ecg) had furthermore the task of making
arrangements for a new conference, involving both consumer and pro-
ducer countries.86 Van der Stoel considered the result an American suc-
cess; but the Americans had had to make concessions, as the communiqué
showed. There would thus be no follow-up conference to be held solely
between consumer countries, as Kissinger had wanted; and the Algerian
initiative for a special session of the un was welcomed, partly due to the
insistence of the Dutch. This was something else Kissinger would rather
not have seen.87 Where the Americans did chalk up a result, however, was
in sharpening the oppositions within the ec. Nixon and Kissinger had
aimed ‘to shock Western Europe back into line behind Washington’, al-
though in this they had only partly succeeded.88 Certainly, France’s posi-
tion had been weakened.
In the Dutch Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel later described the
conference as mainly of ‘procedural’ character, noting that Jobert had
played an obstructive role. The French, of course, had wanted to keep
open the possibility of bilateral agreements. Paris had also tried to ensure
an exclusive role for Europe in the Middle East, while the usa, as the
Dutch Foreign Minister put it, wanted ‘global consultation’. In any case,
The Netherlands had avoided giving any impression of heading for a con-
frontation with the Arab countries. Van der Stoel had for this reason also
been positive over the Algerian proposal to raise the whole oil problem for
discussion at a special session of the un.
This latter remark about the Algerian proposal aroused differences of
opinion in the Council of Ministers. Pronk, with support from Den Uyl,
stressed the importance of the special session of the General Assembly.
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Lubbers disagreed. In his view, the oil-consuming countries would do bet-
ter to organise themselves. He was therefore not so keen on a special un
session where, he felt, because of the nature of the context, the oil prob-
lem would be pushed into the background.89
After the conference, ‘Washington’ was extensively analysed in a
Dutch Foreign Ministry note sent both to the Council of Ministers and to
several diplomatic posts abroad. According to this evaluation, the Ameri-
can initiative was intended to strengthen the position of the consumer
countries; yet at the same time the conference had had a strongly political
character. Four distinct political aspects were identified, There was firstly
‘the European-American relationship’, the subject of an intense struggle
within the ec, specifically between France and the other member states.
Paris saw the summit as an American attempt to gain more influence over
the energy policies of the ec countries and over their relations with the
Arab oil producers. Jobert fiercely resisted these attempts, which if suc-
cessful would be at the cost of European independence.
In this controversy, faced with a choice between a European unity which
in this field scarcely exists and accepting the cooperation offered by the
usa, France’s partners in the event opted for the side of the United
States. The West Germans above all, through Scheel and Schmidt, made
these political aspects a central issue.
This was not to say that the remaining eight member states agreed with
all the American proposals in Washington. At the Dutch insistence, the
initiative for a special session of the General Assembly was welcomed in
the final communiqué, although ‘Kissinger was only reluctantly prepared
to accept this’. But taken as a whole, on this issue the outcome of the con-
ference was most satisfactory for the Americans.
The second aspect concerned ‘relations within the ec’. The ec coun-
tries had gone to Washington with a mandate that was both unclear and
incomplete. As a result, it had been once again evident that, as long as
there was no advance toward internal integration, the Nine were in no
position to conduct any clear foreign policy in the wider world. The con-
ference had only served to intensify the crisis atmosphere in Brussels. The
third question was ‘the relations with the Arab oil producers’. No-one de-
sired a further confrontation with them, and for this reason a further
ministerial conference involving exclusively consumer countries, such as
the Americans had wanted, was undesirable. To what extent the Arabs
would consider the proposed follow-up conference of producers and con-
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sumers a confrontation was unclear. In any case, it was highly uncertain
that they would be prepared to participate in such a follow-up.
Finally, there was ‘the position of the developing countries’. The Wash-
ington participants had all pledged to exert themselves seriously to main-
tain and to expand development aid. The question, however, was how the
developing countries could be involved in an effective capacity in the fol-
low-up talks. It was in this context that the progress of the proposed Gen-
eral Assembly was so important.
The conclusion was that The Netherlands positively valued the tasks
assigned to the Energy Co-ordinating Group, which could be expected to
provide an effective framework for consultation between like-minded
consumer countries. It was regrettable that the ec as such was unable to
contribute to this consultation process so long as Paris remained aloof.
The Netherlands had to continue its efforts within the Energy Co-ordinat-
ing Group to bring about talks between the producers and consumers of
oil, talks in which the developing countries must also be involved. These
consultations would eventually have to lead to a skeleton agreement that
could promote a stable supply of oil to the consumer countries and, at the
same time, guarantee reasonable, stable and predictable prices.90
Conclusion
In the two months from mid-December to mid-February there were vari-
ous shifts in the political force field generated by the oil crisis. In addition,
there were new, fundamental questions that demanded attention: for ex-
ample, in what international framework should matters of oil and energy
needs be discussed. France tried to ensure that the oil needs of Western
Europe should be dealt with under the framework of the ec and epc, as
essentially part of an energy policy that would be independent of the usa,
and which would in part be based on a European-Arab rapprochement.
When this failed, Paris, just like other ec member states, switched to a bi-
lateral approach to the Arab producers. Among the ec member states,
France was also the most radical champion of talks within the un. Wash-
ington, however, had little enthusiasm for the un option: on the contrary,
the consumer countries must first develop their own plan of action before
they sat round the table with the producer, and later the developing coun-
tries.
The Cabinet, although it had adhered to an Atlantic line during the cri-
sis, now stood divided on this question. It was not so surprising that
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Pronk should follow the argument of the more radical oil-producing
countries, such as Algeria and Libya, for holding global talks; but the
Cabinet as a whole adopted a halfway stance with regard to this question.
Kissinger’s initiative for consumer talks was supported, but on the condi-
tion that such talks be followed promptly by discussions with the oil-pro-
ducing countries and with the Third World countries, if possible under
the auspices of the United Nations.
In the months following the Copenhagen Summit, the question of rela-
tions between Europe and America burned with some ferocity. The
Netherlands, faithful to tradition, put Atlantic unity first. As became
clear, this choice was not based on the usual need for unity in the face of a
threat from the Soviet Union. As home country of one of the Seven Sisters
and having an interest in maintaining the existing relations in the interna-
tional oil sector, and as the object of attempts to break down those rela-
tions, The Netherlands was driven toward the American side mainly on
political-economic grounds.
At the same time, it has to be said that the American leadership was not
without its opportunism and self-interest, as was equally evident in other
policy areas. But then again, the forces of opposition were considerable.
Paris declined to acquiesce to American leadership, while various oil-pro-
ducing countries expressed their dissatisfaction over the Washington
Conference convened by Kissinger.
The attitude of the Western countries toward the oil crisis was also an
example of a disintegration within the Atlantic world that could also be
seen in other areas in the early 1970s. At the same time it was clear that
the alternative of an independent European oil and Middle Eastern policy
was not capable of getting off the ground because of mutual divisions and
distrust. The leading role of America was therefore accepted by the Euro-
pean countries faute de mieux, in the face of open resistance from the
French, and by The Netherlands with more enthusiasm than by most.91
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8Sweating it out
As we have emphasized several times, the oil crisis can be approached
from different perspectives. In other words, the crisis had various aspects
or, if you will, different levels. One important aspect was the relation be-
tween the West and the developing countries of the Third World, which
had been affected by the crisis in various ways. On the one hand, rising oil
prices threatened some developing countries – particularly the more in-
dustrialised among them – with ruinous debts; while, on the other hand,
the performance of the opec countries on the international stage fostered
a new self-awareness in the non-Western world. This was expressed in the
appeal by the Group of 77 non-aligned countries for a New International
Economic Order (nieo).
This call for reconstruction of the international economy was in part a
reflection of the power that various anti-Western movements at the turn
of the 1970s had developed, particularly in South-East Asia and South
Africa. Salvador Allende’s accession to power in Chile also seemed like
writing on the wall. Calls for a nieo were frequently heard in the un, an
attractive forum for the supporters of this cause because there the West-
ern countries had no majority. It was entirely understandable that the
non-Western aligned developing countries, particularly the more radical
oil states like Algeria, should want to raise the issue of the oil crisis within
the un. What they were trying to do was to tie the oil problem into a
broader range of political-economic issues.
Against this anti-Western offensive, the Western countries were divid-
ed in their attitude. One might even say that this division further encour-
aged the growing assertiveness of the Group of 77 as well as opec. Divi-
sion also characterised the response in the Dutch Cabinet to the North-
South aspect of the oil crisis. As we shall see, some PvdA members of this
Cabinet, Pronk in particular, had considerable sympathy for the struggle
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to achieve international redistribution of wealth – and understanding,
therefore, for opec’s action in raising oil prices. This approval implied
support for the idea of placing the oil crisis on the agenda at the un,
whether or not in some broader context. Others, Lubbers above all, took
a more business-like approach and argued for the development of West-
ern cooperation, as agreed at the Washington Conference. The problem,
however, as we shall see, was that the attitude of the usa did not altogeth-
er evince a loyalty of purpose appropriate to its hegemonic position.
The Dutch position, partly because of the dubious American role,
would become no easier during this last phase of the embargo. After long
discussions, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia decided on March 18 to lift the embargo against the usa. It
was a provisional decision: the question would be reviewed on June 1. The
embargo against The Netherlands, as well as Denmark, Portugal, South
Africa and Rhodesia, was not lifted.1 Although the oil supply into Rotter-
dam was slowly returning to its normal level, this turn of events neverthe-
less proved a blow, for however ineffective it may have proved to be, the
embargo was still capable of damaging the interests of the port. The mat-
ter therefore remained of getting the Arabs to lift their punitive action.
This turned out to be no easy task, because the circumstances under
which the Dutch policy was necessarily formulated were constantly
changing. During this last phase from February to July, the embargo and
the coalition behind it seemed to change. Those Arab countries that had
in the first place advocated the embargo against The Netherlands were
now opposed to it, and vice versa. Algeria, the first oil producer to an-
nounce an embargo, now began to argue for its removal.2 Saudi Arabia,
initially one of the more moderate states, now turned out to be the driving
force keeping it in place. It is a particularly interesting possibility that the
Saudis took this stance in collaboration with the usa.
A Second Letter to King Feisal
From the middle of January 1974, rumours began circulating that the em-
bargo against The Netherlands, unlike that against the usa, would not be
lifted. On January 12, the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Van Lyn-
den, was instructed to request the State Department to try to get the em-
bargo against The Netherlands ended. Van Lynden, as we saw, was at the
time assured that Kissinger had the Dutch interests ‘very much at heart’.
But it turned out during the course of January that for the time being most
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of the Arab countries had no intention of lifting the embargo against The
Netherlands. On January 26, the Dutch embassies in the Arab countries
were impressed by the Foreign Ministry that it was by no means certain
that the embargo would be lifted at the same time as the embargo against
the usa. They were assigned to keep their eyes and ears open, but not to
approach the Arab authorities officially: the policy was to remain low
profile.
Yet the time did seem ripe for some kind of diplomatic initiative. Van
der Stoel decided on January 28 to propose in Cabinet that the letter from
King Feisal, written at the time in reply to Queen Juliana’s missive, should
be answered.3 The letter would of course have to give a degree of satisfac-
tion, but without doing violence to The Hague’s position on the Middle
East. The missive would need to be sent before February 14, the date
planned for the following oapec meeting in Tripoli. Asked whether
Feisal would appreciate such a reply, the Saudi Ambassador Nowilaty an-
swered positively, albeit in his own unofficial capacity. Ambassador Van
Lynden in Washington was therefore instructed to see whether the State
Department, in parallel with the letter to Feisal, would be prepared to ex-
ercise its influence on Feisal ‘in a subtle way’ to get the lifting of the em-
bargo against the usa linked to a removal of that against The Nether-
lands.4
But the Dutch Ambassador in Jeddah, who had argued earlier for just
such an initiative, warned that his American colleague, James Akins, had
so far shown a rather unsubtle manner. It might perhaps be more sensible
first to try on one’s own behalf; and if this proved unsuccessful, one could
always turn to the Americans later. Van Lynden subsequently reported
from Washington that Under-Secretary Sisco had reached similar conclu-
sions. He repeated that in various conversations with Arab countries, and
especially Saudi Arabia, it was always stressed that any lifting of the em-
bargo should not include the usa alone but also its allies.5 Nothing could
be done, however, about the fact that the us attitude, particularly in Jed-
dah, was apparently not always favourable to The Netherlands. These re-
ports were a first indication of the remarkable intrigues that would be wit-
nessed in the coming months.
In the letter plus enclosure to King Feisal, sent around February 10, the
Cabinet took refuge behind the earlier adopted ec standpoint of Novem-
ber 6. Strictly speaking, there was no question of a separate statement
such as the Arab countries desired; yet the ec declaration was quoted and
paraphrased in such a way that the Cabinet in fact was balanced precari-
ously on the edge of what was still acceptable to the Second Chamber.
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The Cabinet based its position on resolution 242 and on the ec declara-
tion of November 6 which reiterated, crucially, the need ‘for Israel to end
the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of
1967’. Furthermore, this document emphasized the right of any state to
live within secure and recognised borders. The Cabinet also held that the
legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be given ‘form and substance’
within the framework of a peace settlement.
This implies that the Palestinians, by some means or other, should be
given a say in the matter of determining their own future.
The Hague, according to the enclosed document, sought further to make
a constructive contribution to the Euro-Arab dialogue.6
This was going quite a way in the direction of further clarification,
which Van der Stoel had always refused to give. At the end of January,
moreover, he was considering a visit to several Arab countries, even
though in earlier ministerial council he had spoken rather dismissively of
the ‘travel bug’ contracted by some of his ec colleagues. In this context, at
the beginning of February he inquired of the accredited ambassadors in
the Middle East how they rated the low-profile policy he had been con-
ducting with regard to the Middle East.
There was evidently positive appreciation and support for this policy,
although there had been suggestions in more recent months that more ini-
tiatives might be helpful. Ambassador Derksen thought the way this low-
profile policy had served the national interest ‘could hardly be overesti-
mated’. It had prevented worse things happening and furthermore had
made it possible for some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to maintain
their economic ties with The Netherlands whilst turning a blind eye. His
considered view was that the time was not yet ripe to change this low-pro-
file approach. The relatively healthy Dutch position with regard to oil
stocks meant there need be no hurry to honour the Arab countries with a
visit.7 Derksen was not the only one who reacted coolly to Van der Stoel’s
plan to arrange a Middle East visit. Ambassador Schorer in Kuwait also
seemed to have had doubts: a tour by Van der Stoel was perhaps not such
a good idea, but something had to be done to improve Dutch-Arab rela-
tions. A parliamentary delegation, for example, could break the ice.8
Van der Stoel decided to postpone his trip to the Arab countries. At the
beginning of February, the Foreign Ministry considered putting together
a fact-finding mission, with representatives drawn from the business
community; but it quickly became apparent that the latter preferred to de-
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fend their interests through their own channels. Furthermore, it was re-
alised that economic relations between The Netherlands and the Arab re-
gion were actually suffering very few obstacles. What was least needed,
in fact, was publicity.9
King Feisal replied on February 28. He thanked Queen Juliana for her
letter, which he had not personally received, and promised to look out for
opportunities for cooperation and for strengthening the ties between the
two countries. At the same time, however, various recriminations were
listed. ‘What hurt me,’ he wrote:
is to have seen friendly Holland, alone among all European countries,
openly expressing sympathy with Israel, challenging in so doing the feel-
ings of all Arabs, who have a plain and an evident right to their home
and country.
Feisal reiterated that the Dutch Cabinet must openly revise its position
with regard to the Middle East conflict.10 All in all, Feisal’s reply was on
the brusque side; there was no mention of lifting the Saudi embargo.
The Lifting of the Embargo against the USA
It became clear at the beginning of March that the Saudi standpoint, and
that of other Arab countries too, had if anything hardened. In the Council
of Ministers of March 15, Van der Stoel admitted that he had no explana-
tion for this.11 By now, several Arab countries had adopted the position
that the embargo against the usa should be lifted. It was particularly
President Sadat who was aware that this embargo would only frustrate
progress on the diplomatic front. At first, the Syrian President, Assad, re-
sisted the idea of lifting the embargo, but under Saudi pressure the Arab
opec countries agreed in Vienna on March 18 that the embargo against
the usa should be lifted. Syria and Libya did not initially acquiesce in this
decision; in fact, Libya only lifted its embargo against the usa on Decem-
ber 31, 1974.12
As feared in The Hague, the embargo against The Netherlands (and
Denmark) was maintained. Italy and West Germany, on the other hand,
were promoted to the status of ‘friendly’ states, which served to highlight
further the isolated status of The Netherlands within the European Com-
munity.13 In a response to the Vienna aopec meeting, the Dutch govern-
ment issued a public statement in which it expressed ‘disappointment’
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with what it considered unjust discrimination. The Dutch standpoint on
the Middle East conflict did not, after all, differ from that of the Nine.
The Cabinet assumed ‘that the issue of Arab discrimination against The
Netherlands would therefore be raised in the near future within the ap-
propriate European bodies’. How and when was not yet clear.14
The Dutch Cabinet does not seem to have been in any way intimidated
by the Arab oapec countries. Van der Stoel immediately let it be known
that there should be no expectation of change in Dutch policy, but this did
not obscure the fact that there was a real problem.15 Following the oapec
decision, Lubbers expressed his concern over the position of the port of
Rotterdam.16 He had already said in the Council of Ministers on March 8
that although the oil supply had recovered, the maintenance of the embar-
go was nonetheless damaging to Rotterdam’s position in the internation-
al oil trade.17
A first task at the Foreign Ministry was to find out what reasons under-
lay the oapec decision. Ambassador D.R. Bot reported from Vienna that
the reason for maintaining the embargo against Denmark and The
Netherlands was that these two countries had up to that point declined to
issue a more pro-Arab statement. Italy and West Germany had been re-
warded for the statements by Moro in the Italian Senate and the letter
from Scheel to Sadat in which the West German had declared his endorse-
ment of the Arab interpretation of resolution 242.18 It was suggested in
certain Arab capitals that The Hague should follow these examples.
But the information from the Arab countries also seemed to indicate
that matters were becoming more complicated. It was not so much the
more radical countries that were now advocating a continuation of the
embargo but more especially those that had hitherto been more moder-
ate. Ambassador Van Hoeve reported Syrian sources as saying that Saudi
Arabia was most strongly in favour of maintaining the embargo. The
Ambassador in Algiers reported that Minister Abdessalam had told
Jobert that it was not so much his country as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
that were most fiercely opposed to lifting the embargo against The
Netherlands.19
At this time, relations within the ec began to change. Paris began to
give The Netherlands more explicit support. Jobert gave the instruction
to issue démarches in all the Arab capitals to get the continuation of the
action against The Netherlands raised on the agenda. Van der Stoel re-
garded this in a positive light, though he could not avoid the suspicion
that French self-interest also played some part. After all, the continuation
of this discriminatory action made the start of a European-Arab dia-
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logue, which would be so convenient to the French, scarcely thinkable.
During a visit to Algeria, Jobert had insistently raised the issue of the em-
bargo against The Netherlands and had even gone so far as to call it ‘ab-
surd’. Abdessalam’s reply was that the usa had done far more to accom-
modate the Arab position. The Hague had offered no further comment
on the November 6 declaration, as Van Elslande, Moro and Scheel had all
done. When Jobert then answered that this hardly seemed a sufficient ex-
planation, Abdessalam had said: ‘You will find no objection from the Al-
gerian side’ and advised him to raise the issue in Jeddah and Kuwait.20 All
of which confirmed earlier reports from the Dutch embassy in Algiers.
On March 25, news came from De Ranitz in Paris that most Arab
countries, according to Quai d’Orsay, seemed to have no objection to
lifting the embargo. Even Damascus had by now come round to a more
charitable position.21 Only the Saudi Foreign Minister, Omar Saqqaf,
had expressed hostility toward The Netherlands in Vienna, although he
had promised to take up the question with King Feisal. This negative atti-
tude, according to Dutch Ambassador Derksen, was in any case the result
of the tactless behaviour of the American Ambassador, J. Akins.22
Meanwhile in Kuwait, ‘Kiele Kiele Kuwait’ (Tickle Tickle Kuwait),
the carnival hit from the Dutch makers of the tv satirical programme
Farce Majeure, aroused enormous displeasure, with Rabbani being re-
called to Kuwait. When it was revealed in the press there that the Dutch
honorary consul had had connections with Farce Majeure, this caused a
new storm of protest. In Kuwait the affair was taken up at a high level, as
was confirmed in 1997 by the European commissioner F. Andriessen.
When the French Ambassador had suggested lifting the embargo, the re-
ply of Rashid-al-Rashid, the Secretary-General of the Kuwaiti Foreign
Ministry, was to put this gramophone record on the record player.23
Plans for a United Nations Conference
Prior to the conference in Washington, there had been an interesting de-
bate in The Hague. As we have seen, Jobert had strong objections to the
basic premises of the Washington Conference. This was hardly surpris-
ing, since the American initiative was aimed directly against the essence
of French policy vis-à-vis the oil crisis. As an alternative to talks between
consumers, the French government proposed raising the whole issue of
the oil problem at the un, the most suitable framework being the Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ecosoc). Such an approach would from the
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beginning involve both producer countries and developing countries, a
proposal that appealed to various members of the Den Uyl Cabinet.24
Although the aim of this plan was to accommodate the oil producers,
representatives of the Arab and other oil-producing countries reacted
rather critically to the proposal. The developing countries under the um-
brella of the Group of 77 similarly were not impressed. From New York,
the Dutch Permanent Representative, Fack, reported that the Egyptian
mission thought the energy issue could not be raised at the un in isola-
tion, but should rather be investigated in the context of price trends
among other raw materials and industrial products over the past 25
years. Besides, any treatment of the energy question would also have to
include the role of the major oil companies. And furthermore, attention
must also be given to the connection with world food prices and the high
prices that developing countries had to pay for the transfer of industrial
technology. Even Algeria expressed opposition to the French proposal.
What was referred to in Western circles as the ‘energy question’ was, in
the Algerian view, merely a part of the global issue of resources and devel-
opment.25
Nor could the French proposal count on clear-cut approval within the
ec. Most member states reacted with reserve whilst expressing regret that
the plan had been launched without prior ec consultations. Italy did,
however, adopt a cautiously positive attitude. The most powerful criti-
cism came from the British side. The British Permanent Representative
warned of the danger that the agenda of any energy conference might be-
come so voluminous as to be unmanageable if developing countries all
wanted to include their various resources.26
On January 22 Van der Stoel set out his stand against the French pro-
posal. Whilst he did think that in the short term talks between consumers
and producers were to be recommended – and he would bring this up at
the forthcoming Washington Conference – he thought the un conference
advocated by the French demanded too much preparation time and,
moreover, would lead inevitably to the vaguest kind of outcome simply
because of the large numbers of participants. He had no principle objec-
tion to a global conference, but he would certainly prefer tripartite talks
as envisaged in the follow-up to Washington.27 It seemed a better idea, he
thought, to leave the initiative in this to a leading developing country.28
Despite this reception, the French proposal did touch on an important
– and in The Hague’s view, a rather dubious – aspect of the Washington
Conference, viz., the lack of consultation with producer and developing
countries. The Dutch Cabinet had from the outset adopted the standpoint
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that such talks had to be started as soon as possible. The French proposal
for talks within a un framework went even further, however, than calling
for the involvement of developing countries: in the un, specifically in the
General Assembly, the Western countries had no built-in majority. Quite
the contrary in fact: nowhere was the influence of the Third World coun-
tries in principle so great as it was in the General Assembly.
There were different attitudes to the French proposal within the Dutch
Cabinet, as in the earlier reception of Nixon’s invitation. In a public ad-
dress on January 22, Pronk came out in support of the French call for
global talks; an address which caught the attention of the French Ambas-
sador in The Hague, J. Senard. On January 24 Senard met Pronk for dis-
cussion, a meeting at which the latter, following the Foreign Affairs line,
showed himself rather cool on some aspects of the French proposals. But
Pronk recognised that what should be aimed at was a situation in which
all concerned should be part of the consultative process. The Dutch Min-
ister finally pointed out that the American proposal also talked about a
global energy conference. In his view, such global discussion required a
wider framework in which scarce resources other than oil should also be
included for discussion. Nor should it be restricted to seeking agreements
on raw materials but it rather should deal with prices, supply and de-
mand.29 In effect, he was allying himself with the standpoint of the more
radical oapec countries like Algeria.
Senard succeeded insofar as Pronk was prepared to contend for the
French proposal in the Council of Ministers of February 1. Pronk ac-
knowledged that in several respects Jobert’s way of conducting policy had
to be repudiated: in particular, the French attempts to secure bilateral
agreements. Whilst he could well see that for tactical reasons it was not
possible to support Paris openly, he nonetheless thought that, from the
point of view of the interests of developing countries, the French plan it-
self was one that he would subscribe to. Van der Stoel disagreed with
Pronk; he considered Jobert’s plan to be essentially an attempt to scupper
the planned conference in Washington. Den Uyl, however, endorsed
Pronk’s judgement. However ambivalent the French proposal might be,
he believed the oil problem had to be tackled in a global perspective. The
Council in the end came to the compromise that the developing countries
had to be involved in international discussions over the oil crisis as soon
as possible.30
Aside from these deliberations, Permanent Representative Fack re-
ported from New York that the French mission also realised that prepara-
tions for such a conference would cost time and effort. According to the
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French there were two major problems. The first problem was the Ameri-
can attitude. Kissinger rejected the French proposal as premature. The
planned consumer talks should first be held in Washington and then one
should look further ahead. Secondly, the attitude of the producer coun-
tries was also less than encouraging. Jobert therefore had throttled back,
though there were still considerable doubts in Paris over the usefulness of
the rapidly approaching Washington Conference.
At the beginning of February, Algeria took up the French initiative by
calling for a special session of the un General Assembly dedicated to the
problem of resources and development. The Dutch Cabinet had far fewer
difficulties with this plan than with the French proposal. On February 7
Van der Stoel let it be known that he had no objection to this proposal,
since the General Assembly session called for by Algeria would have a far
broader character and would not interfere with the upcoming Washing-
ton Conference. At this stage, partly because of The Hague’s positive as-
sessment of the Algerian proposal, there began a certain Algerian-Dutch
rapprochement that contributed to the shift in the Arab camp alluded to
in the previous section. Some of the initially radical countries, particular-
ly Algeria, gradually began to adopt the standpoint that it was now time
that the embargo against The Netherlands be lifted.
This did not mean that The Netherlands and Algeria found themselves
agreeing about everything, as was evident during a conversation between
Dutch Director-General for Political Affairs Van Lynden and the Alger-
ian Ambassador Chaalal. On that occasion, Chaalal gave his assessment
of Kissinger’s initiative as:
an attempt to regain influence partly lost in the oil-producing countries
and thus to re-establish [American] hegemony in the field of global ener-
gy provision both in relation to producers and Western Europe.
Therefore, Algeria advocated dealing with the whole issue in the un. Van
Lynden skirted round differences of opinion, pointing out to the Ambas-
sador that The Hague’s standpoint of working for a wider consultative
framework after the conference fitted in with Algeria’s wishes.31 The
same day Chaalal spoke with Pronk, who expressed his understanding
for the Algerian criticism of the Washington Conference but at the same
time asked that Kissinger’s recent statements, to the effect that the aim of
the conference was not to form a front of industrialised countries, should
also be given attention. Pronk repeated that The Hague’s standpoint on
this matter in every way accommodated the Algerian objections.32 On
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February 13, The Netherlands and the other ec countries voted for the
convening of a special session of the General Assembly.
The Sequel to Washington
As we saw in the previous chapter, it was decided at the Washington Con-
ference to set up a high-level group – the Energy Co-ordinating Group
(ecg), whose job it was to develop the implications of decisions taken.
The ecg was also assigned to work on an Oil Sharing Plan to share the
discomfort as widely as possible in the event of any new crisis.33 Twelve
countries had pledged to take part in the ecg: only France had declined
any cooperation. As early as February 20, The Hague was invited for the
first meeting of the group. The Americans were in a hurry.
At first sight, the Dutch Foreign Ministry thought Kissinger was mov-
ing too far ahead too fast, for a follow-up conference was to take place
immediately after the special session of the General Assembly, now fixed
for April. In Van der Stoel’s view, there would for this reason be no inter-
est in this follow-up conference, at least in the short term, among the de-
veloping countries. After the Cabinet session in which the invitation had
been discussed, the acting Premier Van Agt remarked at a press confer-
ence that The Hague hated the thought of an excess of institutionalisa-
tion, and that the Dutch representative in the ecg should adopt a ‘cau-
tious approach’.
The high-level group met for the first time at the end of February, The
Netherlands being represented by the Head of the Department for Eco-
nomic Cooperation from the Foreign Ministry. During this meeting,
which was mainly procedural, it became clear that the Americans had in
the meantime abandoned their haste: the workgroups to be formed had
until the end of May to produce their reports. At a second meeting eight
workgroups were established, each to concern itself with a different as-
pect of the programme for international cooperation decided in Washing-
ton. To the satisfaction of The Hague, the workgroup concerned with the
allocation of oil in time of crisis was assigned a Dutch chairman. The
Dutch, after all, had for some time expressed great interest, especially
within the oecd, in the creation of just such a crisis-allocation system in
which the usa should also be a participant.34
Otherwise, however, the American policy toward the crisis did not
give rise to unalloyed satisfaction. Washington seemed to adopt a highly
aloof attitude to the preparation for a special session of the General As-
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sembly, generating the impression that this session was somehow in con-
flict with the aims of the programme agreed in Washington. Such a con-
flict between Western interests and those of the Third World, as we have
seen, had always been a cause for concern in the Dutch Cabinet. On
March 16 Van der Stoel communicated his unease to the American State
Department. He argued for a positive approach toward the aspirations of
the Group of 77. He also wondered whether it would not be possible, as in
Washington, to arrange for ‘convergence’ between the follow-up to the
Washington Conference and the special session. The Netherlands further
argued for such convergence at the third meeting of the ecg. Most other
countries, however, wanted the special session and subsequent talks be-
tween producers and consumers to be kept separate. There was generally
little feeling of support for any substantial energy discussion during the
special session.
The Euro-Arab Dialogue
Jobert, meanwhile, was continuing with his attempts to get a Euro-Arab
dialogue off the ground. Following the Washington Conference, the
Dutch were anxious to give this dialogue a less anti-American character;
for which purpose Van der Stoel, who was greatly disturbed by the con-
flicts within the Atlantic world, travelled to both London and Bonn for
talks. On the advice of his Director-General for Political Affairs, Van
Lynden, and against all his own objections, he decided to go along with
the announcement of the epc plans for a dialogue, on the condition that
only a first, exploratory, stage should be initiated. There could be no
question of second and third stages, involving the setting up of a mixed
commission and a European-Arab ministerial conference, as long as the
embargo against The Netherlands remained in force.35
During an epc meeting in Brussels on March 4, the Nine formally ac-
cepted a French initiative to pursue such a dialogue. Only the British were
unwilling to bind themselves because of the change of government in
London where the Labour Party under Harold Wilson had just been
elected to power. Van der Stoel later said that he had only agreed to the
first exploratory stage of this dialogue because
the Nine as such were incapable of moving on to the second stage, let
alone the third, so long as the Arabs governments of their own choice
continued to wield the weapon of discrimination against the group of
Nine.
232
Furthermore, the dialogue must not be allowed to undermine the ecg
consultations or the American peace efforts in the Middle East.36
It is unclear whether the eventual decision issuing from the epc delib-
erations was to go for the first stage of the Euro-Arab dialogue or the dia-
logue in general, albeit in that case with the Dutch conditions attached. In
the Dutch Council of Ministers, Van der Stoel informed his colleagues
that he had gone along with the dialogue proposal in the epc to avoid be-
ing isolated, but that two conditions had been stipulated. The first was
that the existing peace negotiations must not be hindered; the second,
that following the second stage there must be renewed talks over further
progress.37 In the First Chamber he mentioned yet another condition:
that the energy conference must not be thwarted.38
On further reflection, it had been a remarkable meeting in Brussels. At
that same moment Kissinger was visiting nato headquarters, but there
was no contact with the ec ministers even though they were only a fifteen
minute journey apart. Kissinger was not informed of the decisions made
in the context of European Political Cooperation. On his return to the
usa, Nixon sent a tough letter to Chancellor Willy Brandt in which the
Euro-Arab dialogue was rejected in some fairly sharp language.39
No consultation had taken place. It is not impossible, however, that
during the epc discussions Scheel did suggest having had a meeting with
Kissinger. He even gave the impression that the previous day the Ameri-
cans had agreed to the dialogue idea, which in turn had been a reason for
the Dutch readiness to compromise. Van der Stoel was therefore unpleas-
antly surprised when it became apparent that the State Department was
reacting negatively to the Nine’s decision to arrange a dialogue. Both in
Cabinet and in the Second Chamber, considerable resentment was ex-
pressed at this course of events. Brandt later attempted to soothe matters
by assuring Washington that the Nine had taken into account the Ameri-
can objections to the dialogue being set in motion too soon.40
This could not have been easy, because the French pursuit of a Euro-
Arab dialogue was disparaged in Washington in extraordinarily negative,
dismissive terms. ‘The idea of a Foreign Ministers’ meeting between all
Arab states and European states can only fill one with horror,’ said
Kissinger at a staff meeting at the State Department. ‘Anyone seriously
pursuing it ought to have his head examined.’ One of the most important
American objections was that a Euro-Arab dialogue under French leader-
ship would strengthen Algeria’s position at the expense of the Egyptian
Sadat, who was highly regarded in Washington.41
On March 12 the Comité Politique met to discuss this Euro-Arab dia-
233
logue further, agreeing, at least after British consent, that the Arab coun-
tries should be informed immediately of the main lines of the decision tak-
en. At once, the old differences on the dialogue’s basic aims and principles
reasserted themselves, this time the question of how far the dialogue
should be concerned with the Middle East peace settlement and related
political questions. The French stressed that if economic cooperation
were going to be discussed with Arab countries, it was simply unrealistic
to exclude political questions from consideration. The Dutch delegation
warned again of the danger of undermining other initiatives. According
to The Hague, the aims of the dialogue had to be economic, not political.
There was also disagreement over the Israeli position in the dialogue. It
was agreed that there had to be contact with Israel; but the French wanted
this to be held in strict secrecy in order not to prejudice the dialogue with
the Arab countries. The Netherlands and Denmark expressed their dis-
sent: the Nine had to maintain a certain balance in their readiness to co-
operate with countries in the Middle East. And, moreover, since coopera-
tion with Israel was already on the agenda, this could not now be ig-
nored.42
However, as we have seen, all this had to be shelved until it was clear
what the new British Labour government’s attitude to the epc plans
would be. This exchange of power in London was highly significant for
the Dutch Cabinet. Labour, like the PvdA in the Netherlands, had neither
an anti-American nor anti-Israeli reputation. Wilson’s government might
therefore mean significant support for the Dutch; and Van der Stoel lost
no time in travelling to London, in early March, to hold discussions with
his new colleague, James Callaghan. Callaghan, it turned out, backed the
dialogue. He had reservations, though, being particularly anxious not to
accentuate differences with France. In general, the new party in power in
London clearly gave priority to cooperation with the usa, more so than
the previous Conservative government under Heath. Van der Stoel, of
course, had been playing precisely this tune for some time, and so could
speak freely of the desirability of more frequent consultations with the
usa.43
It had also not been lost on Kissinger that the new Labour government
advocated a far more pro-Atlantic policy than Heath’s government. Dur-
ing talks with the representatives of the American majors, the American
Secretary of State declared that ‘international affairs have reached a point
where a Labour government is more pro-American than a Conservative
one’.44 Kissinger could draw a similar conclusion with regard to the
Dutch government of Den Uyl and Van der Stoel.
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When it became clear on March 18 that the embargo was not to be lift-
ed, The Hague’s resistance to the Euro-Arab dialogue increased. Immedi-
ately following the oapec decision, Van der Stoel reminded the epc
chairman Scheel of the qualification he had entered; the second stage of
direct official contacts with the Arab countries could not begin as long as
the embargo remained in place. This reminder was also brought to the at-
tention of all ec governments. For Paris, this block on further progress
that seemed to have arisen was all the more reason to call for the Arab
world to lift the embargo against The Netherlands.
All the problems surrounding the Euro-Arab dialogue once more illus-
trated how sharp the differences were between the ec member states. In
The Hague, Van der Stoel submitted a note on these problems on March
21 which was discussed on March 27 in the Council for European Affairs
and on March 29 in the Council of Ministers. Van der Stoel’s note con-
tained the classic argument for Atlantic unity with the corresponding
view of European integration: distrusting European Political Coopera-
tion and advocating strengthening of the Commission. The note suggest-
ed that cooperation within the ec was threatened with paralysis, at least
partly as a consequence of the unwillingness to strengthen the authority
of the European Commission. The energy crisis and the admission of
three new members had further undermined the willingness to act, and
the more prominent role assumed by epc had put the European-Ameri-
can relationship under some pressure. The note therefore gave the highest
priority to combating the acute crisis of confidence that had arisen within
the relationship between the Nine and the usa. It was most important to
improve these relations. If Paris was unwilling to cooperate, then one
must turn to Bonn and London.45
At the end of March, there was a positive response from the Arab
world to the proposal from the Nine to institute a dialogue. On April 20
and 21 the nine epc Ministers gathered informally at Gymnich Castle in
Bonn to discuss this response. Once again, there were differences of opin-
ion. The first of these centred on the Dutch pre-condition. Jobert refused
to commit himself in writing to the principle that the discriminatory Arab
actions against certain ec countries must first be repealed before the sec-
ond phase of dialogue could begin. Van der Stoel accepted this, under the
proviso that the Nine did consider themselves bound to the spirit of this
qualification. This was a proviso his eight colleagues were prepared to ac-
cept.
A second problem concerned relations with Washington. Jobert, per-
haps afraid of ‘renewed treachery’ by Scheel, turned against the proposal
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that the epc chairman should be entrusted with full and prompt ex-
changes of information with the usa during the dialogue. Despite French
opposition, Scheel pushed through the so-called ‘Gymnich formula’
which ‘gave the usa the right to be consulted in the epc decision-making
process’. 46 During this epc gathering, Jobert, according to Van der Stoel,
had adopted an ‘extremely anti-American standpoint’.47 Van der Stoel
kept quiet on this question to avoid exposing himself unnecessarily, and
agreement was thus eventually achieved.48
These differences of opinion again demonstrated that the Nine could
only reach any kind of agreement on the dialogue with some difficulty.
The pursuit of a European-Arab rapprochement therefore arrived at a
complete impasse when its driving force, Georges Pompidou, died on
April 2. With the death of Pompidou, after Heath the second greatest
champion of an independent European role on the world stage had disap-
peared. In May, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was elected President, initiat-
ing a period during which French foreign policy would be much more At-
lantic-oriented.49 Shortly after this, the curtain also fell on Willy Brandt’s
time as Chancellor. Brandt’s position had been steadily weakened during
the oil crisis. Finance Minister Helmuth Schmidt had drawn power to
himself, a fact that had become increasingly obvious during ec
meetings.50 It was therefore not by chance that following Brandt’s resig-
nation in the wake of a spy scandal, he should be succeeded by the more
pro-Atlantic Schmidt. In the spring of 1974, politicians thus came to
power in three major ec countries who were far more Atlantic-oriented
than their respective predecessors.
The Supply Recovers
As we saw earlier, the oil supply to The Netherlands had by now begun to
recover. It had already become clear during the period of rationing that
the worst was over. In mid-January the Dutch Cabinet still believed that
the supply would be 70% of the previous year, whereas the actual supply
turned out at the end of the month to be over 80%. 51 Since processing and
consumption were lower than the previous year, the stocks at the end of
January were 20% higher. The situation was roughly similar in February
and March: supply stabilised at around 80 to 85% and processing and
consumption recovered to around 85%. Whether the reduced supply was
still a consequence of the embargo was a question the Cabinet doubted.
The Minister for Housing, J. Gruijters, asked for clarification in the
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Council of Ministers of March 8. According to Lubbers, the reduction
was indeed the result of the embargo.52 In March, however, stocks
reached a level that was in comparison with the previous year as much as
30% higher. Throughout the whole embargo, the end stocks of crude oil
remained higher than the previous year.53 The situation was even more
reassuring in April, with supplies more or less reaching the level of the
previous year. Processing recovered to almost 95% of the level for 1973.
Meanwhile, Shell communicated that there were no more immediate
problems as far as provisioning was concerned.54
After the period of rationing, the need to restrict the consumption of
oil products was thought, logically, to become gradually less. In a letter to
the Second Chamber, Westerterp announced on February 1 that maxi-
mum and minimum speed limits on the roads would be introduced from
February 6. Moreover, the action 3 x 5 = 15 was started by the Ministry of
Transport and Water Management together with the Dutch motorists as-
sociation and the Association of Automobile Dealers and Garage Own-
ers. There would be a 5% saving from the introduction of the maximum
speed limit, 5% from a more economical style of driving, and 5% from
more selective use of motor vehicles.55 The public readiness to observe
these prescriptions, however, was not what it had been at the beginning of
the crisis. This was hardly surprising, given the steadily improving re-
ports of the oil supply. Measures restricting consumption, such as cutting
back on the use of electricity for street lighting and advertising, were in
fact also lifted several weeks later.
‘Sweating it out’
Yet the embargo, at least formally, was still in place. At the Foreign Min-
istry toward the end of March, the balance was again calculated. This
was partly as a result of reports such as that Scheel had sent a grovelling
letter to Yamani and Abdellasam. Parts of Scheel’s letter had by then ap-
peared in the Algerian press. These reports increased the pressure from
his civil servants for Van der Stoel also to go further to meet the Arabs.
But what exactly had Scheel written? Every attempt was made to get
hold of the full text of the letter. On March 28, De Beus reported that the
missive contained a record of the German explanation of their position
during the meeting with Yamani and Abdessalam. Subsequently, the
Arab side had requested a written statement of the German standpoint,
while in Bonn no objection had been raised. De Beus had pointed out to
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his interlocutor from the West German Foreign Ministry that the word-
ing was rather pointed, in particular the reference to returning to the pre-
1967 borders and the demand for complete withdrawal of foreign troops.
De Beus had also requested a copy of the letter, a request which had
caused a certain German embarrassment.56
The result of this letter in The Hague was to increase the pressure on
Van der Stoel. On March 28 he had a meeting with the Algerian Ambas-
sador. In the preparations for this meeting, Director-General Van Lynden
hinted that Scheel’s letter should provoke thought. He suggested that Van
der Stoel too ‘could write something similar’. ‘I know that the idea does
not appeal to you,’ acknowledged Van Lynden, ‘but as a result of their in-
terpretative statements or their letters, your Belgian, Italian and German
colleagues have put the Dutch Government in a dilemma.’
Van der Stoel again put the suggestion to one side. ‘I fear’, he replied,
‘that in our case this would lead to further demands for clarification (for
example, ‘also Jerusalem’).’ In fact, this very question of a clarifying
statement was raised during the meeting with the Algerian Ambassador,
who took the opportunity to suggest that Algeria could publish an inter-
pretation of the Dutch standpoint that would not subsequently be denied
by The Hague. Van der Stoel, however, did not take up the offer. He
replied that his standpoint over the Israeli withdrawal was no different
from that of the other ec partners.57
Partly as a result of this, the Head of the Department for Africa and the
Middle East (dam) drafted a note in which The Hague’s position was
analysed further. Three options were identified. The first was the sugges-
tion of the Algerian Ambassador, that Algiers should publish an interpre-
tative statement of the Dutch position. This should state that the ec for-
mulation of November 6, ‘mettre fin à l’occupation territoriale’, meant in
The Hague’s view, ‘evacuation de tous les territoires occupés’ (i.e. ending
the territorial occupation meant complete withdrawal from all occupied
territory). The second option was for the Dutch government to issue its
own clarification of the ec November 6 statement; and the third option
was ‘sweating it out’.
The Algerian suggestion undoubtedly had its advantages, concluded
the Head of dam. The Hague need not make a further statement itself
and would yet satisfy those in the Arab world who no longer wished to
maintain the embargo weapon. Should this option be taken up, it must be
established in advance that both formally and in practice the embargo
would be lifted by all Arab countries and that there would be no propa-
gandist use made of it (e.g. ‘Netherlands caves in’). There should further
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be plenty of opportunity provided for resumption of trade with the Arab
world, and the Arabs must cease working up cultural indignation over
such trivial issues as the Farce Majeure song, ‘Kiele, Kiele, Kuwait’.
On the possibility of issuing a Dutch statement, the dam note suggest-
ed that the best approach would be to follow the West German example,
to publish a summary of discussions held. The talks Van der Stoel would
hold outside the meeting of the General Assembly would provide a good
opportunity. The memorandum came with an attached draft of such a
statement, setting out that a peace settlement must be found that could be
agreed on by all parties, which incorporated coherently all the elements of
resolution 242, as repeated in the Nine’s declaration of November 6,
1973.
In accord with this resolution, the borders existing before 1967 should
be taken as a basic principle.
This implied
ending the foreign territorial occupation of national territory and thus a
complete withdrawal of foreign troops. Border corrections, reached
through peaceful talks and willingly effected by the parties concerned,
should not of course be excluded.
Something should be said in a possible final paragraph over ‘the impor-
tance of American attempts to bring the respective parties together’. 
The third option, finally, meant maintaining The Netherlands ‘princi-
pled position’, i.e. waiting until the embargo was lifted through the play of
‘exogenous factors’. An end to the embargo might finally result from vari-
ous factors: pressure from the Nine; as a lever to get a stalled dialogue
kick-started again; or through the growth of awareness within oapec that
continuation of the embargo promised less advantage than disadvantage
to the Arabs; or possibly American pressure – ‘which we still hope for’. It
was apparently assumed at the Dutch Foreign Ministry that the usa was
not at that moment about to exert any pressure on the Dutch behalf. 
It was clear from a note added by Van Lynden that he was a strong ad-
vocate of the Dutch issuing their own statement.
Now that the Belgian, Italian, and German statements have given their
own interpretations to the November text, the Dutch government, in
my view, should not avoid giving its own interpretation.
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The appended text was in his view considerably less drastic a revision
than the Italian text and slightly less than the Belgian and German state-
ments. According to Van Lynden, putting out an interpretative state-
ment, either now or at the latest in New York, would have the best chance
together with the French attempts of succeeding in getting the embargo
lifted.
Yet once again Van der Stoel flatly rejected the advice of his Director-
General for Political Affairs. This was made very clear in a note that he
added to the dam memorandum: ‘Choose option III; text appended to
option II too radical for me and moreover would lead to further demands
for interpretation’, and that was an end to the matter. 58
In Cabinet, too, Van der Stoel adopted the same unbending stance. He
urged his colleagues not to be too gloomy. The Arab countries were begin-
ning to see that continuing the embargo would only impede Euro-Arab
dialogue. Den Uyl shared this point of view and criticized Scheel’s action.
The fact that news had only been received of his letter weeks later was a
matter that should be taken up at a high level. A protest was in order. Lub-
bers, as on earlier occasions, was less optimistic, pointing out all the neg-
ative consequences of the position to which The Netherlands had been
brought. Transport Minister Westerterp added his own comment, too: it
must remain the aim of Dutch policy to get the embargo lifted as soon as
possible; and in this connection, he pointed out the problems under which
klm was still labouring.
Van der Stoel recognised that the embargo was a serious headache, but
repeated that if one were to go down the same path as Scheel, new Arab
demands would surely follow. He proposed getting the ec partners once
more to exert pressure in the Arab capitals to get the embargo lifted. A
similar request should also be made to the American government, and be-
yond that, bilateral goodwill initiatives might be considered. It was even-
tually decided that Van der Stoel should protest against the steps taken by
the Italian and West German governments. Secondly, the ec partners
would be asked to demonstrate solidarity and not to accept discrimina-
tion against a fellow member state.59
On March 29 Van der Stoel took a far more lenient view of the West
German letter. He concluded that Scheel had refused an ‘additional state-
ment’ and had only given a written account of the conversation with Ya-
mani and Abdessalam. The earlier conclusion, that The Hague had re-
fused to provide an additional clarification to the ec declaration of No-
vember 6 whereas Bonn had complied, was accordingly incorrect.60
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The Special General Assembly
The special session of the United Nations General Assembly so desired by
the developing countries was held in April. Initially, the American gov-
ernment was against such a session, which was considered a hindrance to
the consultative process resulting from the Washington Conference. But
partly due to pressure from the ec countries, the Americans eventually
came round to participating in the special session that opened on April 9
and lasted for three weeks.
The view of this session taken in The Hague was not entirely positive.
As we saw, Lubbers in particular had expressed his doubts in the Council
of Ministers. His view was shared at the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
particularly within the Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Rela-
tions. In a note from the Director-General, the special session was situat-
ed in the context of an increasing loss of Western influence in the world.
Up till then, international economic cooperation had been based on gatt
and the imf. The basic principles grounding this international order had
been undermined, according to the note. There were two reasons for this.
On the one hand, there had been increasing economic nationalism and a
concomitant lack of adequate international co-ordination; and on the
other hand, there was the increasing influence of power formations in
economic life. In addition, the power that the Bretton Woods system had
always carried was being eroded. The United States was still trying to
take up the leader’s role, but this was being thwarted by Paris as well as
several developing countries. The position of opec was largely so strong
because of Western divisions, and opec was always ready and able, if not
always liberally, to act as the standard bearer of the interests of the devel-
oping world.
All these developments were accelerated by the oil crisis. ‘If my view is
correct, we are now living through the last days of Bretton Woods and of
gatt’, wrote the Director-General. The Western countries were in a
weak position vis-à-vis the developing countries because of the depend-
ence of their economies and their mutual divisions. Some countries were
trying to secure their own interests by means of bilateral agreements,
leading to even greater confusion. It was significant that a new Charter
was already being discussed within the un, one that would no longer be
based on the principle of free trade. The concluding advice of the note
from the Director-General for Foreign Economic Relations ran:
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We have to try to provide a realistic counterbalance to the rather
grandiose philosophies of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that would
seem to betoken a flight from reality.61
It is certainly true that the special session was regarded at the Dutch For-
eign Ministry in a much more positive light. Such views were in the first
place inspired by the progressive climate of ideas within Pronk’s Direc-
torate-General for International Cooperation; but neither the Direc-
torate-General for Political Affairs nor Van der Stoel was against the idea
of the special session, albeit for more opportunistic reasons. For them, the
session seemed a good opportunity for improving relations with the Arab
countries.
The special session kicked off in New York on April 9.62 The following
day, the general deliberations were opened with an address by the Alger-
ian President Boumédienne, who declared that the non-aligned countries
were now a new driving force in international relations. The non-aligned
countries sought to establish fair participation for the Third World in
global politics, which had to be based on a fair share of the world’s
wealth. This necessarily required a fundamental reorganisation of eco-
nomic relations between rich and poor countries that would lead to a re-
distribution of the possibilities for growth and development.
Over the course of the following days, the Western countries, including
specifically the ec member states, acknowledged that a fairer share in the
world economy should be striven for. Such terms as ‘collective economic
security’, ‘economic peace-keeping’ and even a ‘global early warning sys-
tem’ (against undesirable fluctuations in the market for raw materials).
Even the usa declared, out of Kissinger’s own mouth, a willingness to
contribute to the economic development of the Third World, including
the transfer of technologies.
On April 17 the oil-producing countries reviewed the history of the oil
price increases: a long overdue adjustment of price levels, according to
them. They pointed out that the welfare of the industrialised countries
had largely existed thanks to the fact that oil prices had been held at an ar-
tificially low level. In this regard, it was striking that the Saudi address
was more moderate than the other oil producers. Yamani argued that po-
larisation had to be avoided. In his view, the danger of a global recession
as the result of uncontrolled price increases was so great that this would in
all probability lead to a ‘devastating global war’. Because of the devel-
oped economies’ greater capacity for adapting, the developing countries
would be the losers.
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Van der Stoel, in his address, adopted a positive attitude toward the
wishes expressed by various Third World countries. He stressed that from
the beginning The Hague had tried to play a mediating role. The Nether-
lands hoped that a clash between North and South could be avoided and
that the deployment of a broad plan of action would be adopted with the
general support of the industrialised world. He appreciated the work of
the Group of 77 and expressed a willingness to work with the Group to-
ward the realisation of a new international economic order.
Partly at the urging of the Dutch, the Nine declared their readiness to
contribute to a fund for the worst hit developing countries. On behalf of
the ec, Scheel advised Waldheim on April 26 of an offer of a ‘substantial
contribution’. The Dutch delegation was positive over the Algerian Presi-
dent’s proposal to set up short-term funds. If this should not prove feasi-
ble, support would be given to set up a preparatory committee whose task
would be to submit concrete proposals to the un Economic and Social
Council within a short period. The proposal for a ‘crash programme’ for
1974, ahead of a fund for the worst hit countries, was also actively sup-
ported by The Hague. And finally, The Netherlands gave its support to
the proposal to set up a consortium on behalf of those countries most af-
fected.
With the winding up of the general deliberations on April 24, the real
work began behind the scenes. In the meantime, a workgroup had begun
on April 11 with the framing of a development statement and a draft ac-
tion programme. Away from the floodlight of publicity, the Western
countries took a rather less cooperative line than they had professed dur-
ing the general deliberations of the General Assembly. The traditional op-
positions between developed and developing countries re-emerged during
these negotiations. It was also striking that whereas the energy question
and oil prices had assumed a prominent place in the general deliberations,
the negotiations focused on the more general questions of development,
raw materials, trade and finance. This was mainly because the Group of
77 rejected every reference to the energy question. A French attempt to
deal with the oil problem within the wider context of the question of raw
materials in a committee of producers and consumers was wrecked by the
resistance of both the producers and the usa.
Albeit with the greatest difficulty, some sort of agreement was reached
in the workgroup on the framing of a draft statement and an action plan;
but this could not disguise the fact that in several respects the opposition
between North and South remained insurmountable. At the final session
of May 1 and 2, several countries made a final statement. The American
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Permanent Representative stressed that it would be incorrect to speak of
consensus, given the number of points on which there was no unanimity,
particularly referring to the action plan. The usa had objections to this
programme without going into details. Other Western countries said they
also had important reservations.
On the other hand, the Algerian Foreign Minister, A. Bouteflika,
spoke of a consensus that had no precedent. He stressed that this did not
mean unanimity, but added that unanimity should not be expected if one
were dealing with a fundamental change in the economic system. The ses-
sion had strengthened the un, to his mind, while the conduct of the
Group of 77 had been marked by a spirit of moderation. He pointed out
that the General Assembly had witnessed a change in power relations al-
though, in the light of the attitude of most Western countries, it is highly
doubtful whether Bouteflika was right in this.
An important motive for Van der Stoel’s trip to New York, as men-
tioned earlier, was to try to make contact in the corridors with colleagues
from other countries, not least the Arab countries. Van der Stoel thus held
conversations with counterparts from Egypt, Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates, among others, all three of whom were for the lifting of the
embargo. His Egyptian colleague assured him that no bilateral problem
existed between Egypt and The Netherlands, and that he would present
the case to his government for lifting the embargo. This sounded alto-
gether positive. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Minister emphasized that
The Hague would have to come up with ‘something new’ before the
oapec meeting in June.63
Later in Washington, Van der Stoel also held talks with Kissinger,
pointing out to him the remarkable fact that Saudi Arabia especially re-
fused to cooperate in getting the embargo lifted. Kissinger promised to
raise the question on his following visit to King Feisal. The two statesmen
differed, however, in their estimates of the value of the special session.
Van der Stoel thought the session far less confrontational than he had an-
ticipated and wondered whether agreement might be possible, in the
sense that a un world conference on energy might be arranged, attended
by a representative delegation from both producer and consumer coun-
tries. Kissinger’s response was negative. He reiterated the familiar Ameri-
can standpoints: that better cooperation had first to be achieved between
the consumer countries; that a un energy conference could have disas-
trous consequences if no prior agreement had been reached between the
Western countries. Kissinger thought it absurd that the producers should
be capable of forming a cartel whilst the consumer countries could not.64
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Subsequently, Van der Stoel concluded that hardly any progress had
been made at the special session. There was possibly the draft of an action
plan, but that was virtually crippled by a series of preconditions. In the
General Assembly, the initially positive tone had degenerated into con-
frontation.65 In The Hague, nonetheless, the session was not seen as a dis-
aster: indeed, far from it as far as The Netherlands’ status was concerned.
For the attention had shifted during the session away from the politics of
energy to the more general struggle of the Group of 77 toward a New In-
ternational Economic Order. Most Western countries had reacted to this
demand by rejecting it outright. The Dutch delegation, however, had
adopted a more sympathetic attitude and within the ec had endeavoured
to foster understanding for the proposals of the Group of 77, an attitude
which, according to Van der Stoel, had been highly appreciated by vari-
ous developing countries. It was therefore concluded in The Hague that
adopting this approach had certainly contributed to the view now taken
by a number of Arab countries that the embargo should be lifted.66
Saudi Arabia Stands Firm
While Van der Stoel was busy in New York, a certain optimism briefly
prevailed in The Hague concerning the likelihood of the embargo being
lifted. This feeling arose through talks held between Den Uyl and the Sau-
di Ambassador Nowilaty. The Premier inferred from the latter’s wording
that there was now a great chance that the embargo would be lifted, and
on April 11 he shared this judgement with the Council of Ministers,67 go-
ing on to speak of his optimism at a press conference. This of course led to
premature news reports that the end of the embargo was in sight, leaving
Van der Stoel, on his return, to have to straighten various matters out. In
the Second Chamber, Den Uyl later denied that he had ever uttered any-
thing definite about the duration of the embargo, but the impression he
created was less than highly convincing.68
Indeed, Den Uyl had been too optimistic: the embargo still had months
to run. It was becoming clearer at this stage that especially the moderate
countries, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular, remained opposed to
any lifting of the embargo. In both countries ‘the familiar grievances’
were still playing a role, but in the case of Saudi Arabia there was another
line of reasoning involved. As early as March 28, Dutch Ambassador
Derksen had reported that Jeddah was not, on the whole, inclined to lift
the embargo, but rather saw it to their advantage to ‘keep Western Europe
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divided’.69 It was also clear from other sources that Saudi Arabia had no
interest in promoting a Euro-Arab dialogue.70 Maintaining the embargo
therefore served the purpose of blocking this dialogue in a highly effective
manner, an entirely different function from the early days.
In May the Dutch Cabinet adopted a more wait-and-see attitude.
There was no doubt by now that Algeria wanted an end to the embargo.
In Den Uyl’s judgement, the Algerian standpoint was partly based on the
attitude shown by The Netherlands at the special session. Furthermore,
the Dutch Foreign Ministry was supporting the Algerian Minister Boute-
flika’s candidature for the chairmanship of the General Assembly, and at
the same time attempting to find a mutually satisfactory compromise
with Algeria in the World Bank.
At the end of May, Van der Stoel expressed the hope that the coming Is-
raeli-Syrian disengagement accord would lead to the end of the em-
bargo.71 The accord was signed in Geneva on May 31, the same day that
the Security Council approved a resolution empowering Waldheim to
take whatever measures were needed to set up a corps of observers to su-
pervise the disengagement due to begin on June 1.72
Van der Stoel considered taking a trip himself to several Arab capitals
after these events,73 but, to much surprise, no decision was taken at the
oapec session on June 2 to lift the embargo against The Netherlands. By
now, a complete reversal of positions within the oapec had taken place.
On June 3 the Dutch Ambassador in Damascus reported an assurance he
had been given by the Syrians that their country had not voted against
lifting the embargo. On the question as to who had, the Syrians pointed
out that ‘there were Arab countries that regarded the Euro-Arab dialogue
with great reluctance’. In diplomatic circles, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
Qatar were now always cited as the most important opponents of lifting
the embargo. On the other side, Algeria explicitly declared itself opposed
to maintaining the embargo. In fact, Algiers let it be known that it was no
longer willing to abide by the decision of June 2 to keep the embargo in
place.74 That other radical state, Iraq, had also spoken out against main-
taining the embargo.
Various news reports reaching The Hague during June confirmed that
Saudi Arabia in particular wanted to keep the embargo in place in order
to obstruct any Euro-Arab dialogue. More unpalatably, Saudi Arabia
was being supported in this policy by the United States, or was even act-
ing at the behest of the usa. The Algerian Ambassador in East Berlin sug-
gested that Jeddah had not been acting autonomously in the maintenance
of the embargo, ‘but rather in the present case had been little more than
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an instrument of the United States’. It was Washington that had got Jed-
dah to resist the lifting of the boycott
because by this means the American government thought it could see a
way of obstructing the dialogue and cooperation between the ec and
the non-European Mediterranean states.
The Dutch Ambassador in East Berlin found this argument highly im-
probable, but the Algerian stuck to his story.75
Similar stories were coming from other sources, not least from Paris.
De Ranitz reported that a highly placed official in the French Foreign
Ministry, de Commines, had confirmed the rumours – also printed by Le
Monde – of American duplicity. Kissinger, for various reasons, was
against a Euro-Arab dialogue and had probably convinced King Feisal of
the undesirability of such a dialogue. It was not inconceivable that he had
told the king that only Washington was capable of forcing Israel to make
concessions. Furthermore, only the us would have been capable of com-
bating the communism feared so much by Feisal.76
Reports that Washington had incited Feisal to adopt a tough stance
were also circulating in the Egyptian press. Although Van der Stoel sub-
sequently claimed to have given these suggestions little credence, they
were certainly believed at the Foreign Ministry in 1974.77 In a memo to
the Dutch Foreign Minister on June 7, the acting head of the Department
for Africa and the Middle East concluded that it was doubtful whether it
was of any further use, given this background, to continue urging
Kissinger to put in a good word for The Netherlands. 78 On the same day,
Van der Stoel referred in the Council of Ministers to the reasons why Sau-
di Arabia was opposed to a Euro-Arab dialogue. There was nothing in it
for the Saudis, whereas Egypt and Algeria, their competitors, stood to
take a more prominent role in the context of such a dialogue.79 A week
later, the Dutch Ambassador Derksen reported from Jeddah that both his
French and British colleagues thought the usa and Saudi Arabia were in
league in this affair. The Ambassador confessed that he ‘had to acknowl-
edge a certain reality in the scenario alluded to’, not so much because of
Le Monde or Israeli propaganda but because a highly placed Saudi offi-
cial had confirmed the story’s truth.80
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To the End
The oapec decision of June 2 had been a blow. Several days later, Den
Uyl expressed his concern over Rotterdam’s position now that the embar-
go was to continue officially. On June 12 the Mayor and Aldermen of
Rotterdam again asked the Premier as a matter of urgency, given the mag-
nitude of the interests at stake, not to relax the pressure and ‘to take what-
ever steps were necessary to get the Arab countries to end the boycott
against The Netherlands’. Yet again, Van der Stoel decided to turn to
Washington to mediate, but without result. According to Arab informa-
tion, Feisal took a sharp line when Nixon paid a visit to Jeddah. Minister
Saqqaf told a British diplomat, moreover, that any removal of the embar-
go in the short term was out of the question ‘unless the Dutch government
should publicly call for a total Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory’. At
a ministerial session of nato, Kissinger was also in a ‘fairly hopeless’
mood.81
One of Feisal’s influential advisors suggested to the French Ambas-
sador that the embargo would be withdrawn at the next oapec meeting
on July 10. But on June 18 De Ranitz reported that King Feisal himself re-
mained adamant.
The matter was complicated by the rumours regarding the anti-Dutch
intrigues of the United States which in all probability had taken root in
Jeddah and were even being confirmed from the Saudi Arabian side.
The new French Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues, had also referred
to these rumours.82
In London, suggestions of American double-dealing were being treat-
ed cautiously. The idea was not considered probable, although it could
well be that the usa, given the undesirability of a Euro-Arab dialogue,
was not exerting itself as strenuously as it might to get the lifting of the
embargo discussed as a matter of urgency.83 Yet the reports persisted. The
Algerian Ambassador in Peking also confirmed this reading of the Ameri-
can role, adding that this attitude was mainly due to the influence exerted
by the American-Arab oil company Aramco.84
A short time later, however, the Saudi Minister Saqqaf spoke of The
Netherlands in a rather more conciliatory fashion. There were delibera-
tions within the Dutch Foreign Ministry over the possibility of offering
Saqqaf a ‘face-saving’ formula in the guise of a letter reiterating the Dutch
standpoint, but Van der Stoel would not hear of this initiative. ‘In the
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light of earlier experience with the Saudis on this point,’ he said, ‘I think it
would be extremely dangerous.’ It could create the impression that a price
can still be demanded for the lifting of the embargo.85
In fact, it was decided at the oapec meeting on July 10 that the embar-
go against both Denmark and The Netherlands should be lifted. Little at-
tention was paid to the matter within the Arab countries since for some
time the embargo had been regarded as an affair superseded by other
events, and moreover, it had for some time no longer been observed by
many countries. By this time, most other anti-Dutch measures in Arab
countries had also been rescinded. The boycott of klm by Libya had been
lifted at the end of April, though in Iraq this did not happen till August,
and the boycott of Dutch shipping by dock-workers in Libya was not
withdrawn until September.
On the day the embargo was lifted, NRC Handelsblad wrote that ‘a po-
litical comic strip that has scarcely any comparison in the entire history of
Dutch foreign policy’ had now reached its end. Future historians would
undoubtedly be poring over the days of ‘grandeur et misère behind the
dykes’. Besides which, according to NRC Handelsblad, the Arab attitude
had also been based on the knowledge that plans for a Euro-Arab dia-
logue could only be implemented if the embargo were lifted.86
The Energy Co-ordination Group
The Netherlands was of course much relieved at the lifting of the embar-
go. But in one respect The Hague could also be satisfied. A day before the
end of the embargo, during a meeting in Brussels, the twelve countries
that made up the Energy Co-ordinating Group (ecg) had decided ‘in
principle to pool member nations’ oil resources in the event of a future en-
ergy crisis’.87 The ecg talks had by that time got into their stride. On the
basis of a Foreign Affairs note, this progress was discussed in the Council
of Ministers in The Hague on June 14.
There were still several important problems on the horizon, said the
note. There was little chance of talks between producers and consumers
in the foreseeable future. During the special session, it had been evident
that the time was not yet ripe for a special summit devoted to energy, in-
volving producers, consumers and developing countries. There was little
enthusiasm, especially in Washington and London. Nor did the producer
countries seem very keen; they seemed rather to want to maintain a free
hand. Within the ecg it was sometimes wondered whether there was any
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point in pursuing a dialogue with the producers, not least because by this
time the oil prices had begun to fall again. From the Western point of
view, such talks were no longer urgent, but for The Netherlands such a
discussion was still desirable, at least if a clash with the producer coun-
tries could thereby be avoided.
Ideas on the role and status of the international oil companies had been
widely discussed within the ecg. A report on this was drawn up, with the
most important conclusion that the consumer lands had to form a closer,
more collective relationship with these companies which, it was taken for
granted, would continue to play a central role in the future. It was not the
aim to interfere with the power of the oil companies. What was needed
was to set up an effective international system of information.88
This view conformed entirely with the interests and standpoint that
The Hague had always advanced throughout the oil crisis. The most im-
portant problem the Den Uyl Cabinet had had to wrestle with had been in
dependence on the oil companies for information, a state of affairs that
had bred insecurity and distrust. The delegation in the ecg, in the view of
the Dutch Cabinet, should therefore urge that the oil companies be legally
compelled to divulge information in times of crisis. This might have to
happen through a mutual adjustment of the different national legisla-
tions. More generally, and preferably within the context of the oecd, a
code of behaviour should be introduced that would hold not only in times
of crisis.89
In mid-July it was evident that the ecg had largely succeeded in reach-
ing an accord on an Integrated Emergency Programme that, inter alia,
provided for the sharing of oil in cases of serious reductions in the oil sup-
ply. The programme was based on three basic principles: 1) participant
countries, in proportion to their normal imports, must lay up a stock of
oil for a number of days to be determined later; 2) they must jointly reduce
consumption if the oil provision for the entire Group should fall below a
certain percentage, viz. 7%; and 3) subject to decisions to the contrary,
the participants commit themselves in such cases to switch to oil-sharing
according to an automatic formula.
To an extent, this scheme corresponded with the allocation scheme al-
ready worked out within the oecd prior to the oil crisis. It was even more
comprehensive, since the obligations to lay in stocks and to limit con-
sumption in a crisis situation were now defined and incorporated into the
allocation ratios. According to the Dutch Foreign Ministry, this was
cause for satisfaction, because agreement now seemed possible for an
Emergency Programme that would serve to anchor the solidarity of the
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participant countries. The Council of Ministers shared this positive as-
sessment.
Finally, the ecg was to draft an International Energy Programme that
would be based on the International Energy Agency (iea) founded in No-
vember 1974. The iea was a combination of the most important con-
sumer countries that between them accounted for 80% of the world’s oil
consumption. It was in fact a consumer front against the producers. In
principle, all oecd members could be members of the iea. Only France
declined the privilege, although because of its ec membership Paris
nonetheless remained closely involved with the work of the iea.90
Conclusion
With this accord, the adventure of the oil crisis arrived back in port, a
journey that had reached an end in every way satisfactory to The Nether-
lands. With the iea, an organisation joining forces had come into being,
just what The Hague had been advocating for so long. There was no more
question of a European power-combine, independent from the usa, being
linked to any Euro-Arab dialogue. The Netherlands had played an active
role throughout the oil crisis by blocking such an association, as proposed
in particular by Paris. Of course, this opposition was not the only reason
for the failure of the French objectives.
As we saw earlier, political relations within the ec had by this time un-
dergone remarkable changes. In the three largest member states, power
had passed to different political leaders than those at the beginning of the
crisis. Compared with their predecessors, the new leaders seemed much
keener on preserving good relations with the usa. A period of mounting
conflict within the Atlantic world seemed to have passed. The oil crisis, in
various respects, had been the nadir of Euro-American tension during
this period.
Mutual Western divisions, as was emphasized by Economic Affairs es-
pecially, had contributed to a weakening of the Western position vis-à-vis
the countries of the Third World and to a growing non-Western self-
awareness. The actions of opec were in several respects an example and a
symbol of this new self-awareness. In the continuation of the opec ac-
tions, the Group of 77 uncommitted non-Western countries formulated
the struggle for a New International Economic Order. It was especially
Washington that set itself against this non-Western effort to achieve an in-
ternational economic redistribution.
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Within the Den Uyl government in The Netherlands, there were differ-
ent opinions on this question. Pronk sympathised with the ambitions of
the nieo. From this perspective he also understood the measures that
opec had taken. Lubbers, on the contrary, argued for further develop-
ment of the arrangements made in Washington and was more disposed
toward a consumers’ front. The Cabinet supported the effort to get the
whole energy problem dealt with in the un General Assembly, but Van
der Stoel arrived at this position through more opportunistic, diplomatic
considerations than Pronk: this attitude might, after all, contribute to
ending the embargo. The strategy worked. Algeria decided in March that
the embargo had to be lifted, and as a quid pro quo The Netherlands sup-
ported Bouteflika’s candidature for the chairmanship of the General As-
sembly and also attempted to reach agreement with Algeria in the World
Bank.
But for the time being there was no lifting of the embargo. It was main-
ly Saudi Arabia (possibly egged on by Washington) that resisted the deci-
sion to lift the embargo. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait declined to vote for ab-
rogation for the specific purpose of thwarting the so-called Euro-Arab di-
alogue, which had been principally decided to be set up in the context of
European Political Cooperation. Effectively blocking this dialogue was a
cause for considerable satisfaction on the part of the Americans. It is
therefore hardly surprising that The Hague should find American at-
tempts to get the embargo lifted – to say the least – rather ineffective.
During the last phase of the embargo, The Hague played a rather re-
markable role, a role which, as was remarked earlier, can be seen as very
useful for Dutch interests in the international oil sector. In the Dutch
Cabinet, and particularly, in the case of Van der Stoel, there was little feel-
ing for a Euro-Arab dialogue. The latter in fact declined, with not too
much hesitation, to adopt the advice given by his civil servants and diplo-
mats to make some gesture toward the Arab countries. The second letter
to King Feisal was nonetheless a moment that Van der Stoel’s tactics came
closest to those of various other ec countries, such as West Germany. But
with head held high, Van der Stoel declared in ministerial council on July
12 that The Netherlands ‘had not demeaned itself’ in the way that certain
other European countries most certainly had.91 It had in fact been neither
necessary nor advisable.
The pressure to get the embargo lifted by this stage was slackening.
The oil was again arriving in the usual vast quantities in the port of Rot-
terdam and had already reached its normal level by April. In all probabili-
ty, even for those countries that had not wanted to lift the embargo, it had
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only had political significance. In any case, in the spring of 1974 the oil
supplies in the Botlek area reached record highs and lay dozens percent
higher than in 1973. This is not to say that the decision to lift the embargo
on July 10 was not greeted with considerable relief in The Hague. In all,
the embargo against The Netherlands had lasted more than eight months.
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Conclusion
In many respects, The Netherlands came through the oil crisis rather well.
The embargo soon proved ineffective, in the sense that Dutch oil imports
at the end of 1973 were no more seriously depleted than those of other
Western countries. Indeed, compared with several other West European
countries, the oil supply to The Netherlands looked rather healthy. In a
book on the oil crisis written from an Arab perspective, the conclusion
was correctly drawn that ‘friendly states’ in Western Europe had suffered
more from an embargo laid against The Netherlands than had The
Netherlands itself.1
Through the months of October 1973 to the spring of 1974, the oil
supply to Western Europe as a whole was probably not much lower than
during the same period of the previous year. In all West European coun-
tries, oil supplies in this period remained more or less at the normal level.
In some, partly as a result of the usual increase in winter use, the level
dipped: most of all in Belgium, and to a lesser degree in France and Great
Britain. The Netherlands in fact came off rather well: stocks in The
Netherlands remained virtually normal.2
The oil embargo was more a matter of image projection and intimida-
tion. It was mainly the fearful expectations that diminished so drastically,
while in practice the oil supply itself surprisingly remained at a satisfacto-
ry level. This is not to say that there was no cause for alarm. The embargo
was undoubtedly an action of a highly threatening kind. Nor were the
pessimistic predictions of the Central Planning Bureau lies. Moreover, in
December the oil supply to Rotterdam fell by a large percentage over a
very short time. It was in these straightened circumstances that the Den
Uyl Cabinet adopted drastic measures – the introduction of rationing and
the Enabling Act. The oil, however, came rather swiftly back on stream.
The Cabinet realised this, which was one of the reasons for the secrecy
surrounding the figures relating to the oil supply.
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Summarising, we can say that the oil embargo against The Nether-
lands did not work; and the most important reason for this failure was
that the oil companies decided to spread the oil scarcity. In addition, it
was from the outset the question of whether those countries participating
in the embargo were really prepared to exercise control over the transport
of oil to those countries against which the embargo had been imposed. Be-
cause the oil companies switched to rescheduling the oil supply, it is very
well possible that – just as in the usa – oil may have arrived in The
Netherlands from embargoing states.
The real sting in the Arab action, however, was the unilaterally de-
clared price increases. These higher prices were to have major conse-
quences for the Dutch economy, though they hit The Netherlands no
harder than other oil-importing countries. Moreover, The Netherlands
had the additional advantage that the prices of natural gas could, in the
short term at least, be linked to the price of oil. Subsequently, therefore,
things worked out quite well. Even the fear that the position of Rotter-
dam as a port and of the Botlek area as a whole might suffer proved to be
unfounded. When in July the embargo was eventually lifted, Rotterdam’s
central position in the international oil sector was unaffected.
As Van der Stoel had maintained in the Council of Ministers, there-
fore, the Dutch government had not needed to demean itself in the way
that some other countries had done. The Cabinet and Van der Stoel, in
fact, had with considerable care managed to manoeuvre their way
through the crisis. When Voorhoeve singled out Van der Stoel’s policy as
an example of blatant moral intransigence in the face of Dutch economic
interests, this accusation already sounded facile. There had been genuine
attempts to conciliate the Arab countries. The second letter to Feisal (see
Chapter 8) in fact went so far that it was scarcely distinguishable from
the line taken by some other ec member states – such as West Germany –
that had been so roundly cursed by The Hague.
The Dutch government, the Foreign Ministry in particular, had to
navigate between the demands of the Arab countries on the one hand and
those of the Chamber and public opinion on the other. The so-called
Thurkow affair should also be seen in this light. But at the same time it
has to be said that Van der Stoel certainly did not go as far as some of his
advisors and diplomats had wanted. In the main he resisted the pressure
openly and explicitly to satisfy the demands of the Arab countries. It was
his view, and not without reason, that for The Netherlands to concede to
these demands would only lead to further demands.
It was just possible that the Arabs were not primarily concerned with
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the Dutch policy over the Middle East conflict and Israel at all. Van der
Stoel was convinced that the embargo had already been prepared well be-
fore October. In his judgement, given the transit function of the Botlek
area and Rotterdam, the aim of the embargo against The Netherlands
was to put pressure on the whole of Western Europe. The objectives be-
hind the action were political as well as economic.
As we saw earlier, it is not easy to settle on a definitive account of the
role and the specific aims of the Arab oil-producing countries. For a start,
and this was the view of Dutch diplomats at the time, there were signifi-
cant differences between the various countries involved; in addition to
which the attitude of some of these states changed during the crisis. The
oil crisis was therefore a rather complicated power game, which made it
particularly difficult for the Den Uyl Cabinet to undertake any action via
diplomatic means.
In this regard, it would be interesting to compare the objectives (as well
as the self-perception) of the embargo against The Netherlands with that
against Denmark. It should also be noted that the Den Uyl government
never once attempted to collaborate with this other North-West Euro-
pean victim of the Arab action. At any rate, we have been unable to find
anything in the Dutch archives over any such attempt.3
But it was not only the Arab countries that were divided among them-
selves. The same was true of the ec countries. It rapidly became apparent
that no-one could count on European solidarity. Within the ec, it was a
matter rather of ‘every man for himself’; or worse, some partners, France
in particular, were possibly exploiting the situation in order to undermine
the position of Rotterdam as an oil port. The British government also
tried to force the oil companies to leave The Netherlands in the lurch. The
oil crisis showed once again that the ec, when it came to the crunch, was
not prepared to close ranks.
There were complaints in The Hague over the lack of ‘European soli-
darity’, but this was more for public consumption than an expression of
real disillusion, for the attitude in the Dutch Council of Ministers was
business-like and aimed at the defence of the national economic interest.
The government’s efforts in this direction were such that oil transit and
oil products had to be more sharply reduced than domestic consumption.
In case of emergency, the government was even considering requisition-
ing foreign oil stocks stored in the Botlek area. In any case, the West Ger-
mans, Belgians and even the French dependence on Dutch natural gas and
Dutch transit were used to persuade these countries to adopt a more pro-
Dutch attitude. As a Dutch Foreign Ministry memorandum put it: ‘maxi-
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mum use was made of the uncertainty as to whether the oil destined for
transit also fell under the embargo’.4
Yet it would be going too far to attribute the relatively satisfactory out-
come to the crisis mainly to the performance of the Den Uyl Cabinet. One
could equally conclude that the Dutch government and Foreign Minister
Van der Stoel clung far too long to the illusion that The Netherlands’ ec
partners could be brought over to share their view of ‘solidarity’; while
the pursuit of ‘sharing’ can only be seen as pointless or even damaging to
the Dutch case.
The satisfactory oil supply was in the first place the result of the oil
companies’ policy, especially of Shell and bp. Once it became apparent
that the oil shortage was to be shared out by the oil companies more or
less equally over their West European customers, The Hague’s need for
‘solidarity’ rather rapidly evaporated. In December, the Council of Min-
isters realised that the ‘invisible hand’ of the oil companies was rather
more useful than the ec partners’ ‘visible hand’. Accordingly, there was
little disappointment over the less than successful issue of the ec Summit,
held in mid-December in Copenhagen.
Some members of the Council of Ministers, not least of whom Den Uyl
himself, had difficulties with this dependence on the oil companies.5 In
fact, it was later urged within the Energy Co-ordinating Group that these
oil companies should be compelled in whatever way to provide informa-
tion. And yet the freedom of action of the oil companies proved to be in
the Dutch interest. Possible ec interventions, with an eye to the relatively
favourable energy situation in The Netherlands and the Dutch produc-
tion of natural gas, could well have led to disadvantageous complica-
tions. In his discussion with Heath, therefore, Den Uyl could not avoid ar-
guing for the maintenance of that freedom, a standpoint that would cer-
tainly have astonished any Dutch voter who still remembered the 1972
election manifesto Turning Point ’72.
The Den Uyl Cabinet therefore, unlike the French, argued for the main-
tenance of existing arrangements in the international oil sector. This poli-
cy fitted the traditional, liberal standpoint that previous Dutch govern-
ments had also adopted. Initially, at least, the Council of Ministers argued
for some action to be taken by the European Commission, but there was
no need for this to be part of any reform-minded ec energy policy. The at-
tempted economic approach to the Arab oil producers, independently of
the usa, was also viewed from The Hague with distrust. On the contrary,
the Dutch government lent its support to Kissinger’s attempts to reassert
American leadership by means of an Energy Conference convened in
Washington.
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The Dutch oil interests were of course the most important reason for
this attitude. More generally, there was the fear of growing rivalry and
chaos within the world economy. Above all, there was the threat of West-
ern divisions, of the kind seen in the West European ‘bilateral oil diplo-
macy’. Ministers in Den Uyl’s Cabinet concerned with the crisis, howev-
er, held that American leadership was more important than Western divi-
sion and impotence. Some even hoped that the United States would make
concessions to the Third World, though this turned out to be an illusion,
much to the disappointment of Van der Stoel among others.
This did not mean that the American government’s position could be
blindly trusted in all respects. During the last months of the embargo, the
remarkable situation arose that the continuing embargo against The
Netherlands could be exploited as a diplomatic means of preventing a
closer European approach to the Arab countries. In this situation, the
roles in the Arab world began to turn around. The original instigators of
the embargo, such as Algeria, now began to urge that it be withdrawn,
since continuing the embargo stood in the way of the Euro-Arab dia-
logue.
There was one clear exception to this general rule of the Dutch Atlantic
orientation, and that was the Cabinet’s view of the initiative to call a spe-
cial session of the un General Assembly. Nixon and Kissinger rejected
this idea. Within the Council of Ministers, their scepticism was shared by
Lubbers, but the PvdA ministers, Pronk above all, had more sympathy for
this endeavour to involve the Third World more. Van der Stoel and the
Dutch Foreign Affairs chiefs were of the same mind, albeit out of more
opportunistic motives.
Besides, the debates over the special session cannot properly be judged
unless we pay far more attention to the major changes that seemed to be
taking place in world politics at large. At the beginning of the 1970s, the
predominant fear in The Hague – and in the Ministry for Economic Af-
fairs – was that the structure of the post-war world economic order was
under pressure. The years of American hegemony, backed by such inter-
national organisations as the imf and the World Bank, seemed to be com-
ing to an end. American–European relations were tense, and the non-
aligned nations of the Third World, partly in response to this Western dis-
unity, were demanding a New International Economic Order.
In this respect, the position of the Den Uyl Cabinet was ambiguous. In
a certain sense, the Cabinet was itself the product of these changes that
seemed to be taking place in the world at this time. Pronk in particular
personified the willingness to go some way to meet the demands of the
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Third World countries, a readiness which went so far as to generate a cer-
tain sympathy for opec’s actions. Yet most of the Dutch Cabinet mem-
bers adopted a very cautious stance toward the special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly.
The attitude of the Den Uyl Cabinet toward the oil crisis was certainly
not morally inspired, nor was there any question of preaching or of any
exalted ideological aims. Any ideological luxury, after all, is scarcely pos-
sible when such enormous economic interests are at stake. Neither can we
agree with the suggestion of R. Vernon that the Dutch government was
‘less knowledgeable, less powerful, and less prepared to act on oil mat-
ters’ than the British.6 The manner in which goal-directed power politics
were employed, or attempted, by Den Uyl’s Dutch Cabinet was just as
business-like as that of any other West European government.
Support for Israel might at first sight seem to contradict this assertion.
The pro-Israeli attitude of the Den Uyl Cabinet may even have been dam-
aging to Dutch economic interests. During the most ominous days of the
oil crisis, the Dutch government was accused of paying too little attention
to these interests. Indeed, Den Uyl’s government did go rather far in its of-
fer of support to Israel. In secret a considerable quantity of arms and espe-
cially munitions, for The Netherlands at least, was delivered: Stemerdink
points out that after the deliveries to Israel ‘all the depots were empty’. In
this action, The Netherlands assumed a strikingly different position from
other ec countries. Only from West Germany – in all probability – were
American arms and American material transferred to Israel. Moreover,
Van der Stoel went further, trying to assist Israel on the diplomatic front,
in the first place by blocking a joint French-British ec representation in
the Security Council, much to the astonishment of some of his diplomats,
such as Fack and Van der Klaauw.
What was the source of this pro-Israeli attitude? One can first of all
point to the traditional Dutch bond with Israel. Although this ‘special re-
lationship’ had become somewhat weaker in the preceding years, these re-
lations undoubtedly played a role in the arms deliveries. In the second
place, the land of kibbutzim was popular with the Dutch Labour Party.
Van der Stoel’s attitude, especially his refusal to accede to the more pro-
Arab advice from the top echelon of the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, can be partly explained by the existing bond between the PvdA and
the Israeli Labour Party.7
However, in several respects the support for Israel did not represent a
departure from the broader objectives of Dutch policy in the face of the
oil crisis. We were able to remark that the arms deliveries to Israel took
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place with the support of the usa and even at the urging of the Americans,
even though at the time probably only very few individuals knew this. But
more generally, the Dutch Cabinet and Van der Stoel followed the Ameri-
can line on the Middle East. In part, this was a consequence of the usual
basic Atlantic assumptions, but this approach meshed perfectly with
Dutch interests in the international oil sector, in particular The Hague’s
rejection of an independent European economic and political rapproche-
ment with the Arab countries over the head of the United States. The
Netherlands adopted an Atlantic stance, supporting the Americans’ su-
perpower role in the Middle East and rejected a Euro-Arab dialogue as
much out of political as out of economic considerations.
In general, the actions of the Den Uyl Cabinet in international affairs
can be judged business-like and goal-directed. A similar conclusion, how-
ever, would be less justified when it came to domestic measures. Ra-
tioning, in particular, was unnecessary. In the first instance, though, gov-
ernment action was effective. During the first phase of the car-free Sun-
days, the government succeeded in compensating for the reduction in the
oil supply by reducing domestic consumption. In this equation, though, it
must also be noted that the transit and export of oil and oil products prob-
ably declined more sharply than the supply of oil, so that Dutch stocks at
the end of the year had not or had hardly been affected.
Reviewing the figures for oil supply, it might justifiably be concluded
that there had in fact never been any real supply crisis. The fact that the
Cabinet nevertheless took action to reduce the level of domestic consump-
tion is understandable in the light of the threatening attitude the Arab oil
exporters appeared to take. Foresight, after all, is the essence of govern-
ment. Furthermore, the oil supply was in very short order much reduced
in December. The measures restricting oil use were therefore not useless.
Other measures to deal with the temporary reduction in the oil supply
and oil processing – by means of direct talks between those concerned
presided over by the Ministry for Economic Affairs – served an important
purpose. Later on, the government could happily acknowledge that the
setting up of a National Office for Chemical Products had become super-
fluous.
But it soon became apparent that the embargo was ineffective and that
the restriction on the oil supply would be merely temporary. There was oil
enough. Before the oil crisis began, the oil companies had shipped extra
stocks of oil to The Netherlands, which was no more than normal proce-
dure in connection with the approaching winter. In 1973 there was an ad-
ditional reason to maximalize stocks: the threatening price increases.
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Moreover, rumours had for some time been circulating over a possible
‘political use of the oil weapon’. All in all, stocks at the beginning of Janu-
ary 1974 stood at a reassuringly high level,8 while at the same time signs
of recovery in the oil supply were evident. As we have seen, it was also evi-
dent within the Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs that there was no
depletion of oil stocks. In fact, shortly afterwards, stocks were found to
be higher than the previous year. Rumours were circulating to the effect
that oil tankers lay waiting before the coast because storage tanks were
overfull.
The introduction of rationing was therefore a superfluous measure,
decided at a moment when the oil supply did indeed appear to be waning.
The PvdA faction in the Second Chamber later concluded that the gov-
ernment’s analysis, set out in the December note ‘Restriction of the oil
supply and its consequences’, was faulty. The conclusion that a 30 to
35% reduction in oil use had to be achieved was a gross exaggeration.9
By the end of January 1974, there was absolutely no further need to pro-
ceed with the whole exercise. No neighbouring country resorted to such
measures; the Dutch government here was completely out of step.
Nor were all ministers by that time convinced of the need for rationing.
Lubbers, in particular, had his doubts, subsequently dismissed by Rut-
ten, the Economics Affairs secretary-general and chairman of the Co-or-
dination Group, as ‘loss of nerve’.10 The chief reasons for going through
with the plan seem to be all the infrastructural preparation and the con-
comitant ‘credibility’ of the Cabinet. In the eyes of top Economics Affairs
officials like Rutten, it was mainly the credibility of the Ministry of Eco-
nomics Affairs that was at stake. Eventually, all Cabinet members agreed
to push ahead with rationing, albeit for rather different reasons. Van der
Stoel thought calling off rationing would have a provocative effect on the
Arab states, since it would amount to a declaration in so many words that
the embargo did not work.
During the Cabinet discussions over rationing, it became clear that
there was considerable scepticism over the figures furnished by the oil
companies. On several occasions, attempts were made to get further sup-
plementary information, for example through the pilot service. There
was also mistrust between the different departments involved. Wester-
terp, apparently, had little faith in the data on oil stocks and supplies used
by Economic Affairs (originally supplied by the oil companies).
At such moments, interdepartmental mistrust between the Dutch
Ministries of Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs also surfaced pub-
licly. Before the oil crisis, as we have seen in Chapter 1, Economic Affairs
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had primacy in matters international arising from the oil problem. Dur-
ing the crisis, however, Foreign Affairs came to play a more prominent
role, which was regarded with a somewhat jaundiced eye by the other
Ministry. Against this background, it is remarkable that all the reassuring
reports on the embargo reaching Foreign Affairs should have played no
part in the decision-making over rationing. Willemsen, the chairman of
the Co-ordination Group, later expressed his opinion that Rutten consid-
ered any doubt cast on the figures furnished by Economic Affairs as an at-
tack on the competence of the Ministry in its management of the con-
sumption-limiting measures.11
Rationing lasted but a brief period before ending in chaos and civil dis-
obedience. The oil companies, who had originally urged more far-reach-
ing measures than the car-free Sundays, were partly instrumental in put-
ting the skids under the rationing system. This is not to deny that the
measures introduced to reduce consumption were successful up to a point
and that they helped to produce the unexpectedly favourable stockpile
position. These stocks undoubtedly contributed to the record profits
booked by the oil companies in the year 1974. Large stocks at a time of
rapidly increasing oil prices could only benefit the companies, a fact
which, naturally, did not escape the attention of some members of the
Dutch Cabinet. As a former advisor to Den Uyl later put it: ‘You don’t
have to be an economist to see that’.12
Although the longer-term consequences of the oil crisis fall beyond the
scope of this book, we would nevertheless like to close with a few observa-
tions on this aspect. We have already remarked that the oil crisis heralded
a turning point in the development of international relations: the failure
of the ec’s effort to develop a greater political independence from the
usa. The oil crisis took place at a remarkable moment. The Western
world seemed to find itself in an increasingly weaker position. Above all,
the power of the United States appeared to be on the wane. The egregious
American setback in Vietnam was an example and a symbol of this. The
non-Western countries, both the communist states and the countries of
the Third World, had become stronger. The actions of the Arab oil states
were a product of these circumstances and seemed only to amplify this
weakness in the West.
In the face of these challenges, the West could only respond with dis-
cord and division. There were conflicts between the United States and
Western Europe. According to the French historian Grosser, 1973 was
the andiron of post-war American-European relations. Despite all their
best intentions, the ec states were unable to cooperate more effectively
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(as an alternative to the Pax Atlantica), whether in tackling common en-
ergy problems or in relation to the epc. The oil crisis was merely the proof
of this discord.
In the spring of 1974, more pro-Atlantic leaders assumed power in
three major ec countries: Wilson, Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing. This
development put an end to the pursuit of an independent ec energy poli-
cy. Actions to reach a certain tuning of energy policy within the Western
world would subsequently be taken in the Energy Co-ordinating Group
and lead to the setting up of the International Energy Agency.
The days of the worst splits in the Western world were past. Recovery
of Western unity went hand in hand with the end of European manoeu-
vring in the Arab direction. There would also be no New International
Economic Order. As was remarked at the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Western discord had been an important cause of the search for a
nieo. The oil crisis was also an important turning point as far as this was
concerned. The opec measures, both a consequence of and a means to
exploit mutual Western rivalries, in the end drove the Western countries
back together.
In The Netherlands, the events of 1973 and 1974 were to echo and re-
echo for a long time to come. In subsequent years, different lessons were
drawn from the whole experience of the oil crisis, one of the more obvious
being that in the future, energy matters would have to be treated in a
cleaner and more efficient way. Already in the period dealt with here, ac-
tion was taken to rein in the unrestricted growth of energy consumption.
Within a fairly reasonable time, this would lead to the better insulation of
homes, among other measures.
In the Hague, the oil crisis ensured a new awareness that the Western
oil-consuming countries were vulnerable. In the years after 1973-74, at-
tempts were also made by the Dutch government to improve relations
with the Arab world. The Dutch position on the Middle East conflict
would slowly but surely shift in a direction more favourable to the Arab
countries.13 In addition, development aid would be offered to Egypt, even
though the latter hardly belonged to the poorest of the developing na-
tions. Nonetheless, Egypt was selected in the latter part of 1974 as a land
of special help, as a part of a policy of reconciliation by the Dutch govern-
ment in relation to the Arab world.
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study. Private organizations and individuals also made documents available. The
aim of this survey is to provide insight into the archives which were consulted for the
purposes of this study. 
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2 National Defence Council
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Archives City of Amsterdam
Newspaper Archives
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Archives City of Rotterdam
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Ministry of Home Affairs, The Hague
Collection of the Dutch National Security Service (bvd) in Leidschendam
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam
Collection E. van Thijn
Collection J.M. den Uyl
General Affairs, The Hague
1 The archive of the Prime Minister’s office (kmp)
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3 Minutes of the Ministerial Council for Economic Affairs
4 The archive of the Committee of the United Intelligence Services in the Nether-
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6 Directorate-General for General Economic Policy
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Ministry of Finance, The Hague
General Treasury Archives
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Ministry of Justice, The Hague
Files a 73/099, Folder i & ii, 1973-1976
File a 73/399
Ministry of Transport and Water Management, The Hague
Departmental Archives
National Archives, College Park, Maryland
rg 59 State Department diplomatic records
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rg 165 Modern Military Field Branch
rg 273 National Security Council
rg 319 us Army Intelligence, g-2
rg 341 us Air Force Intelligence
National Archives, Alexandra, Virginia <C>
1 Richard Nixon Presidential Materials Project
US Department of State, Washington D.C.
foia requests
Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
rg 84 Diplomatic Posts (The Hague)
Correspondence and interviews were held with the following persons. 
Their position in 1973-1974 is indicated.
Agt, A.A.M. van Minister of Justice
Bar On, C. Israeli Ambassador in The Hague
Bergh, H. van den Member of parliament for the PvdA
Gould Jr., Kingdon US Ambassador in The Netherlands
Graaf, T. van de Advisor of the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office
Hek, A. van der Member of parliament for the PvdA
Helfrich, A.C. Commercial Director Shell Netherlands
Heuven, M. van US diplomat in The Hague
Kaufman, J. Permanent Representative of The Netherlands at the oeso
Klaauw, Chr. van der Deputy-Permanent Representative of The Netherlands at
the Mission to the United Nations
Kruimink, F.E. Coordinator of The Netherlands intelligence community
Lubbers, R.F.M. Minister of Economic Affairs
Meines, T. Brigadier-general, Head logistics at the Ministery of Defence
Molenaar, H. Director Rotterdam Harbor
Oskam, J. Representative of the Independent Oil Traders in Rotterdam
Peijnenburg, G.H.J. Secretary-General at the Ministery of Defence
Pronk, J.P. Minister for Development Cooperation
Rabbani, M. Consul of Kuwait in The Hague
Ranitz, J.A. de Netherlands Ambassador in Paris
Riddle, A.W. Military Air attaché at the US Embassy in The Hague
Rising, L.E. Military attaché at the US Embassy in The Hague
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Rutten, F.W. Secretary-General at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Chairman of Co-ordination Committee for the Oil crisis
Schaik, R.J. van Chief Directorate-General European Cooperation at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Schiff, E.L.C. Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Stemerdink, A. Under-Secretary of Defence
Stoel, M. van der Minister of Foreign Affairs
Swift, Carleton B. cia Station chief in The Hague
Tanguy, Charles Reed US Counselor at the US Embassy in The Hague
Tjeenk Willink, H.D. Advisor at the Prime Minister’s office
Thijn, E. van Leader of the PvdA in parliament
Vredeling, H. Minister of Defence
Willemsen, W.Q.J. Secretary of the Oil Crisis Working group
Wagner, G.A. Chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell
Westerterp, T. Minister of Transport and Water Management
Yamani, Ahmed Zaki Oil Minister of Saudi Arabia
And various officials of The Netherlands intelligence community and officials work-
ing for foreign intelligence and security services who want to remain anonymous.
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List of Acronyms and Terms
aaw Archives of the Netherlands Embassy, Washington
aaz Archives of General Affairs (Cabinet’s Office)
aez Archives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
amd Archives of the Ministry of Defence
amf Archives of the Ministry of Finance
amj Archives of the Ministry of Justice
ara Netherlands National Archives
arp Anti-Revolutionary Party
asd Archives of the US State Department
az Ministry of General Affairs
beb Directorate-General for the Foreign Economic Relations of the Ministry
of Economic Affairs
bp British Petroleum
bvd Internal Security Service
bz Ministry of Foreign Affairs
cec Central-Economic Commission
chu Christian Historical Union 
cia Central Intelligence Agency
cmo Co-ordination Group Measure against Oilcrisis
cos Chief of Station of the cia
cpb Central Planning Bureau
cpn Communist Party Netherlands
cvin Committee on the United Intelligence Services in the Netherlands
dam Department for Africa and Middle-East of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
des Department for  Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
dges Directorate-General for European Cooperation of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs
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dge Directorate-General for Energy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
dgi Directorate-General Industry of the Ministry of Economic Affairs
dgis Directorate-General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
dgpa Directorate-General for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
die Department European Integration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
dio Department for International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs
dgv Directorate-General for Traffic of the Ministry of Transport and Water
Management
dm Deutsche Mark
doc Defence Oil Center
ecd Economic Control Service
ecg Energy Co-ordinating Group
ecosoc Economic and Social Council of the un
eec European Economic Community
ec European Community
emu European Monetary Union
epc European Political Cooperation
ez Ministry of Economic Affairs
feo Federal Energy Office
gatt General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
htk Parliamentary Proceedings
iaea International Atomic Energy Agency
idb Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service
iea International Energy Agency
iep International Energy Programme
imf International Monetary Fund
kmp Prime Minister’s Office
kvp Catholic People’s Party
lpg Liquefied Petrol Gas
m Minister of Foreign Affairs
maag Military Assistance Advisory Group
mdap Mutual Defense Assistance Program
mid Military Intelligence Service
nato North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nkv Dutch Catholic Trade Union
nmfa Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ns Dutch Railways
nvv Dutch Union of Trade Unions
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oapec Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
ofe US Office of Fuel and Energy
opec Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
pa Archives diplomatic post
plan Department for Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
plo Palestine Liberation Organization
ppr Radical Political Party 
psp Pacifist Cooperation Socialist Party
PvdA Labour Party
pv Permanent Representative 
r Minister of Development Aid
pv Council for Economic Affairs
s Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
salt Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
ser Social Economic Council
t Under-Secretary of European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
unef United Nations Emergency Force
vvd People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
wkc Mathematical Center
wsag Washington Special Action Group
z Under-Secretary of Disarmament Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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